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CHAPTER 7

THE INFLUENCE OF HEIDEGGER ON SARTRE'S EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

MILES GROTH

In this chapter, I will address two questions: What was Sartre's contribution to psychology and to what extent was Sartre's psychology influenced by Heidegger's thought? I will concentrate on Sartre's existential psychoanalysis as outlined in *Being and Nothingness* (Sartre, 1956). After some preliminaries, I give an account of Sartre's existential psychoanalysis and then, in the third section of the chapter, review the intellectual encounter between Heidegger and Sartre, especially as it bears on the early Sartre's alternative to the several incarnations of empirical psychoanalysis, which began with Freud.

PRELIMINARIES

Much like what will go on between an analysand and her psychoanalysis, the relation between Jean-Paul Sartre's thought and psychoanalytic theory, once set in motion, was to be ambivalent and lifelong. In a late interview, Sartre (1974a, p. 36) reported: " [I] had a deep repugnance for psychoanalysis in my youth." He goes on to explain that, when he was a young French intellectual, psychoanalysis was considered to be an example of "'soft' thought" (p. 38), that is to say, lacking in Cartesian rigor and dialectical subtlety. Nevertheless, in his late thirties, Sartre published a book, *Being and Nothingness*, that contained a section entitled "Existential

Psychoanalysis." Published 10 years later in an English translation under that title, the text (along with another section from *Being and Nothingness*, "Bad Faith") was for some English-speaking readers regarding their introduction to Sartre's most influential philosophical work, and, apart from *Existentialism and Humanism*, very likely their first exposure to Sartre's philosophy, assuming they did not have in hand a copy of the "special abridged version" of *Being and Nothingness*.[1]

Sartre's existential psychoanalysis is offered as an alternative to empirical psychoanalysis. As applied by Sartre to historical figures such as Charles Baudelaire (Sartre, 1967) and Gustave Flaubert (Sartre, 1971) existential psychoanalysis has much in common with Erik Erikson's psychohistories (Erikson, 1958, 1969).[2] While Sartre presents examples of the existential analysis of an individual's moods and interests in "Existential Psychoanalysis," he does not, however, offer technical advice on how to work with individuals in the psychoanalytic setting and never practiced as a psychotherapist.

Sartre's interest in academic psychology was straightforward. As a young man, writing under the influence of Husserl's phenomenological psychology, he made four important contributions to the field: a study of consciousness, *The Transcendence of the Ego* (Sartre, 1957); two books on the imagination, *The Imagination* (Sartre, 1936) and *The Imaginary. Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination* (Sartre, 1948a); and a monograph entitled *Outline of a Theory of the Emotions* (Sartre, 1948b).[3] These studies are clearly in the background of Sartre's existential psychoanalysis, and his critique of empirical psychoanalysis is already evident in them.[4] By 1960, in *Search for a Method* (Sartre, 1963b) and the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (Sartre, 1976) psychoanalysis was given only occasional mention, and got mixed reviews by Sartre.[5] With his concerns now directed more to social life, thanks to his reading of Marx, Sartre may seem to have lost interest in the psychoanalytic study of the individual.[6] Yet, his last great (uncompleted) work on Flaubert is another exercise in existential psychoanalysis.

But if Sartre's interest in Freudian psychoanalysis was cooling off as he matured intellectually, what are we to make of his participation, beginning in 1958, with the movie director John Huston in the preparation of a screenplay entitled *Freud* (Sartre, 1985)? Some may regard it as Sartre's existential psychoanalysis of Freud, comparable to his other literary existential psychoanalyses.[7] In any event, in the work of the early Sartre, with whom I am concerned here, interest in empirical psychoanalysis was still so strong, albeit highly critical, that he developed an alternative to it. What is existential analysis?

SARTRE'S EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

The doctrine of Sartre's existential analysis begins with his observation that human reality is a unity, not an ensemble of faculties. "The *principle* of this psychoanalysis is that man is a totality and not a collection" (*BN*, p. 568) of functions.[8] As such, a person cannot be pieced together from the elements discovered by an analysis

of his psychological functions (perception, cognition, and will), his memories reassembled as a psychobiography, or even the details of his stages of development. In fact, according to Sartre, when understood with discernment, each element *is* the unity.

Sartre's existential psychoanalysis is grounded in his ontology of human reality, which he formulates in the following way: "Fundamentally man is the desire to be," albeit "the existence of this desire is not to be established by an empirical induction" (*BN*, p. 565). Instead, the desire to be can be discovered only by tracing back what a person has done to his original choice of what to be (his project), that is, to "that original relation to being which constitutes the person who is being studied" (*BN*, p. 595). Regrettably, the desire to be something—in other words, "the desire of being-in-itself" (*BN*, pp. 565–566)—always falls short of its goal. Instead, the person is limited by his status as a being-for-itself. This means that he continually overreaches himself and is never in a position to see or know himself as the unity he is, since he is forever changing and always just eludes even a glimpse of himself as a whole. This is an inevitable state of affairs, given that being-for-itself is the ontological status of human reality (existence), which Sartre defines as freedom.

For human reality, as the famous assertion runs, "existence precedes essence" (*BN*, p. 568), and "far from being capable of being described," for example, "as *libido* [by Freud or Jung] or will to power [by Adler], [human reality] is a *choice of being*, either directly or through appropriation of the world" (*BN*, p. 602). Crediting "Freud and his disciples" with a "first outline of this method" (*BN*, p. 599) of revealing the meaning of human reality, Sartre nevertheless suggests that empirical psychoanalysis must give way to a psychoanalysis that "recognizes nothing *before* the original upsurge of human freedom" (*BN*, p. 569).

Existential analysis also denies the notion of the unconscious any meaning and "makes the psychic act coextensive with consciousness" (*BN*, p. 570). When existential psychoanalysis is effective, the analyst or analysand merely comes "to know what he already understands" (*BN*, p. 571). He does not discover previously inaccessible unconscious contents, which were by definition beyond his understanding.

Just as he dismisses the meaningfulness of unconscious mental life, Sartre also rules out the unmediated influence of the environment on an individual's comportment. "The environment," he writes, "can act on the subject only to the exact extent that he comprehends it; that is, transforms it into a situation" (*BN*, p . 572). As for what the analysand reports that can be interpreted symbolically, Sartre precludes recourse to universal or collective symbols. He explains: "If each being is a totality, it is not conceivable that there can exist elementary symbolic relationships . . . we must always be ready to consider that symbols change in meaning" (*BN*, p. 573).

Finally, for Sartre, there is no fixed technique or method of existential psychoanalysis. "The method which has served for one subject will not necessarily be suitable to use for another subject or for the same subject at a later period"

(*BN*, p. 573). Unfortunately, Sartre does not illustrate or detail how such a method might work in the traditional therapeutic setting.

In general terms, existential psychoanalysis "is a method destined to bring to light, in a strictly objective form, the subjective choice by which each living person has made himself a person; that is, makes known to himself what he is" (*BN*, p. 764). Its goal is to discover in the series of involvements comprising one's existence "the original way in which each man has chosen his being" (*BN*, p. 599). Nothing further is required of the analysand.

From a philosophical perspective, existential psychoanalysis picks up where ontology leaves off; moreover, existential psychoanalysis depends upon ontology. "What ontology can teach psychoanalysis is first of all the *true* origin of the meaning of things and their *true* relation to human reality" (*BN*, p. 603). In a discussion of desire, Sartre explains in more detail the relation between ontology and existential psychoanalysis:

> Existential psychoanalysis can be assured of its principles only if ontology has given a preliminary definition of the relation of these two beings—the concrete and contingent in-itself or object of the subject's desire [a concrete existent in the midst of the world], and the in-itself-for-itself [the desire to be a certain something or someone] or [alas, he admits, impossible[9]] ideal of the desire—and if it has made explicit the relation which unites appropriation as a type of relation to the in-itself, to being, as a type of relation to the in-itself-for-itself (*BN*, pp. 585–586).

In other words, before existential psychoanalysis can begin, ontology must have articulated the relation of a subject's desire to be a certain something, both to the object of his desire and to being.

A distinctive feature of Sartre's view of human reality emerges in his discussion of desire; namely, the significance of *possession* for human reality. For Sartre, desire invariably tends to possession of its object, and "in a great number of cases, to possess an object is to be able to use it" (*BN*, p. 586). This holds for our relation to things as well as to other human beings. Moreover, the "internal, ontological bonding between the possessed and the possessor" (*BN*, p. 588) extends to wanting to *be* the object of desire, so that, in the end, "I *am* what I have" (*BN*, p. 591) and have come to possess. Sartre describes the characteristics of possession:

> Possession is a magical relation: I *am* these objects which I possess, but outside, so to speak, facing myself; I create them as independent of me; what I possess is mine outside of me, outside all subjectivity, as an in-itself which escapes me at each instant and whose creation at each instant I perpetuate (*BN*, p. 591).

And so it happens that, whether in relation to my computer keyboard or my lover, "I am always somewhere outside of myself" (*BN*, p. 51).

Finally, for Sartre, desire for anything in particular is at the same time desire for the world in its entirety, so that "to possess is to wish to possess the world across a particular object" (*BN*, p. 597).

Commenting on the usual explanation of how perception operates in desire, Sartre reminds his reader that "[t]he yellow of the lemon... is not a subjective

mode of apprehending the lemon; it *is* the lemon" (*BN*, p. 603). Similarly, the beauty of someone I desire is not merely a "subjective mode" of my experience of the person; it *is* the person. In a comment from which developmental psychology might learn a great deal, Sartre suggests that, because "we come to life in a universe where feelings and acts are all charged with something material... and in which material substances have originally a psychic meaning" (*BN*, p. 605), the objective quality of a thing "is a new *nature* which is neither material (and physical) nor psychic, but which transcends the opposition of the psychic and the physical, by revealing itself to us as the ontological expression of the entire world" (*BN*, p. 606). Thus, for human beings, all things are human things at first—the rattle or blanket, just as much as the mother's breast or nose—but gradually some things acquire non-human status, while the others go on being human.[10]

In practice, the work of existential psychoanalysis is "to reveal in each particular case the meaning of the appropriate synthesis [of having and being]" for which ontology provides "the general, abstract meaning" (*BN*, p. 595). A kind of psychoanalysis that "must bring out the *ontological* meaning of qualities" (*BN*, p. 599), existential psychoanalysis therefore relies on "the things themselves, not upon men" (*BN*, p. 601), including the words they use.

In *Being and Nothingness*, the dialogue with empirical psychoanalysis is foreshadowed in an earlier section of the work called "Bad Faith."[11] *Mauvaise foi* (literally, falsehood) is "a lie to oneself" (*BN*, p. 49). It is a phenomenon of consciousness that must be understood against the background of Sartre's view that "the being of consciousness is the consciousness of being" (*BN*, p. 49). Bad faith is unique, in that it is a "metastable" psychic structure; that is, it is "subject to sudden changes or transitions" (*BN*, p. 50, n. 2). *Mauvais foi* is ubiquitous. It is "a type of being in the world, like waking or dreaming, which by itself tends to perpetuate itself" (*BN*, p. 68).

Having recourse to the notion of unconscious mental life, empirical psychoanalysis "substitutes for the notion of bad faith, the idea of a lie without a liar" (*BN*, p. 51). For Sartre, a close analysis of Freud's psychodynamic model reveals that the censor operating in the psychic apparatus is in bad faith (*BN*, p. 53). He believes that introducing the censor into the psychic apparatus allowed Freud to make bad faith part of our psychic structure, rather than a pathological feature of psychological functioning.

Sartre illustrates bad faith in action and refines his conceptualization of the phenomenon by contrasting it with its "antithesis," sincerity. In a discussion of bad faith and sincerity, he stresses that the laws of logic do not hold for human reality as they do for things "in" nature. Specifically, the presumed universal law of identity ($A = A$) fails to apply to us, since we never are what we are and always are what we are not. This applies to interpersonal relations as well, since consciousness of the other is also never what it is (*BN*, p. 62).

What is the point of posturing? The result of bad faith is "[t]o cause me to be what I am, in the mode of 'not being what one is,' or not to be what I am in the mode of 'being what one is'" (*BN*, p. 66). One of the primary goals of existential

psychoanalysis is to uncover the source of bad faith, in order to reveal the truth of one's original project.

With this brief review of Sartre's exposition of existential psychoanalysis in mind, what are we to make of his alternative to empirical psychoanalysis?[12] Perhaps the most significant difference is its focus on the present. This does not preclude the goal of existential psychoanalysis to discover the fundamental project governing an individual's life, which is accomplished by means of an examination of current involvements that look back to the decisive choice that set in motion the life they comprise.

By contrast, the archeological method of empirical psychoanalysis painstakingly reconstructs the analysand's past. Some will call its result a biography; others will construe it as a narrative or story. The French word *histoire* captures both senses of reconstruction in empirical psychoanalysis. The point is, a reconstruction need not relate to the truth. It is of little importance (to the analyst or analysand) whether the analysand's personal reality as reconstructed in analysis corresponds to the historical record that is construed and maintained by the official observers of consensual reality in which the analysand grew up—first and not least the analysand's parenting figures, but also other observers of the analysand's life and times.

A second difference between the two forms of psychoanalysis follows from the first and refers back to the ontological grounding of existential psychoanalysis. That is its emphasis on freedom, in contrast to the fatalistic, solid determinism of classical empirical psychoanalysis. For the early Sartre, one can choose a different path at any time. Obviously, this does not mean one can choose *any* path. Thus an amputee cannot in good faith choose to train as sprinter, nor can a male choose to bear a child.[13] But among the feasible paths, one may choose any of them.

From a therapeutic point of view, according to orthodox empirical psychoanalysis, once in analysis, always in analysis, so that, from a psychodynamic perspective, any analysis is interminable. Sooner or later, meeting at regular sessions ends and gives way to a style of self-reflection that haunts the analysand for the rest of her life. By contrast, the end of Sartrean existential psychoanalysis has been reached when the analysand has tracked down and apprehended the event that set her on the course she *is following*, which (to use a grammatical metaphor) may be thought of as her life as lived in the middle voice ("am being"), albeit understood in terms of the future perfect tense ("will have done").

Two considerations of interest follow from the aims of existential analysis.

1. I cannot escape the fact that I never *am* anything. To frame the assertion in the language of developmental psychology, identity is a myth. The much vaunted inner sense of being more or less the same person over time is a fiction. For example, since I always "am being," I will never attain the sense of ego identity that is said to be the goal of adolescence.[14] Instead, in quest of being (what I project for myself), I am forever about becoming who I am. My non-status as a being-for-itself may be unsettling, but it is the privilege and burden of embodying freedom.

The tightrope tension of living my life in the middle voice also deprives me of the certainties that apply to a being with a fixed nature (for example, my cat), so that, in the absence of "having" any such nature, the construction of unambiguous rules or principles to guide or adjudicate the conflicts that arise in my life will be a futile endeavor. My status also exempts me from being predictable, which is one of empirical psychology's coveted goals.[15] At best, I may be kept on a more or less even keel by a morality of ambiguity, such as the one proposed by Simone de Beauvoir around the time Sartre developed his phenomenological ontology of human reality.[16]

Like time, I seem to flow on, and to observe what I would like to think I finally have become is impossible, since that could take place only when I am no longer in a position to see or know anything at all, that is, after my death. It is true that I will then be firmly in the summarizing gaze of others, now chiefly mourners (or those relieved by my passing), but, as Sartre has made clear, that has always been the case.

If I attempt to fix my present for an examination of the stretch from a given starting point to the present moment, I find that the present moment has already passed. This may trouble me (and it should, according to Sartre), but it need not bring me to a psychoanalyst's office. That happens when I am at sea about where I am heading, which is based on the fact that I have lost sight of my fundamental project.

2. A second issue that existential psychoanalysis raises is related to the first and takes the form of a question I may ask myself. Although, Sartre does not discuss the question, it has fascinated me since first encountering his work and, I think, a few words of discussion of the question may shed some light on his existential psychoanalysis. Moreover, it bears on my later discussion of Sartre's understanding of Heidegger's notion of *Existenz*.

   Assume that I have studied piano for many years. I began, when I was a boy, 8-years-old. I took a half-hour lesson every Saturday morning for ten years, then continued to practice technique and learned the piano repertoire on my own. I have spent an hour or so at the piano nearly every day since my first lesson. Now, more than 40 years have passed, and I am sitting at a computer keyboard writing an essay on Sartre's existential psychoanalysis. The question arises: Am I pianist? Strictly speaking, I am not. Perhaps, I will take a break in an hour or so and, providing it is not too late in the day (so as not to bother the neighbors!), I will open *The Well-Tempered Clavier* of Bach and play the C major prelude of Book One. As I play, I am a pianist, but only then. And while playing, am I writer? Clearly, I am not. The impossibility of *being* anything at all suggested by the first issue is in this way complicated by a further ambiguity. It refers to a different ontological issue from the one that concerns Sartre, but it is of interest, I think, for the practice of Sartrean existential psychoanalysis.

To address the second issue from the perspective of the first, I might say that, because I never *am* anything, I could never have become a pianist. I have been asking a meaningless question. Thus, to say that I am a pianist, albeit only while playing the instrument, would be unacceptable to Sartre, since to be defined as anything at all is a betrayal of one's freedom. However, the question bears on the meaning of my *Existenz*, Heidegger's term for the way of life an individual is enacting at any given moment—political *Existenz* (as I protest government policy), philosophical *Existenz* (as I think about Sartre's ontology), artistic *Existzenz* (as I play the piano).

HEIDEGGER'S INFLUENCE ON SARTRE'S EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

From early on in his career, Sartre's relation to Heidegger's thought was just as important as his intellectual affair with psychoanalysis.[17] The story of Sartre's reading of Heidegger includes the attribution to Heidegger of the title existentialist, which, of course, Heidegger denied. The text that reflects his disavowal is his "Letter on 'Humanism'," which was written in response to a letter, dated November 11, 1946, from a young French philosopher, Jean Beaufret.[18] As we will see, given its title and by Heidegger's own acknowledgment in the text, the "Letter" was written with Sartre's lecture "L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme" very much in mind.

I begin with Sartre's lecture. He gave the talk at a meeting of the Club Maintenant, at Centraux Hall in Paris.[19] It is "a defense of existentialism" (*EH*, p. 23) against its opponents, in particular French Communists and Catholics. Existentialism, he writes, is "a doctrine . . . which affirms that every truth and every action imply both an environment and a human subjectivity" (*EH*, p. 24). He notes that "there are two kinds of existentialists: . . . the Christians [Jaspers and Marcel] . . . [and] the existential atheists, amongst whom we must place Heidegger as well as the French existentialists and myself" (*EN*, p. 26). Referring to Heidegger's characterization of man as "the human reality" (presumably translating Heidegger's *terminus technicus Dasein*), Sartre formulates the defining belief said to be shared by all existentialists; namely, that "*existence* comes before *essence*," which he qualifies with the explanatory gloss, "or, if you will, we must begin from the subjective" (*EH*, p. 26). Then comes the frequently quoted passage:

> . . . man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. . . . Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself (*EH*, p. 28).

The human reality is that we are poised in the present, but future-bound rather than determined by the past. Leaving us bereft of any appeal to excuses generated in

consequence of what has happened to us or what we have done in the past, "the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders" (*EH*, p. 29), and not, for example, on those of his parents (as Freud's empirical psychoanalytic theory claims) or on the effects of the environment (as the behaviorists would have it).

The ethical dimension or "deeper meaning" of existentialism is immediately evident in Sartre's subsequent observation that "in choosing for himself he chooses for all men" (*EH*, p. 29) what it means to be human. The meaning of what it is to be human is being invented by each of us every time we make a choice. Using the image of a sculptor, Sartre writes: "In fashioning myself, I fashion man" (*EH*, p. 30). Likening the human being to a painter: "[I]n life, a man . . . draws his own portrait and there is nothing but that portrait" (*EH*, p. 42).

The value-saturated state of human reality is the source of our feelings of "anguish, abandonment and despair" (*EH*, p. 30).[20] As such a state of affairs, human reality "*is* freedom" (*EH*, p. 34), and as we know from the ontological grounding of Sartre's existential psychoanalysis, freedom is not merely one of our characteristics, but our defining status. As radical freedom, "[w]e are left alone, without excuse." Thus, "from the moment that he is thrown into the world [a man] is responsible for everything he does" (*EH*, p. 34). His responsibility is not merely personal, but implicates everyone else (strangers as much as those who know what we do), and we are in the disquieting position of being without any certitudes on which to base our judgments. Sartre concludes that the "despair" of being an existentialist lies in the fact that "I remain in the realm of possibilities" (*EH*, p. 39), not of determinate actualities, let alone certainties.[21]

Sartre cautions that these givens of *la condition humaine* should not suggest an attitude of passivity or "quietism." Quite to the contrary: "The doctrine I am presenting before you," he says, "is precisely the opposite of this, since it declares that there is no reality except in actions" (*EH*, p. 41). We are, in practice and effect, nothing but a series of "purposes" (*EH*, p. 41) or "undertakings" (*EH*, p. 42). As such, existentialism must be construed as a philosophy of radical and uncompromising optimism.

Sartre sums up the philosophical rationale of existentialism in three propositions: (1) ". . . we [existentialists] seek to base our teaching upon the truth, and not upon a collection of fine theories"; (2) "this theory [sic!] alone is compatible with the dignity of man, it is the only one which does not make man into an object"; and (3) "although, it is impossible to find in each and every man a universal essence that can be called human nature, there is nevertheless a human universality of *condition*" (*EH*, pp. 44–46)—*la condition humaine*.[22]

Moving on in the lecture to the question whether existentialism is a form of humanism, Sartre distinguishes between two senses of the term "humanism," which may denote (1) "a theory which upholds man as the end-in-itself and as the supreme value" (*EH*, p. 54).[23] However, (2) its "fundamental meaning," says Sartre, "is this: Man is all the time outside of himself: it is in projecting and losing

himself beyond himself that he makes man to exist" (*EH*, p. 55). Understood in this sense, humanism, like existentialism, is a doctrine of transcendence.

Human reality is ever "self-surpassing, and can grasp objects only in relation to his self-surpassing" (*EH*, p. 55). Existential humanism can therefore claim that subjectivity (understood in the sense of "man who is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human universe" [*EH*, p. 55]) and transcendence (self-surpassing) are the same. Finally, as we recall, existentialism, in particular as applied in existential psychoanalysis, begins with subjectivity. So does humanism, as Sartre understands it, and, in this sense, the two positions may be construed as equivalent.

The references to Heidegger in Sartre's lecture are obvious, though unacknowledged for the most part, and Heidegger is mentioned by name only once, as an example (with Sartre) of an atheistic existentialist. The important question now before us is whether Sartre's Heidegger reflects what Heidegger says, to say nothing of what he thought.[24]

Those who heard or read Sartre's words concluded that he and Heidegger were of one mind. Heidegger soon corrected Sartre's misunderstanding of his thought in his "Brief über den 'Humanismus'" (Heidegger, 1976, pp. 313–364).[25] Sartre is mentioned by name several times in the text; for example, where Heidegger explains that

> Sartre articulates the fundamental statement of existentialism in this way: life [*Existenz*] precedes what is by nature [*Essenz*]. In doing so, he takes (the terms) *existentia* and *essentia* in the sense they have for metaphysics, which since Plato has said that *essentia* [as possibility] precedes *existentia* [as actuality]. Sartre reverses this proposition (*HB*, 328).[26]

Explicitly disassociating himself from Sartre, Heidegger continues:

> Sartre's main point about the priority of *existentia* over *essentia* justifies the word 'existentialism' as a suitable name for this philosophy. But the main point of "Existentialism" has not the least bit in common with the sentence from *Being and Time* (cited earlier: "The 'essence' of existence [*Dasein*] lies in its way of life [*Existenz*]" and used by Sartre to characterize Existentialism). To say nothing of the fact that, in *Being and Time*, no statement about the relationship between *essentia* and *existentia* can even be expressed in any way, since there it is a question of getting ready for something that is a forerunner (of things to come) (*HB*, p. 329).

Heidegger's critique of Sartre's reading of *Being and Time* is that Sartre saw it as a work of metaphysics, which *Being and Time*, in fact, attempted to unsettle, deconstruct and "destroy."[27] What Sartre purports to find in Heidegger on "the relationships between *essentia* and *existentia*" does not have a place in Heidegger's fundamental ontology, which is all about searching for the ground of metaphysics in the ontology of existence [*Da-sein*].

A few pages later in the "Letter," where he refers to Sartre's lecture, Heidegger questions whether his way of thinking can be construed as a kind of humanism, which, by associating Heidegger with existentialism, Sartre has intimated. His reply is unambiguous:

> Surely not, insofar as humanism thinks metaphysically. Surely not, if it is existentialism and it is represented in the way Sartre articulates it in this sentence: *précisément nous sommes sur un plan où il y a seulment des hommes* (*L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme*, p. 36). As thought about in *Being and Time*, this would read: *précisément nous sommes sur un plan où il y a principalement l'Être*. But where does *le plan* [the plane] come from, and what is *le plan? L'Être et le plan* are the same thing [*dasselbe*]. In *Being and Time* (*GA* 2, p. 281), it is said, intentionally and cautiously: *il y a l'Être*: "there is [*es gibt*]" be[-ing] [*Sein*]. But "*il y a*" inaccurately translates "*es gibt* [there is]." For the "it," which in this case "gives," is be[-ing] itself. The (word) "gives," however, names the essence [*Wesen*] of be[-ing] (as) giving [*gebende*], (i.e.,) granting [*gewährende*], its truth. Giving itself [*das Sichgeben*] in (the sphere) of what is open [*das Offene*] (along) with the latter itself is that very same *be*[-ing] (*HB*, p. 334).[28]

For Heidegger, human reality takes place on a "plane" dominated by be[-ing], not human beings. The difficulty, as Heidegger sees it, lies in understanding the way be[-ing] "is" *not*. Transposing this idea to human beings, Sartre has said that human beings precisely *are not*. But that is not what concerns Heidegger in *Being and Time,* or anywhere else in his writings. The passage from Sartre's lecture discussed by Heidegger points to where an error in Sartre's reading of *Being and Time* has occurred that led to a misunderstanding of Heidegger's thought.

Later, Heidegger also cites Sartre "(so far)" (and Husserl) for failing to "recognize the essentiality of what is historical about be[-ing]," which is one reason, Heidegger claims, why existentialism cannot "enter into that very dimension within which a productive discussion with Marxism would for the first time be possible" (*HB*, p. 340). This is a separate issue, of course, but Sartre may have taken Heidegger's words to heart when he abandoned the early aristocratic solipsism of *Being and Nothingness*, where any choice is possible, and later, as a student of Marx, embraced the importunity of social problems on the range of one's possible choices, recognized the impact of one's early environment on the scope of his possibilities, and, periodically leaving aside his meditations on literature, became a political activist.[29]

The substance of Heidegger's disavowal of existentialism is that it is an incarnation of metaphysical thinking in which human beings are the focal point of reference. By contrast, Heidegger's interest is be[ing].[30] Although, Sartre freely adopts some of the terminology of *Being and Time* in *Being and Nothingness,* we must conclude that Sartre's Heidegger is not one Heidegger himself would recognize. References to "being-in-the-world" and "human reality" [*Dasein*] notwithstanding, the upshot of Heidegger's thought is lost on Sartre, who sees Heidegger as continuing the tradition of Husserl, a philosopher who figures even more prominently in *Being and Nothingness* than Heidegger.

In my opinion, much of Sartre's confusion lay with his misunderstanding of Heidegger's concept of *Existenz* in *Being and Time*. Although *Existenz* is a fundamental notion in the early Heidegger, to which Sartre appeals, Sartre understands *Existenz* existentially and metaphysically, not ontologically, as Heidegger does.[31] In addition, like so many others, Sartre read *Being and Time* as an essay

on philosophical anthropology, and understood dread [*Angst*] and care [*Sorge*], for example, as emotional dispositions rather than as ontological structures.

Perhaps more than anything else, however, Heidegger's seriousness attracted Sartre, who was being held as a prisoner of war, not sitting at a Left Bank café, when he immersed himself in Heidegger's *magnum opus*. The stupidities of World War II very likely attracted Sartre to Heidegger's discussion of the no-thing [*Nichts*] in his inaugural address, from 1929, "What Is Metaphysics?," although his circumstances and mood precluded Sartre from seeing that Heidegger's analysis of *das Nichts* in that text was about the co-valence of be[-ing] [*Sein*] and no-thing [*Nichts*], and not a meditation on post-Nietzschean nihilism.[32] In the end, we must never forget that the existential psychoanalysis of *Being and Nothingness* was conceived in the glare of a political prisoners camp's searchlight, which revealed the absurdities of war and death, as much as in light of Sartre's insights into the lack or absence at the heart of human reality.[33]

HEIDEGGER AND SARTRE'S EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

It remains for me to review whether and to what extent Heidegger's thought influenced Sartre's existential psychoanalysis. Heidegger influenced psychoanalysis, but not the Sartrean version. The path of his influence ran, not through France, but through Switzerland, first via Ludwig Binswanger's *Daseinsanalyse* [existential analysis], which Heidegger rejected, and then via the *Daseinsanalytik* [analytique of existence] of Medard Boss, with whom Heidegger collaborated for many years.[34] Nor did Heidegger's ontology have an impact on Sartre, since Sartre failed to understand Heidegger's fundamental ontology in *Being and Time*. Whereas be[-ing] (in relation to temporality) is the central question of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, the human being is at the heart of Sartre's phenomenological ontology. Sartre's misinterpretation of *Being and Time*, which is in the immediate background of his existential psychoanalysis, may be traced to his misunderstanding of what Heidegger means by *Existenz*. I conclude with a few comments about this concept.

In his "Letter on 'Humanism'," Heidegger quotes the well-known sentence from *Being and Time* on which Sartre ran afoul: "Das 'Wesen' des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz." He is quite clear that "the main point of 'Existentialism' has not the least bit in common with the sentence." What *does* the sentence mean? "The 'essence' of existence is in its way of life."[35] The word *Wesen* is given in scare quotes, indicating that Heidegger is not using the word in its standard acceptation, which refers to a thing's nature, *essentia* or *Essenz*, which Sartre confounds with the thing's coming to pass [*Wesen*] or, as Heidegger will say, the remaining or lingering of the thing, in this case existence [*Dasein*].

To understand what Heidegger means by the *Wesen* of something, we must look at the meaning of the verb *wesen*, of which *Wesen* is the substantive form. In the lecture course *Was heißt Denken?* [*What Calls for Thinking?* or *What Is Thinking?*], Heidegger's first course after having been permitted to return to teach after a politically imposed exile, he explains (Heidegger, 1954, p. 143):

> Used verbally, the word *wesen* is (found in) the old German word *wesan*. It is the same word as *währen* [to hold out or endure] and means to remain [*bleiben*]. *Wesan* stems from the Sanskrit [*altindisch*] (word) *vásati*, which means he lives (at) [*wohnt*], he stays (at) [*weilt*]. What is inhabited [*das Bewohnt*] is called the household [*Hauswesen*]. The verb *wesan* speaks of [*besagt*] (an) enduring staying on [*bleibendes Weilen*].

As Heidegger makes abundantly clear in the "Letter," what he had in mind, in 1927, in the sentence that helped launch French existentialism was not a distinction between man's *essence* or nature and his *existence*. Heidegger explains that when Sartre says the fundamental belief of existentialism is that "a way of life [*Existenz*] precedes what is by nature [*Essenz*]," he "takes (the terms) *existentia* and *essentia* [correlatively, in French, *existence* and *essence*] in the sense they have for metaphysics, which since Plato has said that essentia [as possibility] precedes existentia [as actuality]."[36] Whether it is also the case that "Sartre reverses this proposition" remains to be decided, but whether or not Sartre upends Platonic metaphysics, the undertaking and its result are still metaphysics. Sartre failed to understand Heidegger's sentence, which says that the coming to pass [*Wesen*] of existence [*Dasein*] is its way of life [*Existenz*] at any given moment. For that reason, he sees Heidegger as an existentialist, rather than someone whose sole interest lay in elucidating the be[-ing] of human reality, not an individual's way of living his life, which was a central concern of many Occupation-traumatized French intellectuals of Sartre's generation.

We recall that the Club Maintenant, to whose members and guests Sartre gave his lecture on whether existentialism is a humanism, was comprised of a group of intellectuals whose manifesto was saturated with "*l'importance exceptionelle d'aujourdui*," with the extraordinary relevance of the now, of what is going on "today"—in that instance, in fact, on Monday, October 28, 1945.[37] It was a group "*attentifs à 'maintenant'*," engaged, caught up in "the moment." The study of history could wait.[38] Perhaps this prompted Heidegger's comment in the "Letter," cited earlier (Heidegger, 1967, p. 340), on the "historicity" of at-homeness, that is, of be[-ing]. To repeat, Heidegger was concerned about the be[-ing] of any way of life, not about a particular way of life, whether existential or parochial, sacred or profane, philosophical or materialistic. For Sartre, of course, the primary goal of existential psychoanalysis is to reveal the project that sets in motion and sustains a given way of life.

Sartre's haunting question remains: *Am* I ever? It is a question of enduring interest to existential psychoanalysis, whether of Sartrean or Heideggerian inspiration. In keeping with one of the purposes of this chapter, in closing I will try to respond to the question as I think a Sartrean existential psychoanalyst might. The response will take the form of a brief case study.

A playwright who is "stuck" and unable to write visits an empirical psychoanalyst. For such an analyst, the analysand *has* writer's block. The writer who cannot write is inhibited. Her inhibition is *explained* by recovering memories of early childhood events that produced a conflict which has now returned in the form of the symptom "writer's block." The symptom is understood to be symbolic of a

once actual, now long-forgotten conflict.[39] In other words, current stressors have revived a latent conflict, which has broken through the barrier of repression and now dominates the consciousness of the patient.[40] Treatment consists of interpreting the recollected memories and related contemporary events, such as dreams and mistakes (parapraxes), and reconstructing the patient's past. Only knowledge of the patient's distant past provides the analyst and analysand with what they need to know, in order to overcome the analysand's inhibition.

A Sartrean existential psychoanalyst takes an entirely different perspective on the "complaint."[41] He sees the not-writing as embodying the analysand's existence at that moment in her life. She is understood *as* her inability to write. She *is* this incapacity. She does not *have* something ("writer's block"); nor is she missing something (writing ability). For Sartre, existence itself is a lack, the nothingness out of which human being-for-itself fashions a life, without ever completing the job, of course, and without the human being ever becoming something fixed, once and for all. The symptom is a manifestation of something present, the individual's fundamental project, which must be revealed and understood. In this case, the project of being-a-writer must be articulated as it came to life for the analysand.

The analysand talks about her life. As might be expected, much of the discussion focuses on writing, playwrights, plays and criticism, but the moment of therapeutic consequence occurs when the analysand revisits her decision *to be a writer*. She might say, for example: "By writing I was existing. I was escaping from the grown-ups."[42] Her current not-writing is a mode of *being a writer* and must be understood as such.

Where does the therapist go from here? The results of treatment by empirical psychoanalysis are reported to be less than impressive. For Freud, psychoanalysis was successful when the analysand was again able to work and to love; for Jung, analysis energized the on-going process of individuation. But what is the therapeutic benefit of Sartrean existential psychoanalysis, if its goal is to articulate the analysand's primordial project?

To have revisited one's project is to have made contact with the wellspring of one's freedom, and that in itself is therapeutic, in the original sense of therapeutics as attending to what is most essential. Existential psychoanalysis has no interest in adjusting or altering behavior. It shares with empirical psychoanalysis an appreciation for insight, not for purposes of self-transformation, however, but as the way in to the wellspring of one's freedom and the responsibility for one's life that is part of our being freedom.

EPILOGUE: CHANGE

A few comments about change in the context of Sartrean psychoanalysis may be in order. They arise from considering an element of the Heideggerian perspective on clinical practice that eluded Sartre and, as such, may shed a bit of light on what the intellectual encounter between the two philosophers might have led

to, if Sartre had understood Heidegger's thought as he developed his existential psychoanalysis.

When the individual mentioned above was no longer writing, we would say she had changed. For Sartre, however, change is not possible, since each of us is working out the same unifying project embarked on at that critical moment of fundamental decision. We are an uncompleted project—the same project. We do not change, because our project remains the same. On the other hand, for Heidegger, change is possible—thanks to be[-ing], of course, and not to the will or actions of the human being in question. Is a rapprochement between Heideggerian and Sartrean insights possible on the matter of change? Yes, and I think it might be approached in the following, preliminary way.

We are always changing and therefore never are what we are (as Sartre would say, but from a different perspective and for different reasons), yet all change is caught up in the structure of existence [*Da-sein*], which is that site where be[-ing] comes about (as Heidegger would say).[43] It happens, however, that we notice and pay attention only to dramatic changes in the course of everyday life.[44] One who has thought of herself only as a writer is noticeably changed when she can no longer write. My point is that Sartrean analysis seems to be concerned with such dramatic changes, while also claiming that such change cannot occur. The contradiction disappears, however, if we admit that change continually occurs, not in existence, however, but in be[-ing]. Heidegger's fundamental ontology allows for this, although Sartre's phenomenological ontology does not.[45]

Our not-writing individual seems to confirm my observation, that one *is* anything in particular only when she is actually engaged in or practising what the designation indicates we should expect to see her doing. Is this merely a trivial observation? I think it is not only not trivial, but fundamental to what distinguishes existential psychoanalysis from empirical psychoanalysis, in that it points to what Heidegger considered to be the essential feature of existence [*Da-sein*]; namely, that it is always a way of living one's life [*Existenz*]. As I read the famous sentence: "The coming to pass of existence lies in its way of life." In practice, then, existential psychoanalysis is not as far from Heideggerian *Daseinsanalytik* as it might appear to be at first blush. The difference between the two forms of analysis is found in Sartre's emphasis on choice (which Heidegger claims is never ours), while Heidegger attributes all change to a dispensation of the fundamental at-homeness or be[-ing] of existence.

NOTES

1. "Existential Psychoanalysis," which is the first section of Chapter 2 ("Doing and Having") of Part 3 ("Being-for-Others") of *Being and Nothingness* (the other two sections are "The Meaning of 'to Make' and 'to Have': Possession" and "Quality as a Revelation of Being"), was published, in 1953, as the first half of a book entitled *Existential Psychoanalysis* along with another section of *Being and Nothingness*, "Bad Faith," which is Chapter Two of Part One ("The Problem of Nothingness") of the work. That same year, the rest of the translation of *L'Etre et le Néant* was published, but without these sections, in a "special abridged edition." In the edition of *Existential Psychoanalysis*

published by Philosophical Library, there is an introduction by the translator, Hazel Barnes. Henry Regnery also published an edition of *Existential Analysis* in 1953. Beginning in 1962, it contained an introduction by Rollo May, quite to the surprise of the translator, whose introduction was omitted. Hazel E. Barnes (personal communication, March 18, 2002). A complete text of *Being and Nothingness* first appeared only in 1956. A psychoanalyst and one of Sartre's keenest critics, François Lapointe (Lapointe, 1971, p. 17) notes that "the fourth and final part of *Being and Nothingness* [of which "Existential Psychoanalysis" is the core] may be seen as one long dialogue with Freud" or what Sartre will call "empirical psychoanalysis." For the saga of the translation and publication of *Being and Nothingness*, see Barnes (1997, pp. 153–155). *Existentialism and Humanism* (Sartre, 1947) was an English translation of Sartre's 1945 lecture "L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme."

2. While Erikson's psychosocial approach is empirical, he stresses existential turning points in a life history more than many traditional psychoanalytic writers. In his existential psychoanalysis of his contemporary, Jean Genet (Sartre, 1963a, 1963b, 1963c), Sartre treats his subject as an historical figure, as he does himself in his self-analysis (Sartre, 1964). As reported by Clément (1990, p. 57), Sartre once hinted that he had spent a few sessions "on the couch" with a psychoanalyst, presumably of the traditional variety. On Sartre's self-analysis, see Fell's (1968) essay "Sartre's *Words:* An Existential Self-Analysis." This article prompted a response by the psychiatrist Keen (1971), who argues for a "rapprochement" between Freudian psychoanalysis and Sartre's existential psychoanalysis.
3. The influence of Heidegger is already evident in *The Emotions* and *The Psychology of Imagination*, both of which were published just at the time of Sartre's immersion in 1939–1940 in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*.
4. On Sartre's critique of Freud, see the excellent article by Phillips (1986).
5. See, for example, *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (Sartre, 1976, pp. 17–18).
6. One commentator, Schrift (1987), sees continuity between Sartre's early (phenomenological–ontological) and later (dialectical) versions of existential psychoanalysis, arguing that the *ontological approach* to the individual, the for-itself, project, facticity and lack in the early Sartre of *Being and Nothingness* finds parallel and equivalent expression in the *structural* approach to the social in terms of totalisation, scarcity, praxis and need Sartre worked out the *Critique de la Raision Dialectique*. Sartre confirms Schrift's observation in a note to that work (Sartre, 1960, pp. 285–286).
7. Cannon (1999, p. 25) goes so far as to declare that "the screenplay may now be judged to contain some of Sartre's finest writings."
8. Quotations are from the 1956 edition of *Being and Nothingness* (*BN*). The translator notes that the sections published in *Existential Psychoanalysis* were revised for the first complete edition of *Being and Nothingness*.
9. *BN*, p. 598.
10. It is noteworthy that, for some schizophrenics, human beings lose their human qualities, in part or as a whole, and are experienced as non-human things.
11. The reversal in order of presentation of the two sections in *Existential Psychoanalysis* may have complicated the early reader's encounter with Sartre's existential psychoanalysis, since what he recommends in the section by that name presumes an understanding of what we learn in the section on "Bad Faith." The translator/editor, Hazel Barnes, justified the arrangement by arguing that "'Bad Faith' in actuality contains criticism and in a sense the specific application of ideas more fully developed in the other essay" ("Translator's Preface," p. 7).
12. Yalom (1980, p. 222) nicely summarizes Sartre's own project and what might be called Sartre's therapeutic stance: "Sartre considered it his project to liberate individuals from bad faith and to help them assume responsibility."
13. The radical freedom Sartre has in mind has been criticized as naive and disingenuous. Sartre himself modified the absoluteness of this freedom later in his life, when he admitted that early social conditioning affects the range of possibilities from which one makes his choices.

14. Two authoritative sources of this view are Erikson's (1994) *Identity, Youth and Crisis* and Blos's (1985) On *Adolescence*. Among other issues, the question of change looms large in a critique of developmentalism in psychology that any serious discussion of the view would entail. See my comments on change in Sartrean and Heideggerian analysis in the concluding sections of this chapter.
15. For empirical psychologists, the shibboleths of real science are quantifiability, measurability and predictability.
16. de Beauvoir (1948), *Pour une Morale de l'Ambiguité*.
17. The first part of Light's (1987, pp. 3–39) little volume *Shuzo Kuki and Jean-Paul Sartre. Influence and Counter-Influence in the Early History of Existential Phenomenology* contains most of the relevant references to Sartre's encounter with Heidegger's thought. Evidently, the two philosophers met in person only once, on December 23, 1952, for about an hour and a half in Freiburg, where Heidegger lived. For details, see Contat and Rybalka (1974, p. 18) and Petzet (1993, p. 81). Ott (1993, p. 329) reports that a meeting between Heidegger and Sartre had been scheduled for sometime in late 1945, but did not materialize. On December 10, 1940, while a prisoner of war, Sartre (Sartre, 1992, p. 301) wrote to his "Beaver," Simone de Beauvoir: "Je lit Heidegger et je ne me suis jamais senti aussi libre (I am reading Heidegger and I have never felt so free)." According to Sartre's bibliographers (Contat & Rybalko, 1974, pp. 10–11), he gave a course on Heidegger to a group of priests while he was a prisoner of war. Sartre's first sustained reading of *Being and Time* had begun in 1939, although he had tried to read Heidegger's book as early as 1933 (Light, 1987, p. 24 and pp. 6 and 78). *Sein und Zeit* was not published in French until 1964 in a translation by Rudolf Boehm and Alphonse de Waelhens. On Heidegger's initial response to Sartre's reading of his works, see Safranski (1998, p. 321), where a letter from Heidegger to Sartre, dated October 28, 1945, is quoted: "Here for the first time I encountered an independent thinker who, from the foundation up, has experienced the area out of which I think. Your work shows such an immediate comprehension of my philosophy as I have never before encountered."
18. Heidegger's correspondence with Beaufret had begun at least a year earlier with a letter dated November 23, 1945. There Heidegger refers to two articles on existentialism by Beaufret in issues 2 and 5 of the journal *Confluences* (March and June/July 1945). In fact, Beaufret (1945a, 1945b, 1945c, 1945d, 1945e, 1945f) published in the journal a series of six articles "A Propos de l'Existentialismse." The fifth article announced at its conclusion that the series would end with the next installment (Beaufret, 1945e), yet the title of the sixth article (Beaufret, 1945f) suggests that the reader could expect a second part on "Existentialism and Marxism," which evidently never appeared in the journal. Lapointe (1981, p. 316) confirms this in his entry on the series of articles by Beaufret. I give these details, in order to raise the question of how much of what Heidegger learned about French existentialism was acquired by reading Beaufret's articles—on Kierkegaard's influence on the movement (Beaufret, 1945a), and especially the first part of Beaufret's discussion of Sartre (Beaufret, 1945d)—and how much through direct contact with Sartre's works. Of course, Heidegger knew Sartre's lecture, which was given on October 25, 1945, but published only in February 1946, since he quotes it in his "Letter on 'Humanism'," but it is less clear how much Heidegger knew of, for example, *L'Etre et le Néant*, which was written in the early 1940s and published in 1943 (Contat & Rybalko, 1974, pp. 82–84). In the first of the articles that Heidegger had read when he wrote to Beaufret in late 1945, Beaufret cites *Sein und Zeit* as the source of "une analytique de la condition humaine." Referring to Heidegger with great admiration, he writes: "Imaginons un Aristote qui, par la force de la logique qu-il s'impose dans ses recherches, en viendrait à ne traiter que les problèmes pathétiquement débattus par Pascal et Kierkegaard" (Beaufret, March 1945a, p. 197): "Imagine an Aristotle with the power of logic at his disposal that he applied to his areas of study, who has set out to deal with the extremely moving matters discussed by Pascal and Kierkegaard." The remaining pages of Beaufret (1945a) are chiefly about Heidegger, who may not have seen the works (Beaufret, 1945b, 1945c), that are entirely devoted to his thought. Beaufret (1945d, p. 532) points out Sartre's debt to Heidegger, who is mentioned by name only once more in the article (p. 534). This little-known series of articles by Beaufret

may play an important part in the story of how Heidegger came to know about Sartre's work. More important for the present discussion, Beaufret points out Sartre's misinterpretation of Heidegger's notion of *Existenz* and his misreading of the sense of Heidegger's statement that the "essence of human reality lies in its existence," which Sartre transforms into the observation that in human beings, "essence precedes existence." Beaufret also stresses Heidegger's emphasis on the future, which contrasts with Sartre's "existentialist" emphasis on the present moment (Beaufret, 1945a, p. 416). In a stunning twist, Beaufret concludes with the remarkable observation that Heidegger's philosophy is "le platonisme de notre temps" (Beaufret, 1945c, p. 422)—"the Platonism of our time." It is important to recall that the correspondence is taking place at the beginning of Heidegger's post-war exile from teaching (1945–1951). Safranski (1998, pp. 348–350) recounts some of the circumstances of the period.

19. A slightly reworked version of the lecture was published as *L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme* (Sartre, 1947). The following year it was translated into German (no translator named) with the title *Ist der Existeniaslismus ein Humanismus?* and into English, with a title that does not hint at Sartre's question about the relation between existentialism and humanism: *Existentialism and Humanism*. In fact, in the lecture, Sartre asks whether existentialism is a humanism. He does not make the assertion. As his bibliographers point out (Contat & Rybalko 1974, p. 133), in the text itself, Sartre himself refers to the lecture as "L'Existentialisme est-il un Humanisme?," "[a]lthough the lecture was announced in the papers as 'Existentialism Is a Humanism'." A second English translation, by Philip Mairet (to which I will refer: *EH*), was published in 1948. The lecture is complemented by a protocol of discussions with "opponents of his teaching" (prefatory "Note"), most notably the Marxist, Pierre Naville (*EH*, pp. 57–70). Sartre's bibliographers (Contat & Rybalko, 1974, p. 13) aptly note: "It is worth recalling, however, that the work constitutes a rather poor introduction to Sartre's philosophy, above all for readers who have not been forewarned. Focused primarily on ethical questions, it popularizes the outstanding claims of existentialism at the price of making a sort of moralistic travesty out of them. This is, moreover, the only work Sartre has largely rejected." Was Heidegger "forewarned" or is he responding primarily to the Sartre of *L'Etre et le Néant?* Contat and Rybalko (p. 132) add: "This lecture marks an unforgettable day in the anecdotal history of existentialism: so many people came that women fainted and the lecturer could scarcely make himself understood."
20. In connection with our "abandonment," Sartre refers to Heidegger, for whom, he says, this is "a favorite word" (*EH*, p. 32). Here Sartre is probably translating Heidegger's *Geworfenheit* as used in *Sein und Zeit*. The reference to Heidegger at this point may suggest to the reader that Heidegger is an ethicist, which a close reading of his writings does not confirm. This has not prevented some scholars from claiming to have found the basis for an ethics in Heidegger's thought. See, for example, Hatab (2000).
21. We should not forget that what, for Sartre, seem to be affective reactions (anguish, abandonment, and despair) are, for Heidegger, ontological features of human be-ing [*Da-sein*]. The influence of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* is unmistakable in this section of the lecture. One thinks of the passage in *Being and Time* (1996, p. 34), "Higher than actuality stands possibility."
22. There are some difficulties with these principles, but a critique of (1) existentialism and truth, (2) the status of existentialism as a theory or an ideology, and (3) how *la condition humaine* differs from human nature would require another series of studies.
23. At this point, Sartre disassociates himself from classical humanism and allies existentialism with the "fundamental" meaning of humanism, which he gives in the next few sentences of the lecture. One source of Sartre's affinity for Heidegger may be traced to their shared distrust of value-based philosophy. As we will see later on, however, Heidegger may not have fully appreciated Sartre's distinction at this point in the lecture.
24. By his own admission, Sartre's reading of Heidegger had been an arduous ordeal. Even German-speaking readers had complained of the difficulty understanding Heidegger's thought as expressed in *Sein und Zeit*.

25. As we have seen, the "Brief über den 'Humanismus'" was Heidegger's response to a letter from Jean Beaufret. It was first published in 1947 along with Heidegger's 1940 lecture "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit" as a separate booklet, which has been reprinted many times. A French translation by Roger Munier was published in two installments in the periodical *Cahiers du Sud* **40** (pp. 319–320) only in 1953. In April 1949, the British periodical *World Review* (#2, New Series, pp. 29–33) published an anonymous translation of a few excerpts of the text. This was apparently the *first* Heidegger published in English anywhere. In 1962, a full English translation, by Frank Lohner, appeared and has been reprinted in several volumes since then. Two other English translations have been published. I refer to Volume 9, *Wegmarken*, of the *Gesamtausgabe* edition, Klostermann, Frankfurt [*HB*] of Heidegger's writings. All translations are my own.
26. The equation of *essentia* with possibility and *existentia* with actuality had been made by Heidegger earlier in the text. In fact, however, Sartre has not done what Heidegger claims he has. Sartre says we "remain in the realm of possibilities," which has priority over actuality. He understands actuality as being. My rendering of *Existenz* with "life" or, better, "a way of life" is the result of a long struggle with Heidegger's thought and *Being and Time's* language, which Heidegger himself eventually dismissed as inadequate to his way of thinking. For a full treatment of what is at stake here, see my *Translating Heidegger* (Groth, 2004). Briefly, the problematic is as follows. For Heidegger, the outstanding feature of existence [*Da-sein*] (the human way of be-ing [*Seiende*]), is *Existenz*, a distinctive way of living one's life [*Leben*]. The emphasis on our always existing as a particular way of life is the "existential" element of Heidegger's thought that attracted (among other French intellectuals) Sartre, but which, I will argue, Sartre did not fully grasp. His misunderstanding of Heidegger's thought depended on his misreading of Heidegger's usage of *Existenz* in *Sein und Zeit* and other early texts.
27. Heidegger's term *Destruktion* is perhaps better rendered with de-structuring or disassembling.
28. Sartre's words in the passage quoted may be likened to the English expression "plane of existence." However, the French word *plan* also corresponds to Heidegger's term *Entwurf* (project). Earlier on in the lecture, Sartre had said: "Man is at the start a plan which is aware of itself . . . ; nothing exists prior to this plan; there is nothing in heaven; man will be what he will have planned to be. Not what he will want to be." One English translation confuses the two sense of the French word *plan*.
29. Sartre (1974b, pp. 199–223) includes the author's late views on psychoanalysis.
30. It is interesting to note that many existentialists underwent major transformations of their *Existenz*, while Heidegger remained absorbed by one question throughout his life—the question about the meaning of *Sein*. Among the Christian existentialists, Karl Jaspers *is*, by turns, psychiatrist and philosopher. Gabriel Marcel *is*, by turns, playwright, theologian and philosopher. The major atheistic existentialist, Sartre himself, *is* variously a novelist, playwright, philosopher, existential psychoanalyst, and political activist. By contrast, the inveterate interrogator of the *Seinsfrage* [question about be[-ing]], Heidegger *is* nothing at all. Eventually even disowning the designation philosopher, he admits only to thinking [*Denken*], which is not to be confused with cognitive activity but is construed as a form of thanking [*Danken*]. See Heidegger (1968, p. 138), which he is said to have referred to as his "favorite book" among those he published.
31. I will return to this issue at the conclusion of the chapter.
32. Heidegger (1976, pp. 103–122). After 1943, the text was published with an important "Postscript" (1976, pp. 303–312) and, in editions from 1949 on, the lecture was preceded by an equally important "Introduction" (1976, pp. 365–384). Heidegger's lecture was first published in 1929, with a French translation by Henri Corbin and others available only in 1938.
33. Once again, we should not forget that, at the beginning of the Second World War, for many French existentialists, including Sartre, Heidegger's philosophy was tainted by his involvement with National Socialism in 1933 and for many years following.
34. Several of Binswanger's essays were published (Binswanger, 1963) under the obviously Heideggerian title *Being-in-the-World*. The book contains essays from 1930 on. Heidegger's influence on Boss is evident beginning with his *Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis* (Boss, 1963) and

concluding with the posthumously published *Zollikon Seminars* (Heidegger, 2001), which contains Heidegger's critique of Binswanger's *Daseinsanalyse*. The book is a collection of protocols of seminars Heidegger held for residents in psychiatry being supervised by Boss. The seminars were held at Boss's home in the Zollikon district of Zurich. *Zollikon Seminars* also includes correspondence and accounts of conversations between Boss and Heidegger from the years 1947 to 1972. In the course of the seminars, Heidegger also dismissed the work of Erwin Straus, Wolfgang Blankenburg and Jacques Lacan, whom he diagnosed as perhaps being in need of a psychiatrist himself. See my review (Groth, 2002, pp. 164–166) of *Zollikon Seminars*. Unlike Sartre's existential psychoanalysis, Boss's *Daseinsanalytik* was not caught up in the metaphysical *Weltanschauung* inherited from the post-Socratic Greek philosophers. We know that Heidegger rejected Freud's psychoanalysis and, like Sartre, saw it as a form of empiricism. In an interview with the author, in June, 1976, Boss recounted observing that, after having read a few of Freud's texts, Heidegger asserted that he could not accept Freud's approach. On Heidegger's opinion of Freud, see Groth (1976, p. 69, no. 1).

35. In the standard translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Heidegger, 1962, p. 67), the sentence runs: "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence." Joan Stambaugh's (Heidegger, 1996, p. 39) rendering is more in the spirit of Heidegger's thought: "The 'essence' of the being lies in its to be."
36. Heidegger had established these equivalences—*essentia*/possibility, *existentia*/actuality—in the preceding pages of the "Letter."
37. The preceding and following quotations are from the "Avant-propos" to Wahl's (1947, pp. 7–9) *Petite Histoire de "L'Existentialisme,"* which never made it into the English translation, *A Short History of Existentialism* (Wahl, 1949). The preface is signed, collectively, "C.M." The translation also omits Wahl's remarkable reflections on "Kafka and Kierkegaard," which conclude the French edition. Wahl's little volume was published by the same house as *Existentialism and Humanism*. On her experiences with the publisher, see Hazel Barnes' memoir (1997, pp. 149–150, 153, 159).
38. On that very day, as it happens, Heidegger had written a letter to Sartre touting his "comprehension of my philosophy as I have never before encountered." The letter was uncovered by Frédéric de Towarnicki and published for the first time in the early 1990s. See Safranski (1998, pp. 349 and 448, no. 27) for details and a reference (p. 350) to a document in which Heidegger credits Sartre's understanding of *Sein und Zeit* as decisive for Heidegger's later reception among French intellectuals. Safranski notes that around the same time the Club Maintenant was meeting to listen to Sartre's lecture on existentialism and humanism, Heidegger was in his Alpine lodge, near Todnauberg in the Black Forest of southwest Germany, considering whether to write a philosophical analysis of skiing and pondering the denazification proceedings he was facing.
39. Repression indicates that the individual has forgotten uncomprehended or emotionally overwhelming events but has *also* forgotten that something once known has been forgotten.
40. The old conflict may be compared to a microorganism that has lain inactive since it manifested as a disease (chicken pox). Under the influence of stressors that weaken repression (the immune system), the organism revives in a somewhat altered form as the current symptom (shingles).
41. The best sources of information about Sartrean clinical practice are by Cannon (1991, 1999). An earlier version of Cannon (1999) was given at the Wagner College Conference on Existential Psychotherapy, which was held on May 1, 1999, hosted by the author.
42. The quotation is, of course, from Sartre's own *Words*.
43. Heidegger's verb here is *west*, the third-person singular of *wesen*. See the passage from *Was heißt Denken?*, cited above. As it happens, the passage was omitted from the English translation.
44. Something similar can be said about moods. Each of us is always in a mood, but we are usually not aware of the mood unless it is especially strong or is markedly different from the mood we were in that preceded it.
45. When Sartre says that we never are what we are and, at the same time, always are what we are not, Heidegger agrees but takes us a step further ontologically, by suggesting that we have nothing to do with such change. This is not a sort of crypto-determinism or fatalism. Heidegger simply wants to say that change is of be[-ing] not by existence.

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