



# *amo: volo ut sis.* Therapeutic Eros in Daseinanalysis

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## Abstract

Medard Boss (1903-1990), the founder of therapeutic daseinanalysis (*Daseinsanalyse*), introduced into existential analysis Carlos Alberto Seguí's notion of the therapeutic *eros*. This, the effective element of daseinanalytic therapy, is based on Augustine's classic expression 'love, do what you will'. The daseinanalyst's non-interventional love is a gift directed at the Dasein, not the person, of the analysand. It is offered in the spirit of a way-making caring for the other.

## Key Words

Medard Boss, Daseinsanalysis, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, Carlos Alberto Seguí, therapeutic *eros*, transference love

*Higher than actuality [Wirklichkeit] is [liegt] possibility [Möglichkeit]*

Martin Heidegger (1977 [1927]: 51-52)

*Another possibility of such manifestation [Offenbarung] of all of what is there [das Seiende im Ganzen] lies hidden [birgt] in our joy in the present [Gegenwart] of the existence [Dasein] – not merely the person [Person]—of a human being [Mensch] whom we love.*

Martin Heidegger (1976 [1929]: 110).

*The highest aim [Ziel] of all psychotherapy [Daseinanalysis] is and remains the opening up [Eröffnung] of our patients to an ability to love and to trust [Lieben- und Vertrauen-Können] which permits all oppression by anxiety and guilt to be surmounted as mere misunderstandings [Mißverständnisse]. Such trust can and may be fittingly called the most mature [tiefste] form of human love.*

Medard Boss (1962a: 56).

*Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto*

Terence, 163 BC (Terence 2018).





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## I.

In December 1964, Medard Boss wrote an introduction to the German translation of Carlos Alberto Seguí's *Amor y Psicoterapia. El Eros Psicoterapéutico* [*Love and Psychotherapy: The therapeutic eros*], which had appeared the previous year. This book, published as *Der Arzt und sein Patient. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des therapeutischen Eros* [*The Doctor and His Patient: A contribution to the problem of the therapeutic Eros*], which had been translated by Marian von Castelberg, appeared the following year, as did an English translation by Seguí himself entitled *Love and Psychotherapy: The psychotherapeutic eros*. This edition of Seguí's little-known classic is unique in that it is the only one that includes Boss's 'Introduction' (Seguí 1962, 1965). That year (1962), Boss also published a monograph entitled *Lebensangst, Schuldgefühle und psychotherapeutische Befreiung* [*Fear of Life, Guilt Feelings and Psychotherapeutic Liberation*], in which he refers to 'the therapeutic eros', citing Seguí's paper and mentioning the forthcoming book-length Spanish publication (Boss 1962b: 191). Earlier that year, on 25 February, Boss had presented an English version of the monograph as a contribution to a conference on existential psychology and psychiatry held in New York. The essay is quite long, so it was probably delivered in a somewhat abbreviated form. Clearly influenced by Seguí, it is Boss's most personal and sensitive published account of his approach to therapy. It makes plain that 'the therapeutic *eros*' is at the heart of his daseinanalysis. The German volume is the only book Boss dedicated to his children. Boss uses the word 'psychotherapy' in deference to his audience, indeed hoping to reach an even wider audience. He has in mind, however, *Daseinsanalyse*, a term which had appeared in his publications as early as 1947 in his book on the sexual perversions (Boss, 1947).

Seemingly long forgotten, both texts recently came to light in a lecture by Charlotte Aigner at the University of Vienna, on 5 July 2020, at a meeting of Austrian daseinanalysts (Aigner, 2021)<sup>1</sup>. In her presentation, Aigner emphasised the current relevance of the work of Boss and Seguí to daseinanalysts. Given interest in the theme of this paper, especially among young therapists, I take this opportunity to revisit Boss's monograph, defending the view that the therapeutic *eros* is what distinguishes daseinanalytic *praxis* from the other 'modalities' of therapy.

It is worth noting, and not merely in passing that the year Boss composed his introduction to Seguí's book was an important year for daseinanalysis in another respect. On 24 January 1964, seminars led by Martin Heidegger began in earnest at Boss's home in Zurich (*Zollikon*) (Heidegger, 1987, 2001, 2018). While there was no mention of Seguí as the seminars ran their course through 21 March 1969, the Peruvian psychiatrist's work was certainly fresh in Boss's mind when they got underway. Nor were Heidegger's





reflections on love mentioned during the seminars. Both, however, resonate in Boss's account of what he calls "the highest aim of all psychotherapy" (1962: 191).

## II.

A saying attributed to Augustine captures the essence of Boss's therapeutic stance. It is implicit in Seguin's therapeutic *eros*. The saying runs as follows: *amo: volo ut sis*. It has sometimes been rendered love [and that means] do as you will [or do as you please]. Here, for *amo* and *volo* the imperative mood is implied. From a daseinanalytic perspective they are perhaps more meaningfully heard as the first-person singular: 'I love you', 'I want you to be'; or 'I love you, which means I want you to be just as you are'; or 'I love you, I am determined that you become all that you can be'.

Augustine's expression was at the heart of Heidegger's reflections on love, which are few in number in what has been published to date but had deep personal significance for him. The saying informs a notion found in Heidegger's fundamental ontology of Dasein in *Being and Time*, the notion which is central to daseinanalytic practice, namely, the existential (*Existenzial*) he termed *vorausspringende Fürsorge* – way-making caring for. Since the Macquarrie/Robinson translation of *Sein und Zeit*, the expression has come to known as 'anticipatory solicitude'. This chilly rendering hides the importance of Heidegger's notion for daseinanalysis.

Privately, Heidegger's thoughts on Augustine's saying appear in 1925 in his correspondence with Hannah Arendt, whose doctoral dissertation of 1929 with Karl Jaspers at Heidelberg was on *The Concept of Love in Augustine* (Arendt, 1996). Heidegger also quotes Augustine in his correspondence with another student, Elisabeth Blochmann in 1928 (Heidegger & Blochmann, 1989: 23). Much later in his life, in 1960, he cites the saying in a letter to Ludwig von Ficker (1880-1967) and comments on it in an address given in April 1960 on the occasion of von Ficker's eightieth birthday. In the address, Heidegger (2000a: 563) said: "Probably the deepest interpretation of what love is is found in Augustine's words *amo: volo ut sis*," which he translates as "*Ich liebe, das heißt, ich will, daß das Geliebte sei, was es ist. Liebe ist das Seinlassen in dem tieferen Sinn, demgemäß es das Wesen hervorruft.*" I translate: "*Amo: volo ut sis*; I love, that is, I want the beloved to be that which it is. In a deeper sense, love is letting be, according to which it calls forth the essence".

Heidegger reflected several times on Augustine's understanding of love in his lectures. As early as the Summer Semester of 1921, in his course on 'Augustine and Neoplatonism', Heidegger said:

*Genuine love has the fundamental tendency toward the dilectum,*





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ut sis [loving, so that he may be]. Love is thus the will toward the being [Sein] of the beloved...Love of those who share this world [mitweltliche Liebe] has the sense of helping [verhelfen] the beloved other achieve his existing [Existenz], so that he comes toward himself [er zu sich selbst kommt].

(1995: 291-292).

Thirteen years later, in the Winter Semester of 1934-35, elucidating Hölderlin's hymns *Germania* and *Der Rhein*, students heard him say: "... love is a willing; namely, willing that the beloved be [*Sosein*] steadfast in its essence in the way that he is" (Heidegger, 1980: 82). In a seminar from the Summer Semester of 1937, Heidegger (2004: 168) considers the saying again in the context of the will, this time with reference to Nietzsche. Finally, there is one of his *Gedachtes*, or afterthoughts, which bears the expression as its heading. In it, highlighted, we find the line: "So that you in essence dwell [*wohnst im Wesens*], what must I do?" (Heidegger, 2021: 183)<sup>2</sup>. The question was, in this instance, most certainly asked of Hannah Arendt, it is also the question the daseinanalyst ultimately asks the analysand in her or his meeting [*Begegnung*] with him or her. As we will see, the daseinanalyst has an answer to Heidegger's question.

### III.

But, as Tina Turner famously sang: "What's love got to do with it?" Certainly in psychotherapy, nothing, right? Psychotherapy is a sober undertaking, a rational discussion of the patient's concerns, wishes, scary behaviour ('acting out'), wild ideas ('delusions'), fantasies and, of course, feelings. There may be talk of love, but it is 'all talk', based on the analysand's associations to long-gone relationships with parents, family and friends, as well as to current affairs with friends, lovers and sexual partners. There is no place for 'real love' in therapy. Certainly not any expression of love emanating from the analysand, whose confused emotions and motivations have brought him to the psychotherapist in the first place. Augustine's saying is surely therefore of no importance to the practical business of counselling and psychotherapy. Or is it?

There is a problem here that Freud himself identified at the very beginning of his practice of psychoanalysis, that form of psychotherapy which is the source of daseinanalysis. As Freud warned, love does enter into the picture in psychoanalysis in a powerful way, namely, in what he termed transference-love (*Übertragungsliebe*). But this is not 'real love'. It is talk about what has gone on or is going on outside of the psychotherapist's office. The analysand may believe she now has loving feelings for her analyst (often, but not always, including a sexual element), feelings that are all out of proportion to what is actually going on in the analysis. Two people have





been talking, during an appointed hour, hour after hour, sometimes for years for which time a fee has been charged by the analyst<sup>3</sup>. The analyst and analysand have not been flirting or courting one another. They are not even friends in the conventional sense. This is a professional relationship between an expert on human relations (the psychotherapist) and a client (for Freud and Boss, it was always talk of a relationship between a doctor and his patient) which is limited to serious exchanges of reports of experiences by the analysand and interpretations and reconstructions of those reports by the analyst. Yet, out of nowhere, it seems, come feelings of ‘real love’, usually first fantasised and eventually expressed openly by the analysand.

Famously, such feelings when once expressed by a patient of Freud’s older colleague, Josef Breuer (1842-1925), the co-author of their *Studies in Hysteria*, caused Breuer such alarm when he was apprised of them by his female analysand that he fled Freud’s psychotherapeutic approach altogether and returned to his wife, Mathilde, five children, and a conventional practice as a neurologist (also Freud’s background) and researcher in neurophysiology. His young patient had expressed amorous feelings about him. They were, for Breuer, as unexpected and unlikely as similar feelings coming from the patient of, say, a gynaecologist. Something very strange was going on, which Breuer anxiously reported to his younger colleague.

Freud was braver than Breuer, however, and fourteen years younger. Also a married man with six children by 1895, he looked into these unexpected protestations of ‘love’ by the analysand. He took them seriously and studied them, explaining that they were not real love. No. In the third of his published papers on psychoanalytic technique (in 1915), he explained, such feelings should not be seen as surprising but were, in fact, to be expected from his female patients. (He does not mention his male patients.) He assured everyone in the growing population of psychoanalysts who read his ‘recommendations’ that these feelings were infantile, that is to say, childish feelings, not commensurate with the ongoing adult-adult relationship between a doctor and his patient. Only seeming to be feelings of real love, they were, as the term ‘transference’ indicated, feelings transferred (*übertragend*) from a remembered figure in the analysand’s past life “onto” the person of the analyst. An intrapsychic representation, for example, of the analysand’s father was cast over the inner representation of the analyst, externalised and experienced in the present moment of psychoanalytic therapy as embodied by him (or her) with perceptual reality. The sex of the analyst did not matter in matters of transference. A female analyst would be experienced as a loving father just as readily as she might be mistaken for the analysand’s loving mother figure.

There is something about the psychoanalytic setting, Freud explained, that prompts this sort of transference of an inner image to a living, breathing person which has nothing to do with the behaviour of the analyst. He





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attributed this to regression (*Regression*) which the analytic setting promotes. Thus, under the influence of regression an entirely indifferent male analyst (and mild indifference was to characterise the analyst's demeanour) would gradually come to be experienced as a loving male (paternal or otherwise). Since Freud believed that all children have 'sexual' feelings for their parents, even an impassive and not at all attractive male analyst could come to be perceived as an emotionally and sometimes sexually attractive male to the analysand. For a child, his or her father's 'looks' have little to do with the child's attachment to him. Moreover, the analysand often begins to imagine that her analyst has similar feelings for her of the kind her real father had. It is important to add that if the real parent had been harsh or hurtful to analysand, such negative feelings may also be attributed to the analyst. Transference is not only about love (Freud, 1953b).

Having decided that it was universal, Freud explained that transference-love and transference-hate by the way were not irrational, unwelcome intrusions into the professional relationship but instead inevitable, necessary and, yes, useful feature of psychoanalysis and that, in fact, if there were no transference, there was no real analysis going on. Manifestations of transferred feelings became grist for the mill of Freud's psychotherapeutic *praxis*. They revealed hidden concerns (desires, wishes, feelings) on the part of the analysand that bubble to the surface – that is, come to conscious awareness – once inhibition of verbal expression of them has been overcome. Sometimes the feelings are there for a long time, unexpressed by the analysand. The important thing, however, is that this transference-love is sheer fantasy 'love' and has intrapsychic reality only.

Freud also noticed what he termed counter-transference (*Gegenübertragung*) occurring in the analytic situation. While he seems not to have used the term counter-transference love (*Übertragungsliebe*) anywhere in his writings, the term was introduced by Freud's followers. These are feelings of love that have been induced in the analyst – to be more precise, in the analyst's unconscious mental life. They are entirely inappropriate but useful as indications that the analyst has not been well-enough analysed him or herself or, as in the case of Freud's criticisms of his Hungarian colleague, Sandor Ferenczi, who had spoken of feelings of love toward his patients as perhaps being of therapeutic value, a sign of psychopathology in the analyst. Like transference-love, counter-transference love is put to use as more than a signal of an insufficiently analysed analyst. Thus when unconscious feelings about an analysand surface in an analyst's awareness, these feelings can be used as guides for a more complete understanding of the transference as a whole, including what are as yet inexplicit unconscious feelings of love (transference-love) the analysand is beginning to have for her analyst or has had for a long time but was unable to talk about openly. Finally, countertransference feelings of love indicate that a remarkable 'tuning in' to the unconscious of the





analysis and is in effect. Like transference, it should be added, countertransference is not necessarily loving (Winnicott, 1949).

It should be added that immediate unconscious-to-unconscious communication became a hallmark of orthodox psychoanalysis. Learning how to tune into the unconscious of the patient was part of training in psychoanalysis, in particular by way of the teaching analysis (*Lehranalyse*) required of all candidates during which all the quirks of the unconscious intrapsychic life of the would-be analyst are brought into open discussion. It is well known that Freud had an interest in telepathy and wrote a paper on the topic as early as 1921. The extent to which telepathy and such unconscious-to-unconscious communication are related remains unclear.

This may be a good time to review the similarities and differences between psychoanalysis and daseinanalysis, since the latter has its origin in the former and retains a number of its features. For both, a personal analysis is the only possible way of learning what the practice is about.

Daseinanalysis can be learned, but it cannot be taught in the way that one might teach a surgical technique. Daseinanalysis also makes use of the couch and the invocation of the ‘fundamental rule’ (to ‘say whatever comes to mind’ or, in daseinanalytic terms, to ‘speak’ (*sprechen*) what one has to say (*sagen*)) without hesitating when one has something to say. Where they differ, of course, is in the complete abandonment of Freud’s metapsychology entailed by Heidegger’s ‘new *Besinnung* of man’. But it is not real love.

The context of Freud’s discussion of transference love and countertransference love is the abstinence required of the psychoanalyst, an impassive indifference expressed in the analyst’s behaviour by an ‘evenly suspended hovering’. Freud (1953c: 162) warned: “Analytic treatment should be carried through, as far as is possible, under privation – in a state of abstinence.” Emotional abstinence is *de rigueur*, especially since feelings of real love – warmth and affection – might easily escalate into sexual sensations, especially in male analysts and even among those most thoroughly analysed. The emphasised assertion was included in Freud’s lecture on ‘Lines of advance in psycho-analytic psychotherapy’ (1918). It was, however, immediately followed by the qualifier: “How far it is possible to show that I am right in this must be left to a more detailed discussion.” Abstinence was easier explained than maintained in practice. The lecture, ‘*Wege der psychoanalytische Therapie*’, is perhaps better rendered (as Joan Riviere did) as ‘Turnings in the ways of psychoanalytic therapy’, suggesting that early psychoanalysts had to face up to some very touchy matters, especially regarding feelings of love toward the patient. There were already worries enough about ‘wild psychoanalysis’ which Freud (1953a) had voiced in 1910. Concerns about just how emotionally taxing psychoanalysis might be in practice had been expressed as early as 1904.





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To be sure, the modern psychotherapist or counsellor no longer hears anything about such intrapsychic chimera in her or his training. The business of the mental illness professions is carried out either as short-term cognitive behavioural modification treatments (CBT) or, if a medical doctor is involved, by medicating the patient. In the first case, thinking differently about things changes everything or, thanks to the effects of so-called psychotropic drugs, signs of disturbance and most symptoms disappear (especially anxiety and depression) as if by magic.

But there is a missing chapter in the history of Freud's hidden psyche and that is Medard Boss's questioning its reality. We turn next to that episode in our story.

#### IV.

Having been Freud's analysand for several months in 1925 at the tender age of twenty-two (paid for by his father), Boss was in a position to know more than what could be read in Freud's books about psychoanalytic practice when he came to the realisation of a fundamental misunderstanding at the core of psychoanalysis. Boss also experienced a three-year *Lehranalyse* with Hans Behn-Eschenburg (1919-1955) after finishing up with Freud and completed his training for full admission to the Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis before he had reached thirty (Boss, 2019: 6-7).

Twenty years after his analysis, however, he concluded that Freud was wrong, utterly wrong about the basic psychoanalytic concepts that comprise the metapsychology of psychoanalysis. These include, in addition to the hypotheses of transference and countertransference, the dynamic unconscious (*Unbewußt*) itself, as well as notions such as projection, introjection, repression and regression. As Boss's records of conversations with Heidegger in the early Sixties attest, Heidegger had by that time shown him that transference (and this would include transference-love) was nonsense and in fact impossible. He told Boss:

*Every comportment [Verhalten] is always already attuned [gestimmt] beforehand and therefore it makes no sense to talk about about 'transference'. Nothing needs to be 'transferred' because the particular attunement [Gestimmtheit], from which and alone according to which everything encountering [Begegnende] one is able to show itself, is always already there [immer schon da]. [If one is] within a particular attunement, a human being [Mensch] whom one encounters also shows himself according to this 'disclosedness [Entschlossenheit] [sic]' (attunement)*

(Heidegger, 1987: 210)<sup>4</sup>







The conversations took place in the late spring of 1963 while the two men were on vacation together in Taormina. Here Heidegger refers to the ontological existential *Befindlichkeit* (how one ‘finds’ oneself at any given moment) discussed in *Being and Time*. There he glosses (and contrasts) this ontological feature of Dasein with the ontic *Stimmung* (mood) or *Gestimmtsein* (being-attuned) of any named actualisation (person) of such Dasein. It is noteworthy that as early as 1927 Heidegger (1977: 178) was making it clear that the ontological way one ‘finds’ oneself is to be understood as “prior to all [ontic] psychology of moods, a field which in any case still lies fallow [*brach*]”. So much for the scientific psychology of emotion. Heidegger (2002: 9) would diagnose the problem of psychology as its being a science, whether understood as a natural, social or human science, adding that “science does not think”. An account of Dasein’s *Befindlichkeit* answers to the question “How are you faring?”<sup>5</sup>.

Rejection of transference (and transference-love) thus marks what is remarkably new about daseinanalysis, since the love in daseinanalysis is real love, a love that is expressed very nicely by Seguí as therapeutic *eros*. As we will see, however, it is not strictly speaking love between two people.

But surely, in talking of love at all we are treading on dangerous ground. A daseinanalyst usually meets several people a day. That amounts to many people a week. If the therapeutic *eros* is real love, does not this suggest that the analyst is in many loving relationships at the same time. Thus, for example, a female daseinanalyst with a ‘patient load’ of twenty to thirty people seen during a typical month would be in that many relationships with that many people, men and women, some young, some old. Her love for an attractive young man might seem easy to understand. But what of analysands who are younger than eighteen or other women? Where does this leave her ‘personal life’? What about her husband or partner? What about her children? This would be emotionally exhausting, wouldn’t it? And what about a male analyst working with a male analysand?

We come to an understanding of these questions with the realisation that the therapeutic *eros* (*amor*) is not about ‘interpersonal relationships’ at all, especially sexual relationships. It is about the love Augustine speaks of which is directed at the Dasein of the other.

In the second part of this article, which will follow in the next issue of *Existential Analysis*, I will take up the implications of the view presented here, namely, that the therapeutic *eros* in daseinanalysis is directed to the Dasein of the other (the ontological ‘level’), not to the named actualisation of the analysand (ontic ‘level’). The hypothesis of such a crossing of the borders, as it were, of the Dasein-Dasein relation (*Verhältnis*) and the relationship (*Beziehung*) between two human beings (daseinanalyst and daseinanalysand) is shown to account for the unique ‘move’ made possible





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by the therapeutic setting announced by Augustine's powerful, gracious invitation *vol ut sis*.

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## Endnotes

1. The text is available on the author's website: <https://www.charlotte-aigner.at/texte>. See also Groth (2020, 2021, 2014) and Groth & Fazekás (2021). The author has prepared an English translation which is available upon request.
2. This nothing less than heroic attempt at translation of the entire entry is by the Irish poet Eoghan Walls. For Heidegger, to dwell in essence is to dwell poetically (*dichterisch*) (Heidegger, 2000b: 206).
3. The only situation in which one pays for 'real love' is, of course, at the sex-worker's salon. Yes? This now extends to the uncanny world of internet sites.
4. The editors of the English edition note that *Entschlossenheit* (resoluteness) must be a misprint for *Erschlossenheit* (Heidegger, 2001: 165 note). They quote *Being and Time* to the effect that *Entschlossenheit* is a "mode of Dasein's *Erschlossenheit*" (Heidegger, 1977: 393). Boss would go on to work this out in great detail in his *Grundriß der Medizin und Psychologie* (1974: 530-553; 1979: 257-272).
5. This would be confirmed fifty years later by two major figures in the field, Sigmund Koch and David E. Leary (1985), who looking back in *A Century of Psychology as a Science*, an anthology they edited of essays by experts in the 'field', found that the discipline had utterly failed to meet its promise since its founding in 1879, usually said to have had its inception in the experimental laboratory of Wilhelm Wundt. On feelings and emotion, this failure was confirmed by A. Charles Catania, writing as the expert on 'Motivation, emotion and value'. See also the inaugural lecture 'Was ist Metaphysik?', where Heidegger (1976 [1929]: 110) discusses *Stimmung*.

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# ***amo: volo ut sis.* Therapeutic Eros in Daseinanalysis: Part 2**

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## **Abstract**

Medard Boss (1903-1990), the founder of therapeutic daseinanalysis (Daseinsanalyse), introduced into existential analysis Carlos Alberto Seguí's notion of the therapeutic eros. This, the effective element of daseinanalytic therapy, is based on Augustine's classic expression "love, do what you will." The daseinanalyst's non-interventional love is a gift directed at the Dasein, not the person, of the analysand. It is offered in the spirit of a way-making caring for the other.

## **Key Words**

Medard Boss, Daseinsanalyse, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, Carlos Alberto Seguí, therapeutic eros, transference love

*Higher than actuality [Wirklichkeit] is [liegt] possibility [Möglichkeit].*

Martin Heidegger (1977 [1927]: 51-52)

*Another possibility of such manifestation [Offenbarung] of all of what is there [das Seiende im Ganzen] lies hidden [birgt] in our joy in the present [Gegenwart] of the existence [Dasein] – not merely the person [Person] – of a human being [Mensch] whom we love.*

Martin Heidegger (1976 [1929]: 110)

*The highest aim [Ziel] of all psychotherapy [Daseinanalysis] is and remains the opening up [Eröffnung] of our patients to an ability to love and to trust [Lieben- und Vertrauen-Können] which permits all oppression by anxiety and guilt to be surmounted as mere misunderstandings [Mißverständnisse]. Such trust can and may be fittingly called the most mature [tiefste] form of human love.*

Medard Boss (1962a: 56)

*Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.*

Terence (2018 [163 BC])

In Part I of this article, I presented the background for an understanding of the effective element in daseinanalysis, namely, what Carlos Alberto Seguín termed the therapeutic eros. This notion was adopted and elaborated by Medard Boss in the development of his therapeutic daseinanalysis. In this, the concluding part of my article, I conclude an overview of the background of Boss's development as a therapist and work out the implications of this view of unique possibility in human relations (at the ontic and ontological levels) for praxis.

## V.

Before turning to what this means in 'practical' terms for daseinanalysis, it will be helpful to recall as context a well-known passage from Heidegger's 'Letter on 'Humanism''. Here, playing on the hidden connections between favouring [*Mögen*] and enabling [*Vermögen*] the other and their inner connection to Dasein as possibility [*Möglichkeit*], Heidegger provides intimations of what we later see in the therapeutic eros as a gift or favour.

It is a dense text that does not immediately resonate in the well-known English equivalents, but it serves us well in pointing out the connection between enabling and loving according to Augustine, a connection that is implicit in Boss's praxis:

*To embrace [annehmen] a 'matter' [Sache] or a 'person' [Person] [emphasis added] in their essence [Wesen] means to love them, to favour [mögen] them. Thought in a more original way, such favouring [Mögen] means to bestow their essence [die Wesen schenken] [as a gift]. Such favouring [Mögen] is the proper essence [Wesen] of enabling [Vermögen], which can not only accomplish [leisen] this or that but can also let something 'come to pass' [wesen] in its coming-forth [Her-kunft], that is, can let it be [sein lassen kann]. It is on the 'strength' [kraft] of enabling by favouring that something is actually able to be what is authentically its own [etwas eigentlich zu sein vermag]. This enabling is the actually 'possible' [das eigentlich 'Möglich'], that whose essence [Wesen] resides in favouring [Mögen].*

(Heidegger, 1976: 316)

This passage written by the nearly sixty-year-old Heidegger in 1946 is remarkable as a characterisation of the effect of the therapeutic eros as described by Boss fifteen years later in his monograph. Let us now see how it is expressed by Boss. We turn to his text, focusing on the concluding section, 'A new understanding [*Besinnung*] of man as the basis for psychotherapeutic liberation'. The notion of *Besinnung* is of great importance to Heidegger (1997). The new 'understanding' of man referred to by Boss

attributed to Heidegger is the result of making sense of the human being in a fresh way which requires seriously taking to heart what is essentially at issue [*die Sache*] with the human being. *Besinnung* can also mean ‘meditation’. This perhaps better captures the sense of both the effort (meditation as meditating) and what it is called (a meditation such as an extended consideration of something). Heidegger wants to understand what this is and how it differs from various kinds of calculating discursiveness. We could therefore translate the title of Boss’s final section of his monograph ‘A new meditation on man as the basis for therapeutic liberation’.

The new way of making sense of the human being is based on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Dasein, in particular a passage in *Being and Time* in which he identifies a ‘positive’ variant of the philosopher’s existential of Dasein known as caring for [*Fürsorge*], namely, way-making [*vorausspringende*] caring for. It is one of two ‘positive’ variants of *Fürsorge* and the key notion for daseinanalysis (Heidegger, 1977: 163). Sometimes Heidegger will refer to it as *vorspringende Fürsorge*, hence the early translators’ reference to something anticipatory, to the ‘timing’ of the caring for. The usage *vorausspringende Fürsorge* suggests an image of stepping out of the way of the other. In this respect, such caring for may be compared to the Taoist way or even the Zen master’s not-doing.

The other ‘positive’ variant must be mentioned here since it represents the approach taken by psychotherapy as it has developed beginning with Freud’s psychoanalysis. That variant is termed interventional caring for [*einspringende Fürsorge*], a kind of caring for that steps in for the patient or client. As the term patient indicates, the other is as such seen as one who is passive (from *passio*, to take no action). As the term ‘client’ indicates, the other is one who depends upon (from *clino*, to lean on) someone else. Such caring for takes over for the other, much as the medical doctor does (and we hope he does it well and effectively) when he or she ‘takes on’ our case and ‘treats’ us. Indisposed, injured or perhaps even unable to assume the upright posture, we put ourselves in the care of the physician or surgeon. We lie supine under his watchful gaze. We temporarily abandon agency and literally put our body in her hands. With advanced technology at the doctor’s command, life functions themselves can be taken over for us in such care of the body. Here, the positive variant is comparable to what in German is termed *Besorgen*, which refers to taking care of things important to us, from our bodies to our homes. *Besorgen* can also refer to social work.

As Heidegger points out, however, when such interventional caring for is practiced the very caring about [*Sorge*] what is there [*das Seiende*] by the person is taken away from him. Dasein is deprived of much of its fundamental existential, *Sorge*. This happens in psychiatric practice most notably when psychotropic drugs are prescribed. In days gone by, external restraints were used. Drugs exert controls from within the patient’s body,



designed to make the patient not care about anything, from thoughts, feelings, wishes and impulses to what is going on in the world apprehended by the senses. Appreciation and action are diminished. Indeed, we become less human. This also happens in all the modalities of counselling and psychotherapy, which are also based on interventional caring for. Daseinanalysis, which is based on way-making caring for and has as its goal giving back to the other his or her Dasein's caring about [*Sorge*] what is there, is utterly different. For this reason, I have spoken of it as psychotherapy without the psyche in order to preserve at least a reference to the therapeutic.

Interventional and way-making caring for have their effect on the Dasein of the other and on its named actualisation (the person). Any caring for thus works at two 'levels', the ontological (the possible) and the ontic (the actual). The daseinanalyst works at two 'levels' since he is both Dasein and a named actualisation of that Dasein, with all of its ontic singularity, subject to what Heidegger's calls its givenness [*Geworfenheit*] (another of the existentials of Dasein). Both analysand and analyst are, ontologically speaking, Daseins and, ontically speaking, named actualisations. In the daseinanalytic situation, as in life, there is both an ontological relation [*Verhältnis*] between the two Daseins and an ontic relationship [*Beziehung*] between the two persons (named actualisations of Dasein).

Before drawing our conclusions about the relation between this parallelism and the therapeutic eros in daseinanalysis we return to Boss's monograph, where he is clear about how the daseinanalyst is not interventional, about what he does not do.

In its closing pages, Boss (1962b: 191) writes: "We as psychotherapists ought to refrain completely from the vainglorious practice of preaching to our patients maxims and dogmas of any kind. We have to content ourselves with clearing away [*aus dem Wege räumen*] an obstacle [*Hindernis*] here and there, so that what is already there [*da*] and has always constituted the essence [*Wesen*] of the patient can emerge on its own into the open [*ins Offene*] from its previous closedness [*Verschlossenheit*]." It is perhaps more in keeping with what follows to think of *Verschlossenheit* as 'reserve' in the sense of holding back. Although here he uses the term psychotherapist (as did Freud), it is fair to say Boss has in mind daseinanalysis, just as Freud had in mind his psychoanalysis. In plain language, Boss says that the analyst must not 'preach' to the analysand, must not tell her what to do or what not to do. Echoes of Heidegger's discussion on enabling and the essence [*Wesen*] of the other in the *Humanismusbrief* cited above are unmistakable.

But if the emphasis is on not intervening, it might seem there is little for the daseinanalyst to do, does it not? Not until we realise that not intervening is difficult work. We are not in the world of the orthodox psychoanalyst who remains silent at all costs so as not to interfere with the flow of 'free' associations. This is not about sitting still and remaining

quiet. What makes daseinanalysis challenging is an ongoing attempt to be nothing to the other, to be no one in particular to him. It means attempting to stay out of the way of the other, whether as doctor, parent, teacher, friend or guide. The work is hardest when the analysand implores the analyst to do something, to ‘explain’ things. In not giving in to this demand, ironically the daseinanalyst hews more closely to the Hippocratic Oath than does the psychiatrist, who, we recall, as a physician has sworn *primum non nocere* – first, do no harm. We must never forget that psychiatrists are first medical doctors. The everyday physician’s legendary watchful waiting rather than rushing in to do something when what is going on is not clear is similar to the non-interventional, way-making caring for of the daseinanalyst.<sup>1</sup> Obviously, when a doctor does know what is going on – an artery has been severed, for example – he must act promptly. In daseinanalysis, however, where we never really know precisely and with accuracy what is going on with the other, everything is open and the work of the analyst is to enable this openness [*Offenheit*] to remain open or open further by making room for [*räumen*] the freedom of the Dasein of the other to realise itself. Note the implication that such freedom is always there *in potentia*, as possibility. It is not handed over to the other.

Where nothing is certain the tacit “*Warum aber nicht?*” (“Why, after all, not?”) for which Boss was so famous, offers a relief-giving option to the psychoanalyst’s reiterated, probing question, “Why?” (I prefer for Boss’s “*Warum aber nicht?*” the even plainer expressions “Why in the world not?” or “Why the hell not?”.) Someone may object that it is certain that certain certainties have come to cripple the other and that the therapist is obliged to track down these certainties. This is true, but such certainties such as “I have bipolar personality disorder” or “I am schizophrenic” are attributions authorised by psychiatry and supported by the criminal justice system. As R.D. Laing (1965a, 1965b) observed, working at levels of metacognition and meta-metacognition certainties are often imposed upon an individual in the form of what he called mystifications. For Boss, however, therapy is enacted precisely by focusing on the present [*Gegenwart*] of the Dasein of the other, that present-making in which all three of the traditional linearly-conceived ‘dimensions’ of time are enfolded. The daseinanalyst attempts to remain in the shadows to the greatest extent possible. This is difficult to do, especially in an era of experts, a medicalised society and the media’s promulgation of ‘mental illness’.

Following Heidegger, Boss says that to intervene is to snatch away the other’s caring about [*Sorge*] from his Dasein rather than to make way for its restoration, the caring about things that is ultimately up to the other alone to resume to a greater extent in his freedom, albeit having been made possible alone together with the daseinanalyst in the therapeutic setting. In this setting, the ontological being-with [*Mitsein*] that Heidegger identifies

as another existential of Dasein guarantees this.

At this point in the text, Boss summarises his position in its most succinct form:

*The highest aim of all psychotherapy [daseinanalysis] is and remains the opening up [Eröffnung] of our patients to an ability to love and to trust [Lieben- und Vertrauen-Können] which permits all oppression by anxiety and guilt to be surmounted as mere misunderstandings. Such trust can and may be fitly called the most mature form of human love [emphasis added].*

(1962b: 191)

The therapeutic eros grounds such trust. The root of *Vertrauen* is *Treue*. The daseinanalyst is thus true to the other. He is trustworthy. There is an implicit covenant or pledge between analysand and analyst. It may be best expressed as evoked by taking the other's Dasein seriously.

Boss notes that in his experience most analysands share a common feature, namely, that they have missed "the physical, concrete experience of a sufficient, imperturbable bestowal of maternal love. Our patients would not be ill if they had not come off the losers in this primary experience" (ibid). Sometimes, he explains, this is the result of what we call 'poor mothering'. In other cases, however, it may be due to an early, unusually extreme neediness on the part of a given infant or young child to which no mother would be up to snuff. That said, in "psychotherapy [daseinanalysis] the important thing is to let the patient first make up for [*nachholen zu lassen*] the missing but at bottom indispensable experience of the protective and unshakable granting [*Zuwendung*] of caring for [*Fürsorge*] and love [*Liebe*] suited to the unique essence [*Eigenwesen*] of the patient" (ibid).<sup>2</sup> Here Boss plainly identifies way-making caring for and the therapeutic eros (love). The therapeutic eros is not to be confused with the unconditional love we usually attribute to mothers nor to the pastoral 'unconditional positive regard' well-known from the work of Carl Rogers. Boss uses *Zewendung* in two different but related senses, as the granting of a gift for which nothing is expected in return and its expression in what we know as the fundamental sense of *therapeuein* (to attend), a way of being that is associated with the practices recounted by Philo of the early Therapeutes (*Therapeutae*), an early Judeo-Christian Essene sect whose name is source of our words Therapeut or therapist. The daseinanalyst 'merely' attends to the other but in so doing and when it 'works' makes the freedom of the other's Dasein recoverable.

But the daseinanalyst is not to be a mother to the analysand. Instead, "there is a special kind [*ein besondere Art*] of attending [*Zuwendung*] of the psychotherapist [*daseinanalyst*] to his analysands which cannot be

found anywhere in the world outside the psychoanalytic [*daseinanalytic*] setting. This specific ‘psychotherapeutic eros’ is as different from the love of parents for their children, different from the love between two friends, different from the love of the pastor for his flock, quite decidedly different from the extremely variable love between the sexes, as it is from the objectifying indifference [*versachlichenden Gleichgültigkeit*] of purely conventional kindness [*bloß Liebenswürdigkeit*]” (ibid). There has been hardly a clearer delineation of the features of daseinanalytic praxis that distinguish it from the variety of forms of psychotherapy than is found in this passage. Boss offers a full turning of attention to the other, without distraction, with dedicated interest and devotion to the other during the time he and an analysand are together. I have referred to this as taking the other’s Dasein seriously.

Acknowledging Freud’s insight into the special nature of the therapeutic relationship, Boss goes on to credit Freud with having seen that the therapist must be “wholly free to devote himself to his patient in a manner that is right, balanced and imperturbable [*rechte, gleichschwerbende, untrübbare*]” (ibid). Referring directly to Seguí, he writes: “Genuine psychotherapeutic eros...has to distinguish itself by an otherwise never practiced [*sonst nie geübte*] [in everyday life] selflessness [*Selbstlosigkeit*], self-restraint [*Selbstzucht*] and reverence [*Ehrfurcht*] before the partner’s [*Partner*] unique essence [*Eigenwesen*]” (ibid). This is an especially important passage for the future of daseinanalysis, since for once Boss puts aside the language of doctor and patient and speaks of partners. Ever sensitive to language, Boss’s use of the English word ‘partner’ in both the German and the English texts is suggestive. Here Boss points to the intimacy of the *Gesprächspartner* (interlocutor) and to a unique kind of relation in which the one partner does not does not make sense without the other, as in left/right, up/down, inside/outside.

Talk of partners seems to imply analysands who ‘behave socially’ and are in some measure cooperative (see Boss, 1964). But what about the patient who is aggressive verbally and sometimes even belligerent in her behaviour toward the therapist? This will surely have come to mind among those reading this who have had years of experience in ‘clinical’ settings, both ‘in-patient’ and ‘out-patient’. Boss answers that living out an ‘otherwise never practiced’ way of being with others in the Daseinanalytic therapeutic setting, the analyst “must not be shaken and perturbed either by compliant [*entgegenkommendes*], or by indifferent [*gleichgültiges*], or by hostile [*feindseliges*] behaviour on the part of the patient” (ibid). What then of ‘patients’ or ‘clients’ who are eagerly submissive but uninvolved (the fabled ‘good patient’ of psychoanalysis), those who are bored and indifferent (often because they have been forced to ‘submit’ to therapy by a spouse,

parent or civil authority), and most of all those who rage against the therapist verbally and maybe even lash out at him physically? The latter especially is not uncommon in closed hospital wards and treatment facilities where individuals are in custodial ‘care’. Boss had sanitarium experience, but I think he would be shocked by the genteel consulting rooms in use by so many psychotherapists in clinic settings today – often windowless, dreary, air-conditioned, cramped, sombre chambers in which so much counselling and psychotherapeutic practice now occurs. In Boss’s case, he saw patients in a bright room lined with books, many of them on art, with a view of Lake Zurich (Boss had first wanted to be a painter). Maintaining the equanimity (what Heidegger calls *Gelassenheit* and some daseinanalysts have called *heitere Gelassenheit* – lighthearted equanimity) is surely more likely in such a setting, but even at that the basic attunement [*Stimmung*] Boss invokes is a tall order, especially when the other is agitated or distraught. And yet it is necessary. Such equanimity and what I have called being nothing to the other it will be seen are closely related to each other.

In this highly condensed passage that attempt to draw the lineaments of the daseinanalyst, Boss also contrasts his approach with pastoral counselling, with which it has sometimes been compared, as it has with the various existential and humanistic forms of psychotherapy. The text contains an important observation: “Psychotherapeutic eros has to go even somewhat beyond Christian humility [*christliche Demut*] in its selflessness and overcoming of the self [*Selbstüberwindung*] in so far as it must not even intervene [*eingreifen*] in the interest of the therapist’s own God and seek to guide the partner’s life accordingly” (ibid). This observation will resonate with Boss’s consideration of the spiritual life of the daseinanalysand, which is also of fundamental importance to daseinanalysis. As a rule, it is missing from Freudian practice in which religious sentiment is a distillate of sublimated sexual drives. Suffice it to say that Boss does not see himself as an agent of religious formation [*Bildung*]. On the other hand, he is respectful of the analysand’s religious affiliation and practices, no matter how different from his own or how esoteric they might be. Explicit reference to Seguí, whose paper and book are in part devoted to differentiating the therapeutic eros from pastoral care, friendly love, fatherly love, pedagogic eros (the famous ‘Platonic love’), and Christian *agape*, then follows (Seguí, 1962: 174-180; 1964: 96-98 and 110-112). In his book on travels in India, he remarks on the great variety of individuals he worked with who came from backgrounds in Islam and Hinduism, as well recently imported Christianity. At home in Switzerland, of course, he saw people for the most part who had been reared in the Christian tradition. Some were agnostic, others even atheistic.

## VI.

Boss continues. Only if the daseinanalyst is able to assume an attitude of selflessness “will the openness [*Offenheit*] of a human space [*mitmenschlichen Raumes*] allow our patients [*partners*] to reach the point where they can put out their feelers again [*ihre Fühlhörner*] and with autonomous responsibility get involved in ever freer and more extensive world relations [*Weltbezüge*]” (Boss, 1962b: 192). Boss has no ‘cure’ to promise, no ‘fix’ to provide, no manualised technique to implement. He notes that Freud had referred to the very human ‘space’ he is speaking about as a kind of ‘playground [*Tummelplatz*]’ on which the other regains his freedom by being free to play. It is a shared space for serious play based, as we have seen, on the ontological being-with [*Mitsein*] of two Daseins. This playground is a place for a game for which the analyst and analysand make up the rules as they go along. It is not a competitive playing field. There is no winner, unless one may speak of the analysand winning back his freedom. Such play need not be without humour. As we know, Freud loved jokes. I suspect Boss did, too, especially given his lively, sometimes tart writing style. In my own brief meeting with him in 1976, I encountered a man who was both serious and lighthearted, someone who had the capacity to make a complete stranger feel at home. Boss’s humour is perhaps summed up in his famous rejoinder “Why in the world not?” which I cannot see being spoken with at least a trace of a smile. I am also reminded here of R.D. Laing’s reply to the question about what makes for an effective therapist. He is reported to have said “a good memory and a sense of humour”.

The image of a playground is important in another sense since it suggests childhood. While Freud had asserted that the revenants of childhood make an appearance in recovered memories in the psychoanalytic setting in which two adults converse, Boss is more radical in suggesting that the child is actually there in daseinanalysis and that “what occurs on the playground of the psychoanalytic [and daseinanalytic] situation, supported by [the] genuine attending to [*Zuwendung*] and selfless devotion [of the analyst], is the patient’s gradual rising above [*Aufgehen*] his childish reserve [*Verschlossenheit*] into ever richer possibilities of love, [a growth] that takes place as though spontaneously, [but only] to the extent that the essence [*Wesen*] [of the other’s Dasein] is endowed with corresponding potentialities for development [*entsprechenden Entfaltungspotenzen*] in the first place” (ibid: 193). Here Boss alludes to the givenness [*Geworfenheit*] (another of Heidegger’s existentials) of a Dasein. There will sometimes be limitations of verbal ability or command of a large enough vocabulary to express oneself adequately. On the other hand, this seems to be of little importance given the meagre vocabulary for expressing feelings available to any of

us in any case in our so-called ‘natural languages’. And so poets continue to try to verbally express love, joy, dread, hope and the like, as do composers, painters and sculptors.

Following the image of the playground, Boss likens the analysand to a child who is shy in the way that youngsters generally are in the presence of strangers. This is not the reappearance of childish (infantile) attitudes, wishes and feelings in the reminiscences of an otherwise adult person as Freud had it, but rather the presentation and behaviour of most children’s comportment, which is evidence for the state of a Dasein that is, we might say, timid about its existing. This is not for Boss a sign of psychopathology. He is not looking down upon the analysand as immature. Instead, he is referring to the great variety of potentialities for unfolding or opening out that are, in fact, part of the wonder of childhood that he hopes to see recovered in daseinanalysis. The image is also not of a growing organism, of something that is ‘growing up’ or maturing, but rather one of an unfolding flower. Boss is not suggesting that what we have here are ‘developmental delays’ that need to be remediated, of having become ‘stuck’ at a childhood ‘level’ of development. A good example of this model is Erik Erikson’s notion of psychosocial epigenesis which is focused on identity formation and consolidation. Here identity is something fixed, an “inner sense of being more or less the same person over a period of time”. By contrast, for Boss, the unfolding of possibilities potentiated by daseinanalysis in the case of the analysand for whom it has slowed down or nearly stalled is a phenomenon of change, not of taking on a fixed form once and for all. Dasein is always further possibility until it realises the one possibility that entails no further possibilities, and that is the death of the human being.

The childlike comportment of the analysand is not ‘diagnostic’ of a classifiable psychological disorder but an indication that a given Dasein is self-limited in the actualisation of its possibilities. Finally and perhaps of most importance, this childlike ‘status’ makes the analysand susceptible to the kind of love Boss has to offer, to the therapeutic eros. Boss knew well that children are experts at telling inauthentic attention and affection from ersatz pretence. They see through hypocrisy with unflinching accuracy. If they learn they have been betrayed by insincerity, they respond with rage. Much of the rage of our analysands has been in response to faked consideration, the negative form of *Fürsorge* Heidegger had identified in *Being and Time* which amounts to indifference. By contrast, the kind of love that is experienced as trust in daseinanalysis is grounded in sincerity and, to repeat yet again, is exemplified by taking the other’s Dasein seriously. This lack of sincerity, it seems to me, is why the so-called ‘efficacy rate’ of psychotherapy patients’ mental health (as if this has anything to do with their Dasein) as judged by the patient is so low (Shedler, 2018).

As alluded to earlier, Boss makes it plain that daseinanalysis does not step back from the spiritual in man. Once again, it understands the spiritual more broadly than the religious. Boss (1962b: 193) therefore writes that “we shall concede to the spiritual or religious [*geistigen oder religiösen*] experience of our patients that emerge in the course of treatment [*Kur*] the same originality [*Ursprünglichkeit*], genuineness [*Echtheit*] and actuality [*Wirklichkeit*] as [we give] to the phenomena of the so-called drives”. Like the Indian gurus Boss met in the late Fifties while travelling in India and Sri Lanka, the daseinanalyst honours the spiritual life as central to the existing as a whole of a given Dasein, but without failing to pay as much attention to the other’s “lived bodiliness [*Leiblichkeit*] and sensuality [*Sinnlichkeit*]”, including his sexuality, that is, to what Freud had referred to as our drives or urges [*Triebe*].

We will now leave Boss’s monograph, but not before mentioning an important cautionary note included in this part of his text. “It is not the business [*Sache*] of a psychiatrist [*Seelenartzes*]<sup>3</sup> [*Daseinanalyst*] to determine in what way [*Weise*] in particular such a healing experience [*heilsame Erfahrung*] [as Daseinanalysis offers] occurs [*ereignet*] in the therapeutic course of treatment” (ibid: 194). This is an extremely important comment, since it makes it clear that for Boss the lead is always taken by the analysand. There are many ways to greater freedom for a given Dasein. The analyst follows the analysand’s way [*Weg*], his or her course of treatment [*Kur*]. The analyst does not set its course. Together ‘at sea’, as it were, the analysand is at the rudder of the small therapeutic skiff.

It is a fact of current therapeutic practice, of course, that the analyst must signal that it is time to return home, i.e. to end a session. While not desirable, it is a reality of therapy as now practiced even by daseinanalysts. Perhaps as our own sincerity about what we do is taken more seriously we will find a way around this so that a session may continue as long as is needed. Sometimes only a few minutes are required. Other times (lived times), a ‘session’ should continue for several hours. Here is place where daseinanalysis may be in a position to provide the lead in re-envisioning therapy as such. The analyst is also responsible for gauging whether the ‘boat’ is perhaps moving a bit too far from shore into dangerous waters and it might be necessary to ‘turn back’ sooner than had been anticipated. The metaphor refers to the responsibility of the daseinanalyst to contain the session in instances where the individual is of the kind Boss described as having had insufficient early experiences of love and who begins to feel desperate. Is this intervening? Such considerations as these just mentioned are problematic and will require long and careful discussion regarding the practicalities of providing daseinanalysis.

The point of the image is to stress that, for Boss, the analyst and analysand



are both ‘in the same boat’, as it were. In everyday life as well as in the therapeutic situation, we are all in this together. There is no hierarchy among Daseins in daseinanalysis. The daseinanalyst is not an expert on being-in-the-world. He is only more patient about thoughtfully trying to understand it. Neither analyst nor analysand is powering the ‘skiff’. The wind and the tides are.

## VII.

You will appreciate by now that, for Boss, what matters is not what the analysand has done but what he has not done. As we have seen, the question “Why?” is therefore of no interest to him as an analyst of dasein. A biography nearly always makes for fascinating reading, of course, but anamnesis is not the point of daseinanalysis as it is in psychoanalysis. As Boss (1962b, 177) writes: “It cannot be proved by means of any set of facts [*Tatbestand*], no matter how constituted, that what appears earlier in a life history [*das lebensgeschichtlich früher Erscheinende*], simply because it is prior in time, should also be the efficient cause [*bewirkende Ursache*] of everything that follows and is thus supposed to be the real actuality itself [*das eigentlich Wirkliche*].” This includes what was done to the analysand, especially what we commonly refer to as traumatogenic experiences which have the attention of clinical psychologists to a great extent in our time. None of these events can be undone and yet many ‘return’ vividly in recollections. The recollections are disturbing to the individual in one way. To outsiders they are disturbing in another sense.

But what is to be understood by ‘traumatic’ here? Unaccountably, the recollection of a given event (let us say something as horrific as a childhood rape or a violent accident) is for one person devastating, while for someone else it may be surprising, even momentarily stunning, but not traumatogenic. It has been ‘coped’ with...somehow. What registers as shocking and profoundly upsetting for one person may not have that effect on another. For example, infantrymen subjected to the same event (a bomb explosion, for example, in which several fellow soldiers are severely injured) is more than just frightening or shocking for some of them, but not for others. Vicious beatings of two siblings (twins, for example) by a parent are for one of them painful but for the other all but forgotten. For the other twin, however, they are traumatogenic. It seems likely that what most Westerners now experience as physically unbearably painful (childbirth, surgical operations) was not experienced as such by most people in earlier times and different settings. So also for experiences of deprivation or unspeakable torture. The example of Viktor Frankl’s experience of his years in concentration camps comes to mind. While many others with him in these fiendish hells were subjected to the same miserable degradations he experienced died,

went mad or suffered for the rest of their lives from recollections of what they had experienced, Frankl not only survived but went on to work out the well-known modality of psychotherapy first called existential analysis and, later, logotherapy precisely because of his suffering (Frankl, 2006).

Only a long digression would do justice to the question of ‘traumatic events’ from the immediate or distant past of the individual. Here we can only remind the listener that (following Heidegger), for Boss, the past as such is never independent of the other two temporal ‘dimensions’. It cannot be separated from the other two and accorded a separate reality independent of the temporalising of Dasein. Recollection occurs as the present of a beckoning future. No event is ‘played back’ as it were like a film or video, the modern media on which the notion of recollection as the retrieval of memory traces is based. Instead, memory is creative and the idea of revisiting an exact replica of something that happened to someone, say, at age five or earlier in the day before an analytic session must be rejected. To repeat an event from the past is impossible. One revives and reinvents it in memory. For the daseinanalyst something recollected is happening now. It is as different a reality as the imagined future of a fantasy, for example, or the expectation of an event that is envisioned to be played out.

Visceral reactions may occur during recollection: the sudden production of adrenaline, cortisol or certain neurotransmitters; increased salivation or tearing up; blushing, increased rates of heartbeat and respiration; a shudder, an erection; one’s head moving back and forth as the gestural reaction of an event is replayed on the same ‘stage’ as Freud described as the playhouse or theatre of dreaming. Just as the individual once shook her head “No” to what was being done to her or nodded disapproval of what was being asked of her, an involuntary movement is spontaneously produced.

Of course, moments of great joy are also recreated in memory considered as imagination. One smiles at the recollection of a highly pleasant experience; one utters the same sound made once before. It is joy, but not the same joy as experienced, say, in orgasm. That we hear little of such memories should be surprising since joys are also as life-changing and sources of disorientation as events that cause pain or, in Freud’s terms, unpleasure [*Unlust*], the absence of pain.

The point is that, for Boss, the *Lebensangst* that is renewed by such recollections must be understood differently than as merely a reaction to the return of repressed memories of shocking (or joyous) experiences. To revert briefly to the title of Boss’s monograph and much of this discussion it contains, anxiety is always anxiety about existence itself and not about a recollection: “The of what [*das Wovor*] of every anxiety,” he writes, “is always a crippling attack on being able to be human Dasein [*Dasein-Können*]. Fundamentally, every anxiety fears [*fürchtet*] its [Dasein’s] annihilation, the possibility of

not being allowed to be there [*da*] anymore. The about what [*Worum*] of human anxiety is thus Dasein itself, insofar as every anxiety is always concerned and fearful [*sorgt und ängstigt*] about its [Dasein's] continuation [*Bestand*]" (Boss, 1962b: 180). It is important to consider that excitement is sometimes mistaken for fearful agitation. The non-stop verbal performance of the logorrheic is said to be a sign of anxiety (a disturbance), while it may be, in fact, a given individual's exhibition of enthusiasm. Everything depends on who decides what too much talking amounts to.

Similarly, feelings of guilt, which are also so often cited as crippling experiences of the kind that motivate an individual to see a therapist, are seen differently by Boss. Instead of being understood as the source of one's unaccountable need to be punished, with all that entails from childhood on, Boss understands guilt [*Schuld*], like Angst to be an existential of Dasein. To be indebted (which is the fundamental sense of guilt) is an element of the structure of Dasein. What this means for Heidegger is that no matter what we do, we always do not do something else (usually, a great deal else) which we thus owe ourselves or are indebted to ourselves for. We are always, as it were, in arrears for possibilities that might have been actualised. Here, again, we must pass up an opportunity to discuss these two existentials in more detail. The important point to be made is that they are not indications of psychopathology as the title of Boss's monograph might suggest, but rather features of Dasein.

The reader of Boss's monograph will be enlightened by his discussion of how daseinanalysis comes to terms with being-anxious and being-guilty (ibid: 183-189). It is enough here to say that fear of life and feelings of guilt are not meant to be eliminated by daseinanalysis. Instead, the analysand comes to see that "it is precisely anxiety that opens to man that dimension of freedom into which alone the experiences of love and trust can unfold at all" (ibid: 186). Similarly, Dasein's indebtedness eventuates in the motivation to do more.

## VIII.

We are now finally prepared to say something more about the therapeutic eros in daseinanalysis than Boss has presented. I do not claim that Boss would agree with what I have to say, but I think there is a way to understand the therapeutic eros that will further clarify Boss's already evocative presentation. I also hope my reading will relieve the notion of the therapeutic eros of some of the uneasiness it has generated in therapists since Freud uttered the word *Liebe* in the context of his practice.

What I propose is that the therapeutic eros is directed at the Dasein of the analysand. The situation is clear enough but not obvious. Here in broad strokes is the situation. There is the Dasein of the analysand and the Dasein

of the analyst. These are ontological givens. When we meet, a relationship [*Beziehung*] between the named actualisations of each Dasein begins to form. This takes place at the ontic level. The relationship implies the relation [*Verhältnis*] between the other's Dasein and my Dasein own. One may serially discuss the relation and the relationship, but in reality they are not separable. The ontological and the ontic are congruent but distinguishable. For Heidegger, this ontological relation is unique between human beings. It is not to be found in a human being's relationship with other living things, with non-living things – with God. In everyday life, any relationship usually takes on a number of forms including, more or less in ontogenic order of appearance: infant-parent, sibling-sibling, friend-friend, student-teacher, patient-doctor, congregant-spiritual adviser, lover-sexual partner, consumer-service provider, etc. Some relationships have one feature only so that typically, for example, the doctor and her patient are not also friends. In the daseinanalytic situation two human beings meet in the therapeutic setting which is utterly unique and different from the relationships already mentioned.

Just as in any other relationship, the Daseins of analyst and analysand are in a relation based on our being-with [*Mitsein*]. A relationship also begins to form, but with a difference. Other relationships imply a certain expected and typical reciprocity. For example, in a friendship, a certain love of one for the other is expressed. In an intimate genital relationship between a male and female, sexual feeling of one for the other is expressed. In the parent-child and pastor-congregant relationship, yet other kinds of feelings are exchanged in which there is a power differential or hierarchy. In the doctor-patient relationship (including psychiatry), feeling is put to one side to the greatest extent possible. The ontological given relation remains and a parallel yet congruent relationship forms. In the therapeutic setting between analyst and analysand, however, when the therapeutic eros comes into play something remarkable happens. The sort of love Boss describes originates – the therapeutic eros – is directed not to the named actualisation of the other but to his or her Dasein. In therapeutic encounter [*Begegnung*] nothing in kind is expected in return from the analysand. The message of the therapeutic eros is *amo: volo ut sis*. The therapeutic eros is love of the Dasein of the other. For Augustine's *amor* is gratuitous. It may best be described as a gift [*Gunst*], a term Heidegger (1979: 132) used in 1943 to gloss Eros. Here Heidegger also discusses the related notion of *φιλία*, also glossed with *Gewähr* (assurance, guaranteed dedication). The etymological connection with *wahr* and *Wahrheit* will not be lost on a reader of Heidegger.

In Boss's language, the therapeutic eros is selfless, self-restrained, and reverent with respect to the *Eigenwesen*, that is to say, to the wholeness of the Dasein of the analysand.

The question arises about how this is experienced by the analyst and

analysand, respectively. I conclude with a few preliminary comments on these questions, comments that themselves take the form of questions.

Is it possible to bracket or suspend the ontic relationship in the daseinanalytic situation? Boss will be charged with simply falling in love with his patient. This is not to deny the possibility that he (or any analyst) will from time to time feel attracted to the person of the other. This happens. But, as we have seen (following Heidegger) it is precisely not the person of the other that the daseinanalyst keeps in view here, but instead his Dasein. What does it mean for the analyst to experience this *volo, ut sis* with respect to his analysand? How does it feel?

I want you to be all that you are. It is not by chance that Heidegger's discussions of love are often in the context of will. The Latin *volo* means 'I wish' or 'I will'. It is a willing that consents to the other doing what he will, whatever he will do: love and do what you will. But is this not merely licensing the other to act in any way he cares to? We must answer 'No', since existential freedom – the Dasein as free – cannot be handed over to him. It is already there. The daseinanalyst does willingly step aside, making way for the other. He wills not to interfere with the opening out of the Dasein of the other to which he is committed not to interfere with. We must be very candid here about the obvious. The analyst has no control over what the other will do, how he will act. That is the case in everyday life as well, unless one is in a relationship the very nature of which is oversight and direction (as in child rearing) or restraint (as in policing the other). But in the case of the therapeutic situation, is this not a matter of irresponsibility on the part of the analyst? What if the other is sociopathic or suicidal? Alas, Augustine's invitation is not invoked with strings attached. It does not say "Love and do what you will...but do not do certain things like harming yourself or someone else".

In the history of therapy, daseinanalysis is the only 'modality' to admit that the therapist is not responsible for the behaviour of the other. Indeed, he is not responsible for the other in any sense. He is responsible only to the other in providing a unique situation in which the latter's Dasein is respected, even revered. As Thomas Szasz pointed out as early as the Fifties, when responsibility for the enforcement of civil law became part of psychiatry (and, for Szasz, this was the case from the start), it was relieved of its mandate to make way for the freedom of the human being which is his human legacy (Szasz, 2010).<sup>4</sup>

I close with a brief reflection on this notion of reverence which I believe sheds light on the daseinanalyst's experience of the therapeutic eros. The reverence for the Dasein of the other Boss speaks of is awe in the face of the divine in the other. This is the *Eigenwesen* of the other, which as I have suggested is, from the daseinanalytic perspective, equivalent to his

Dasein. To extend the therapeutic eros is to embrace the other in his or her essence, that is, as Dasein. And as Heidegger had said, to embrace a person in his essence

*...means to love him, to favour [mögen] him. Thought in a more original way, such favouring [Mögen] means to give [the other] his essence [die Wesen schenken] [as a gift]. Such favouring [Mögen] is the proper essence [Wesen] of enabling [Vermögen], which not only can accomplish [leisen] this or that but can also let something 'come to pass [wesen]' in its coming-forth [Her-kunft], that is, can let it be [sein lassen kann]. It is on the 'strength' [kraft] of enabling by favouring that something is actually to able be its [authentic] own [etwas eigentlich zu sein vermag]. This enabling is the actually 'possible' [das eigentlich 'Möglich'], that whose essence [Wesen] resides in [such] favouring [Mögen].*

I began with this passage as an epigraph to my contribution and I conclude with it. The daseinanalyst has his eye on the possibilities of the other, nothing more. And again, with Heidegger in mind, we affirm that “higher than actuality stands possibility”.

Some may step back from talk of the divine. Personally, as a therapist, I do not find this an embarrassment. But if you do, in that case, R.D. Laing’s comment nicely says pretty much the same thing. Essentially, he has the same phenomenon in mind. If we substitute ‘daseinanalysis’ for ‘psychotherapy’ in what he says (and I will be generous with a few interpolations), we conclude that daseinanalysis “is an obstinate attempt of two people to recover the wholeness of being human [the Dasein of the other] through the relationship between them,” a unique crossing of that invisible border between the ontic relationship between two named actualisations and the ontological relation between to Daseins on which it is grounded (Laing, 1967: 53).

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## Endnotes

1. I always bring to mind the famous painting by Sir Luke Fildes of ‘The Doctor’ (1891). Tate Gallery (London).

2. The early psychoanalyst, Erik Erikson (1959), discussed this from a developmental epigenetic perspective, citing basic trust as the foundation of psychosocial well-being.
3. I am reminded of Viktor Frankl's (1979) designation of the psychiatrist as a medical caregiver for the soul [*Seelsorger*] and that Freud himself, even though he wrote of the psyche, an *Ich*, an *Es* and an *Überich*, the Unconscious [*Unbewußt*] and so on, thought of the object of his psychoanalysis as man's soul [*Seele*].
4. It may be worth recalling that the inventor of the psychiatric patient, Philippe Pinel, rounded up eccentric individuals who had been in prison with confirmed offenders of the rights of others and removed them as prisoners in jail to being prisoners in a wing of his hospital. Psychiatry thus merely created a new prison (the insane asylum) for a group of individuals who offended 'most people' (what Heidegger calls *das Man*) in certain ways. It is common knowledge that one can be both mad and lawbreaker. In the end, however, the case redounds to civil authority when it is a matter of sociopathic and violent behaviour. The point is that the analyst is not also a policeman and cannot be both a therapist and an agent of the state.

## Erratum

In part I of this extended article published in *Existential Analysis* 33.2 (July 2022), on p. 368, the dates for Hans Behn-Eschenburg's life should read '1893-1935'.

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