

Médard Boß: A Memoir (1973)

Translated by Miles Groth

Abstract

This paper is a translation of a memoir written by Medard Boss when he was seventy years old. This is the first time it has been published in English and it contains some important details about Boss's early life and influences. It is also important because Boss had contact with many of the major figures of modern psychiatry and psychotherapy, including Freud, Heidegger, Bleuler and Jung. It is therefore important because it shows how Boss's thought has been influenced by all these figures.

Key Words

Medard Boss, early life, memoir, Martin Heidegger

Introductory Note

This charming memoir appeared when the author was seventy years old as 'Medard Boß' in Ludwig Pongratz (ed.), Psychotherapie in Selbstdarstellungen (Bern: Huber, 1973), 71-106. It is an example of the great psychiatrist's engaging style and gift for clarity, depth and humour. Previously untranslated, some important details about Boss's youth are recounted, including especially his early interest in art. It is also significant for its broad sweep of the history of modern psychiatry and psychotherapy, beginning with Freud. The appearance of nearly every major figure in these fields and in philosophy is remarkable. Boss had contact with all of them and, in the case of Martin Heidegger, the relationship ran from mentorship to friendship. He had been in analysis with Freud and trained with Eugen Bleuler and Carl Gustav Jung.

Boss lived until 1990 and continued to add to his contributions at conferences and in journals after writing this memoir. He went on to publish five more books, including his comprehensive Grunrsriß der Medizin und Psychologie [Outline of Medicine and Psychology], which appears to have been in press while Pongratz was preparing his collection of self-portraits, which also includes autobiographical sketches by Rudolf Dreikurs, Karlfried Graf von Dürckheim, Viktor E. Frankl and eight others.

I am convinced that Boss is the central figure in the story of existential psychotherapy. His disinterest in forming a school around him may have contributed to the current unfamiliarity with Boss among most young psychotherapists and psychiatrists. He relented, however, as you will read.

I chose to translate and see into print Boss's memoir on the occasion of the publication of Heidegger's Zollikoner Seminare in the edition by Peter

Trawny (Gesamtausgabe 89, 2018), which complements the edition completed by Boss himself that appeared under special circumstance in 1987.

Médard Boß [1903-1990]

Official papers testify that I saw the light of day on 4 October, 1903, in St. Gallen [Switzerland]. My parents later added that the event had taken place on an auspicious Sunday morning when the bells of the nearby monastery church summoned people to mass. It may be that this pious welcome was one that aroused a secret but never quite silenced desire for monastic life. I came close to fulfilling it half a century later when I was granted refuge in a Hindu ashram in northern India. However, just as the transfer of my parents from St. Gallen to Zürich at the beginning of my life quickly spirited me away from the monastery, I also had to leave the stillness of the Indian ashram after only a few weeks and returned to my post in the West at the behest of its abbot. Meanwhile, however, the intervening time has not passed without the appearance of god-like beings.

Of course, instead of gods, demons first came my way. But their work was not just evil. Only because of their intervention in my life when I was four years old do I know from my own experience that I exist at all. They were the source of a long period of often recurring anxiety that made me fear for my very life. They seized me every time I had completed smaller or larger ‘business’ when, in a single rush, the mass of water from the tank above crashed with an overwhelming din into the toilet bowl below and dragged everything it found there to some ghastly depth. Only a swift escape to my mother could appease my horror at the possibility of being yanked down into the darkness of some unknown gaping maw. At the same time, however, these fears also revealed to me early on with dramatic urgency that I was something unto myself independent of everything else around me. Luckily, my mother came in handy when I confessed my concerns to her. It is true, she said, that man was actually created from dirty earth. But he was also given a guardian angel who, all one’s life, pulled us up toward heaven. Therefore, what one actually is can never just decay into mere earth. Such clarification was immediately followed by salvation. Even today, such early maternal psychotherapy seems to have been much more appropriate help at the time for the great power of my fears than were the interpretations much later of my training analyst, who could see in them only symptoms of unconscious fear of castration. In any case, from that point on, over the years only the bright areas of my world have preoccupied me.

My parents went to Zürich when I was two years old because they had been appointed to administrative posts at the University Children’s Hospital. With almost submissive respect my parents met their new boss, the medical director of the clinic, Professor [Peter] Fehr, who at that time had already become world famous. His stature in the eyes of their sensitive four- to

five-year-old firstborn was heightened by reverential veneration of such a demigod. Looking down the long corridors of the hospital I could see his radiance reflected by the white-coated flock of assistant doctors and nurses who made their daily visit, following their boss like the tail of a comet. Going to school, however, put the boy hitherto well-protected and pampered by a tenderly loving mother into the rough atmosphere of a gang of local street kids. In their world, there was no more of the respect and awe my humble parents showed the great ones of the world. Rather, the opposite was the case. The urchins were left with nothing but rebellion and confusion about adults. Their influence soon changed my view of the hospital director and his doctors from being at an unattainable distance to being more down to earth. My reverence for the latter's supernatural nature made me decide to become one of them myself.

From that point on my decision prompted me to gain as much insight as possible into the wards, operating rooms, and medical and surgical polyclinics of the children's hospital, in both permissible and less permissible ways. The boy's premature 'scientific' curiosity could not be satisfied by anything else. Even harsh punishments failed. Over time, my interest in the medical facilities gained me the outright and enduring goodwill of the medical director. Much later this also benefited me in my state medical examinations.

My father was visibly impressed by my early career choice and supported it whenever he could. Among such endeavours, one day – I may have been ten years old – he took me by the hand and led me to the clinic's morgue. There lay the pale corpse of a girl about my age who had died. Today, I know that leukaemia had probably brought her to that end. At the time, I was shaken not only by the peculiar whiteness of the face and folded hands, but above all by the uncanny stillness of the figure. Both gave the dead child a supernatural magnitude and heavenly purity. 'This too,' said my father, referring to the death of the child, 'belongs to life, and all of us face it.' He then took me back outside into the warm sunshine of a bright spring morning. This first physical encounter with death strengthened my determination to become a doctor. At the same time, it called forth a flood of questions about the origin, journey, meaning and purpose of man. I realized that a doctor, who would hour after hour be in close proximity to the challenges and finitude of human life, should not be embarrassed to answer these questions.

I began to assert myself with questions of this kind, not only with doctors but with everyone I thought wise. My father's best friend, who regularly took part in our family's Sunday walks which had now grown to include five members, suffered the most. This was a man who had once joined the Foreign Legion because of a youthful love affair and had therefore seen more of the world and its inhabitants than anyone else around me. And yet he, too, was obviously stumped for answers. He retaliated by giving

me the nickname 'philosopher'. Soon my sister and schoolmates had also adopted it. However, since I had no idea what a philosopher was and the word might just as well have referred to something evil as to something good, the gibe didn't bother me at all.

My steps toward a career in medicine advanced with my entrance into Zürich's high school. But they were soon seriously caused to falter. The minimal requirements of middle school then gave me more than enough time to indulge in 'stupid thoughts'. Soon the idea that dawned on me of becoming an artist instead of a doctor was noticed by my parents and, with a single exception, by all my teachers. The exception not only broke ranks with respect to his colleagues. He was the real reason for the change of career I now envisaged. The drawing teacher of our school had put the 'stupid idea' in my head. He evidently believed I had unusual artistic talent. So, one day, he dragged me to the studio of one of his painter friends. The scholastically most gifted one had been betrayed by his drawing teacher. His friend the able maestro immediately took me on as an apprentice. From that time on, I spent every spare minute in the midst of the indescribable disorder of a painter's workshop. I sized dozens and dozens of canvases for him. From time to time he let me at the paint and brushes. The 'works of art' I created at the time seemed to show him and me that my painterly talent was worth the trouble of sacrificing my whole life. My hope became a certainty when one of my paintings was included in an exhibition at our art gallery. Clever as he was and unaffected by such an honour, my father continued to hold to the opposite view. When due to lack of time and interest my scholastic achievements were affected because of painting, my father resorted to therapy. Rather than saying anything, I traveled with him to Munich. There he took me to the museums and for days let me see the paintings on display there. Above all, I saw the pictures of Rembrandt, Cézanne, Monnet [sic] and Renoir. Their presence moved me to vivid delight. At the same time, however, they also inflicted on me a gloomy anguish that made my father's drastic treatment a full and lasting success. Faced with such inspired masters, the overestimation of my own talent and all my previous bumbling attempts at painting were no longer hidden from me. After returning home, to this day I have never again touched a brush. For better or worse, my former master had to prepare his own canvases again. All the more eagerly did I immerse myself in the works of true painters. I believe that over time I have acquired a considerable degree of 'appreciation for art'. The art historian [Joseph] Zemp [1869-1942], whose lectures I attended regularly and enthusiastically during the first semester of my medical studies, helped me a lot.

More and more, however, I was fascinated by science. This was due not least to my incredible and undeservedly good luck, which started at the beginning of my medical studies and has remained faithful to me to this

day. It bestowed on me extraordinarily many and extraordinarily outstanding teachers, each of whom for some unknown reason took utmost care of me and sought to promote me in every way. Hans Schinz [1858-1941], the rowdily distinguished botanist, and Paul Karrer [1889-1971], the chemist and Nobel laureate, were the first. They were followed by W. R. Hess [1881-1973], later also a Nobel laureate in physiology. From the very beginning his teaching captivated me to such an extent that I immediately asked him to save an assistant's position for me in his institute for the time after my state examinations. With obvious joy, he readily agreed. But then came the time for instruction in psychiatry afforded me by Eugen Bleuler [1857-1939]. He was the first of the four men with shining eyes – as I silently try to find a name for them – whom I would encounter during my lifetime. The other three were Sigmund Freud [1856-1939], Martin Heidegger [1889-1976] and an Indian sage who lived high up in the Kashmir Mountains. All four presented an almost shy demeanour in their outward behaviour. At the same time, however, each of them radiated a spiritual fire almost perceptible to the senses that came from deep within and often seemed to erupt from even greater depths.

When I first heard Eugen Bleuler's lectures, he was close to retirement. As is often the case with first-rate scientists, the aging Eugen Bleuler had been increasingly seized by an urge for philosophical reflection. It met my own inclination so much that our conversations filled hours and hours of a small private seminar. The theme was mostly the essence of the 'mneme [memory trace]'. Eugen Bleuler could not be dissuaded from using [Richard] Semon's [1859-1918] engram theory as an adequate explanation for memory phenomena in man and indeed for the development of the entire animal kingdom. On the other hand, it was even then incomprehensible to me how a mental reality [*Gegebenheit*] of the sort which has the capacity for memory of what were significant events could ever be produced by chemical-physical processes that take place within brain cells.

Meantime, in my military career I had made it to medical corporal. In this capacity I faithfully took the refresher course prescribed by the state. My supervisor, the captain, had a book on his desk in the infirmary. It bore the at first incomprehensible title *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Its author was a certain Sigmund Freud. I sneakily started to snoop around in the book. Soon, however, I could not put the book down. I wanted to borrow it but came up against a certain contrariness on the part of its owner. The grounds for his refusal were that one should first undergo his own training analysis [*Lehranalyse*] and only then read psychoanalytic books. Of course, one was unable to interrupt the reading one had begun. Freud's writing opened an incredibly new, fascinating world of which I had not been given even the slightest idea during my previous medical studies. All the riddles of the human soul and many of the body found plausible explanation

in this book with its simple catchy drive formulas. These were so much like the chemical-physical laws of nature I had just learned that I considered Freud's 'metapsychology', which was so logically consistent and self-contained, no less correct and true than those laws. The questionable nature of their premises was to remain hidden from me for quite some time.

Not long after the military refresher course that was so memorable thanks to Freud, I was lucky enough to meet Sigmund Freud face to face. The impressive power of suggestion that emanated from this brilliant man was all that was needed to secure my belief in the truth of psychoanalytic theories. My father's generosity had enabled me to spend the summer semester of 1925 and summer holidays in Vienna. Long before my arrival in Vienna I had intended to visit the famous Freud. Only during the second half of my time in Vienna, however, did I actually gather enough courage to put my intention into action. Of course, my visit to Berggasse 19 had to be done in secret. The whole circle of my Viennese colleagues had nothing but ridicule for Freud. They called everything that was connected with his psychoanalysis one big mess.

Even today I do not quite know how it happened to me then, but suddenly I lay on the couch [Couch] in Freud's office and got to hear from his own mouth the only basic rule of his psychoanalytic treatment. It obligated me to unrestrained truthfulness, but also ruthless honesty towards myself and Freud. On the basis of my so-called free associations, I quickly sensed in my body the full force of Freud's power at unmasking. Nothing was any longer what it seemed to be. Everything was just a euphemistic façade [*Fassade*] that would always conceal unfamiliar bad things. That was confusing enough. But even more amazing was the fact that during the entire period of analysis I was to go through with him Freud was completely different than he was supposed to have been according to his own deterministic instinctual theory and his representation of the analyst as a blank screen. For example, at no time did he deal with me as a bundle of drives. In addition, as soon as he heard I had been forced to starve because of him he did not hesitate to reduce to a minimum the fee he was to be paid. More than once he even gave me ten shillings [about seventy-five dollars in 2018] out of his pocket. Who can say whether this first obvious contradiction between what Freud wrote and theoretically proclaimed and his actual therapeutic behaviour was the kernel for all my many later doubts about his theory?

For the time being, however, I innocently followed the entire educational path established by the International Psychoanalytic Association. After my return from Vienna, I continued my training analysis in Zürich for another three years with Hans Behn-Eschenburg [1919-1955]. I went through the stage of permanent guest of the Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis, then the period of associate membership, until I was finally accepted as a full member of the association and eventually even held a post on its board.

Bearing in mind their very strict admission conditions, all of this is worth mentioning because it may be enough evidence that I know what I am talking about when discussing my later experiences with Freud's psychology and psychotherapy. On the other hand, I also take note of these details with a certain amount of pride about my membership in the International Psychoanalytic Association, which I still maintain. It therefore means a great deal to me, since I am well aware that without Freud, without his work, and without his followers I would not have been able to become an even reasonably competent existential analytic therapist [*daseinsanalytischer Therapeut*]¹. My Zürich training analyst [*Lehranalytiker*] adhered to psychoanalytic theory much more rigorously than its creator had. Nevertheless, if I may trust my own experience, this second bit of analysis, too, managed to bring about decisive and liberating advancement of my maturation as a human being, although I had found neither myself nor my environment to be particularly in need of treatment before the commencement of my analysis. That's how I learned that at its most beneficial psychoanalysis is for the healthy.

Hans Behn-Eschenburg was not only a psychoanalyst, he was also an expert in the administration of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. For many years he had been a student of Rorschach himself. So, I owe to him the impetus for my own extensive Rorschach studies. However, the more numerous the test protocols that I worked up, the more difficult their proper interpretation seemed to me to be, and above all the more suspicious I became of the increasingly finely tuned mathematization of the findings that began to emerge in the literature.

At the end of my medical studies, the then senior physician of the Psychiatric University Clinic in Zürich and later Professor of Psychiatry at Basel, John Staehelin [1891-1969], approached me. He himself and on behalf of his supervisor asked me whether I was ready to enter the Burghölzli [Hospital] as an assistant after taking the state examination.

From earlier on, however, W. R. Hess still kept open a position for me at the Physiological Institute. Gradually, however, Eugen Bleuler gained the upper hand over Hess in my thoughts and aspirations. Now more and more psychiatry seemed to me to be able to gain far more of what was essential for man than any ingenious physiology. Still, W. R. Hess's brain stimulus experiments in which he knew how to put cats into different moods still committed me to his subject. Nevertheless, the final decision for psychiatry was not difficult for me. The five-year residency at the Zürich Psychiatric University Hospital and Polyclinic flew by for two reasons: in the first place, even though he had already handed over his post as its director to H. W. Maier [1882-1945] a half-year earlier, it was still overseen by Eugen Bleuler, whose conception of one's duties kept the assistants busy day and night without a single moment of boredom. On

the other hand, I was granted a one-and-a-half-year stay abroad. The first six months of this holiday I spent at the National Hospital for Nervous Diseases in London because I wanted to add some neurology to my psychiatry. There I was fortunate enough to report directly to the outstanding scientists [W.J.] Adie [1886-1935] and [S.K.] Wilson [1878-1937]. At the same time, I enrolled as a training candidate at the London Institute for Psychoanalysis. There I was given the privilege of being allowed to accompany Ernest Jones [1879-1958], its stern director and later Freud biographer, when he examined patients and decided on their suitability for psychoanalytic treatment. The improbable speed and precision with which his gaze apprehended the ill at their core bordered on magic for me.

I moved from London to Berlin for another year. The change of location meant a change in climate of a very special kind. In London, people knew how to deal with each other in a natural, tactful, amiable and obliging manner, as if everything were self-explanatory. By contrast, Berlin conversation felt like an icy shower. Its brusqueness and mocking hardness initially felt like knife stabs, until I discovered that there could be good-naturedness even under a rough shell.

I was readily accepted as a training candidate at the Eitington Psychoanalytic Institute in Berlin. I was immediately assigned to five patients whom I had to treat analytically under the regular supervision of Karen Horney [1885-1952], [Otto] Fenichel [1897-1946] and [Harald] Schultz-Henke [1892-1953]. In addition, I was permitted to attend the seminars of Hanns Sachs [1881-1947], Wilhelm Reich [1897-1957] and [Siegfried] Bernfeld [1892-1953]. I marvelled at Hanns Sachs's supreme ease in giving his lectures. He did not need the least written help. He presented his finely differentiated material in print-ready, form-perfect sentences without any faltering in the flow of his speech. Wilhelm Reich possessed an ingeniously exciting style of presentation. To this day, some of his statements made at the time have remained therapeutic for me. This applies in particular to his statement that in psychoanalytic therapy chaos can be avoided only if one always addresses and questions the resistance behaviour of the patient; by contrast, the id content is self-evident. Fenichel had a phenomenal memory. For every word that Freud had ever written, he knew instantly where to find it in the collected works as well as the time of its publication. Bernfeld's stubborn endeavour, with which he was obsessed at the time of my stay in Berlin, seemed rather bizarre to me. It was about measuring quantities of libido. Karen Horney seemed to me the most humane of all the Berlin psychoanalysts. It made a great impression on me how she started out from a myriad of constituents of the human psyche but always spoke of man as a whole person.

In addition to my work at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, I was also engaged as a guest student at the Neurological Department of Kurt Goldstein's

[1878-1965] Moabiter Hospital. However, there prevailed there (it was now 1932, and the Nazi Reich was advancing powerfully) too intense a nervousness and doom-and-gloom for the greatness of the master to be able to really surmount. One sentence from Goldstein's lecture has especially stuck with me. The human brain (so I heard him say in a side note) is a structure that far surpasses all man-made works in terms of beauty and efficiency.

After my one-and-a-half year stay abroad, I remained only one more year at Zürich's Burghölzli. Then the management of the private sanatorium Schloss Knonau fell into my lap. It had gained world fame through its then director, Jakob Kläslī [1883-1980]. As the only doctor in the house, I was able to form a very close partnership with ten nurses and a maximum of twenty patients. I owe most of my insights into the nature of schizophrenia to this period. Compared to the routine examinations and usual brief visits the doctors at large psychiatric clinics have to carry out, living together continuously with many different sorts of patients from the time they get up, through their mealtimes, working and playing hours, until bedtime lets one see what is decisive that until then has remained hidden. On the basis of what I was able to see and given my psychoanalytic training, I soon ventured to undertake actual attempts at psychotherapy with schizophrenic patients. As a 1938 paper on 'Preparatory individual treatment for group occupational therapy with severe, chronic schizophrenics'² testifies, I had pretty much used the same procedure that was later to be given the name '*réalisation symbolique*' by Ms. Sechehay [sic] [Marguerite-Albert Sechehaye (1887-1964)]. Some rather considerable successes completely contradicted Freud's opinion, which he had made known to me in a letter of 5 August, 1936. In it he says: 'It is true that I have seen little success in the analytic treatment of schizophrenia. My advice not to use this method in private practice has practical motives. The failures are written about in accounts of analysis and damage its reputation. Of course, there is nothing wrong with using analysis to study schizophrenia in an institution'³.

It seemed to me that too much therapeutic pessimism was expressed in these lines. It was he who for the first time shook my blind faith [in psychoanalysis] that I had brought to every statement of the great man. Further disruptions of my confidence in the genuineness of Freudian doctrine followed in rapid succession. I discovered an alarming self-contradiction that gaped between two kinds of Freud's writings. His theoretical treatises on 'metapsychology' represent the strictest determinism. On the other hand, in his writings on technique, which relate to the practical behaviour of the psychoanalytic therapist [*psychoanalytischen Therapeuten*], there are at least a half dozen times when there is talk of a being free [*Frei-Sein*] and an even greater freedom that his treatment could bring to the ill. In a conception of man whose psychic life is forced into a seamlessly determined series of causal connections strictly and really scientifically conceived,

no place at all is given for any freedom, any more than for ‘tactlessness towards the analysand [*Taktlosigkeiten gegenüber den Analysanden*]⁴, which Freud so authoritatively said the therapist was to avoid. Added to this were difficulties of their own in the analytic treatment of neurotic patients. Theoretically, I knew in great detail about Freud’s dream theory. In practice, however, its application gave me the biggest headache. Most of my analysands had the disadvantage of being people who were clever and critical well above the average. With none of them did I arrive at Freud’s dream explanations. These were flatly rejected by them as highly absurd artefacts for which I had not the slightest evidence to offer. The excuses I made to myself for the peculiar behaviour of my patients traced back to the ‘resistance’ of the patient and to my own inadequate experience never really caught on with me. So I took a closer look at Freud’s *Interpretation of Dreams* [1900]. To my astonishment, two peculiar facts came to into view at the same time. First, in his numerous examples of interpretation I saw nothing of Freud’s analysis until the discovery of the postulated dream core [*Traumkern*]; namely, the actual cause of the dream [*Traumursache*], the infantile dream wish [*Traumwunsch*] that he assumed. Even more serious, however, seemed to be the only ‘proof’ in favour of his theory of dreams [*Traumlehre*] given in all five hundred pages of the work. In fact, it consists of a single reference to so-called undisguised [*unverhüllt*] dreams. In Freud’s way of speaking, these are dream images in which the instinctual desire comes to nothing. These undisguised dreams, writes Freud, are not interesting in themselves, but only as ‘proof [*Beweis*]’ that all dreams are constructed the same way. I then wanted and still do not want this ‘evidence [*Beweisführung*]’ to be as valid as the assertion: since there are white roses, all other-coloured roses are basically white, but only a disguised white. The scales fell from my eyes and I realized that present dream phenomena were not the least indication of the factual occurrence of psychic things [*Dinge*] and processes at work presupposed by Freud.

In my perplexity following this discovery, *Freuds Auffassung des Menschen im Lichte der Anthropologie* [*Freud’s View of Man in the Light of Anthropology*] which had just been published by Ludwig Binswanger [1936] gave me the help I longed for⁵. On the basis of this excellent critique of Freud, I understood that Freud was forced to invent his whole theory of dreams together with his idea of an ‘unconscious’ only because a causal connection had to necessitate everything that is present [*Vorhanden*]. Doubt upon doubt about Freud’s theoretical metapsychology now assaulted me. Why had Freud resorted to the term ‘metapsychology [*Metapsychologie*]’, that is, to a beyond [*jenseits*]- or about [*über*]-psychology? ‘Meta-’ [psychology]? Apparently because with it he knowingly went beyond factual experience and what is actually present. But whence his justification for the apodictic directive with which he characterizes the basic intention of his entire

psychology: ‘In our view, perceived phenomena must take a back seat to merely assumed strivings’⁶? Who or what forced on him such an odd ‘must’? In any case, Freud himself does not have the least justification for this ‘must’ that supports the entirety of psychoanalytic theory. Even more striking, however, seemed to me to be the fact that, on the one hand, Freud declares man’s instinctuality to be the actual and only real ground of all psychic phenomena but, at the same time, he characterizes the instincts as fathomless [*bodenlos*] with the words ‘vagueness’, ‘dark’ and ‘mythic’. Did Freud not contradict himself further and in a dubious manner when, on the one hand, he prescribed the analytic practice of dismantling the prejudices brought by the analysand but under no circumstances replacing them with the analyst’s own prejudices, only then to explain the bodily [*Körperliche*] and the instincts that stem directly from it in terms of the actual reality of psychic life [*Wirklichen des Seelenlebens*]? Or is this enthronement of domination by one’s physical urges something other than the prejudice of a psychoanalyst?

Being under the burden of these and many other doubts threatened to suffocate my medical work. At just the right time a new great teacher approached me. As he openly admitted, C[arl].G[ustav]. Jung [1875-1961] was pained that he had been able to gather only a few medical students around him. In Zürich, he was surrounded almost exclusively by a close circle [*dichten Kranz*] of admiring ladies. Certainly this was a wall of protection that might have been vital for his prodigious sensibility. Obviously, that was not enough for him. That is why, in 1938, he summoned half a dozen psychotherapists practicing in the city. One of them was me. He formed a working group with us that lasted for almost ten years. Its abrupt end was my fault. For a while, however, this group of psychotherapists sometimes met weekly, sometimes monthly in Jung’s private home in Kusnacht, near Zürich. He tried to make his teaching understandable and acceptable with case discussions. In dire need, he was for me a saviour in the truest sense of the word. His opening up of the Freudian prison of the drives and the rehabilitation of the alleged dream façade [*Traumfassade*] by Alphons [sic] [Alphonse] Maeder [1882-1971] and Herbert Silberer [1882-1923] let me breathe again for a while. But soon I also noticed certain discrepancies in C.G. Jung’s teaching. I first became suspicious when he called himself a natural scientific phenomenologist [*naturwissenschaftlichen Phänomenologen*]. Shortly before that, I had been informed by L[udwig]. Binswanger about the nature of phenomenology, which is so different from natural science. That is why I now knew that a natural scientific phenomenology is like the nonsense [*Unding*] of wooden iron. There the scientific method, with its rejection of actually present perceptible phenomena in favour of the assumptions of subtle, causal forces; here phenomenological science [*phänomenologische Wissenschaft*], with

its interpretive dwelling [*Verweilen*] with what appeals to human beings of the significance of the thing itself [*von den Dinge selbst*] and its renunciation of all inference and causal deduction.

It was my 1947 habilitation thesis *Sinn und Gehalt der sexuellen Perversionen*, however, that first caused our working group to break up. For the first time in my work my descriptions were based on the phenomenological approach, but, of course, as I had received it from L. Binswanger. In working this way it was unavoidable that I had to subject to phenomenological critique not only Freud's speculative metapsychology but also C.G. Jung's hypotheses of the archetypes and the 'collective unconscious'. Of course, from such a point of view I could see C. G. Jung's archetypal representation as only an intellectual inference from certain phenomena of human perception of something abstractly logical which could correspond to something factually present and identifiable only with very little probability.

One week after I had given C.G. Jung my book as a gift, his break with me was by that time complete [*perfekt*]; better, half complete. For my part, I maintained bound to C.G. Jung with unchanged gratitude. On the other hand, on his part his response to my gift was a very indignant letter. It is dated 5 August, 1947. Apart from its surly personal tone, it seems to me to be of not insignificant general interest. The text shows in an amazing way the spiritual closeness of C.G. Jung and Sigmund Freud, even though in their later years they both sought to withdraw from one another in such a lively [*lebhaft*] way. In the first place, the letter makes clear the same incapacity for basic philosophical thinking that Freud had always shown. Both sought to compensate for this with an identical contempt for all philosophizing. On the other hand, C.G. Jung's letter shows that, like Freud, he was at times well aware of the purely fictive character of his basic ideas. Again and again, in no time at all both can speak again and again with the greatest degree of self-understanding of the same intellectual constructs [*Gedankengebilden*] as if they were actual facts whose observable occurrence had been long known and proven. For example, as already mentioned, Freud calls the 'impulses' dark, vague, mythic beings [*Wesen*], and called his basic idea of a psychic apparatus [*Apparates*] itself a fiction. On the other hand, every psychic reality [*psychische Wirklichkeit*] and its instinctual energy was for him nothing other than the product of this machine [*Maschine*], which had just been characterized as a fiction. Freud never had a clue that with such statements he spoke as a philosopher (albeit as a bad philosopher), as one, namely, who thoughtlessly transferred the basic philosophical dogma of an allegedly entirely real, thoroughgoing seamless causality of lifeless things to something entirely different – human life [*menschlichen Existenz*].

But C.G. Jung is equally unaware of the philosophy that dominates and supports his ideas. It is obviously the philosophy of the neo-Kantians. Without it, his supposition of a 'collective unconscious' and its archetypes

would not have been able to spring from the mind of C.G. Jung at all. Out of such philosophical ignorance Jung was able to write to me: ‘Man as an archetype is a purely empirical affair, to which nothing philosophical is attached. The fact that the archetype is causal or conditional is also empirical. If that were not the case, it would never have come to be observed. It’s not a theory, but rather a purely factual observation’⁷.

Only C.G. Jung forgot that elsewhere he himself had proclaimed the opposite and also had this opposite confirmed by his crown interpreter, Mrs. Jolanda [sic] [Jolande] Jacobi [1890-1973]. He explicitly stated that the archetypes are never directly observable, but can only be deduced from their effects. Moreover, Jung overlooked the fact that one of the first insights of philosophical reflection is always knowledge of the fundamental impossibility of a ‘pure empiricism’ or ‘pure factuality’. All observation is always ‘theory’ insofar as it necessarily takes root in some particular earlier, pre-scientific (if for the most part not specifically considered) conception of the basic nature of all facts. Finally, in his letter to me, C.G. Jung does not even consider the possibility that the same factual phenomena he first considered to be the effects of something else, namely psychic causes thought to lie behind them, are archetypes in the sense of general human brain structures or equally ubiquitous intrapsychically organized forces that could be understood quite differently and in a much less complicated way. Why, for example, shouldn’t people at different times and diverse places be affected by the same perceptions simply because one and the same thing shows itself to them? When I presented these objections to C.G. Jung, he barely listened and dismissed me with the rather harsh words ‘I don’t follow you [*Da komme ich nicht mehr nach*]’.

But that, by contrast, in better times while holding so stubbornly to the reality of his basic theoretical concepts, C.G. Jung could also be well aware of their merely fictitious character is clear from a conversation, confirmed to me in writing, that once took place between his former schoolmate, the Basel philosopher Paul Häberlin, and him. To wit, one day Häberlin accused C.G. Jung of being too bright to believe in the reality of his complicated psychological constructions. Jung’s startling answer was ‘Of course, but *mundus vult decipi* (The world wants to be deceived [*Die Welt will betrogen sein*])’. From the beginning of the Second World War until its end, each year I had to carry out border guard military service. That was predictable. Just before the outbreak of the war, the prospect of this had prompted me to give up direction of Schloss Knonau Sanitarium in order to be able to dedicate myself to my psychotherapy practice in the city, my scientific research and academic teaching. At first, of course, and for as long I functioned in my military service as the battalion physician for high quality, healthy mountain troops, I was mostly underemployed. With so much free time, time was by now a problem for me. It reminded me that L. Binswanger

once mentioned a work on time by Martin Heidegger. I had the book sent high up into the mountains. I wanted to finally find out what had been bothering [*plagende*] me for too long a time. The disappointment was great. I understood nothing of Heidegger's work *Sein und Zeit* [1927]. At the same time I couldn't get it out of my mind. I vaguely suspected that there was something important about it. I read the book again and again. Here and there, things began to dawn on me. First and foremost, I understood page 122 [7th edition; see GA 2: p 162-164] of the book. I could not believe my eyes when I saw Heidegger writing at that place about two different kinds of looking after [*Fürsorge*]. Both paragraphs could well have been taken from one of Freud's *Schriften zur Technik* [*Writings on Technique*]⁸ in which Freud wanted to characterize how an analytic therapist [*analytischer Therapeut*] should and should not behave. According to Freud, the therapeutic behaviour to be avoided at all costs Heidegger calls an 'intervening [*einspringende*]' looking after; that to be carried out, a 'way-making [*vorausspringende*]' looking after⁹. As a matter of fact, that which both Heidegger and Freud warn against is characterized by the philosopher in a way consistent with Freud's, that 'this looking after takes over for the other what he is to care for. Thus forced from his position, he steps back so that afterwards he can either take over what has been taken care of as already a done deal, or disburden himself of it completely. In such looking after the other can become one who is dependent and controlled, even though this control may be tacit and remain hidden from him.' Heidegger characterizes the other, 'way-making looking after', the positively valued looking after in this way: '[It] does not so much intervene on behalf of the other as make way for him in his existential capacity to be, not in order to take away his "care" but instead to restore it to him essentially as such for the first time. This kind of looking after, that actually concerns real care, the way of life [*Existenz*] of the Other and not a "what" that he looks after helps the other in that way to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.' But this characterizes with great conciseness the behaviour that Freud described as the analyst's only possible, permissible and fruitful way of dealing with his analysand.

Although I began to understand a little bit of *Sein und Zeit*, it became clear to me that I needed the direct help of the author in order to be able to make much progress in understanding his work. I began to inquire about the man. To my astonishment, the information of all the sources available to me about Heidegger was awful [*miserabel*]. There were rumours of his Nazism, tinged with atrocities committed at the university and toward his former teacher, [Edmund] Husserl [1859-1938]. I did not give up until, immediately after the end of the war I was finally able to look into the files of the university authorities, the command posts of the occupying powers and the denazification offices. It was not until I had obtained

sufficient assurance that Heidegger had become the victim of monstrous slander and abuse [*das Opfer ungeheuerlicher Verleumdungen und Misshandlungen*] that I made direct contact with him. As soon as circumstances allowed, in 1946, I visited him at his cabin [*Hütte*] in Todtnauberg. A mutual good will immediately united us. His physical form was certainly not very impressive. It is even more unsightly than mine. But I was struck by his gaze. His eyes seemed to betray an almost dizzying inscrutability [*eine fast schwindelerregende Abgründigkeit*], and at the same time an unaccustomed sharpness and sureness of thought. A greater contrast between this experience and the encounter with Heidegger that Hans Kunz [1904-1982] recently described in his self-portrait is hard to imagine¹⁰. It becomes understandable, however, as soon as one remembers that two people can never look at one another exactly the same way. The way in which two people meet is always determined by the nature of both. It depends on whether one partner at least potentially has something to say to the other, and if so how much. Therefore, depending on the degree of possible harmony between them, seeing and meeting the other runs the gamut for each from meaningful proximity to meaningless distance. My meeting with Heidegger in Todtnauberg was the beginning of a steadfast friendship and intellectual apprenticeship. Soon after our friendship began, however, many strange things were again whispered to me. It was said that I should beware of Heidegger, that he had betrayed [*verraten*]¹¹ and let down every man soon after he made friends with them.

During a period of more than a quarter of a century, I had not the slightest indication of this. Perhaps it's because I did not overwhelm him personally and respected his human limits. I could succeed in that, however, only because I didn't let myself be blinded by his stupendous intellectual ability, but during our time together was attentive to my habitual, professionally trained observation of human behaviour. At the same time, I saw at close range how a tremendous force consumed itself in solitary thought of a kind that is unparalleled in human history. It is not surprising that Heidegger did not have the same amount of strength for maturation and discernment in the area of human relationships. Who should demand of a perfect genius an equal development of all human possibilities for life and be angry with a very great thinker if he is not so very great all around?

The great amount of slander and injustice that had befallen Heidegger made me strive to make amends for it where that was still possible. Heidegger's own complete disinterest in a defence of his personal rights had earned him the bizarre fate of being both suspected and incriminated by the Nazis, and then after their downfall being tormented by their counterpart, denazification. Heidegger himself was little moved by my attempts at help. Regardless of his bad luck during hard times, undeterred, he unswervingly stayed on his path of thinking. Insofar as I took him for the man he was

and loved him as he was, he thanked me with indescribable patience and helpfulness in philosophical matters. The amount of effort and time that the man's 'Zollikon seminars' cost him really reached the limits of human capacity. For about fifteen years he spared no effort to be a guest in my house in Zollikon for eight to fourteen days each semester where twice (sometimes three) times a day he held seminars on the basic questions of medicine in general and psychiatry and psychotherapy in particular with my young colleagues and earlier on with assistants from the psychiatric clinic. For a good eight to ten years just prior to his physical collapse [*physischen Zusammenbruch*], he also followed the work on my book *Grundriß der Medizin* [1971] with utmost interest. He worked so hard on it that hardly a line of its six hundred pages lacked his corrective, supplementary or corroborative comments. At the beginning of our acquaintance, of course, Heidegger had at first been repelled by all psychology. What he had previously known from hearsay about this science seemed to him so bizarre [*skurril*] that he had regretted taking the time to even look into it. With some patience, I persuaded him to read at least a few of Freud's and Jung's writings. On reading them, he no longer appeared to be amazed and shake his head. Obviously, Freud's language did it. Based on the content of their psychological works, however, he could not believe that such intelligent men could be so serious about such abstruse [*abstrusen*] ideas about man. After studying some sections of Freud's three *Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* [1905], Freud's work *Das Ich und das Es* [1923], and his study *Die Zukunft einer Illusion* [1927], Heidegger said he had never considered it possible for anyone to be able to speculate mechanistically on the peculiarity of human existing [*menschlichen Existierens*]. After reading selections from C.G. Jung's works *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* [1967] and *Psychologie des Unbewußten* [1912], Heidegger could only confirm that it was fundamentally the same as Freud, but said less succinctly.

It was not until I spared Heidegger all the psychological theories and began to describe as simply as possible the concrete behaviour of my psychoneurotic and psychotic patients that his interest became more and more acute. Soon I could not tell him enough about my professional 'subject matter [*Materie*]'.

For my part, in that way I tried to thank him for his great willingness to help me make serviceable to psychology and medicine his fundamentally new insights into the nature of man, his world and the relationship between the two. But I was never to lose sight of the fact that for Heidegger himself it was never merely about anthropology [*Menschenkunde*]. In fact, all the basic features of human existing [*menschliches Existierens*] which he had worked out in *Sein und Zeit* were important to him only in regard to an appropriate [*rechtes*] question about 'being [*Sein*]' as such. That is why he called his epoch-making work *Sein und Zeit* a 'fundamental ontology [*Fudamentalontologie*]'.

Precisely because Heidegger's philosophy is a fundamental ontology, it seemed to me, his insights into the main features [*Grundzüge*] of human existence [*menschlichen Existierens*] did not exclude but rather included the viable theoretical foundation [*Fundament*] of a completely new, more humane [*menschengerecheten*] psychology, psychopathology and psychotherapy, and medicine as a whole. In all probability, such a daseinsanalytic [*daseinsanalytisches*] foundation would far outweigh the viability of previous concepts of psychology and medicine.

So that I could follow this way with some prospect of success but on firm ground, Heidegger first had to disabuse me of the existentialist [*existentialistische*] thinking of J.[-]P. Sartre and Ludwig Binswanger. In particular, until my personal encounter with Heidegger I considered Sartre, like Binswanger, to be competent interpreters of the analysis of Dasein [*Daseinsanalytik*]. But Heidegger now showed me dozens of passages in which both of them back read [*zurück interpretiert*] his discovery of human being-in-the-world into the old subjectivist Cartesianism and only used new terms. For example, in addition to a large number of other errors, Sartre speculated that Heidegger's ontological statements addressed things that were on a completely different level than that of those things belonging to man's ontic behaviour which could be explored by psychology. However, such an opinion is so wrong that, to the contrary, the ontic phenomena of human existence of interest to psychology can be what they are only because they are from the very beginning and forever permeated by the fundamental basic features that Heidegger's ontology set forth. These constitute their real nature [*Wesen*]. That is why, from the ground up, neither of them can ever be separated. One is never without the other. For one thing Binswanger had, for example, attributed to manic man a 'hopping existence [*hüpfendes Dasein*]' . Moreover, in his 'daseinsanalytic [*daseinsanalytisches*]' dream interpretations, he also spoke of moving dream figures as symbols of a rising or falling existence [*Dasein*]. Heidegger only needed draw my attention to such formulations and ask me what I made of them in order to let me see to what an alarming extent Binswanger's way of thinking kept man's existence trapped in the old reification [*Verdinglichung*]. Heidegger was even more shocked by Binswanger's misunderstanding of his concept of transcendence. A particularly grave misunderstanding by Binswanger whose origin was to be found in what was just mentioned was to be found in his reification of existence as a subject. Binswanger's misunderstanding misjudges Heidegger's central concept of transcendence so thoroughly that he uses the term to describe the alleged ascendancy [*Oberstieg*] of a subject out of his subjectivity toward the things of the world. Through such a representation of transcendence he believed he could overcome the 'malignant evil [*Krebsübel*]' of all human sciences, the subject-object split.

Following warnings of this kind, with unprecedented patience Heidegger prepared me at that time for new opportunities to continue to exercise and sharpen my perception of the genuine being-in-the-world of human existence. He would then add¹²: ‘The word transcendence has never meant for me an ascendancy of man to the things of the world, to individual beings. Rather, by transcendence I have always meant only the relation of human existence to being as such and in the verbal sense of that word. As such, the relation between human existing and being is unique. Human existence is related to being such that it is none other than true existing, a standing out in the most literal sense of the word. The human being *ek-sists* as the abiding of an area of world openness common to all human being that consists in the ability to interrogate the presence of everything that is met and in being responsive to the meaning and referential connections of what is presenting itself. Thanks to the fundamental nature of human existing this constitutes the site of appearance and unfolding of all that is and has to be, that is to say, of everything that arises from being as such, and lets come about the singularity of what is there in an area of world openness formed by human existing. On such a view, the notorious subject-object split is not just apparently bridged by some mysterious subjectivist transcendence; in fact, the Cartesian idea of a gap between a *res cogitans* and the *res extaense* [sic] [*res extensae*] can no longer even come up.[’]

Only when we are successful in seeing human existence as such as completely insubstantial [*substanzlos*] and non-objective [*ungegenständliches*] being-in-the-world will it be fully understood why man can behave physically and mentally as he in fact does. To a great extent all previous psychological and medical sciences of man are overwhelmed by the task set for them. It is otherwise if in place of the philosophy of science which allows only what is measurable to be truly valid, there are philosophical insights into the fundamental theory of the whole study of man, including psychology and medicine from the analysis of existence [*Daseinsanalytik*]. At the same time, the necessary ‘ethics’ are given that can give a well-founded goal and fixed guidelines for therapeutic applications in both sciences. Or is there a more meaningful goal for man than to let himself be used for free and responsible purposes as the manifestation and site of unfolding for all that is and has to be?

To such corrections Heidegger would regularly add the remark: ‘As long as you psychologists and physicians have not radically cleared out relics of Descartes’ time from your heads, the analytic of existence [*Daseinsanalytik*] will not be able to help you further with your psychotherapy.’”

The application to psychotherapy and psychosomatics of daseinsanalytic [*daseinsanalytischen*] insights into the basic features of human existence [*menschlichen Dasein*] brought with it all sort of requirements. First of

all, the therapeutic behaviour demanded by Freudian psychoanalysis had to be changed where in response to Freud's inhuman theoretical metapsychology it had become unfaithful to its own fundamental rule and the ways of behaving shown by the analysand in the course of treatment no longer let themselves appear as what they obviously are. Disfigurements by Freud's theoretical metapsychology, which incidentally Freud himself called a secondary and replaceable superstructure [*Superstruktur*], had also happened in the area of the cornerstones that support psychoanalytic therapy. These are the field of what is erroneously termed 'transference' phenomena and all dream life. The theoretical and practical modifications that more properly humane [*menschengerecherten*] insights necessitated especially in these realms justified, even required, another nomenclature. The term 'psychoanalysis [*Psychoanalyse*]' had to be replaced by 'analysis of existence [*Daseinsanalyse*]'. Like 'psychoanalysis', 'daseinsanalysis' also means two things: as much a science of man [*Menschenkunde*] as a therapeutic treatment [*therapeutische Verfahren*]¹³.

But not only a name change proved to be unavoidable. My students and their pupils more and more insistently urged me to finally institutionalize the analytic of existence [*Daseinsanalytik*]. Whether it would survive later, they asserted, they could not do without it today. For many years I persistently resisted the suggestion. I would argue that one cannot make a new 'school [*Schule*]' of 'daseinsanalysis [*Daseinsanalyse*]'. It is not an established organization [*Gebilde*] that exists in and of itself, not at all a system of readymade propositions and the like. 'Daseinsanalyse' can only be an invitation to tirelessly look at things, to take an even better look. The only thing that matters is that the daseinsanalyst [*Daseinsanalytiker*] be able to make the phenomena [*Phänomene*] of his 'objects of investigation [*Untersuchungsgegenstände*]' and of the patients to be treated more differentiated and more comprehensive.

But these people did not let up. Finally, I gave in. And so in the summer of 1971, a 'Society for Daseinsanalytic Anthropology [*Gesellschaft für daseinsanalytischer Anthropologie*]' based in Zürich was founded. Only nine months later, its offshoot the '[D]aseinsanalytic Institute for Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics [*daseinsanalytische Institut für Psychotherapie und Psychosomatik*]' appeared. It is an educational institution for future practicing medical and non-medical daseinsanalysts [*Daseinsanalytiker*] and an outpatient treatment center. There even poor patients find a way to be treated daseinsanalytically by candidates in training.

Both institutions, the Daseinsanalytic Society and the Institute, have to some extent replaced the Institute for Medical Psychotherapy [*Institut für ärztliche Psychotherapie*] in Zürich. This emerged from the author's longtime working relationship with Gustav Bally. As early as 1941, on the initiative of Manfred Bleuler, the son and indirect successor of Eugen

Bleuler at the Burghölzli Psychiatric University Hospital, the Zürich government commissioned both of us to take charge of and oversee the psychotherapeutic education [*Ausbildung*] of the assistants. We had a remarkable experience at the beginning of our work. Since no assistant in the clinic had yet completed his own training analysis we were forced to throw Freud's wise advice to the wind and even give analysts access to unanalyzed young colleagues. However, it did not take a year for all six aspiring analysts whom we first had to supervise [*kontrollieren*] in their work to quite naturally feel an urgent need to undergo their own training analysis. They just didn't get past certain difficulties with their patients. Subsequently, they also unanimously reported to us from their own experience what a tremendous difference it makes in terms of understanding and practical skill whether psychotherapeutic interventions [*Eingriffe*] are based on theoretical knowledge alone or are based on one's own experience. With the death of Gustav Bally, the ground was taken out from under the Institute for Medical Psychotherapy, which had grown out of our collaborative work. There had existed tension and conflict between Bally's more or less psychoanalytic orientation and my new daseinsanalytic [*daseinsanalytische*] view. However, the up-and-coming young colleagues who regrouped had mastered either orthodox psychoanalytic theory or the exclusively daseinsanalytic language, so that fruitful discussions could not come about. As a result, the Institute, once well-known and valued far beyond the country's borders, drifted off into a deep sleep.

My ever active personal contacts with Heidegger were interrupted only once for a two-year period. In 1956 and 1958, I accepted invitations to be a visiting lecturer in India and Indonesia¹⁴. I surprised myself most of all when out of the blue it occurred to me that my conception of scientific work was much better suited to the superior thinking of the people of the distant Southeast than to American psychology and psychotherapy so long known about by now here. This was done only with the head. However, nothing would appear to be complete to the Indian man without his head and heart being equally involved. It was amazing, then, how easy it was for Indian and Indonesian colleagues to follow my remarks and apply them in their practice. Almost as stunning was the difference that came to light in this regard between my Eastern colleagues and the American aid workers who regularly took part in my local lectures and seminars. Although all of us, Indian and American students, psychologists and physicians alike, were speaking the same English language, understanding was incomparably greater in fact with the Indian people than with the Americans. It is probably more than a mere coincidence that more of my books were translated into Japanese than into Western languages¹⁵. If I'm not mistaken, gratifying attention will be paid to them there in psychiatry and psychotherapy.

Of course, I had not made the considerable material sacrifice of a long stay in those Far Eastern countries only to hear myself again somewhere else. I hoped to find that there were still true teachers of wisdom there whose insights into the constitution and meaning of man and his world came from past millennia and were passed on only from teacher to student. To my great surprise I often heard about in-depth agreement of their ancient knowledge of man and his world with the findings that had come unexpectedly so much later and very far away to the mind of a man in the Black Forest of Germany. Neither had my Indian sources ever heard Heidegger's name, nor had he heard the least of Indian thought¹⁶.

With regard to my experience, it might easily be suspected, of course, that it was simply a matter of a misinterpretation of Indian thinking on the basis of my partiality for the *daseinsanalytic* perspective. That this suspicion is hardly correct is proven by the fact that I'm not blind to critical differences. The essential discrepancy may lie between the ancient Indian conviction about Brahman, that the coming into light of being [*Gelichtet-Sein*] is possible without the way of life of man [*Existenz des Menschens*]. Heidegger's thinking, on the other hand, requires human existing [*menschliches Existierens*] so that anything can be there at all [*damit überhaupt etwas sein kann*]. Only this is capable of fashioning, opening and keeping open the global [*weltweiten*] ability to interrogate [*Vernehmenkönnen*] things, the actuality of which necessarily requires us in order to be able to be present to [*an-wesen zu können*] them at all. Conversely, of course, that man needs what encounters him is just as indispensable because he can make his sojourn in the world only with interrogating and responding reference to it.

When I later confronted Heidegger with this difference, his answer was that for him 'being [*Sein*]' was experienceable [*erfahrbar*] only in its dependence on human existence [*menschliches Dasein*]. He did not want to go beyond what was factually [*faktisch*] experienceable by himself.

A few years after my return from the Southeast, I received a phone call from America. Presumably, one of my New York friends was right in claiming that the materialistic positivism that prevailed there for many years had aroused great 'ontological hunger' among many psychologists and physicians in the USA. At any rate, more and more invitations to American universities poured in, three of them alone for full-semester stays at Harvard University. Given the extremely strict selection of students who are admitted to this school, lecturers there work only with an intellectual elite, something unknown to us. It is probably thanks to this circumstance that my work there turned into one of my most beautiful teaching experiences. It also happens that American students are used to incomparably harder work and reading than ours are. For this reason alone, one can set his teaching standards very high¹⁷.

Given such a gathering of so much brilliance, it was proposed that I title of one of my Harvard lectures ‘Phenomenological Psychology [*Phänomenologische Psychologie*]’. Even there it took a lot of effort to teach the listeners that in principle there can be no such thing. For in the light of a phenomenology, instead of the idea of a psyche as an imagined construct [*vorgestellten Gebilde*] somewhere objectively present (albeit immaterially present) that of the completely different being-in-the-world is always already there. Without a ‘psyche’, of course, there can be no subject [*Lehre*] about such a thing, that is, no psychology. It is therefore all the more timely that this is itself overcome and a teaching [*Lehre*] about There-being [*Da-Sein*] blossoms forth.

Two of my three children have found their way back to nature from the weird [*versponnen*] world of their father: psychiatry. They became farmers in Brazil. I have heard amazing news from them that for years there has been an extensive Heidegger Circle [*Heidegger-Kreis*] in Rio de Janeiro to which the best minds [*Köpfe*] belong. The prospects are not bad that the daseinsanalytic mindset [*daseinsanalytische Gedankengut*] might also prove to be fruitful for South American psychotherapy. Appropriate connections have already been made there. Of course, much will depend on whether I will succeed in adequately mastering the Portuguese language. Anyhow, considering all that I have done, by now I’ve reached a fairly advanced age. No wonder then that for quite some time the usual occupational symptoms of aging have also begun to set in, in the form of various appointments as corresponding member or even as honorary member of various professional societies. Among the rewards of this kind granted me, my appointment as honorary president of the board of the International Federation of Medical Psychotherapy is the one closest to me since I was one of the obstetricians who helped to bring this creature to life in 1954. Actually, for sixteen years, I even served as its hard-working president. Thankfully, I note, the effort was not in vain. The initially fragile creature has grown into an association of several thousand members. The whole matter of psychotherapy [*Sache der Psychotherapie*] seems to serve this federation superbly because it represents an incomparably wide forum [*Forum*] in which representatives of dozens and dozens of different psychotherapeutic trends have the rare opportunity to talk to each other. It is eagerly utilized year after year.

In recent years, the Zürich faculties of medicine and philosophy, which had hitherto been alienated from each other, have begun to talk. Since then I have stood with one leg in one department, the other one in the other department. This stance has suited me admirably. Most psychologists also seem to take pleasure in it¹⁸. By contrast, many medical people [*Mediziner*] remain suspicious. Those who have been hardened by a purely scientific, materialistic positivistic way of thinking do so with

good reason. The phenomenological approach threatens its claim to absoluteness [*Absolutanspruch*] regarding man. Moreover, given the trends of our technical age they feel more committed than ever to hold on to them under any circumstances. In any case, I am certainly the last person who would hold their distrust against them. Last but not least, I am among those people who for the benefit of the sick and healthy men and women entrusted to us who have been striving have for decades to pull the ground out from under scientists for what they have usurped [*usurpieren*] – but only what they have usurped. There seems to be no place for mercy. Probably, one thing is more important than anything else: that is, in particular that human beings come back from the homelessness [*Heimatlosigkeit*] of purely natural scientific abstractions to stand on the ground [*Grund*] on which they already fundamentally exist [*existieren*]. For now, I can see such a solid home [*konkret Grund und Boden*] only in the daseinsanalytic understanding of being-in-the-world.

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Notes

1. Boss's self-designation here as a daseinsanalytic [*daseinsanalytisch*] therapist nicely parallels the designation psychoanalytic [*psychoanalytisch*] therapist, which he never quite abandoned. In the history of psychoanalysis, there came to be known a practice called psychoanalytic psychotherapy and a group termed psychoanalytic psychotherapists who never abandoned the appellation psychotherapist, likely echoing their psychoanalyst colleagues. Nothing like a daseinsanalytic psychotherapist or daseinsanalytic therapist has been so named. Instead we have heard of existential psychoanalysts (following Sartre's usage) and, most recently, existential analysts, whose title does not translate back to daseinsanalytist (*Daseinsanalytiker*). In German-speaking countries, including Switzerland, what anglophone cultures term a psychotherapist is known as a *Therapeut – therapist*, the term I currently prefer above all the others. Freud first spoke of what he did as psychotherapy [*Psychotherapie*] and then replaced the designation with psychoanalysis [*Psychoanalyse*] and its researcher/practitioner as a psychoanalyst [*Psychoanalytiker*]. This a bewildering array of professional designations (to which we should surely add psychiatrist [*Psychiater*], from whom most of the leading lights in

psychoanalysis came to be drawn). It is worth recalling that Freud never trained as a psychiatrist; his medical specialty was neurology. Boss, as we will see, began as a psychiatrist, trained and remained a psychoanalyst, and then came to refer to himself as a daseinsanalytic therapist, even while he and others also referred to him as a daseinsanalyst, but not as an existential analyst. Boss published an article (with Gion Condrau) in the *Encyclopédie médicochirurgicale* (1967) entitled ‘*Analyse existentielle (Daseinsanalyse)*’.

2. See Boss’s own selection of his publications at the end of this memoir.

3. ‘*Es ist richtig, dass ich von der analytischen Behandlung der Schizophrenien wenig Erfolg gesehen habe. Mein Rat, diese Methode nicht in der Privatpraxis anzuwenden, hat praktische Motive. Die Misserfolge werden auf Rechnung der Analyse geschrieben und schädigen ihren Ruf. Gegen die Verwendung der Analyse zum Studium der Schizophrenie in einer Anstalt ist natürlich nichts einzuwenden.*’

4. I have not been able to locate the passage in Freud that Boss seems to be quoting. He may be paraphrasing Freud.

5. Ludwig Binswanger, ‘*Freuds Auffassung des Menschen im Lichte der Anthropologie*’, in *Nederlandsch Tijdschrift voor Psychologie*, 4, 1936, 5-6 (Freud’s conception of man in the light of anthropology’ in *Being-in-the-World: Selected papers of Ludwig Binswanger* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 149-181.

6. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis [1917]. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth) XV, 67 (‘On our view the phenomena that are perceived must yield in importance to trends which are only hypothetical.’)

7. “*Der Mensch als Archetypus ist doch eine rein empirische Angelegenheit, an der nichts Philosophisches haftet. Empirisch ist auch die Tatsache, dass auch der Archetypus causal oder conditional wirkt. Wenn dem nicht so wäre, so hätte er überhaupt nie beobachtet werden können. Das ist also keine Theorie, sondern rdne Tatsachenbeobachtung.*”

8. Sigmund Freud, Papers on Technique (1911-1915) [1914], in *SE XII*, 89-171.

9. These terms are taken from a passage in Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* [*Being and Time*]. The distinction is fundamental for the entire discussion of Daseinsanalyse (daseinsanalytic therapy or dasein-therapy). The difference concerns a kind of looking after the other that intervenes and takes over for the other (much as parents and doctors do), thus relieving him of responsibility for what the final outcome is and a looking after the other that opens the way perhaps for the first time for the other to see himself for what he is: existing and, as *Da-sein*, free in his ontological be-ing ‘as’ care [*Sorge*]. The contrast is between interventional *Fürsorge* (looking after) and way-making *Fürsorge*. Boss does not see the full implications of Heidegger’s insight since he remains a doctor, whose business it is to intervene (albeit while above all ‘doing no harm’), to do something. However, way-making looking after is the essence of genuine therapy, which is precisely non-interventional. Although Boss fell

short of the mark he set for himself, his insights are essential for the move from psychiatric/psychoanalytic treatment (*Kur*), which remains grounded in the medical model, to a therapeutic looking after the other that is existential-phenomenological. See my *After Psychotherapy* (New York: ENI Press, 2017). Boss's 'position' was taoist. The most effective action is precisely non-action.

I quote the passage in full along with an attempt at translation. Readers may consult *Being and Time* [trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.] (New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 158-159) and *Being and Time* [trans. Stambaugh, J.] (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996, 114-115), [rev. trans. Schmidt, D.] (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010, 118-119):

Die Fürsorge hat hinsichtlich ihrer positiven Modi zwei extreme Möglichkeiten. Sie kann dem Anderen die »Sorge« gleichsam abnehmen und im Besorgen sich an seine Stelle setzen, für ihn einspringen. Diese Fürsorge übernimmt das, was zu besorgen ist, für den Anderen. Dieser wird dabei aus seiner Stelle geworfen, er tritt zurück, um nachträglich das Besorgte als fertig Verfügbares zu übernehmen, bzw. sich ganz davon zu entlasten. In solcher Fürsorge kann der Andere zum Abhängigen und Beherrschten werden, mag diese Herrschaft auch eine stillschweigende sein und dem Beherrschten verborgen bleiben. Diese einspringende, die »Sorge« abnehmende Fürsorge bestimmt das Miteinandersein in weitem Umfang, und sie betrifft zumeist das Besorgen des Zuhandenen.

Ihr gegenüber besteht die Möglichkeit einer Fürsorge, die für den Anderen nicht so sehr einspringt, als daß sie ihm in seinem existenziellen Seinkönnen vorausspringt, nicht um ihm die »Sorge« abzunehmen, sondern erst eigentlich als solche zurückzugeben. Diese Fürsorge, die wesentlich die eigentliche Sorge — das heißt die Existenz des Anderen betrifft und nicht ein Was, das er besorgt, verhilft dem Anderen dazu, in seiner Sorge sich durchsichtig und für sie frei zu werden.

With regard to its positive modes, looking after has two extreme possibilities. It can, as it were, take 'care' away from the other and put itself in his place in caring for; it can intervene for him. This looking after takes over for the other what he is to care for. Thus forced from his position, he steps back so that afterwards he can either take over what has been taken care of as already a done deal, or disburden himself of it completely. In such looking after the other can become one who is dependent and controlled, even though this control may be tacit and remain hidden from him. This intervening, 'care' removing kind of looking after to a great extent determines togetherness, and for the most part it concerns caring for what is at our disposal.

In contrast to this, there is also the possibility of a kind of looking after that does not so much intervene on behalf of the other as make way for him in his existential capacity to be, not in order to take away his 'care' but instead to essentially restore it to him as such for the first time. This kind of looking after, that actually concerns real care, [that is, concerns] the way of life of the

Other and not a ‘what’ that he looks after in that way helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.

11. This word has a much more colourful translation, which with the appropriate trigger warning I leave to the reader to research.

12. The text in Pongratz does not show where the following quotation ends. Most likely, however, given the style, this quotation or paraphrase of Heidegger in conversation ends with the paragraph. One would expect the sentences to appear somewhere in the *Zollikoner Seminare* or the *Grundriß*, but these seem to be unique reports of Heidegger’s comments to Boss. See also the next quotation attributed to Heidegger. I quote the passage in its entirety:

Das Wort Transzendenz hat bei mir nie und nimmer einen Überstieg des Menschen zu den Dingen der Welt, zum einzelnen Seienden gemeint. Vielmehr habe ich unter Transzendenz immer nur die Beziehung des menschlichen Daseins zum Sein als solchem und im verbalen Sinne dieses Wortes gemeint. Dabei ist der Bezug menschlichen Existierens zu diesem Sein als solchem einzigartig. Menschliches Dasein verhält sich zum Sein als solchem so, daß es nicht anderes ist als ein wahrhaftiges Existieren, ein Ek-stare im wörtlichsten Sinne. Der Mensch ek-sistiert nämlich als das Aus-stehen eines allen Menschen gemeinsamen Welt-Offenheitsbereiches, der aus Vernehmenkönnen der Anwesenheit alles Begegnenden und aus Ansprechbar-Sein für die Bedeutsamkeiten und Verweisungszusammenhänge des Anwesenden besteht. Dank solcher Grundnatur menschlichen Existierens bildet dieses die Erscheinungs- und Entfaltungsstätte alles dessen, was ist und zu sein hat, das heißt: alles dessen, was Sein als solches aus sich aufgehen und in den vom menschlichen Existieren gebildeten Weltoffenheitsbereich hinein als einzelnes Seiendes anwesen läßt. Nur in solcher Sicht wird die berüchtigte Subjekt-Objekt-Spaltung nicht bloß durch ein rätselhaftes subjektivistisches Transzendieren scheinbar überbrückt; vielmehr kann die cartesianische Vorstellung von einer Kluft zwischen einer res cogitans und den res extensae schon gar nicht mehr aufkommen.

13. In this sentence Boss contrasts psychoanalysis (not ‘psyche-analysis’ – recalling that early translations hyphenated the new science, as in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*) with daseinsanalysis (‘analysis of existence’, with its subjective and objective genitive senses), only in the next paragraph to speaking of institutionalizing *Daseinsanalytik* (the analytic of existence’, which hearkens back to Heidegger’s usage in *Sein und Zeit*).

14. See Boss (1959).

15. By 1973, four of Boss’s had been translated into Japanese.

16. This may not be entirely accurate, since Heidegger had been exposed to taoism even before writing *Sein und Zeit*. His source was very likely Martin Buber. See Petzet (1983), Parkes (1987), May (1989, 2014) and Ma (2008).

17. My, how times have changed!

18. There is a bit of a play with Freud and psychoanalysis in Boss’s comment

here that only the German preserves: ‘*Auch die moisten Psychologen scheienen daran Freude zu haben*’.

Author’s Choice from His Publications

- Die Bedeutung der Daseinsanalyse für die Psychologie und die Psychiatrie. *Psyche*. 6 (3), 1952, 178-186. Reprinted in *Von der Psychoanalyse zur Daseinsanalyse* (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1979), 151-160. [The significance of existential analysis [Daseinsanalysis] for psychology and psychiatry.]
- Die Blutdruckkrankheiten als menschliches Problem. *Psyche*. 2 (4), 1949, 499-517. [*Hypertension as a human problem.*]
- Die Gestalt der Ehe und ihre Zerfallsformen. Ein Beitrag zur Psychopathologie der menschlichen Gemeinschaftsbildungen* (Bern: Huber, 1944). [*The Face of Marriage and Its Forms of Disintegration: A contribution to the psychopathology of the human formation of community.*]
- Die Grundlagen einer psychosomatischen Medizi. *Schweizerische medizinische Wochenschrift*. 79 (50), 1950, 1203-1208. [Fundamentals of a psychosomatic medicine.]
- Die Grundprinzipien der Schizophrenietherapie im historischen Rückblick. *Zeitschrift für gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*. 157 (3), 1937, 358-392. Reprinted in *Von der Psychoanalyse zur Daseinsanalyse* (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1979), 11-35. [Survey of the fundamental principles of the therapy of schizophrenia.]
- Die notwendige Revolution der Weltanschauung. *Journal der Reisehochschule Zürich und des Reisehochschulclubs Zürichs*. 10, 1971, 1-22. Reprinted in Gloor, A. (ed.), *Die Zukunft im Angriff. Die Schweiz auf dem Weg. 21. Jahrhundert* (Frauenfeld: Huber, 1971.) 11-47. [*The Necessary Revolution of Worldview.*]
- Der Traum und seine Auslegung* (Bern: Huber, 1953; 2nd edition, Munich: Kindler, 1974). [*The Dream and Its Interpretation.*]
- Ego? Motivation? *Acta Psychologica*. 19, 1961, 217-222 (Le problème du moi dans la motivation. *L'évolution psychiatrique*. 4, 1960, 481-489.)
- Einführung in die psychosomatische Medizin* (Bern: Huber, 1954). Also published as *Praxis der Psychosomatik. Krankheit und Lebensschicksal* (Bern: Benteli, 1978). [*Introduction to Psychosomatic Medicine*]
- Grundriss der Medizin. Ansätze zu einer phänomenologischen Physiologie, Psychologie, Pathologie, Therapie und zu einer daseinsgemässen Präventiv-Medizin in der modernen Industrie-Gesellschaft*. (Bern: Huber, 1971; 2nd expanded edition, 1975; 3rd edition, 1999, with a Preface by Marianne Boss). [*Outline of Medicine: Approaches to a phenomenological physiology, psychology, pathology, therapy and to an existential preventative medicine.*]
- Grundsätzliches zur Wissenschaftlichkeit der Traumbedeutung. *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Psychologie und ihre Anwendungen*. 13 (2), 1954, 128-

135. [*Basics for the scientific nature of dream interpretation.*]
Indienfahrt eines Psychiaters (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959; 2nd edition, Freiburg: Herder, 1966; 3rd edition, Bern: Huber, 1976; 4th expanded and illustrated edition, Bern: Huber 1987. [Includes an important Preface in the 4th edition.] [*A Psychiatrist's Journey to India.*]
- Individuelle Vorbehandlung zur kollektiven Arbeitstherapie bei schweren, chronischen Schizophrenen. *Schweizer Archive für Neurologie und Psychiatrie*. 62 (1), 1938, 15-26. Reprinted in *Von der Psychoanalyse zur Daseinsanalyse* (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1979), 55-70. [Preparatory individual treatment for group occupational therapy with severe, chronic schizophrenics]
- Körperliches Kranksein als Folge seelischer Gleichgewichtsstörungen*. (Bern: Huber, 1940; 6th edition, 1978). [*Somatic Illness as a Consequence of Psychological Disturbances of Equilibrium.*]
- Lebensangst, Schuldgefühle und psychotherapeutische Befreiung* (Bern: Huber, 1962; 2nd edition, 1977). [*Anxiety About Living, Guilt Feelings and Psychotherapeutic Liberation.*]
- Man – object of scientific research. Contribution to the series ‘L’Homme – Objet de la recherche scientifique’ of the main Romanian newspaper *Scinteia* [*The Spark*], Bucharest, 1967. [Der Mensch—Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher. *Psychosomatic Medicine*. 1 (2), 1968-19, 1-4.]
- Martin Heidegger und die Aerzte in G. Neske (ed.), *Martin Heidegger zum 70. Geburtstag* (Neske: Pfullingen, 1959). 276-290. [*Martin Heidegger and the Doctors.*]
- Modell und Antimodell in der psychosomatischen. *Therapeutische Umschau*. 24, 1967, 536-545. Reprinted in *Von der Psychoanalyse zur Daseinsanalyse* (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1979), 327-346.
- Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik* (Bern: Huber, 1957; 2nd edition, 1980). [*Psychoanalysis and the Analytic of Dasein.*]
- Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis*. New York: Basic Books Inc., 1963.
- Psychologisch-charakterologische Untersuchungen bei antisozialen Psychopathen mit Hilfe des Rorschach'schen Formdeutversuches. *Zeitschrift für gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*. 133, 1931, 544-575. [Psychological-characterological investigations of antisocial psychopaths with aid of the Rorschach Inkblot Test.]
- Sinn und Gehalt der sexuellen Perversionen. Ein daseinsanalytischer Beitrag zur Psychopathologie des Phänomens der Liebe* (Bern: Huber, 1947; 2nd expanded edition, 1952; Munich: Kindler, 1953; 3rd expanded edition, Bern: Huber, 1966, contains Ein Vorwort und ein Nachwort. Zugleich ein Versuch einer Differenzierung zwischen psychiatrischer Daseinsanalyse und psychiatrischer Anthropologie; (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1984). [*Meaning and Content of Sexual Perversions. An Existential [Daseinsanalytic] Contribution to the Psychopathology of the Phenomenon of Love.*]

Warum verhält sich der Mensch überhaupt sozial? *Proceedings of the Third World Congress of Psychiatry*. (Toronto 1961) 3, 1963, 233. [*Why Does Man Behave Socially at All?*]

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BOOK REVIEWS

Here I am again, another year and another issue of *Existential Analysis* filled with more reviews.

Over the last few weeks I have been wondering, what is it for me about reading reviews, these, and so many others out there in the papers and online? How and why am I drawn to them? Is it simply to find out about a book, an exhibition or a movie perhaps, so I may choose more wisely what to read and what to avoid in the precious little time I have to myself? Or is there more to it?

I realize it is not just about the object and my need to select from the huge offering out there, but many a review give me great pleasure; they are so much more than just a review of a book. They make an argument, give a view, and are frequently written in a highly personal style that affects me. I enjoy reading how reviewers present their arguments, the words they use, the length of their sentences and paragraphs. As I read their thoughts, they speak to me. Sometimes I feel moved, often they teach me. Do I take their ideas in and make them mine, or do I reject them? Does my reading somehow change how I consider the world, and in this case, my work? All of the above and more.

Once again, I have a diverse selection of reviews for *EA*'s wide audience. The section starts with a review of Martin Adams' *An Existential Approach to Human Development* and is followed by Kevin Krycka's *Psychotherapy for the Other*. Both books centre on existential philosophy and its applications in psychotherapy. The next review is of Donna Savery's *Echoism*, a book with as sole focus the issue of echoism as linked to narcissism (see Savery's article on page 142). I have included a review of *Revisioning Person-Centred Therapy* (edited by Bazzano, et al) as many among us, myself included, have humanistic leanings (read person-centred in this case).

The deep and lasting connection between the arts and psychotherapy, is covered in the last two reviews. First, a review of the Royal Academy's exhibition of the drawings of Klimt and Schiele, whose works provide us with their expressions of dread, desire, beauty and being. It is followed by a review of the two *Blade Runner* movies, which cover, *par excellence* in my view, many of the existential themes that we meet in the therapy room and life on a daily basis.

I wish you happy reading in 2019.

Ondine Smulders