

Daseinanalysis has as little to do with psychotherapy as being a therapist has to do with being a doctor. That said, many daseinanalysts have earned doctorates in fields ranging from medicine to philosophy and everything in between. The disentangling of daseinanalysis from its origins among psychiatrists and psychoanalysts and its later affair with clinical psychology, pastoral counseling and the full range of mental healthcare professions, including existential analysts, is finally under way in earnest. It is a difficult birth. The central part daseinanalysis has to play as psychotherapy loses its grip on the popular imagination and the treatment of psychological disorders is increasingly addressed by psychopharmacology and managed by psychiatrists is only now becoming clear. While some have predicted that daseinanalysis is over and done with, it is my belief that it holds promise for providing a genuinely human therapy—a therapy of the human being—that has eluded previous attempts to address as needed the existential turning points that are inevitable in everyday life when possibilities are constricted and human freedom is at stake. As strange as it may sound, daseinanalysis is not a theme for modern psychology. Its origins are in the *commedia* of a love affair between phenomenology and psychoanalysis, and an unlikely meeting between philosophy and the ancient practice of some who feel called to respond to fellow human beings in way that is oriented first of all to our common humanity.

The goal of this introduction is to express in plain language what daseinanalysis is and is not with special attention to how it is practiced. I begin by contrasting it with psychiatry and the many modalities of psychotherapy and care (including existential analysis) that are available to the public since the first modern form of psychotherapy, beginning with Freud's psychoanalysis, were deployed in the community. While it is true that daseinanalysis had its originating impulse in psychoanalysis, it is important to emphasize from the outset that daseinanalysis is radically different from psychoanalysis, differing from it in having abandoned the notion of an entity known as the *psyche* as well as all of Freud's metapsychology. It is therefore, strictly speaking, not related to psychology as it has developed since the 19th century where it has been somewhat natural, somewhat social, and somewhat human science.¹ Nor is

¹ The many forms of psychotherapy and counseling share a view of the human being based on science, whether it be natural science (physics, chemistry, biology), social science (sociology, anthropology), or the *Geisteswissenschaften* (sciences of the spirit or human sciences). Psychology holds the ambiguous position of being somewhat natural and somewhat social science, and for some somewhat human science. Some psychologies allow a place for mind understood in various sense of the term and others, such as behaviorism, do not. Some have retained a place for the soul. Still others have attempted to introduce non-Western spiritual practices into the the mix. By contrast, daseinanalysis begins with a view of the human being prior to its being divided conceptually into mind (*psyche*) and

daseinanalysis related to psychiatry (medical psychology) and neuroscience, which, like psychology, are based on a natural scientific view of the human being. Second, the notion of *analysis* in psychoanalysis differs fundamentally from that in daseinanalysis. In the former, it has the meaning of a taking apart or breaking up into parts of a unity, as in chemical analysis. By contrast, daseinanalysis preserves the original meaning of analysis, which is to loosen or set something free from its moorings.

In Part I, I explain what daseinanalysis is not and recount its origins. In Part II, I describe its theoretical foundations and praxis. I conclude, in Part III, with a discussion of the preparation of the daseinanalyst for work with his fellow human beings. This introduction is intended primarily for the beginning student of daseinanalysis and has been written as a basic textbook for individuals who are candidates for the certificate program offered by the American Daseinsanalytic Institute to accompany its introductory seminar. It is my hope, however, that it will gain wider interest.

Introduction

Frederick Crews, in a prefatory note to the republication of his article of 1980 published in *Commentary*, “Analysis Terminable,” wrote that “the aggregate curative record was dismal” for psychoanalysis, recalling that for Freud “unique therapeutic efficacy was an indispensable warrant” for his metapsychology.² Now, nearly thirty-five years later, this remains the case. At the time of this writing, in the States the rate of efficacy of “psychodynamic psychotherapy” is judged to be at about 5 percent—just as dismal.³ If a procedure in medicine had such a poor rate

body (soma), a view introduced into Western philosophy by René Descartes in the middle of the 17th century, and after the medieval Christian (and perhaps classic Greek) notion of an ensouled body. It is the view of the human being as *Dasein*, that being which alone among all beings is in question about itself, that is, as a *who*.

² Frederick Crews, *Skeptical Engagements*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, 18. See also his summative critique, *Freud. The Making of an Illusion*, New York: Picador, 2017.

³ Jonathan Shedler, “Where Is the Evidence for Evidence-based Therapy?” in *Psychiatric Clinics of North America* **41**, 2018, 319-329, where cure is defined as based on *reports of patients* who say they got well and stayed well (324). Cures based on cognitive-behavioral modalities (originally called “persuasion therapy”) are said to be higher, at about 22 percent. Shedler has been very careful to examine the methods of gathering data and their statistical manipulation. He concludes that inflated reports of success may be traced back to flaws in sampling the patient

of efficacy of such a long period of time, it would have been abandoned. In my view, this is precisely what we can expect of *psychotherapy* in all its forms.

Is there something better to offer our fellow human beings? We believe there is in *daseinanalysis*.

Crews, arch critic of Freud and psychoanalysis, speaks of psychotherapists as “hired friends.” And so, in a sense, they are.⁴ From the start, however, psychotherapists have been compared to physicians, especially in the States where the first psychoanalysts were psychiatrists and, hence, medical doctors. But this has been a major mistake. One does not consult a physician to find a friend. Instead, today, one wants a skilled scientist and technician.⁵ It is important to recall that medical practice has changed dramatically since the early decades of the 20th century. Expertise informed by the findings of natural science has gradually replaced the watchful waiting of the traditional doctor, who knew little about the body but was willing to spend long hours in the company of a patient while a disease

population and “fudging” the data. For example, he suggests that the CBT (cognitive behavioral therapy) rate is very likely exaggerated.

⁴ The obvious, more than embarrassing, comparison with “the world’s oldest profession” is unavoidable.

⁵ While, hopefully, the doctor has a good bedside manner, the latter is not essential. All the same, evoking in the patient a sense of reassurance, based on the impression that an illness has been identified and is understood well enough in order for the physician to offer an informed opinion to the patient about the status of her health and to recommend the best range of treatments available. The word ‘patient’ is correct here, since one willingly *undergoes* (from the Latin *patio*, to undergo) treatment in the care of a physician. We willingly take a passive stance with the physician’s agency. The social graces are suspended in the clinical setting, where we undress for the doctor, stretching out on his examination table in complete trusting vulnerability. We allow ourselves to be touched (palpated, percussed) in ways and places to which otherwise only a parent or lover is given access. We may expose our most “private” parts for examination. In the surgical suite, we allow ourselves to be rendered unaware and unable to remember what is being done to us. The commonly used intravenous anesthetic propofol (known familiarly among surgeons, anesthesiologists and nurses as “milk of amnesia”) allows the surgeon and her team to undertake drastically invasive procedures without frightening the patient, who does not register what is happening and forms no memories of it. Above all, we trust that the doctor is not motivated by any personal interest in us. He does not see our body as an object of aesthetic appreciation, least of all as a sexual object. We may as well remain nameless. Indeed, in a busy emergency room, one hears talk of “the leg in bed 3” or “the acute abdomen in bed 6.”

process manifested itself, took its course, reached its crisis or turning point, and resolved. We see this sort of physician memorialized in the well-known painting by Sir Luke Fildes (1891). Now, however, the medical doctor has become more and more a technician, relying on the data provided by measuring and monitoring instruments. This has been to the great benefit of the patient.

How do things stand by comparison with one's involvement with a psychotherapist? Crews is completely correct in characterizing her as a kind of friend—a "hired friend." For times when a real friend or trusted family member is not available or appropriate to discuss a sensitive issue, the 20th century invented a special form of relationship to stand in for one of the former. This is the psychotherapist. By contrast, the daseinanalyst must be understood in a different way. Instead of providing a friendship, the daseinanalyst offers a relationship just as intimate but fundamentally different from that of a friend.

Further, when daseinanalysis has been fully realized in all its potential—and it is a practice that is still evolving—its practitioners will not be for hire. Responding to a calling (*Beruf*), daseinanalysts have in principle no place among the great variety of professional "mental healthcare providers." Daseinanalysis, in short, is an alternative to both medical treatment and psychotherapy.

H. C. Rümke rightly defined psychotherapy as "the art of conversation." The conversation in which daseinanalysts engage with their analysands is also an art, but quite different than that observed between psychotherapist and patient. Short of invoking some sort of magical influence on the other, we will see what is special about the daseinanalyst's comportment, especially in conversation with an analysand. Understanding the uniqueness of such comportment depends on understanding the notion of *Dasein* introduced by Martin Heidegger in his book *Sein und Zeit (Being and Time)* (1927). There we read that a meeting of *Dasein* and *Dasein* is basic to every human experience of another human being. We are fundamentally together before any particular relationship develops. A phenomenology of such meeting (*Begegnung*, which may also be rendered with 'encounter') makes it clear that while it is an immediate *relation* common to every human being's experience of another human being, in the daseinanalytic setting, such a meeting unfolds as a remarkable and quite unique *relationship* between the daseinanalyst and analysand.⁶

⁶ It is clear that conversation takes place concurrently at a nonverbal level. This has puzzled those who have studied psychotherapy more perhaps than the obvious power of purely verbal exchange, even when taking into consideration

The quality of the comportment of the daseinanalyst is based on the fact that is in response to a *calling* or vocation to which he has answered and that has come to guide him when working in the therapeutic setting. I will have a great deal more to say about all this, but in a preliminary way such comportment may be described as a devotion to the other based on the *Dasein to Dasein* relation which is inevitably given *ab initio*. Highly nuanced, the relationship that ensues will reflect the many individual differences between the partners in the daseinanalytic encounter (sex, age, ethnicity and the rest), but it depends on the immediate *Dasein to Dasein* relation. The daseinanalyst offers the other an opportunity to gain knowledge of this relation *in her own good time*.

Like what happens between trusted friends or mothering figure and child, the daseinanalytic meeting cannot be valued in any quantitative way. It is not worth a given amount of money per hour, just as is the case in a friendship. What this mean for the vexing issue of whether to charge a fee for daseinanalysis is currently a vexing issue. At the present time, all daseinanalysts charge a fee just as psychotherapists do. On occasion, some offer it *pro bono* to certain individuals. It it my sense that this will change as daseinanalysis develops and becomes entirely independent of the the medical model and the tradition of psychotherapy as a profession.

such variables as tone of voice, facial expression, posture, and gesture that accompany the psychotherapist's discourse. Apart from these nuances, however, another level of engagement with the patient is assumed that is difficult to describe but also termed nonverbal. Freud, who had an interest in telepathy, described it as communication in psychoanalysis between the unconscious of the analyst and the unconscious of the analysand. It has been related to the presence of the analyst, his "personality" and even charisma. These mysterious levels or media of communication have been described, but little is known about them. The patient thus reports responding to a certain *sense* or *feeling* that is conveyed by the psychotherapist. In an optimal therapeutic situation, the patient's own *sense of feeling* is said to resonate with that of the therapist. There is then harmony between the two "tones," of patient and therapist. For daseinanalysis, however, communication is understood to depend on but effectively concur with the meeting between the *Dasein* of the analyst and *Dasein* of the analysand. This, our ontological relation as human beings, concurs with the ontic relationship between the named actualizations of these *Daseine*.

But let us not forget that there was a time when a physician was compensated in eggs and chickens or labor instead of coins when someone who was ill had been treated by him but could not pay a fee. The Hippocratic oath required the he treat the person first and then worry about compensation.⁷

If daseinanalysts agree that their work is a calling, however, and their relationship with the analysand is a partnership that is more like a friendship or mothering relationship than a medical consultation, no fee should be charged, just as priests and pastors, who also answer to a calling, are not paid, for example, to offer mass or to officiate at a marriage or a burial. The Catholic Church as an institution overseeing the great variety of Holy Orders or all the members of a Protestant congregation, who hand over regular offerings (tithes), are the source of money for meeting the living expenses for those answering the pastoral calling. A comparable arrangement for daseinanalysts is difficult to imagine and will be difficult to institute, but I believe it will be necessary if daseinanalysis is to be practiced as should, but without resorting to large-scale institutionalization. The most feasible immediate solution, one that I would encourage trying out, is to settle on the reality that the daseinanalyst must earn her living doing something else, for example, working as a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist or teacher and, from time to time, practicing as a daseinanalyst. The arrangement would work as well for a philosopher. As we will see, we had in Medard Boss, who established therapeutic daseinanalysis, someone who was both a psychiatrist and philosopher. In short, one might offer medical treatment and practice daseinanalysis—but not at the same time; one might teach and practice daseinanalysis—but not at the same time.⁸

⁷ Today, when attempting to arrange a consultation with a doctor, the prospective patient must first make his way past the medical office gatekeeper, who first asks “What insurance do you have?” If you have none or none that is accepted by the physician, you must agree to pay out of pocket or go elsewhere, places that for the most part subsidized by the government. Arriving unconscious or incoherent in critical condition at an emergency room is an exception to such negotiating, but eventually someone must pay and the private hospital setting costs soar since they include paying for the use of the hospital's facilities and support staff.

⁸ After my days as a psychoanalyst, it became my practice to teach psychology and philosophy to undergraduates and see individuals in daseinanalysis without charging a fee. After roughly thirty years of working this way, I continue to do just that. I have retired from teaching and live on a pension and social security that I accumulated over fifty years of teaching. The point I wish to make is that no one should consider earning a living as a daseinanalyst.

Nor is daseinanalysis a hybrid, somewhat profession and somewhat calling, as teaching has become. The latter example is instructive. In the millennia following Socrates and his maieutic encounters with young interlocutors from whom he did not assess a tuition fee and who sat together with him in the agora in dialogue for hours at a stretch, many teachers were first clergy associated with the Roman Catholic Church. After the first *university* was founded in 1088, in Bologna, by a guild of *students*, independent scholars from around the known world were invited to come to Bologna to teach the liberal arts and eventually the sciences. These guests were paid by the students for traveling there and staying at *their schola* to teach. The masters' first reward was, however, in answering a calling. The present identity of the daseinanalyst is comparable to that of the earliest university teachers. The real models of the daseinanalyst, however, were the more ancient Therapeutae.⁹

Nothing like the university has served daseinanalysis as an institutional locus of shared interest and activity. Instead, the first daseinanalytic institute was formed in Zurich in 1970, modeled on the psychoanalytic institute. Although an International Federation of Daseinsanalysis was formed twenty years later, it remains to be seen how the roughly half-dozen institutes in Europe and the Americas will co-operate as daseinanalysis become fully independent of the medical model.

I am convinced that, given its very disappointing results, psychotherapy will disappear in the coming years as it is replaced almost entirely by medical treatment with so-called psychotropic drugs. Daseinanalysis is positioned to fill

⁹ Although I will most often speak in terms of daseinanalysis and the daseinanalyst, it will also make sense to talk about in terms of *therapy* and what is *therapeutic*. The *Therapeutae*, mentioned by Philo of Alexandria, were a Jewish sect related to the Essenes and known throughout the Greek world in the first centuries of the Common Era. Their name is based on the Greek verb θεραπεύω, which means "to attend to" so as to enhance the healing powers of the person attended. Their service was to the gods, not to those whom they attended. Later, in the New Testament, they were associated with the care of people. Some were known for their ability to effect remarkable improvement in those whom they attended. This "healing" sometimes involving casting magical spells, laying on of hands, and various physical interventions. The Apostles of Christ were in this sense thought of as healers, much as He was. The Therapeutae were also precursors of Freud's psychoanalysis as it developed, from the use of hypnotism and "pressure technique" to "free association." Their influence was thought to be based on their mediation of divine influence and so the results of their practice were not explicable in terms of the medical interventions of the Hippocratic school. They did not charge a fee.

the breach for those who wish to talk to someone, not a professional or some sort, but another human being whose understanding of human *being* is radically different from that underwritten by natural, social and/or human science.

What is the *point* of daseinanalysis? Why become involved in it, whether as an analyst or analysand. This is not a question about its outcome and goal, which is for the analysand nothing other than his or her *Dasein's* recovery of its freedom to realize to the greatest extent its possibilities within the range of the givenness of the individual instance. The point of daseinanalysis at its best and most effective is to be concluded as soon as possible.¹⁰ Unlike psychoanalysis, which as a procedure was said to be in principle interminable (*unendlich*), sometimes lasting years given the great mass of hypothesized contents of an individual's unconscious as well as the accumulation of fresh trauma that continue to put out of balance the exquisite harmony of ego, id and superego functioning.

What brings the potential daseinanalyst to daseinanalysis is another matter, which I have described in terms of answering a calling. It would be fair to ask such a person: Why in the world would you want to do something like this? The question will become arise as I describe the theory and practice of daseinanalysis, but even by now the reader will have some sense of the ethos of daseinanalysis which draws certain individuals to learn about it and become involved in its practice.

I welcome those who are reading about daseinanalysis here and encourage them to continue to practice as psychiatrists and teachers, clinical psychologists and pastoral counselors, or as a representative of one of the great varieties of psychotherapy now marketed to the public, including the psychodynamic (psychoanalytic), Jungian, client-centered, and existential modalities. Daseinanalysis is not in competition with any of these. Nor does it wish to

¹⁰ It is often forgotten that treatment of the insane was originally entirely an "inpatient" affair. Directors of insane asylums were entrepreneurs, much like those who operate spas or hotels. A moment's reflection makes it plain that the owners of these places were not interested in the speedy "cure" of their inmates, but profited from patients staying on for as long as possible (for some, most of their lives), subsidized by the government or a family that wanted to have the madman off their hands. A pamphlet printed for such directors, prepared by psychiatrists, is a crude taxonomy of diagnoses. It is the precursor of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychological Disorders (DSM-5)*. Daseinanalysis, in principle, looks to the earliest conclusion of meetings between the analytic partners. The scenario of a greatly extended psychoanalysis is also alien to daseinanalysis.

displace any of them. My only claim is that all of these forms of treatment collectively known as *psychotherapy* are based on a view of the human being that is fundamentally different from that taken by daseinanalysis.

Chapter One

The Term 'Daseinanalysis'¹¹

Daseinsanalyse, which here translates as 'daseinanalysis', is a therapeutic modality that originated in the tradition of the classic psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), was introduced into psychiatry in the early 1940s by the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966). A grammatically and orthographically appropriate translation of the word yields "analysis of existence" since the German compound *Daseinsanalyse* consists of the possessive form of the noun *Dasein* (existence) and the noun *Analyse* (analysis). Instead, the term 'Daseinsanalysis' was devised which imitates the German and merely replaces the German suffix '-se' with the English equivalent '-is'. The term distinguishes it from various psychotherapeutic modalities collectively known as "existential analysis," which translate *Existenzanalyse*, a form of therapy introduced by Viktor Frankl and later renamed logotherapy. A properly anglicized translation of the latter would yield something like 'existence analysis', but the latter has rarely if ever been used. Instead, leaving a trail of muddled usage, both *Daseinsanalyse* and *Existenzanalyse* have been translated as "existential analysis."

¹¹ The reader already familiar with our topic will notice that I abandon the tradition of using the term 'Daseinsanalysis', spelled without an 's' following 'Dasein-' and not capitalized. The traditional term appears in the name of the American institute in conformity with the international organization that oversees the various institutes worldwide, the International Federation of Daseinsanalysis (IFDA). The Institute's website retains that usage for the same reason (daseinsanalysis.org). There is no reason to capitalize the word as though it were a German noun. The reason for the elimination of the 's', which indicates the possessive in German will become clear in the next few paragraphs. I always use the German noun *Dasein* and not 'existence' in order to remind the reader of the source of the term in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*. All German nouns are capitalized.

According to Gerhard Fichtner, the name *Daseinsanalyse* was suggested by Jakob Wyrsh (1892-1980) at a meeting of the Psychological Society in Bern, Switzerland, on October 23, 1942, where Ludwig Binswanger read a paper called "Über Daseinserkenntnis [On Knowledge of Existence]."¹²

The words *Daseinsanalyse* and 'daseinanalysis' are alike built on the noun 'analysis', which is derived from the Greek verb *analysein*, which in its primary sense means "to loosen" or "to free up." This is the sense it has for daseinanalysis. A secondary but more common meaning of the verb, as used, for example, in chemistry and in psychoanalysis, means "to break apart into constitutive elements." In its everyday usage, the noun *Dasein* denotes everyday life or existence. In philosophy, it indicates a predicate of a being, indicating that whatever being is under consideration is real or has existence (for example, a stone in the road, a human body sitting across from me, God) by contrast with imaginary or fanciful beings such as unicorns, which are not real. The German word *Dasein* as used by Binswanger

¹² *Freud/Binswanger Correspondence* [1992], New York: Other Press, 2003. Fichtner reports that the term first appears in Binswanger's diary in an entry dated September 11, 1943 (Volume VIII, p. 30). Wyrsh is said to have devised the term precisely to distinguish it from Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik* (Fichtner xx), with which it nonetheless continued to be confused. Further on the origin of the name, Fichtner refers to Roland Kuhn's "Erinnerungen an Ludwig Binswanger [Recollections of Ludwig Binswanger]," in *Der Psychiater Dr. med. Ludwig Binswanger und das Sanatorium Bellevue. Beiträge zur Ortsgeschichte [The Psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger, MD and the Bellevue Sanatorium. Contributions to the History of the Place]*, Kreuzlingen: Vereinigung Heimatsmuseum **21**, 7-14.

Binswanger first met Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) on January 24, 1929, in Frankfurt, at a meeting of the Kant Society where Heidegger gave a lecture entitled "Philosophische Anthropologie und Metaphysik des Daseins [Philosophical Anthropology and the Metaphysics of Dasein]" (GA 80.1, 213-251). Binswanger noted in his diary: "Met with [Kurt] Reitzler (1882-1955) and Heidegger and others" after the lecture. He also recorded that he first read Heidegger in April 1928, with his son who was then age 19. Binswanger refers in print to Heidegger's influence on his thinking as early as 1930 in his paper "Traum und Existenz [Dream and Existence]," where he writes about Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik*. See *Dream and Existence*, New York: Humanities Press, 1993, first published in the *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry* **19**(1), 1984-1985, 81-105, and as a special edition of the journal in 1986. The English publication famously includes an introduction to the essay by Michel Foucault, "Dream, Imagination, and Existence" [1953] (30-78), which Foucault had written for a French translation by Jacqueline Verdeaux of Binswanger's essay published as *Le rêve et l'existence*, Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954, 8-128. See Binswanger's tribute to Wyrsh in *Psychiatria et neurologia* **143**(6), 1962, 369-378.

and those who followed in the tradition of daseinanalysis, however, has a third meaning which is a *terminus technicus* introduced by Martin Heidegger in 1927 in his book *Sein und Zeit* [*Being and Time*]. In that work, *Dasein* denotes the ontological condition of the possibility of the actualization of the life of a human being [*Mensch*]. It is that which makes the human being utterly unique and different from all other beings, from the most lowly inorganic thing to the *summum ens*.

In his analytics [*Analytik*]¹³ of human being, Heidegger makes a philosophical distinction between what he terms the *ontological* [*ontologisch*] and the *ontic* [*ontisch*]. The ontological refers to the possibilities of human being. The ontic refers to the actualizations of those possibilities as a named *Dasein*. Other beings (pets, places, geographic features) therefore do not have names in the sense that human beings have personal names. Heidegger's usage of 'ontology' deviates from its sense as a branch of philosophy as "the study of what is," distinguished since the mid-18th century from philosophy's other branches: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics. The *difference* between the ontological or possible [*möglich*] and the ontic or actual [*wirklich*] Heidegger terms the "ontological difference." He warns that such a differentiation is an abstraction and therefore somewhat misleading, since we know of the possible (the ontological) only because we have already actualized it (the ontic) to some extent and can make statements about the difference. In experience, the human being exists at both levels which can be only theoretically distinguished. In the order of things, the human being is ontological, what Heidegger calls *Dasein*. In the order of experience, our ontic actuality so to speak only *seems* to take priority.

Heidegger speaks of his project in *Being and Time* as fundamental ontology [*fundamental Ontologie*],¹⁴ that is, the ontology of the human being (*Dasein*). Ontology in the traditional sense deals with all other sorts of beings and is based on the categories of Aristotle. Heidegger's fundamental ontology, however, is based on a different set of "categories" which he refers to as existentials [*Existenziale*].

We read in Heidegger's early text that "das Wesen des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz."¹⁴ Here we must be especially careful, since both *Dasein* and *Existenz* have been translated with 'existence'. Consequently, the language of "existence" has been ambiguous, misleading and confusing. In Heidegger's later philosophy, the term *Existenz* all

¹³ Heidegger traces his usage of *Analytik* to Kant's critical philosophy, but it may also hearken back to Aristotle's analytics, prior and posterior (the *proteros* or beforehand and the *husteros* or afterward), of his *organon*.

¹⁴ GA 2, 56. All references are to the *Gesamtausgabe* edition of Heidegger's works (Klostermann 1975-).

but disappears. This was all to the good since it led to such incomprehensible statements such the following translation of the sentence just quoted: “The essence of existence [*Dasein*] is to be found in its existence [*Existenz*].” Heidegger’s solution was to trace the word *Existenz* back to its source in the Latin *eksistere*, which means “to stand out into.” Some translators adopted the derivative English adjective ‘ecstatic’ to describe the essence of *Dasein*. This word, however, derives from the Greek *ekstatikos* (via the Latin *ekstasis*), which has the unfortunate meaning of “being beside oneself” or dissociated. Heidegger’s understanding of the “standing out into” of *Existenz* has to do with time, to be precise, making time for . . . and not with some sort of spatial extension which the translation suggests. Thus, the problematic but basic statement quoted quite clearly says that “the essence of existence is in its standing out into in the sense of making time for . . .” It also makes sense to render *Existenz* with ‘existing’ with all the verbal sense of the participial gerund. Thus we might also translate Heidegger’s famous saying as follows: “The essence of existence lies in its existing.” This makes sense, since, for Heidegger, only *Dasein* exists. *Dasein* never *is*, which is the case for all other beings, until the moment of its death. For this reason, it is understandable that, for Heidegger, *Dasein* is to be understood pre-eminently with respect to its mortality, its being-towards-death, where death is the one possibility that has no further possibilities. To say “a given human being is not” may sound nonsensical until the ontological difference and Heidegger’s technical use of the word *Dasein* are taken into account.

Let us further consider the phenomenon of *Dasein* in terms of the ontological difference. At conception, a human being’s *Dasein* is pure possibility. Ontologically, at conception *Dasein* is pure possibility. Ontologically, it is in a sense nothing, without sex, lineage, age, or nationality. At the same time, ontically its history begins and the range of actualizations of its possibility is circumscribed by its embodied givenness (its sex, place of birth and era). *Dasein*’s actualizations are further constrained by all manner of happenstance, from parenting and other cultural influences to accidents of its body’s anatomical features (hair color, skin pigmentation, and other genetically determined details). In the case of a comatose body, possibility is most severely limited but possibility nonetheless always remains a given for *Dasein*.

With these considerations in mind, we speak of beings other than the human using the relative pronoun ‘what’ (and ‘something’) and reserve ‘who’ (and ‘someone’) for *Dasein*. At its death, the *who* of *Dasein* cannot be further possibilized. The human being *is* for the first time a what.¹⁵ Since *Dasein* is always embodied, however, is its body

¹⁵ According to theologians, the *summum ens* of the Judaeo-Christian is a ‘Who’ (capitalized, denoting for Christians three persons in one being). Heidegger rejects this status for God, since for theologians God also *is*. The predicate of

not a what? The human being—*homo sapiens sapiens*—is, after all, an animal organism. We therefore say that as embodied the ontological (existential) *who* of *Dasein* is phenomenologically *ontic* and on its way to finally *being* something. Of great importance to Heidegger is the *where* a given *Dasein* appears since the “atmosphere” of that *where* is fundamentally linguistic. *Dasein* is grounded in a spoken natural language, its mother tongue. This will be of central importance to daseinanalysis, which takes place as conversation. In his fundamental ontology, Heidegger points to one of the existentials of *Dasein* as talk [*Rede*]. As such, it is the ontological possibility for speaking a so-called natural language (Greek, German, English).

I. What Daseinanalysis Is Not

Chapter Two

Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis

Recalling the two components of the term ‘daseinanalysis’, we may characterize the therapeutic modality so named as the freeing up of a given *Dasein* of its possibilities. To be clearer about what daseinanalysis is and its practice, we first consider what daseinanalysis is not.

Daseinanalysis is not psychoanalysis, although it has its origins in this, the best known of the earliest forms of psychotherapy in the modern sense.¹⁶ Psychoanalysis was the brainchild of a Viennese neurologist¹⁷ who became interested in hypnotism. Its possible clinical applications in hospitals, insane asylums and sanatoriums quickly drew the attention of psychiatrists such as Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939) and Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) in Switzerland, and Abraham Brill (1874-1948) in the United States, but it would be the practice of psychoanalysis in the privacy of

existence in the ordinary sense applies to God as it does to all “lower” beings. This is a problem for theologians to work out, but we may say that the *summum ens* is like *Dasein* after the death of the human being it occasions, but also a *Dasein* that retains its existing. It is, of course, God become man, the second person of the Trinity, that “solves the problem of such a “Who.”

¹⁶ For an appraisal of the status of psychoanalysis as a form of psychotherapy and other forms of psychotherapy that preceded or were contemporaneous with psychoanalysis, see Frederick Crews, *Freud. The Making of an Illusion*, New York: Picador, 2017.

¹⁷ Recall that Freud was not trained as a psychiatrist.

the analyst's home, in his consulting room, that made it unique. A clinical discipline that grew up in the context of the model of natural science at a time when modern medicine was just evolving, psychoanalysis was not, however, a clinical practice commonly such as psychiatry with its interventions including institutionalization, electroshock, brain surgery and pharmacotherapeutics. By Freud's own account, it was an exploration of man's soul [*Seele*], not his brain. On the other hand, its *theoretical* rationale was a *metapsychology* that reflected the philosophy of the sciences established by Isaac Newton and others at the end of the 17th century. Since its attempt at a beginning with the radical empiricism of William James at the turn of the 20th century, modern psychology has been viewed variously as a natural science, a social science, and a human science [*Geisteswissenschaft*]. Any discipline that regards itself as a science of whatever sort shares the same features: What science studies is quantifiable and measurable and based on the notion of causality with the prospect of predictability as its goal. Psychoanalysis claims to be a science but it fails to qualify as such in that its propositions such as the unconscious are not falsifiable.¹⁸

The two major figures in the history of daseinanalysis, Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss (1903-1990), were personally acquainted with Freud, the latter having been an analysand of Freud's for a brief period of time when Boss was 22-years-old. Binswanger and Freud were contemporaries who carried on a mutually satisfying correspondence for thirty years (1908-1938). Both Binswanger and Boss were hospital psychiatrists by early experience, but after training as a psychoanalyst, Boss began to see patients at his home as was the custom among psychoanalysts. Psychoanalysis was of interest to people outside of medicine in areas in which it was applied such as education, social work, nursing and pastoral care, and it attracted individuals from these professionals to prepare as lay (that is, non-medical) psychoanalysts. In the States only psychiatrists were admitted to psychoanalytic institutes affiliated with Freud's international association. The same pattern occurred in Europe and the United Kingdom, although a few exceptions were made. For example, the editor and principal translator of the *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, James Strachey (1887-1967) held only a bachelor's degree from Cambridge. The theorist of ego psychology, Erik Erikson (1902-1994), had no university degree whatsoever. Anna Freud (1895-1982), Freud's daughter, trained as a school teacher. Oskar Pfister (1873-1956) was a Lutheran minister. Lou Andreas Salomé (1861-1937), who was also close with Friedrich Nietzsche and Rainer Maria Rilke, completed one year of university education at the University of Zurich. All practiced as renowned psychoanalysts based only on having been in analysis with Freud. Even much later, a maverick such as M. Masud R. Khan (1924-1989) came from

¹⁸ Karl Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, and *Conjectures and Refutations*, London: Routledge, 1989.

a background in the humanities. The best known of the early lay analysts was Theodore Reik (1888-1969), who had been accused of quackery, that is, posing as a medical doctor. In response, Freud published an essay on the question of lay psychoanalysis and concluded that non-medical candidates were perfectly acceptable for institute training and that, in fact, a medical education and psychiatric specialization might in some cases even be a hindrance to successful work as a psychoanalyst. At the very least, he concluded, a medical background was not essential for the prospective psychoanalyst.¹⁹

Having arrived in New York from Austria in 1938, Reik was nevertheless refused full membership in the New York Psychoanalytic Association, which had been founded in 1911, because he was not a medical doctor. He had earned a PhD in psychology at the University of Vienna with a dissertation on Flaubert. In response, Reik founded the first lay psychoanalytic institute, the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (NPAP), in 1948. At least four lay psychoanalytic training institutes in New York owed their origins to individuals who were trained at NPAP. The writer was in training at one of them. Lay analysts thus came to form a separate group from the psychiatrist psychoanalysts and their institutes. They struggled for equal status among psychiatrists (especially access to the prescription pad) as providers of psychotherapy as a form of medical treatment, but the battle lost momentum as socialized medicine was instituted in the States and most psychotherapy came to be carried out by clinical *psychologists* (a legally protected title) and a variety of other licensed counselors. Beginning in the mid-1950s, psychiatrists began to manage the psychoneurotic ailments of their patients with so-called psychotropic drugs. Like the rest of the areas of medical specialization, psychiatry became a profession of technicians. In its beginnings, however, psychoanalysis was considered to be a calling or vocation, not unlike that of a pastor, a teacher, or an artist. That was and is also the case for daseinanalysis. Like psychiatrists who provided psychoanalysis, lay psychoanalysts have nearly disappeared. There are now few candidates in big-city psychoanalytic institutes, medical or lay. By contrast, the number of daseinanalysts is increasing.

Chapter Three

Psychiatry, Modalities of Psychotherapy and Care, and Daseinanalysis

Psychiatry

¹⁹ Sigmund Freud, *The Question of Lay Analysis* [1926], *SE 2*, 177-258.

It may come as a surprise to most readers that daseinanalysis is no stranger to American psychiatrists, having been introduced to the profession in 1957. Usually equated with existential analysis, however, its differences from the latter were not made clear from the start and the term itself has shown up in the psychiatric literature. In the States there have been few daseinanalysts since it first became known by name, but their numbers are now increasing. This contribution is a response to the current renaissance of interest in daseinanalysis, especially among young therapists.²⁰

Daseinanalysis—spelled ‘Daseinsanalysis’ —was introduced to American psychiatrists in a substantial 50-page, two-part article by Eugen Kahn (1887-1973) in the *Psychiatric Quarterly*.²¹ Subsequent understanding of

²⁰ It is now clear that given what we know about the way they worked, a number of American therapists, including psychiatrists and psychoanalysts, were in effect daseinanalysts. Their contributions appeared in several journals that began publishing around 1960, especially the *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*. In this writer’s view, three of the most remarkable therapists of our time, Wilfred Bion (1897-1979), Jan van den Berg (1914-2012), and R.D. Laing (1927-1989), were daseinanalysts, even though they did not mention it in any of their publications. It was the author’s good fortune to have worked with the American psychoanalyst Robert J. Gaukler (1924-1984), to whom this study is dedicated *in memoriam*. Like Laing, Bion and van den Berg, while he would not have identified as a daseinanalyst, Gaukler was one in practice. The author’s lineage as a daseinanalyst can be traced to his experiences in analysis and supervision with Gaukler over a period of many years.

²¹ *Psychiatric Quarterly* **31**(1-4), 1957, 203-227 and 417-444. Kahn was a German-born psychiatrist whose *Habilitation* in Munich was supervised in part by Emil Kraepelin. Kahn taught at Yale University from 1930-1951, spent several years (1946-1951) in Switzerland in close contact with Binswanger, Boss, Roland Kuhn (1912-2005), and other representatives of the then innovative form of psychotherapy known as *Daseinsanalyse*, and then returned to the States where he taught at Baylor College of Medicine (1951-1973). Kahn wrote his appraisal during his tenure at Baylor. It is ironic that psychiatry’s most feared and respected critic, Thomas Szasz, published his first paper to appear in that journal in the same volume as Kahn’s essay. In it Szasz presents “A Critical Analysis of the Fundamental Aspects of Psychical Research” (96-108). His contribution would be followed four years later by the seminal paper, “The Myth of Mental Illness,” in the *American Psychologist* **15**, 1960, 113-118. The *Psychiatric Quarterly* is the second oldest psychiatry journal published in the United States after the *American Journal of*

daseinanalysis among medical psychologists may in large measure be attributed to how Kahn characterized it there since the *Quarterly* was one of the two most important journals in the field at that time and was widely read. As we will see, Kahn's presentation got things off to a bad start for a correct understanding of this modality of therapy.

An introductory note to his "Appraisal of Existential Analysis" announces it as "Part I of a two-part discussion of *Daseinsanalysis* appearing in successive issues of *The Psychiatric Quarterly*" (Kahn 2003). That the word 'Daseinsanalysis' does not appear in the title is unfortunate. Having omitted it there may have been an editorial decision intended to avoid putting off readers unacquainted with an unfamiliar German term, much as *Gestalt* had challenged readers in the areas of psychology and psychiatry when it first appeared in the titles of books in English beginning in the late 1920s. Nor would readers have found help by looking for the word in a dictionary of psychiatric terms or even a standard dictionary. How even to pronounce this strange word?²²

In his essay, Kahn reviews seven books and ten articles published between 1947 and 1957 by Binswanger, Boss, and Roland Kuhn (1912-2005).²³ The appraisal begins with the sentence: "If one plans a discussion of

Psychiatry, which was established in 1921 (first published in 1844 as the *Journal of Insanity*). The *Quarterly* was established in 1915 as the *State Hospital Quarterly*.

²² For the record, it is pronounced /'däzīn/ (dah-zyne), with equal emphasis placed on both syllables.

²³ Ludwig Binswanger: *Über Ideenflucht [On the Flight of Ideas]* (1933), *Grundformern und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins [Basic Forms and Knowledge of Human Existence]* (1942), *Daseinsanalytik und Psychiatrie [Analytics of Dasein and Psychiatry]* (1951), and *Drei Formen missglückten Daseins. Verstiegtheit Verschrobenheit Manieriertheit [Three Forms of Existential Failure. Eccentricity Quirkiness Manneredness]* (1956) (dedicated to Heidegger), three case histories (Ellen West [1945], Jürg Zünd [1947] and Lola Voss [1949]), and "Symptom und Zeit [Symptom and Time]" [1951]); Medard Boss: *Sinn und Gehalt Sexueller Perversionen [Meaning and Content of Sexual Perversions]* (1947), *Der Traum und seine Auslegung [The Dream and Its Interpretation]* (1953), *Einführung in die Psychosomatische Medizin [Introduction to Psychosomatic Medicine]* (1954), and *Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik [Psychoanalysis and Analytics of Dasein]* (1957); Roland Kuhn: "Mordversuch eines depressiven Fetischisten und Sodomisten an einer Dirne [Attempted Murder of a Prostitute by a Depressive Fetishist and Sodomite]" (1948), "Daseinsanalyse im psychotherapeutischen Gespräch [Daseinsanalysis in Psychotherapeutic Conversation]" (1951), "Zur Daseinsanalyse der Anorexia nervosa [On the Daseinsanalysis of *anorexia mentalis*]" (1951, 1953) (Kahn gives the title as "On the Daseinsanalysis of *anorexia nervosa*"), "Zur Daseinsstruktur einer

Daseinsanalysis, it is necessary to go back to Existentialism.” We are off to a bad start, since Heidegger, who is the central figure in the background of daseinanalysis, was quite clear that he never thought of himself as an existentialist and had little interest in the movement. Kahn continues: “Mentioning Existentialism makes it inevitable that one say something of its founder, Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855).” As a religious thinker, Kierkegaard would have been surprised to have been given this distinction. Nonetheless, since the publication of the very influential book edited by Walter Kaufmann, *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, Kierkegaard has been accorded that distinction.²⁴

There follows a brief synopsis of Kierkegaard’s life, which segues to a short review of the work of the psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) and a much more extensive discussion of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), both who are said to have been unusual in taking notice of the Danish writer’s work.²⁵ Both, says Kahn, were “profoundly influenced” by Kierkegaard “and incidentally by Nietzsche’s, thought.” Ominously, we are reminded, “both were dismissed from their universities.” The implication is that the primary source of daseinanalysis is the somewhat dark, brooding figure of the Danish writer and a movement known as Existentialism that can be traced back to him. Wondering about Kierkegaard’s part in the background of daseinanalysis in general, Kahn quotes Fritz Heinemann (1889-1970): “The Kierkegaard-Renaissance is one of the strangest phenomena of our time.”²⁶ Just why this is so is not elaborated. While it is true that Heidegger was influenced by Kierkegaard, just how is in fact not relevant to the

Neurose [On the Structure of the Dasein of a Neurosis]” (1954), and “Der Mensch in der Zwiesprache des Kranken mit seinem Arzte und das Problem der Übertragung [The Human Being in the Dialogue between a Patient and His Doctor and the Problem of Transference]” (1955). Kuhn’s Rorschach studies were collected in his book *Über Maskendeutungen im Rorschachschen Versuch [On the Interpretation of Masks in the Rorschach Test]*, Basel: Karger, 1944.

²⁴ Walter Kaufmann, *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, New York: Meridian Books, 1956 (2nd, expanded edition, 1975). Among the writers included in Kaufmann’s anthology, chronologically, Kierkegaard (1813-1855) holds pride of place in relation to Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881) in terms of when they wrote the key texts linking them to Existentialism movement.

²⁵ Although he was familiar with Freud and psychoanalysis from early on, Heidegger’s interest in psychiatry was stimulated by his contacts with Binswanger and Boss, both of whom came to his attention only in the 1940s. According to Spiegelberg, it is in the series of papers by Roland Kuhn (1940-1944) on the interpretation of masks in the Rorschach test that “first references to Heidegger and Binswanger’s *Daseinsanalyse*” occur (Spiegelberg 105).

²⁶ F.H. Heinemann, *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*, New York: Harper and Row, 1953.

background of daseinanalysis. That is to be found in Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik*, not Kierkegaard's religious concerns.

In the section on Heidegger, we are told that he "is considered the godfather of *Daseinsanalyse* (existential analysis)." Since this appraisal may have been many psychiatrists' first encounter with the philosopher's name, it is worth revisiting just what Kahn said about Heidegger.

[Heidegger] had been professor of philosophy in Marburg an der Lahn before he was called to Freiburg to succeed Husserl in 1929. He had been educated as a Jesuit novice, but obviously became estranged from the Roman Catholic church. He appeared for a time to be wholeheartedly Nazi, as rector of the University of Freiburg, with the consequence that he was dismissed in 1945. He is now again lecturing at that university.

The biographical sketch requires more detail and some of it is misleading. At the time of the appraisal, Heidegger still had twenty more years of life ahead of him and the circumstances surrounding his early life were not well known except to his family and close friends. His relation to Catholicism was more complicated than his novitiate, which was cut short by some sort of ailment. Second, Heidegger's nine-month rectorship in 1933-34 at the University of Freiburg during the height of National Socialism in Germany is a far more complex affair than is suggested by Kahn. Some kind of involvement with the Germany's Austrian-born *Führer* and his government was unavoidable for all university rectors at the time. It is true that Heidegger was forbidden to teach for six years after charges were brought against him at the end of the war regarding his involvement with Hitlerism as rector. His right to teach was reinstated after a "denazification" process.

In connection with his reputation, it is worth noting that three years after the *Quarterly* essay appeared, the psychoanalyst Leslie Farber broached the topic to his colleagues of bringing Heidegger to the States to lecture at the Washington School Psychiatry, where Boss was also scheduled to teach. Farber met opposition from his colleagues on the basis of talk about Heidegger and National Socialism of the kind found in Kahn's essay. In his correspondence with Farber, who had inquired about whether Heidegger was yet another "Nazi man," Boss vigorously defended Heidegger's reputation and spoke of the philosopher as having been a much "maligned" man. As it turned out, the then seventy-one-year-old Heidegger would not have been able to make the trip in any event because of illness, no matter whether or not Farber invited him. We will never know just what his welcome might have been among Farber's and Kahn's psychiatrist colleagues. Boss did visit Washington.

With *Dasein* translated as “human existence” here as earlier, Kahn refers to two passages in *Sein und Zeit*. I have interpolated the German words which correspond to the original text as cited in Kahn’s notes:

[1] *Dasein*, about which more will be said later, always refers to the human individual; it actually means for Heidegger a human mode of individual existence. Hence early in *Sein und Zeit* he writes, ‘Human existence [*Dasein*] is a being [*ein Seiendes*] which does not only exist [*vorkommt*] among other beings [*anderen Seienden*]. It is rather characterized as a being [*Seienden*] that in its Being [*Sein*] is concerned *about* [*um* . . . *geht*] this Being itself [*Sein selbst*].’²⁷ And [2] ‘The Being itself [*Sein selbst*] to which human existence can

²⁷ See GA 2, 16. Throughout his article, when Kahn quotes he gives the original German in footnotes but he does not specify the work of a given author cited. In this case, Kahn misquotes Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* in the second sentence of the first passage referred to and the translation is problematic. At this point in his appraisal just what to do with the word ‘*Dasein*’ becomes critical, but it is not adequately dealt with. Here is the text as it is found in *Sein und Zeit*: “Das Dasein ist ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter anderem Seienden vorkommt. Es ist vielmehr dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, daß es in seinem Sein zu seinem Sein *um* dieses Sein selbst geht.” Heidegger uses the verb *vorkommen*, which means “to happen” or “to occur.” Rendering *vorkommt* with ‘exists’ introduces unnecessary confusion, given that the words ‘*Dasein*’ and ‘*Existenz*’ are also translated with ‘existence’. Also, Heidegger uses the verb *auszeichnen* (“distinguish from”), not *kennzeichnen* (“identify as” or “be known as”), as Kahn has it. Finally, Kahn omits the word *ontisch* and does not preserve Heidegger’s emphasis on the separable prefix *um* in *umgehen* (used with the prefix *um-* as separable). An more accurate translation of the passage might be: “*Dasein* [left untranslated] is a being which does not merely occur among other beings. It is instead ontically better distinguished [from other beings] as a being that in its be[-ing] is concerned *about* [*geht* . . . *um*] this very be[-ing] itself.” The critical word in the second sentence is the verb *umgehen*. It has been various translated as “to be an *issue* for” (Macquarrie-Robinson 1962) and, as in Kahn, “being concerned *about*” (Stambaugh/Schmidt 1996/2010). Neither translation, however, does justice to Heidegger’s usage in this critical passage. The construction *gehen um* (with the *um* emphasized) is perhaps best rendered as “go *about*,” as in “I go about my business.” Using the verb *umgehen* allows Heidegger to avoid the verb *sein* (to be), which would require him to say (in German) that *Dasein* “is.” *Dasein* precisely *is* not; unlike every other being, it exists. Instead, it “goes *about*” its be[-ing] (*Sein*) itself. That is the point of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. *Dasein* is remarkable in that it goes *about* its be[-ing] and nothing else. In other words, it has to do with nothing other than its very be[-ing] itself. Heidegger’s lifelong meditation on *Sein* confirms that. In this way, *Dasein* is

refer in this or that way and to which it always refers in some way is called existence [*Existenz*].”²⁸ As presented, both passages are presented carelessly and could not have but caused confusion among

ontically (as well as ontologically) distinguished from other beings. The word ‘ontic’ refers to the everyday life of the actualization of a given *Dasein* as you or me, as a him or her. Translating *Sein* with be[-ing] is surely an oddity, but I think it is helpful. It avoids ‘Being’ (a rendering of the infinitive *sein* nominalized) which is then just a capitalized letter away from ‘being’, what has been an unacknowledged translation of *eine Seiende* (“a being”) as one instance of *all that is there* or simply *what is there* (*das Seiende*), ‘beings’. We then see *Sein* as based on *sein* as a transitive verb comparable to, say, taking an infinitive such as *leben* (“to live”) and nominalizing it to *Leben* (living) or *denken* (“to think”), nominalized as *Denken* (thinking), as in “Was heißt Denken (What is called/goes by the name/calls for thinking)?” My construction ‘be[-ing]’ should be read as ‘be’. There would be some advantage to pronouncing ‘be[-ing]’ as simply /bē/ to distinguish it from ‘being’ (/’biŋ/) (*eine Seiende*), which also then be rendered with ‘entity’. Recall that ‘*sein*’ is, in fact, ‘*seien*’, where the ‘e’ of the suffix denoting the formation of an infinitive, ‘-en’, has disappeared in the development of German.

²⁸ This sentence appears a few lines later in Heidegger’s text. In GA 2, marginal notes to copies of the book are included. In that edition of *Sein und Zeit*, two words in the sentence are glossed (footnotes ‘b’ and ‘c’): “Das^b Sein selbst, zu dem^c das Dasein sich so oder so verhalten kann und immer irgendwie verhält, nennen wir ‘*Existenz*.’” For b: “Dasjenige [that]”; for c: “als seinem eigenen [as its own].” Since Kahn will say that both quotations sound “strange” and require his clarification, it is also worth pausing to consider the sentence a bit further. Macquarrie/Robinson translates: “That kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call ‘*existence*.’” Stambaugh/Schmidt writes: “We shall call the very being to which Dasein can relate in one way or another, and somehow always does relate, *existence*.” Macquarrie/Robinson retains the word ‘existence’ in scare quotes (as Heidegger does), but Stambaugh/Schmidt does not. The word is italicized in the original, which both translations observe. Kahn does not observe either of these important details, however. With Heidegger’s glosses in mind, the meaning of the sentence would seem to be: “That being itself to which existence [as intrinsic to what is its own] can comport itself one way or another, and always does comport itself, we call ‘a way of life’.” Some may question my translation of *Existenz* here. It is justified, however, given just how puzzling the sentence is. ‘*Existenz*’ can also be translated with ‘existence’, but in a crucial passage in *Sein und Zeit* that we have already visited (“*Das Wesen des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz*”) doing so leads to the problems. Later, Heidegger will replace the word ‘*Existenz*’ with terms that exploit the literal meaning of the Latin *existere* (from *ex-stare*, “to stand out into”). In *Being and Time*, however, *Existenz* is probably best understood as “a way of life” (as in *mathematische*

Existenz, etc.), as I have suggested. Each actualization of *Dasein* as a way of life is unique so that *Existenz* indicates an indeterminate number of actualizations of *Dasein* each of which has, as Heidegger says, the character of mineness (*Jemeinigkeit*)—one of Heidegger's existentials in his analytics of *Dasein*.) One reason Heidegger abandoned the term was because of what came to be its association and confusion with the notion of *Existenz* in Jaspers' *Existenzphilosophie*. Kahn's discussion of forms of the verb *sein* which follows does nothing to shine any light on its sense. The context of the passages quoted is important and may help shed some light on what is under discussion here. The three sentences are from section §4 ("The Ontic Priority of the Question of Being") in which the terms '*Dasein*' and '*Existenz*' are first defined (hence the scare quotes around '*Existenz*'). Highlighted, Heidegger suggests that *Existenz* is of central importance in understanding the structure of *Dasein*. A bit earlier In §4 Heidegger had written about the *sciences* as ways in which human beings comport themselves, that is, as forms of *Existenz*: "Wissenschaften haben als Verhaltungen des Menschen die Seinsart dieses Seienden (Mensch) [Sciences have as relations of the human being [to being] the kind of being of this being (man)]." The sentence would then run: "Sciences have as relations of man [to the be] the kind of be of this being (man)." (The root 'seī' or 'sey' thus stands out. Its etymology it leads back to the proto-Indo-European *wesana*, thence from *h'wes*—to dwell, reside at, stay over, stay on. This in turn leads to etymological connections with the root for the English 'be', namely, 'bhū' (or 'bhévo'), and 'bēon', and their relation to the Greek φύω, the root of the all-important Greek notion of φύσις: to grow, to appear. It is easy to hear the close connection phonologically between 'bhū' and φύω.) Each of the sciences is thus a distinct sort of *Existenz* (for example, mathematical, psychological). The critical word in *this* sentence is '*Seinsart*', which here means "a kind of being," "a way of being," or "a mode of being." The word is rich in connotation in meaning a way of being (*Sein*) where the 'of' is understood in both the subjective genitive and objective genitive senses. Each *Existenz*, then, is both *of* (from) be[-ing] and *about* (directed towards) be[-ing]. What is common to all of the sciences is that they reflect *Existenz*, which is unique to man. Moreover, the point seems to be that given this relation to be[-ing], only man does in fact *comport* himself to other beings. Thus "going about" means comporting, as concernfully directed to other beings, whether as mathematician or a carpenter or psychologist. It is not indifferent to things (as inorganic beings are) or merely instinctually reactive (as animals and perhaps plants are) to things, nor is comportment God's way in his omnipotent influence in things. Instead, man *cares about* things. This Heidegger will express in terms of the overarching existential *Sorge* (care about). *Dasein* is care-ful in its dealings with things. In short: Other, non-human beings (from the inorganic to the divine) are related to other beings (including human beings) in different ways, as described, for which a relation other than comportment is implied. Recall that Heidegger is here considering the *ontic* situation of *Dasein*, that is, *la condition humaine*, which he wants nonetheless wants to

readers. The patient reader may want to have a look at the author's notes on the problems that have been introduced.

Worried that such statements might sound "strange" to his readers (as indeed they do), Kahn then tries to explain basic terms, but with a less than successful outcome. He summarizes what he has said up to that point and then goes about presenting a brief grammar lesson:

understand *ontologically* in his analytics of *Dasein*. In the context of the sentence cited by Kahn, Heidegger introduces the key terms of his ontological analysis (*Dasein* and *Existenz*) but he must do this from the *ontic* perspective, that is, from the perspective of that of a particular living, breathing human being. Then there is, finally, the pivotal word *Sein* to consider, which I have defended as translating with 'be[-ing]'. The sentence cited by Kahn that we have been lingering on says that *Existenz* (a way of life or ek-sisting as standing out into) and *das Sein selbst* (be[-ing] itself) are somehow ontologically indistinguishable inasmuch as *Sein* denotes that to which *Dasein* must comport itself. The ontic comportment of *Dasein* to other beings differs in each case but its comportment toward be[-ing] is in each case the same. Recall that Heidegger's effort here is merely terminological clarification. Thus, "grasped terminologically" (although by no means adequately understood), man "is" *Dasein*, but *Dasein* is not. To get around this seeming contradiction necessitated by the limitations of language, Heidegger suggests that *Dasein* can be understood only as *Existenz*, as a given way of life or existing. Understanding (*Verstehen*) is an existential of *Dasein*. Essential to his argument is Heidegger's reminder to the reader not to forget that "scientific research is not the only and not the closest [*nächste*] possible *Seinsart* of this being (man). This distinction [*Auszeichnung*] has to be made visible for the first time. At this point, the discussion must [necessarily only] anticipate [*vorgreifen*] the following [discussions] and actually for the first time revealing analyses." Heidegger's concern will therefore turn to revealing a way of being human that is not that of the sciences. Another, non-scientific and *nearer* way or mode of comportment toward beings and, so also, to *Sein* is to be revealed. At this point, however, it is only anticipated. It can only be formally indicated. All that is to follow of Heidegger's fundamental ontology is about accomplishing such a revelation, but, he reminds us, what is to be revealed must somehow have been grasped in advance of its actual accomplishment in order that one might have any sense at all of just what one is inquiring into. All that is accomplished in the sentence is to point out what expression Heidegger will use for any human comportment, *Existenz*, each of which is of and about be[ing] itself (*Sein*).

This may sound less strange if one tries to clarify some of Heidegger's terminology. It has already been remarked that by *Dasein* he means the individual mode of human existence; *Dasein* will, in the following discussion be rendered, for brevity's sake as human existence; the reference to the individual should always be kept in mind. The German words *sein* [the infinitive 'to be'], *Sein* [the noun 'Being'], *seiend* [the present participle of *sein*] and *Seiendes* [the noun 'being', built on the participle] mean: 'to be,' 'Being,' 'being,' and 'existent,' respectively. The word *sein* is the infinitive that corresponds to 'to be'. It is spelled with a small 's' unless it begins a sentence, which will be avoided here. The word *Sein*, always spelled with a capital 'S', is a noun; it means existence per se, the existence due to which all existing things—living and not living—exist; the sentences just quoted 'The Being itself to which human existence can refer in this or that way and to which it always refers in some way is called existence,' may be quite understandable now, although at first sight it may have looked odd.²⁹

The word *seiend* is the present participle of the verb *sein*; *seiend* is related to *sein* as 'being' with a small 'b', is related to 'to be'. From the present participle, *seiend*, the noun *Seiend* [sic] is derived. It can be used for people (male and female) and things (neuter); in order to avoid confusion *Seiend* will be translated as 'the existent'. 'Existent' will be used only as a noun. If an attribute (adjective) is needed, 'being' as well as

²⁹ As we have seen, the expression "human existence" for *Dasein* is redundant since, for Heidegger, only the human being exists. Heidegger does not have in mind the sense of *Dasein* as a predicate of a given being, one that says it is real, not imaginary, nor its everyday sense as referring to what is. Further along in the paragraph, we are soon in a hopeless confusion of terms, with the word 'existence' standing in for both '*Dasein*' and '*Sein*'. It is not the case that "the sentence just quoted . . . may be quite understandable now, although at first sight it may have looked odd." What holds for the third sentence from *Being and Time* just discussed (see previous note) must be said about the "clarifications" of '*sein*' and '*Seiend*' (which is not a German word). In a note to the word '*Dasein*' (208, n. 14) Kahn writes: "The German word *Dasein*, noun with capital 'D', is generally used in the German language to denote existence or life. Heidegger uses *Dasein* with the special meaning mentioned. So do his followers, although, at a closer view, not all of them really mean exactly what Heidegger does. Writers who are not existentially oriented usually take the word in its general meaning. The use of the word *Dasein* is no certification of existentialism." Quite apart from the technical meaning of the word, which is in play here, *Dasein* does not mean interchangeably 'existence' (a predicate of beings indicating they are real) and 'life' (being alive). To suggest 'existent' (having the quality of existing) for *das Seiende* conflates the distinction between what is there (*das Seiende*) and an instance of that (*eine Seiende*).

'existing' is available. One might now slightly change the sentence quoted first: 'Human existence is an existent which does not only exist among other existents, it is rather characterized as an existent that in its Being it is concerned about this Being itself.' There is no doubt that many a sentence of Heidegger's must be read repeatedly and carefully before one actually 'gets home'.³⁰

Once again, in a note, I have detailed the difficulties Kahn introduced, but these discussions may be saved for a later time. The point is that psychiatrists will not have made it "home" through Kahn's discussions of the "godfather's" terminology. Instead, they will have been led, wading into a muddle. The remaining paragraphs in the section on Heidegger thus suffer from Kahn's confusions. Since this is not a German lesson, we must forego further comments on the problems with Kahn's attempts to get the reader to be at home with Heidegger's language. Suffice to say that most will likely have become even more bewildered after reading Kahn's attempts at clarification and explanation. The notes, I hope, have shed some light on the mess.

Immediately following his digression on terminology, Kahn claims that for Heidegger "human existence, as he wants to have it understood, is '*geistig*'." In a note, he translates *geistig* with 'spiritual'. It is not made clear to which texts he is referring here, but in *Sein und Zeit* there are only two passages on the *geistig* on "human existence." Early on, Heidegger says that *the human being [Mensch]* is "first a spiritual thing [*geistige Ding*] that is then afterwards

³⁰ I will point out only a few problems with Kahn's comments on the verb *sein* in relation to the notions of *Dasein* (existence) and *Existenz* (standing out into being and existing as a way of life). The preceding notes have covered some of the same territory. But note that there is no German noun '*Seiend*' (which only amounts to capitalizing the present participle). There is the noun *das Seiende*, with the definite article, which is a collective noun (like 'cattle') and means "what is there." It has often been translated as 'beings', but in doing so there is the sense of a countable, determinable plurality of entities (for example, how many cows there might be in a herd of cattle), which is not what Heidegger has in mind. There is also *eine Seiendes* (with the indefinite article), which denotes "a being," an instance of all that is there (*das Seiende*). Such an instance might be a pebble, a tree, a horse, or God—or the human being. Given these two usages of *Seiende* we can speak in an abstract, general sense of *what is there* (reality) (*das Seiende*) or an example or instance of what is there (*eine Seiendes*), respectively. Kahn's error with *Seiend* here is surprising since his first language was German. Perhaps it was a proof-reading error, although that is unlikely since the word occurs twice in the passage. The distinction between (1) *Dasein* as a predicate (ontic) and (2) Heidegger's usage of *Dasein* as a *terminus technicus* (ontological) is lost again and again in Kahn's discussion.

transferred [versetzt] 'into [in] some space [einige Raum]' (GA 2, 76). Then very late in the book, he has something more to say about *Dasein* in this context when he writes that "because it is 'spiritual [geistig] and only because it is so, can *Dasein* be spatial [räumlich] in a way that is essentially impossible for an extended bodily thing [ausgedehnten Körperding]" (GA 2, 487). What Kahn does not see is that Heidegger is talking about *Dasein*, not its ontic actualization, the human body that occupies space. Indeed, for Heidegger, *Dasein* makes room for things, is space-making. *Dasein* does not occupy space. Heidegger's comments on the spiritual and space will occupy him at length later, forty years later, for example, in the Zollikon seminars.³¹ Kahn understands the spiritual in a conventional sense, however, where spirit is something that is somehow superadded to something physical, as when, for example, Christian theologians speak of human beings as having been blessed with the presence of the Holy Spirit which has descended into the human body. For Heidegger, by contrast, *Dasein* is *geistig* in the sense of being the condition for the possibility of what is spatial and therefore corporeal.

Kahn's discussion next takes up the topic of time in Heidegger, aptly pointing to the fable "Cura" (Hyginus CCXX) to which Heidegger refers in *Being and Time* as a "preontological" account of *Dasein*. There are also brief allusions to several of the other existentials [Existenziale] worked out in *Being and Time*. All of this is sketchy, however, and does not add up to an accurate or complete introduction to the "godfather" of Daseinsanalysis.

In section VI of Kahn's appraisal, the discussion turns to Binswanger's appropriation of Heidegger.³² Kahn does grasp the difference between Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik* and Binswanger's *Daseinsanalyse* (212, n. 38 and 215, nn. 49-50), but he again mystifies the reader with sentences such as: "Binswanger considers love the ontological opposite of [Heidegger's] care [Sorge]" (216). Kahn misunderstands Heidegger's existential care (*Sorge*) in the sense of cares or

³¹ See, for example, ZS 9-45/8-35.

³² Kahn covers two of Binswanger's books and five articles published between 1933 and 1951. These include Binswanger's *Über Ideenflucht* [On the Flight of Ideas] (1933), *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschliches Daseins* [Basic Forms and Cognition of Human Existence] (1942), three case studies (Ellen West [1945], Jürg Zünd [1947] and Lola Voss [1949]), and two journal articles ("Symptom und Zeit [Symptom and Time]" [1951] and "Daseinsanalytik und Psychiatrie [Analytics of Dasein and Psychiatry] [1951]). Neither of Binswanger's major works has been translated. Two of the case histories have been translated: "Lola Voss" (in Ludwig Binswanger, *Being-in-the-World*, New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 266-341) and "Ellen West" (in Rollo May et al. [eds.], *Existence*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958, 237-364).

woes, that is, something negative in contrast with which Binswanger proposes something positive, love, to make up for the omission as Binswanger saw it in Heidegger's "anthropology." Of course, Heidegger's concern is not with attitudes or feelings, but rather with the ontological condition for the possibility of such. Love, an ontic emotion, could in any case not be the "ontological opposite" of the ontological existential *Sorge* as the human being's fundamental structural possibility as being-in-the-world. Such a way of misunderstanding Heidegger was based on Binswanger's failure to grasp the ontological difference at the heart of *Dasein*.

Kahn cannot be faulted here, since he was not aware that Binswanger eventually understood that he had *misunderstood* Heidegger and that the two men agreed about the psychiatrist's "fruitful misunderstanding." Kahn could only point to Binswanger's principal interest in what he took to be an anthropology implicit in Heidegger's analytics of *Dasein*, noting that only "slowly" did Binswanger come "to believe that there were psychotherapeutic possibilities in existential analysis [Kahn's emphasis] [*Daseinsanalyse*], namely when some patients seemed to show an understanding of the new manner of being understood; [quoting Binswanger] 'when the experience of insight into their own structure of human existence and the pertinent knottings, bendings and shirkings' seemed to carry a certain therapeutic effect" (219). Further discussion of Binswanger concludes the first part of Kahn's appraisal.

Of more importance to our revisiting Kahn's message to psychiatrists is his account of the work of Medard Boss, whose major interest was therapeutic *Daseinsanalyse*. "Medard Boss," says Kahn, "is a writer of fertility equal to Binswanger's. Of all the practicing psychiatrists who have accepted Heidegger's teaching, he appears to be closest to the teacher. Boss writes with a tremendous élan, with an admirable vocabulary and, like Binswanger, with the obviously unswerving conviction of being a prophet of a new, unshakable truth" (417).

In general, Kahn's review of Boss's three early books is fair. He often likes to refer to Boss as a sort of disciple of the master, Heidegger, a charge against Boss that runs through his discussion of *Sinn und Gehalt Sexueller Perversionen* [*Meaning and Content of Sexual Perversions*] (1947), *Der Traum und seine Auslegung* [*The Analysis of Dreams*] (1953), and *Einführung in die Psychosomatische Medizin* [*Introduction to Psychosomatic Medicine*] (1954).³³

³³ Kahn was evidently not familiar with the second, expanded edition of the book on perversions, which appeared in 1953. Nor does he advise the reader of the English translation of Boss's book, which had appeared in 1949. Boss's first book on dreaming was not translated into English until 1958 and the book on psychosomatic medicine has never

While Boss was influenced by Heidegger, he was very much his own man. Other important, decisive influences on the development of therapeutic *Daseinsanalyse* came from Boss's experiences in India and from his reading of Hindu and other Eastern philosophy.³⁴

Apparently referring to Boss's book on psychosomatics, Kahn reprises his reference to the *geistig* in the early Heidegger, quoting Boss, that "human existence is 'spiritual', it is 'carried out' in the body, its organs and its functions: 'the body is bodying [*Der Leib leibt*]'." "This is a point of particular interest" for Kahn inasmuch as it gives him an opportunity to criticize Boss. The passage reflects the tone of much of Kahn's discussion of "existential analysis": "In his great enthusiasm, Boss does not seem to see that he is doing what many psychotherapists do; but he does it with the ample use of resounding words and with all the convert's fervor" (Kahn 419). He concludes that "although Boss's writing not only sounds—but is—fantastic, there is something appealing in it which is missed in Binswanger's, and still more in Kuhn's, publications. The writer cannot help assuming this is due to several factors, among which Boss's sense of humor and his undeniable, if often hidden, common sense are as relevant as his style and his convert's fervor" (Kahn 427). Which brings us to Kahn's remarks on Roland Kuhn.³⁵

appeared in an English version. Boss's first major book on Daseinsanalyse, *Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik*, appeared the same year as Kahn's appraisal and is discussed in the "Postscript" to the "appraisal."

³⁴ See *Medard Boss and the Promise of Psychotherapy*, London: Free Association Books, 2020.

³⁵ Kahn reviews five papers published by Kuhn between 1948 and 1955. See n. 11. Kuhn is an important figure in the history of psychiatry apart from his participation in the development of therapeutic *Daseinsanalyse*. In 1956, he began to treat patients diagnosed as schizophrenic at the psychiatric hospital in Münsterlingen, Switzerland, which he directed with an antihistamine imipramine hydrochloride. The drug had been synthesized in 1951, its sedative and antipsychotic properties having been asserted by French psychiatrists Pierre Deniker (1917-1998) and Jean Delay (1907-1987) a but later in the 1950s. The use of imipramine (Tofranil) followed on the introduction of the use of chlorpromazine (Thorazine or Largactil), which Deniker and Delay had used with their patients as an antipsychotic. Because of its expense, however, something cheaper had to be found that could be used with a large number of patients in the hospital setting. This motivated Kuhn's experimenting with imipramine. Originally manufactured by the Geigy Chemical Corporation in Switzerland, imipramine was abandoned as an antipsychotic and came to be widely used as the first nominally *antidepressive* medication instead. Kuhn's findings were published in English in "The Treatment of Depressive States with G 22355 (imipramine hydrochloride)," in *American Journal of Psychiatry* **115**(5), 1958, 459-464. The paper was first read at Galesburg State Hospital by Kuhn on May 19, 1958. Kuhn was eventually

As early as 1946 Kuhn had published the case history of a patient diagnosed with schizophrenia whom he treated daseinsanalytically. Oddly enough, Kahn did not include this paper and several others by Kuhn among the contributions of the Swiss psychiatrist that he reviewed.³⁶

Says Kahn, “one may best consider him as a devoted son-pupil of Binswanger and an adoring grandson-pupil of Heidegger. . . . Despite all his courtesy, once in a while he seems to be unable—or unwilling?—to suppress a certain hostility against non-adherents to his creed. The ‘it is so’ of the psychiatric existential analysts is very outspoken in Kuhn. . . . Like Binswanger and Boss, he realizes that not every individual is accessible to, and apt to go through a deeper reaching psychotherapy; he writes ‘In psychotherapy, the attempt is made to extricate the patient from bane of his past. To the degree to which this attempt succeeds, the patient becomes free, open to the new, and able to unfold his creative faculties.’” Kahn adds: “This is, one conjectures, likely to reduce the number of candidates for such therapy to a rather modest figure” (428).

Following his review of Kuhn’s case report on a “depressive fetishist and sodomite,” Kahn admits that “Kuhn’s case has been presented at some length, as the writer presumes that his method and its shortcomings become visible step by step” (Kahn 431). Kahn’s generally negative appraisal of “existential analysis” now becomes explicit. Kahn’s concern is that in *Daseinsanalyse* “there is the tendency to complicate matters which in all likelihood are not so complicated at all . . . and to use a flood of words where only a few words would be more telling. Who thought and who experienced this or that—the intuiting doctor or the patient under treatment—is often not discernible” (Kahn 431). We might suppose that Kahn’s personal acquaintance with Kuhn and the others whose work he is reviewing over a

embroiled in accusations of having run trials of the drug on patients in his hospital on Lake Constance without their informed consent.

³⁶ Roland Kuhn, “Daseinsanalyse eines Falles von Schizophrenie [Daseinsanalysis of a Case of Schizophrenia],” in *Monatschrift für Psychiatrie und Neurologie* **112**(5-6), 1946, 233-257. Other papers by Kuhn left out of consideration include “Daseinsanalyse im psychotherapeutischen Gespräch [Daseinsanalysis in Psychotherapeutic Conversation],” in *Schweizer Archiv für Neurologie, Neurochirurgie und Psychiatrie* **67**, 1951, 52-60, “Daseinsanalytische Studie über die Bedeutung von Grenzen im Wahn [Daseinsanalytic Study on the Meaning of the Boundaries in Delusion],” in *Monatschrift für Psychiatrie und Neurologie* **124** (4-6), 1952, 354-383, and Kuhn’s paper on “The Attempted Murder of a Prostitute,” which appeared in *Existence*, 365-425.

period of years left him with a rather negative impression. Whatever the case on that score may be, he could not approve of “existential analysis” as a therapeutic modality.

Kahn's evaluation of Kuhn is quite brief and in the following section of his appraisal he returns to Heidegger, whose influence on all three psychiatrists is summarized. He quotes the Hungarian-born philosopher Wilhelm [Vilmos] Szilasi (1889-1966), who had studied with Heidegger: “Szilasi . . . strikingly and briefly expressed what I have been trying to present in so many words; Szilasi says that Binswanger dwells ‘in his own intermediate territory between psychoanalysis and existential analysis’” (Kahn 434). Looking back to Boss, Kahn declares that “Boss declines to make any practical applications of existential analytics [emphasis in the original]; he accepted Heidegger's philosophy as his metaphysics of *Weltanschauung*. . . . To the present writer, Boss appears to be a genuine psychotherapist. His familiarity with Heidegger's work is complete, and his devotion to it is perfect” (Kahn 436). What Kahn says about Boss is incorrect since he bases his therapeutic *Daseinsanalyse* precisely (and correctly, unlike Binswanger) on Heidegger's analytics of *Dasein* (*Daseinsanalytik* or, as he writes, “existential analytics”). What Kahn means by Boss's having “accepted Heidegger's philosophy as his metaphysics of *Weltanschauung* [world view]” is unintelligible. Of course, Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik* in *Sein und Zeit* brings the history of metaphysics into question. His accomplishment is not a metaphysics that someone (such as Boss) could accept on which to base a world view and Boss understood this. It is rather a fundamental ontology accomplished by a hermeneutic phenomenology that attempted to structure a fundamental ontology that brings to light a different view of humanity, that and nothing more. Boss did not find a metaphysics in Heidegger, but rather a critique of metaphysics. He found in Heidegger a phenomenological approach to his patients' behavior and experience to replace the positivistic approach of the natural sciences with which he grew up. Boss's *Weltanschauung*, whatever it may have been, is not to be found in Heidegger's analytics of *Dasein*. In the end, Kahn concludes that “Boss appears to be a genuine psychotherapist,” thanks to his knowledge of “Heidegger's work.” His praise is brief, however, since he cannot avoid suggesting yet again that Boss's attitude toward it is one of “perfect” “devotion” to the “godfather” of “existential analysis.” He feels, in short, a deep ambivalence about it. This is seen in his concluding remarks about Boss: “From his *Glaubenshaltung* [system of belief], Boss admonishes physicians to remember they are ‘descendants of ancient priest-physicians [*Priester-Ärzte*]’. He asks the rhetorical question, ‘Did not a division of the healers of mankind into priests and physicians then occur, the priests wanting to bring man only salvation, the physicians wanting to bring him nothing

but healing?"³⁷ Here Kahn points to something that is central to Boss's uniqueness and that of daseinanalysis, namely, a central place for the spiritual dimension of human life. Kahn detects in Boss a sensitivity to the spiritual element in the life of his analysands which was a hallmark of Boss's approach, but Kahn is mistaken in suggesting that Boss's own religious faith somehow played a part in the therapeutic process. For Boss, he writes, "if the physician is devoted to his faith and is practicing this faith in his work, his patients will fall in line and share his faith. He is able to transfer his faith to his patient. It does not matter what faith it is. What matters is the doctor" (Khan 437). He suggests that working with Boss could produce in his analysands a deepening of their religious faith. In fact, Boss was careful to say very clearly that the therapist's *Glaubenshaltung* was not to intrude into the therapeutic setting.³⁸ Kahn is very helpful in pointing out "one of Boss's pertinent remarks": "From the simplest technical-surgical procedures and operations to the technique of psychoanalysis, the whole thinking and acting of the physician ought to be driven by the aim [*Bestreben*] to pave the way [*Weg zu bahnen*] for our patients' becoming fully human [*vollen Menschsein*]."³⁹ This is very much in line with Boss's having taken Heidegger's notion of way-making caring for [*vorausspringende Fürsorge*], as first worked out in *Being and Time*, as the principal guide for his practice.⁴⁰

³⁷ Kahn quotes *Einführung in die psychosomatische Medizin*, Bern: Huber, 1954, 212. The book is dedicated to Heidegger, "dem unermüdlichen Lehrer und gütigen Freund in Dankbarkeit zugeeignet [dedicated with gratitude to the tireless teacher and kind friend]."

³⁸ "Psychotherapeutic eros has to go even somewhat beyond Christian humility [*christliche Demut*] in its selflessness and overcoming of the self [*Selbstüberwindung*] in so far as it must not even intervene [*eingreifen*] in the interest of the therapist's own God and seek to guide the partner's life accordingly." Medard Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic Liberation," in *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry* 2, 1962, 192. Published in German as *Lebensangst, Schuldgefühle und psychotherapeutische Befreiung*, Bern: Huber, 1962.

³⁹ *Einführung in die psychosomatische Medizin*, 213. Kahn's translation has been modified.

⁴⁰ An existential or structural given of *Dasein*, such *Fürsorge* is contrasted with *einspringende Fürsorge*—intervening caring for—which steps in for others in looking after them (medical practices such as surgery are perhaps the most dramatic examples) but in so doing effectively *takes away from* the other's *Dasein* its care [*Sorge*] about what is there (*das Seiende*). Reference by Boss in the quoted passage to surgical and other medical procedures is puzzling, then, since such operations are undoubtedly interventional. It is hard to imagine how removing an appendix and resetting a bone are in themselves "way-paving" unless we take Boss to mean that in carrying out such acts present limitations of realizing possibilities will in the long run enhance the freedom of the other, who now is incapable of eating or walking. Boss includes "the technique of psychoanalysis" with medical techniques with good reason since

Kahn concludes his appraisal with some general comments on “existential analysis,” most of which were prescient, by observing that “it may not always have been easy for the psychiatrists to keep step with Heidegger’s thought. . . . The [existential] doctors have discarded Freudian theory, but remained faithful to psychoanalytical technique. What will happen to their adherence to Heideggerian theory and its use in their interpretations remains to be seen. What worries the writer is the notion of these colleagues that, with the introduction of the concept of *Dasein*, everything becomes or can be made meaningful—everything that happens to or is experienced by patients; and that every interpretation is looked at as valid which expounds this in pertinent vocabulary and shows how *Dasein* sets body and soul to work” (Khan 438). Here we become aware that, for Kahn, the importance of the notion of *Dasein* and ‘Daseinsanalysis’ as announced in the opening note of the series has not been far from his thoughts.

Khan does not see that the daseinanalyst’s interpretations are not modified merely by introducing the concept of *Dasein*. *Daseinanalysts do not make interpretations as do psychoanalysts*. That is for the analysand to do. The only valid interpretations are self-interpretations and they must come to the analysand in their own good time. By abstaining from introducing his purported understanding of the behavior or experience of the other and in this way turning this mandate over to the analysand, he returns the analysand’s *Sorge*, his care about what is there, to his *Dasein*. That is, after all, what makes daseinanalytic therapy different from interventional therapies in *not* being interventional caring for (*einspringende Fürsorge*) but rather way-making caring for (*vorausspringende Fürsorge*) in the sole interest of the analysand’s more fully realizing his possibilities, that is, by setting the conditions for restoring his freedom.

Kahn also misunderstands daseinanalysis on the matter of the Cartesian body-mind relation. What he terms the “body-soul” relation in the passage cited is indeed “artificial,” as he says, but while observing that Boss indeed still wrote of “psychosomatics” he does not see that for Boss daseinanalysis begins by making the need for accounting for

psychoanalysis is interventional in making interpretations and reconstructions for the benefit of the analysand. This also makes clear just how much daseinanalysis differs from psychoanalysis, which Boss is concerned to articulate beginning with *Psychoanalyse and Daseinsanalytik* (1957) and culminating in his *Grundriß* and the Zollikon seminars. This remains the case even though daseinanalysis retains features of psychoanalysis—invocation of the fundamental rule, use of the couch to the greatest extent possible, and an emphasis on dreaming life while abandoning its metapsychology.

such a relation superfluous. Boss's conventional terminology, which continues to be very much in vogue in European psychiatry and even in some current discussions of daseinanalysts, refers to what can be about the human being from an ontic perspective. *Dasein*, of course, is neither psychic nor somatic. It is the condition for the possibility of appearing as embodied and, if you will, ensouled, as Freud believed we are.

Kahn's criticism that "existential-analytical minded colleagues . . . settle the problem [of dualism] by pre-ordaining *Dasein* to whatever may be considered physical or psychological, that is, to whatever may concern the human being's body or experiencing" is misleading. *Dasein* is not "pre-ordained" to the physical or the psychical, but rather the latter are conceivable only given *Dasein* as what makes possible making such a distinction in the first place, the first instance of which was the result of that famous thought experiment accomplished in the middle of the 17th century by René Descartes in which psychical "stuff" (*materia*) was invented as a complement to physical "stuff" (*materia*). Boss's point, following Heidegger, is that we do not first experience ourselves as divided in such a way. When Boss speaks of "psychosomatic" ailments, he is talking about disturbances of the *unity* as which a given *Dasein* appears. This is related a further comment by Kahn, who says that "Boss's understanding is through psychology or psychopathology, despite the existential-analytical *Weltanschauung*" (Kahn 439). That is a fair appraisal of the Boss of 1957, if Kahn means that Boss's understanding was then still *based* on the psychology of his day and on conventional notions of psychiatric psychopathology (etiology and nosology).

There is, of course, an inconsistency here, since Boss would deny correctly that there has ever been a coherent account of the psyche. Boss lived another 30 years after the time of Kahn's review. It is fair to say he understood that daseinanalysis is not, after all, part of the world of psychology, dominated as it is by the notion of consciousness. And yet, even in 1975 he referred to the field. Indeed, he added the word 'psychology' title of his comprehensive *Grundriß* for a "phenomenological physiology, psychology, pathology, therapy and existential preventative medicine." Like other psychiatrists and psychoanalysts of his day, he made use of standard diagnostic terminology even while turning his back on it and along with it the language of mental illnesses, diseases of the mind and the like. Boss and the early daseinanalysts who gathered around him spoke therefore spoke in ways that did not correspond to their approach to praxis where notions of disorders, conditions, syndromes and the like are meaningless for the purposes of daseinanalytic meeting and exploration.

To put it directly and unambiguously, daseinanalysis is psychoanalysis without the psyche. Boss's accomplishment was to have made this clear, albeit only implicitly. This entails leaving *psychology* and *psychiatry* behind. And yet—

Boss, like some of his medical and non-medical colleagues, more than a little ambivalently remained a doctor and medical psychologist throughout his life. In its current phase, however, daseinanalysis is finally making a clean break with its remaining ties to the medical model. It is a process, as we will see, that will require careful oversight by daseinanalysts in order not to remain attached to the world and discourse of psychology and psychiatry while remaining accepted and respectable among their colleagues in those fields (clinical psychology, psychiatry, social work, counseling, coaching and the rest).⁴¹

As already noted, Kahn spent several years in the company of Binswanger, Boss and Kuhn. His appraisal of their “existential analysis” not flattering: “The writer wants to express personal gratitude to the three colleagues from whom he has learned much” (Kahn 439). But—“the certainty with which they write—‘no doubt’, ‘because it is so’, ‘of course’, ‘naturally’—cannot conceal the fact that concepts, or even worse, words, are often gaily tossed around” by them. “The ponderousness of the older, the alacrity of the younger, priest and the assiduity of the deacon, though occasionally irritating, show the manner in which each of them goes after his business. It is the writer’s impression that our existential-analytic friends have overdone it philosophically. . . . Did they try to be revolutionists?” (Kahn 439). Kahn seems to suggest that the three protagonists of his appraisal were more on a crusade than working out a revised approach to therapy. Just what it means to “have overdone it philosophically” is not clear. The point is that an recognition and “outing” of the philosophical underpinnings and presuppositions of psychology and psychiatry as sciences had been long overdue. This was accomplished in the Zollikon seminars, where Heidegger would again and again challenge the doctors in attendance to become aware that they *held* presuppositions that informed their work. Most had never considered that natural science and its application in medicine and psychology imply a philosophical position.

The three men whose work was discussed and many others were radicals but not revolutionaries. They wanted to penetrate to the pure gold as it were of psychoanalysis and refine it as daseinanalysis.

⁴¹ As Kahn’s appraisal was going to press Boss was making plans for the first of two visits to India (and Sri Lanka) in 1958 and 1959. Boss’s experiences in India in the years just following the publication of Kahn’s appraisal led him to a dramatically revised self-understanding. That and his close personal contact with Heidegger over many years (roughly 1947-1976) challenged his adherence to the medical model but was never enough to completely free him from it. See *A Psychiatrist Discovers India* [1959], London: Wolff, 1965.

Wrapping up his appraisal, Kahn reprises his opening background survey of Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and makes some general impressions of the three existential analysts he has considered. "It is noteworthy that Binswanger brings brighter colors into the picture" against the background of Kierkegaard, "an unhappy, gloomy man" with his pessimism, and Heidegger, whose "existence, eksistence and world are not joyous" but do not fail to be "consistently beclouded." The "picture . . . becomes ever brighter the more that existential analysis (Binswanger, Kuhn) and existential analytics (Boss) are brought into closer contact with people—particularly if this contact is a therapeutic one. Here, it is Boss, above all, whose optimism is unmistakable" (Kahn 440). Kahn mixes up the attribution of the terms *Daseinsanalytik* and *Daseinsanalyse* to the three men under review as he had discussed them. The therapists Boss and Kuhn are to be associated with *Daseinsanalyse* while Binswanger's interest in a purported anthropology first came to his attention in relation to Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik*. Of course, it was only a serious reading of Heidegger on the structure of *Dasein* (*Daseinsanalytik*) that led to therapeutic *Daseinsanalyse* (Boss and Kuhn). Perhaps this is what Kahn had in mind.

Referencing Otto Friedrich Bollnow's *Existentialismus*,⁴² Kahn writes that he "is looking forward to the day when our friends will say in a modification of Bollnow's observation: 'There is no pure existential analysis or existential analytics; what is called so is essentially a transition that will lead into a deepened understanding of human experiencing.' No one will begrudge it to our friends that it fell to their lot to do some pioneering into the broader and profounder psychopathology" (Kahn 441). It is not at all clear what Bollnow means here. There is Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik* and it is distinguishable from *Daseinsanalyse*, although sometimes in *Sein und Zeit* he referred to his analytics of *Dasein* (*Daseinsanalytik*) as an analysis of *Dasein* (*Daseinsanalyse*). The former is a hermeneutic phenomenological undertaking while the latter was the name both for an anthropology of human being (psychiatric daseinanalysis) carried out by Ludwig Binswanger in an attempt to understand the psychopathology of his patients and for a mode of therapeutic practice (therapeutic daseinanalysis) developed by Medard Boss.

In a "Postscript," Kahn briefly considers two book-length publications that appeared during the period when his appraisal was under consideration for publication by the *Psychiatric Quarterly*. Given the time frame of publication, the reading required for the "Postscript" seems to have been done in a bit of a hurry. In his *Drei Formen mißglückten Daseins* [*Three Patterns of Existential Failure*] Binswanger identified three forms of unsuccessful or failed *Dasein*:

⁴² Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Existenzphilosophie*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1949. Kahn refers to a book entitled *Existentialismus*. I have not been able to see what Kahn presents of Bollnow in a "modified" form.

Verstiegenheit (eccentricity), *Verschrobenheit* (quirkiness or, for Kahn, “queerness”), and *Manieriertheit* (manneredness or, for Kahn, “stiltedness”). All three are in a sense disturbances of one’s relation to verticality (high and low or “straight up” and not at an angle from plumb). This is not the place to review Binswanger’s understanding of *Dasein*’s spatiality. It is enough to repeat here Kahn’s reading of Binswanger that “unsuccessful” forms of *Dasein* are “facets of one comprehensive rigidity of existence—rigid in the existential sense.” The point is that *Dasein* is flexible, not rigid. For Binswanger, it “fails” when it is disoriented with respect to above and below or has gone off-balance and may have become rigidified in that position.

Kahn is correct that Binswanger’s “existential-analytic considerations are entirely different from thinking in clinical and psychopathological terms” (Kahn 441), yet he does not seem to realize that what they yield in the text being surveyed is clearly in the service of the diagnosis of psychopathology (mental illness), in this case schizophrenia. “What Binswanger has performed here is a *tour de force* from schizophrenia to schizophrenia, using his particular vocabulary against the background of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*.” The “background” Kahn may have in mind is what the philosopher has to say about the spatiality of *Dasein* in his book and its relevance for Binswanger’s studies of “failed *Dasein*.”⁴³ In general, it is difficult to judge what Kahn has taken away from his reading of both Heidegger and Binswanger.

Boss’s *Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik [Psychoanalysis and Analytics of Dasein]* is then reviewed. It should be added that in his “Postscript” Kahn overlooked several papers published by Boss in 1956-1957.⁴⁴ Kahn is still not especially kind, remarking that “Boss stands, in his most recent dissertation, without reservation on the ground of Heidegger’s existential analytic and later philosophical concepts, which he accepts and propagates with all the enthusiasm of of the fanatically devoted pupil” (Kahn 442). He correctly points out what for Boss were central

⁴³ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, New York: Harper and Row, 1962, §§ 23-24 and *passim*.

⁴⁴ “Daseinsanalytik und Psychotherapie. Über die Grenzen der Psychoanalyse [Analytics of Dasein and Psychotherapy. On the Limits of Psychoanalysis],” *Deutsche Universitätszeitung* 11(23-24), 1956, 17-19; “Wirkungsweise und Indikation der Psychotherapie [The Mechanism of Action and Indications for Psychotherapy],” in *Schweizerische medizinische Wochenschrift* 87(6), 1957, 128-133; “Zusammenfassung und Schlußwort zum internationalen Symposium über die Psychotherapie der Schizophrenie [Summary and closing remarks at the international symposium on the psychotherapy of schizophrenia],” in *Acta psychotherapeutica et Psychosomatica et Orthopaedagogica* 5(2-4), 1957, 352-359.

observations about psychoanalysis, namely, that Freud's "practical method" is "as acceptable and useful as ever" and that as a therapist Freud's "understanding [*Verstehen*]" was "always existential-analytical," so that one can speak of Freud as in practice a daseinanalyst and of the intrinsic "harmony of psychoanalytic practice and existential-analytic understanding" (Kahn 442).⁴⁵ On the other hand, Kahn claims that "Boss does not see, or does not want to see, that his explication is thoroughly arbitrary, according to the deplorable fact that one can read anything into and out of anything that one cares to read anything into and out of. Boss seems to be ignoring the fact that he is constantly interpreting. He appears to be imbued with the conviction that, where one talks about existence, there are facts" (Kahn 442-443). Kahn does not tire of accusing Boss of what he perceives to be his "uncritical fanaticism" with regard to Heidegger and the "dogmatic pomposity" of Boss's rhetoric. For Kahn the psychiatrist, "Boss appears to feel that whatever Heidegger says is the last word concerning existence and related and unrelated problems. One may be glad to leave the pertinent discussion to the philosophers" (Kahn 443). It would be Heidegger's task in the Zollikon seminars to do just that and to force psychiatrists to think philosophically. We must admit that Boss does provide the reader with interpretations, but this does not mean he made them for his analysands in their presence. This would have required responding to the question of causality (Why?), which Boss precisely eschewed, in favor of his response to an analysand's report of self-standing "Why, after all, not?"⁴⁶

⁴⁵ See *Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik*, Bern: Huber, 1957, 56, and "Der Einklang von psychoanalytischer Praxis und daseinsanalytischem Menschenverständnis [The Harmony of Psychoanalytic Practice and the Daseinsanalytic Understanding of Man]," 75-87. (Kahn hyphenates '*daseins-analytischem*' in the title of the chapter.) Cf. the English translation of the chapter in *Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis*, New York: Basic Books, 1963, 61-74.

⁴⁶ Other work published by Kuhn was overlooked by Kahn. See "Roland Kuhn," in *Bodensee Zeitschrift* 5(6), 1956, ***-***; *Über die Ausbildung zum Spezialart für Psychiatrie [On Training as a Specialist in Psychiatry]*, Zurich: Orell Füssli, 1956; *Ludwig Binswanger*, Amriswil: Bodensee Verlag, 1956; *Über psychiatrische Hygiene [On Psychiatric Hygiene]*, Münsterlingen: Thurgauischer Hilfverein für Gemütskranke, 1956; "Beitrag zum Problem der Lärmempfindlichkeit [Contribution to the Problem of Noise Sensitivity]," in *Zeitschrift für Präventivmedizin* 2(1-2), 1957, 300-302; "Griesinger's Auffassung der psychischen Krankheiten und seine Bedeutung für die weitere Entwicklung der Psychiatrie [Griesinger's Conception of Mental Illness and Its Significance for the Further Development of Psychiatry]," in Alfred Glaus (ed.), *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Psychiatrie und Hirnanatomie [Contributions of the History of Psychiatry and Brain Anatomy]*, Basel: Karger, 1957, ***-***; "The Treatment of Depressive States with an iminodibenzyl derivative ("Tofranil")," in *Schweizerische Medizinische Wochenschrift*

Kahn was 70 when he published his appraisal of existential analysis. That same year other publications of his Binswanger appeared to which he did not have access: *Der Mensch in der Psychiatrie* [*The Human Being in Psychiatry*], Pfullingen: Neske, 1957, and *Schizophrenie*, Pfullingen: Neske, 1957. There was also Binswanger's history of Bellevue, his hospital on Lake Constance (Bodensee), *Zur Geschichte der Heilanstalt Bellevue in Kreuzlingen 1857-1957* [*On the History of the Bellevue Sanatorium in Kreuzlingen 1857-1957*], Kreuzlingen: Bodan, 1957. Evidently either fascinated with or troubled by daseinanalysis, the same year of his appraisal Kahn also published a fairly substantial essay "Wieder einmal: Die Daseinsanalyse [Once Again: Daseinsanalysis]" in a German journal.⁴⁷

Kahn lived to see the publication of Boss's India book, *Indienfahrt eines Psychiaters* (1959), *Lebensangst, Schuldgefühle und psychotherapeutische Befreiung* [*Fear of Life, Guilt Feelings and Therapeutic Liberation*] (1962), and his *Grundriß der Medizin. Ansätze zu einer phänomenologischen Physiologie, Psychologie, Pathologie, Therapie und zu einer daseinsgemäßen Präventiv-Medizin in der modernen Industrie-Gesellschaft* [*Outline of Medicine. Approaches to a Phenomenological Physiology, Psychology, Pathology, Therapy and to an Existential Preventative Medicine*] (1971), which Boss wrote in close collaboration with Heidegger. One wonders what he thought about Boss's ever deepening involvement with Heidegger's philosophy. Binswanger, who died in 1966, published a number of papers and three books with which Kahn would have been familiar after the appearance of his appraisal.⁴⁸ Kuhn also published in English during the period following Kahn's appraisal.⁴⁹

87(35-36), 1957, 1135-1140; "Zum Problem der ganzheitlichen Betrachtung in der Medizin [On the Problem of the Holistic View in Medicine]," in *Schweizerische medizinische Jahrbuch*, Basel: Schwabe, 1957, 53-63.

⁴⁷ *Psychiatria et Neurologia* 133(6), 1957, 336-345.

⁴⁸ *Melancholie und Manie. Phänomenologische Studien* [*Melancholy and Mania. Phenomenological Studies*], Pfullingen: Neske, 1960, and *Wahn. Beiträge zu einer phänomenologischen und daseinsanalytischen Erforschung* [*Delusion. Contributions to a Phenomenological and Daseinsanalytic Exploration*], Pfullingen: Neske, 1965.

⁴⁹ "On Existential Analysis," in *Comprehensive Psychiatry* 1(1), 1960, 62-68. Kahn might also have come to be familiar with Kuhn's reflections on "Die aktuelle Bedeutung des Werkes von Ludwig Binswanger [The Current Importance of the Work of Ludwig Binswanger]," in *Zeitschrift für Klinische Psychologie und Psychotherapie* 20(4), 1972, 311-321.

Apart from Kahn's article, the *Psychiatric Quarterly* also contributed to making daseinanalysis known to American psychiatrists by reviewing two of Medard Boss's books: *Meaning and Content of Sexual Perversions* (1949), in 1950,⁵⁰

⁵⁰ *Psychiatric Quarterly* 24(2), 1950, 417. The reviewer, who is not identified, quotes generously from Oskar Diethelm's introduction to the book, *Meaning and Content of Sexual Perversions. A Daseinsanalytic Approach to the Psychopathology and Phenomenon of Love*, New York: Grune & Stratton, 1949, vii-viii. Diethelm identifies Boss as "a leader in the Swiss psychoanalytic group" who "found in the *Daseinsanalyse* of Martin Heidegger certain philosophically-adequate concepts for some of the limitations of psychoanalytic theories" which led to the formulation of "a broad concept of personality with equal attention to subjective experiencing and manifestations that can be demonstrated objectively. . . . *Daseinsanalyse* is based on the assumption that one must try to understand a person's being; i.e. experiencing in the here and now as well as in the past." The reviewer "believes that there will be others like himself who will wonder just what these daseinsanalytic conceptions really are." Quoting Boss in his "Preface," that "the German *Daseinsanalyse* translates readily to *existential analysis*" (x), he concludes that "after reading the book, your reviewer found himself in a confused daseinsanalytic state." Many of the problems surrounding the reception of daseinanalysis in the States originated in confusions about translation of the sort introduced here to prospective readers of Boss's book as early as 1950. The reader will find helpful comments on the topic of the distinction between *Daseinsanalytik* (analytics of existence) and *Daseinsanalyse* (analysis of existence) in Herbert Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, in his article "Medard Boss: Phenomenological *Daseinsanalytik* (333-342): "The term *Daseinsanalytik*, in contrast to *Daseinsanalyse* (*Daseinsanalysis*), as used in the English version of Boss's basic work of 1957, indicates some of the difficulties in interpreting this new type of existential analysis. The word *Analytik* forms part of the German title, where it makes clear the difference between Boss's complete allegiance to Heidegger's existential analytics in *Being and Time* and Binswanger's *Daseinsanalyse*, which is based on a much freer understanding of the early Heidegger, if not a misunderstanding, however productive, of his intentions. The exclusive use of *Daseinsanalysis* for both is apt to conceal the difference between the two phenomenologies of *Dasein*. The price of leaving the title [of the chapter on Boss] even more Germanic than in Boss's book title seems to me worth paying here" (333). Spiegelberg is misleading only in identifying *Daseinsanalysis* as a species of existential analysis. Spiegelberg drew attention to the Zollikon seminars (perhaps for the first time) when he cited Boss's "Letter of a Friend," published in 1969 on the occasion of Heidegger's 80th birthday in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (October 5, 1969, p. 5). The letter was later published as Boss's "Afterward" to the *Zollikoner Seminare*. See Martin Heidegger, *Zollikoner Seminare. Protokolle—Gespräche—Briefe*, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987, and *Zollikon Seminars. Protocols—Conversations—Letters*,

Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001 (363-369/293-297) (citing in what follows as ZS, the English/German pagination). See also Spiegelberg's chapter on Ludwig Binswanger, "Phenomenological Anthropology (*Daseinsanalyse*) (193-232): "The most appropriate title for [Binswanger's] contribution is still the *untranslatable* [emphasis added] term *Daseinsanalyse*, which according to Roland Kuhn was first suggested by Jakob Wyrsh but was adopted by Binswanger himself in the forties. Binswanger was thinking of the phrase 'phenomenological anthropology,' and in the present context that may be preferable as a less mystifying label for his enterprise" (193-194). This is a questionable translation of the term, but it accurately reflects Binswanger's intention, which was to derive an anthropology (in the Kantian sense) from Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik* in *Sein und Zeit*. In a note to the word 'untranslatable' Spiegelberg adds: "I call it untranslatable because it is too closely connected with Heidegger's conception of human existence to be safely rendered by the vague term 'existential analysis'." Later, on Binswanger's "Heideggerian Phase," Spiegelberg notes: "For Binswanger, Heidegger had simply added another dimension to Husserl's phenomenology as the basis for what he was to call *Daseinsanalyse*. Binswanger himself admitted later that his interpretation and utilization of Heidegger's enterprise for a new *anthropology* [emphasis added] was based on a misunderstanding but, in fact, a 'productive' misunderstanding, as Hans Kunz (1924-1982) had called it before, of Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik*, the attempt to use the ontological structure of human existence as the privileged access to an interpretation of the meaning of Being as such" (204). With his usual incisiveness, Spiegelberg makes clear that "what Binswanger took out of *Being and Time* were mostly motifs from the first section, the preparatory analysis of everyday existence. . . . Only comparatively little of the 'fundamental analysis' of *Dasein* in Heidegger's second section seems to have permeated Binswanger's creative interpretation . . ." (205) According to Spiegelberg, who had access to Binswanger's private papers thanks to the latter's son, Wolfgang, Binswanger and Heidegger, who had both attended the gymnasium in Constance, met several times, in Freiburg, Constance, Kreuzlingen, and on October 30, 1965, in Amriswil, where Heidegger gave a talk on the occasion of Binswanger's 85th birthday. The lecture was eventually published as "Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens [On the Question of the Determination of the Matter of Thinking]" (see *GA* 16, 620-633). Binswanger's son showed Spiegelberg a packet of thirty-five letters between Binswanger and Heidegger which Spiegelberg characterizes as "fascinating pieces" (205). On questions of the translation of key terms, Spiegelberg is, once again, more helpful than nearly anyone writing on Heidegger and *Daseinsanalyse* at the time: "The difficulties of rendering the German *Dasein* satisfactorily are so well known that they need not be restated here. The crux of the matter is that Heidegger has loaded the harmless German word *Dasein*, and especially the element of 'Da' (there), which is neither here (*hier*) or there (*dort*), with so many new connotations that *not only a literal rendering but also a complete substitution is apt to break down*

[emphasis added] under this load. An artificial word like 'there-being,' coined by William J. Richardson [which Richardson capitalized as 'There-being'], at least gives warning of this difficulty. 'Existence', especially in quotes, might do properly interpreted, but the use of the untranslated German *Dasein* is still the safest way to give notice to the new connotations" (220). Finally, there are Spiegelberg's specific comments on the difference between the *Daseinsanalytik* of Heidegger's *Being and Time* and the form of *therapy* known as *Daseinsanalyse*. Here we find the essential distinction on the basis of which we may understand the shift from Binswanger's *Daseinsanalyse* to that of Boss and Kuhn: "Thus [for Binswanger] the science of man as mentally sick presupposes *Daseinsanalytik* just as pathology presupposes general biology, *Daseinsanalytik* being understood as insight into the a priori structure or *Seinsverfassung* [constitution of being] of human being in general. On this ground floor rests *Daseinsanalyse* as the empirical-phenomenological investigation of definite modes or *Gestalten* of *Dasein*. Therapy forms a second story above pathology" (229-230). Binswanger's understanding of Heidegger's contribution is that of the medical doctor, for whom tissue and functional pathology is based on knowledge of anatomy and physiology. To the latter (which he terms "biology"), he says, corresponds Heidegger's structure of *Dasein* which he construes as the "investigation of definite modes or *Gestalten* [forms] of *Dasein*." Here Spiegelberg articulates exactly the problem with Binswanger's recourse to Heidegger in providing a norm as it were with respect to which the psychopathologist judges the mental illness of the patient. But, as we will see, Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik* is not descriptive of an ontic norm but rather of the given existential structure of *Dasein* which is an ontological matter. What Binswanger, in Spiegelberg's reading, terms "modes or *Gestalten* of *Dasein*" are rather the mutually equiprimordial *Existenziale* (existentials) of *Dasein* (*Sorge* [care about], *Fürsorge* [care for], *Verstehen* [understanding], *Verfallenheit* [distraction], *Geworfenheit* [givenness], *Angst* [anxiety], *Rede* [talk] and the rest). It is important to recall that Heidegger's account of the existentials in *Sein und Zeit* is incomplete and many are not fully developed, even when they are reprised in the Part Two of the text, where they are interpreted in terms of time. Binswanger took the existentials as a fixed ensemble of modes or forms of the ontic actualization of *Dasein* on which to build his anthropology. But there is no such anthropology in *Being and Time*. Thus, that "Binswanger modified Heidegger's implicit anthropology significantly . . . and applied his *Daseinsanalyse*" to the study of patients, reflects a basic misunderstanding. Spiegelberg concludes that "*Daseinsanalyse* would have been impossible without phenomenological philosophy. But its validity does not depend on it" (230). Here he is reflecting on his own principal interest, which is the place of phenomenology in psychology and psychiatry as it unfolded after Husserl. For our purposes, the point is that in the end Binswanger's psychiatric *Daseinsanalyse* was not about the therapeutic possibilities arising from an understanding of Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik* but rather only about a way of understanding a given individual's *behavior* and *experience* based on

and *Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik* (1957), in 1957, in the same volume as Kahn's appraisal appeared.⁵¹ In 1960 the journal published an article by the American psychiatrist, Thomas Hora, "The Process of Existential

an ontic reading of Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik*. The question of the therapeutic value of Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik* would be the concern of Boss's *Daseinsanalyse*.

⁵¹ *Psychiatric Quarterly* 31(1-4), 570. The reviewer, who is not identified, provides a parenthetical translation of *Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik* as "Psychoanalysis and Existential Analytics." This is correct, but the English translation six years (*Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis*) later did not follow suit. The reviewer writes that "after a brief review of Freud's and Jung's theories and those of their students and followers, Prof. Boss devotes the rest of his discussion to Martin Heidegger's theories and their application to psychoanalysis." He suggests that Heidegger is "merely an extension and development of [the] earlier works [of Freud and Jung]" and that "the Existential analytic technique is . . . far more scientific than that of its predecessors, and thereby permits a better insight into the mental make-up of the human being" and that, for Boss, the technique "is one of the best tools that the analyst can use in his work. In German-speaking circles, where Heidegger is better known as a philosopher than a psychologist, this book should make for a new evaluation of his work." The reviewer thus labels Heidegger a psychologist. Nothing could be farther from the truth, of course, since Heidegger's work (*Sein und Zeit* is referenced by the reviewer) was from a start in critical contrast to psychology. Nor does Boss present a "technique" in his book. Note that the English book *Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis*, New York: Basic Books, 1963, is not really a translation of *Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik*. A few examples of how the books differ may be in order. The chapter "Abriß der Daseinsanalytik [Outline of the Analytics of *Dasein*]" is Chapter 5 of the German. This becomes Chapter 2, "Outline of Analysis of *Dasein*," in the English. Heidegger figures prominently in the discussion. Only in the English version, however, do we read at the beginning of Chapter 3, "The Most Common Misunderstandings about Analysis of *Dasein*," that "a summary of a philosopher's life work amounts at best to an incomplete sketch of his understanding of man and mankind. If we have successfully traced the way of thinking of analysis of *Dasein* (albeit modestly), much must be owed to Martin Heidegger's untiring personal help in compiling the foregoing summary" (Boss 1963, 49). We might reasonably conclude that sometime in the mid-1950s Heidegger went over the manuscript of the original German text of what became the "Outline" chapter. On the other hand, he may not have seen it until the years between 1957 and 1963 when Boss was preparing the English version. These questions will be answered only when we have access to the complete correspondence between the two men. What we have in print of Heidegger's letters to Boss (SZ 297-362/237-291) is heavily redacted. There is no mention in them of Heidegger working on such an "outline" with Boss.

Psychotherapy,” in which we find a detailed discussion of Heidegger and psychotherapy in general.⁵² Finally, in 1967, the *Quarterly* reviewed Joseph J. Kockelmans’ *Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to His Philosophy* (1965), in which much background material was presented to help psychiatrists understand the philosophical underpinnings of daseinanalysis.⁵³ The other most important journal for psychiatrists at the time was the *American Journal of*

⁵² *Psychiatric Quarterly* **34**(3), 1960, 495-504. Citing an unpublished paper by Boss given in French in September 1958 at an International Congress of Psychotherapy in Barcelona (“La psychoanalyse de Freud et l’analyse existentielle de Heidegger”), Hora has a few words to say about Boss in his essay. Boss is reported to have quoted Heidegger on “*l’homme clarière de l’existence* [man the clearing of existence].” Hora’s article is well worth reading since it reflects basic principles of Daseinsanalysis in the form I believe Boss intended and practiced but did not fully express in print. Hora, who was psychiatrist and psychoanalyst by preparation, writes: “To think in terms of ‘techniques’ of psychotherapy, or of ‘doing’ psychotherapy is . . . a mistake. . . . Man is not a ‘case’, and psychotherapy cannot be ‘done’. . . . [To think this way] is based on lack of understanding of existence as an event. The idea of ‘managing’ or of the ‘handling of’ cases in psychotherapy represents an objectification which violates the essence of man as an existential phenomenon. . . . The psychotherapeutic process is a segment of life. Life is an event. Life is happening to man. Existence is reflected in man somewhat in the way light becomes visible while passing through a translucent medium. Medard Boss in quoting Heidegger speaks of *l’homme clarière de l’existence* [man the clearing of existence]. Man experiences existence. He does not cause it to be. . . . Psychotherapy, like life itself, is an event in time. Therefore, one can only talk about a process of psychotherapy, or the *way of psychotherapy*, as the Taoist sages spoke of the ‘Way or Tao of Life’ ” (Hora 495-496). Further excerpts from Hora’s remarkable paper are found in the Appendix.

⁵³ *Psychiatric Quarterly* **41**(1), 1965, 173-174. The reviewer is not identified. It is an interesting review in making the observation for psychiatrists that “as phenomenologic psychiatry superceded analytic methods, the older, speculative type of practitioner has been forced to the wall by his ignorance of not only of behaviorism but more especially physics, and particularly biochemistry. There has been a rush to patch up antiquated training by the frantic study of drug house releases, the memorization of a few popular, chemical formulae, and the ordering of laboratory tests. Such an approach bespeaks the mentality of a technician. The modern phenomenologic approach to psychiatry was predictable because of the inadequacy of its theoretical precedent. It was logically inevitable. Just as past events in psychiatry were predictable philosophically, the alternative to the development of the technician’s mentality can also be anticipated—if one is adequately informed, philosophically speaking.” One wishes that many psychiatrists had paid close attention to this unknown reviewer’s observation that Heidegger’s “phenomenologic approach” provided an

Psychiatry, which reviewed Boss's *magnum opus Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology* (1979) in 1980.⁵⁴

antidote to the trends in psychiatry at that time that were leading to the hegemony of psychopharmacology, supported by "the mentality of the technician." The readers of this review were told that "*Dasein* may be translated as 'the being which is man'."

⁵⁴ *American Journal of Psychiatry* **137**(8), 1980, 1001-1003 (reviewed by Leston L. Havens). Originally published in 1971, the English translation is based on the second edition (1973) of the book. In addition to the book-length studies already mentioned, Boss published texts in several English psychiatry journals: *Comprehensive Psychiatry* (1962), the *Indian Journal of Psychiatry* (1958, 1972), *Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics* (1965), and the *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry* (1986-1987, 2002-2003). He also contributed to several books, *Modern Perspectives in Psychiatry* (1968), *Phenomenology and Psychiatry* (1982), two proceedings of international congresses (1957, 1961), and the *International Encyclopedia of Psychiatry, Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Neurology* (1977). Finally, he published in English journals more widely based in psychology and philosophy: *Psychology Today* (1968), *The Humanistic Psychologist* (1988), and *Philosophical Bulletin* (India) (1962). A tribute to Heidegger was published in Richard Wisser (ed.), *Martin Heidegger in Conversation*, New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann, 1977, 9-11. Finally, Boss co-authored a number of papers with Gion Condrau (1919-2006) (1967, 1968, 1970) and one each with Gaetano Benedetti (1920-2013) (1953-1954) and Brian Kenny (1978) that appeared in English. Some remarkable dialogues with Dongshick Rhee (1920-2014) from 1976 were made available in 1966. Letters to his colleague Erna Koch (1919-2003) from 1960 have been published in translation (1991). A full bibliography of Boss's publications has been published in the author's *Medard Boss and the Promise of Psychotherapy*, London: Free Associations Books, 202-236. Havens' review is fairly extensive and notable for several observations. "Every disorder, from a broken leg to schizophrenia [that a doctor encounters] is described from the existential viewpoint in its impact on human freedom, by which is meant one's ability to relate fully to the world or, in Boss's language, to have access to the modes of being in the world. . . . Descriptions of pathology are descriptions of impingements on these modes, and the therapist's responsibility, whether as surgeon or psychiatrist, is to place himself or herself with the patient in in the task of restoring human freedom" (1002). This accurately reflects the perspective of therapeutic Daseinsanalysis, but restoration of the freedom is something accomplished by analysand, not the Daseinsanalyst, who only makes the loosening of ties to a limited way of being (the sense of *analysis* understood by Daseinsanalysts) possible in a way-making caring for the other. "The first goal of the existential healer is to see the world from the patient's point of view" (1002). This is the goal claimed for many existential analysts, but as all therapists know this,

though it be a much desired goal, is not possible. One can never know the experience of another, including his or her perspective on the world. This desire is based on an understanding of world as something understood in terms of a world-view (*Weltanschauung*), a notion introduced by Kant that refers to abstract philosophical positions, not world as understood in terms of Heidegger's analytics of *Dasein* in which being-in-the-world and *Dasein* are indistinguishable. Havens' comment about the efficacy of existential analysis by comparison with the two other forces in psychology, psychoanalysis and behaviorism, thereby loses its force, effectively mistaking Boss's Daseinsanalytic approach from humanistic (so-called "third force") modes: "Psychoanalytic and behaviorist treatments may be effective, but Boss implies this is because both provide the brittle patient with an ally against uncertainty. The existential claim, which I have seen sustained enough not to dismiss it, is that the same result can be achieved more fully and directly by allying with the patient in his world view and then helping him gradually to modify it" (1002). The work of Daseinsanalyst is not "allying with the [other as] patient in his world view and then helping him gradually to modify it." The reviewer's reading of Boss thereby allows him to offer that "the existential view is curiously like the medical view. Both see the patient as impinged upon: in the medical view, by bacteria, viruses, cancers; in the existential view, by these and, as well, other people, social systems, etc." (1002) Taking the position of the medical doctor, Havens' default view is of the Daseinsanalyst as a helper and a helper intervenes. But it is the distinction of Daseinanalysis that it precisely avoids this stance. While there is a welcome and needed place for interventional caring for or looking after the other, that is not sets the Daseinsanalyst apart from the helping professionals, no matter which of the "forces" they represent, including now what one might call the "fourth force" in psychology, namely, psychopharmacology, which has all but supplanted the other three, although its alliance with behaviorism implied. Havens' criticism of the "tone" of Boss's book is difficult to contextualize. He writes: "The tone of the book is polemical, at times cranky, and repetitious. . . . Boss's presentation of existential work suffers from the same tone. He does not speak well of even the existentialists. Indeed, he cannot speak of many at all. (The American reader will miss any reference to May, Fromm, Rogers, or Kohut.) Most readers, I suspect, will deplore the 'only I know' attitude so epidemic on the present sectarian scene" (1002). Boss is dismissive of psychoanalysis, it is true, but only of its metapsychology. He is critical of all other modalities for the same reason and that is their grounding in an unacknowledged, unexamined philosophical position, which is that of science, whether modality belongs with the natural, social or human sciences. The hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger is an alternative to the view of the sciences, including the phenomenology as "rigorous science" of his teacher, Husserl, with his *fons et origo* in consciousness. Placing Boss within the "existentialist" tradition, Havens claims that "existential writings often have a flat, broad quality, for all their occasional rising to poetry and philosophy, that does fit the uneven terrain of actual

Kahn's influential appraisal of daseinanalysis was reprinted five years later, this time directed to psychoanalysts.⁵⁵ Its influence can therefore be said to have been extensive among psychodynamic psychiatrists, since at the end of the 1950s as we have seen, with a handful of exceptions, all psychoanalysts were psychiatrists. It is impossible to judge how favorable or unfavorable a reader's impression of daseinanalysis as such was given that the very word was eclipsed by the expressions "existential analysis," "existential psychology" and occasionally "existential psychiatry." There was also mention among certain readers of Jean-Paul Sartre's "existential psychoanalysis," which got its name from the concluding chapter of Sartre's book *Being and Nothingness*. For most psychiatrists, unless they read Boss's book published six years later (*Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis*) or in the meantime ran across his contribution to *Comprehensive Psychiatry* in 1962.⁵⁶

Here we have focused on what was available to professional psychiatrists about daseinanalysis, but clearly a survey of literature on the topic in *academic psychology* is also in order as is one devoted to the complex relation between *psychoanalysis* and daseinanalysis. The uneasy alliance between medical and non-medical therapists, including psychoanalysts and daseinanalysts, can be seen in the contents of the *Review of Existential Psychology and*

clinical work. I write this appreciating that Boss's own clinical work probably does not imitate his conceptualizations. It is very hard to write accurately of clinical work" (1003). Given the fact the "existentialist tradition" is by definition not susceptible of being formalized and formulated, the reviewer is not fair in placing Boss in it. Indeed, like Heidegger, Boss is not an existentialist. As we have had occasion to repeat often, nor is he therefore an existential analyst. Havens is on target in saying that one does not and cannot get a sense of how a therapist works by reading his accounts of technique or case studies. That can be seen only first-hand, *vis-à-vis*. It is the case with Boss no less than any other therapist. This is one of the enduring problems in writing about therapy, but I think we get more a sense of it from the style of writing of the therapist than from any theories we might glean from reading what he has written. That Boss's prose "rises to poetry and philosophy" is therefore not a limitation but a way getting the scent for who he was and how he worked.

⁵⁵ Hendrik Ruitenbeek (ed.), *Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy*, New York: Dutton, 1962, 188-253.

⁵⁶ "The Conception of Man in Natural Science and Daseinsanalysis," in *Comprehensive Psychiatry* 3(4), August 1962, 193-214.

Psychiatry.⁵⁷ Given its title, we must include it among the journals published for psychiatrists, even though it welcomed contributions from clinical psychologists of all stripes, philosophers, theologians, and even literary figures. Unique among journals in this respect, the *Review* was initially the organ of the Association of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, co-founded in 1960 by Leslie Farber (1912-1981) and Rollo May (1909-1994) at the Washington

⁵⁷ It is worth recalling at this point that at first all psychoanalysts in the States were also psychiatrists. That is, they were all medical doctors. As “lay” psychoanalysts became more common, however, a history of the meeting of medically- and non-medically-trained individuals who worked as Daseinsanalysts unfolded. Their common allegiance to Daseinsanalysis was perhaps more faithful than that of their psychoanalyst colleagues, medical and lay, to each other. It was not until 2021, of course, that the first Daseinsanalytic institute opened, founded by the author Tamás Fazekas, a Viennese pediatrician and Daseinsanalyst. It is unique in having been co-founded by a medically trained Daseinsanalyst and a lay Daseinsanalyst. The story of lay psychoanalysis in the States is less pleasant. The first lay psychoanalytic institute, the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (NPAP), was founded in 1948 by Theodor Reik (1888-1969). Having arrived in New York from Austria in 1938, Reik was refused full membership in the New York Psychoanalytic Association, which had been founded in 1911, because he was not a medical doctor but had earned a PhD in psychology at the University of Vienna with a dissertation on Flaubert. Reik had been at the center of a controversy that motivated Freud in 1926 to write his important paper on “The Question of Lay Analysis,” in which Freud makes it clear that medical training was not necessary to work as a psychoanalyst. That is also the case for Daseinsanalysis. At least four lay psychoanalytic training institutes in New York owed their origins to individuals who were trained at NPAP. The writer was in training at one of them. For many years, the lay institutes fought for privileges legally afforded only to medical doctors, especially access to the prescription pad. Despite decades of court cases and lobbying at many levels of government, none of their efforts led to the desired result and lay psychoanalysis more or less went its own way. Like psychoanalysis practiced by psychiatrists, however, it has nearly disappeared. There are now few candidates in big-city psychoanalytic institutes, medical or lay. The treatment of patients with drugs has replaced “the talking cure,” and since drugs can be prescribed only by medical doctors or certain professionals who ultimately are overseen by them, the treatment of “mental illness” is in the hands of medical doctors. Few psychiatrists offer psychotherapy, which is offered instead by a wide range of professionals ranging from social workers and clinical psychologists to counselors of many sorts. Having entirely abandoned the medical model (including the notion of psychopathology) and eschewing the use of drugs as purported forms of treatment, Daseinsanalysts, like the first psychoanalysts, rely entirely on the spoken word. In this way, they preserve the tradition of psychoanalysis as Freud envisioned it more than those psychoanalysts who are psychiatrists.

School of Psychiatry. First published as *Existential Inquiries* (1959-1960), the *Review* took on its name beginning in 1961, edited first by Adrian van Kaam and then Thomas Lynaugh. Beginning with volume 16 (1978-79), editorship was taken over by Keith Hoeller. Reflecting the wide interest in and appeal of existential analysis, which included daseinanalysis the *Review* was remarkable in having published contributions by Binswanger and Boss as well as Albert Ellis, Michel Foucault, Viktor Frankl, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan, R.D. Laing, Rollo May, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Joyce Carol Oates, William J. Richardson, Carl Rogers, Thomas Szasz, Paul Tillich, and Jan van den Berg. It effectively ceased publishing with volume 27 (2002-2003) and remains in the hands of its last editor.⁵⁸

Before concluding our look at the earliest presentation of daseinanalysis to the psychiatric community, we should remind readers that Kahn's appraisal appeared the year before *Existence*,⁵⁹ the anthology that presented "a new dimension in psychiatry and psychology" and may be said to have had the widest influence on psychiatrists previously unfamiliar with existential analysis—and daseinanalysis. Dedicated to Binswanger and Eugène Minkowski (1885-1972), the book introduced readers to an essay and two case studies ("Ellen West" and "Ilse") by Binswanger and a case study by Kuhn ("Rudolf," the depressive fetishist and sodomite). Since Kahn had mentioned "Ellen West" and "Rudolf" in his appraisal these cases may have rung a bell with some readers who were familiar with his appraisal. If they read even the preface (May et al. vii), they would have found the word *Dasein*. *Daseinsanalyse* was mentioned by name on a few times (May et al. 4, 41, 119, 269) where it is associated with Binswanger's approach and glossed with "existential analysis."

The context of the first appearance of the word *Dasein* was as follows: "But no sooner had we [the editors] commenced work than we found ourselves up against grave difficulties. How could one render into English the key terms and concepts of this way of understanding man, beginning with even such a basic word as *Dasein*?" Again we find spokesmen for daseinanalysis shying away from the term, motivated by expected difficulties of readers with the

⁵⁸ For a period of time, the *Review* was associated with Division 24 of the American Psychological Association (now the Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, founded in 1962), which has independently published the *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology* since 1993. Several other journals were published for brief periods of time directed to psychiatrists interested in existential analysis: *Existential Inquiries* (1959-1960, Rollo May, ed.), *Journal of Existential Psychiatry* (1960-1964, Jordan Sher, editor; a journal of the American Orthoanalytic Association), *Existential Psychiatry*, also known as *Journal of Existentialism* (1964-1968).

⁵⁹ Rollo May, Ernest Angel and Henri Ellenberger (eds.), *Existence*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958.

word. For May, Binswanger was the “chief spokesman” for “the *Daseinsanalyse*, or existential-analytic movement” (May et al. 4). The two expressions are presented as equivalent throughout *Existence*.

Daseinanalysis, as distinct from forms of existential psychology, psychotherapy and psychiatry, was lost in the discussion. Boss and Kuhn, who represented therapeutic daseinanalysis, were challenged for apparently having been enchanted by Heidegger and with an outlook toward therapy that did not allow for critique. They were said to have merely made self-verifying assertions not open to discussion. The rhetoric of certainty of their “no doubt”, ‘because it is so’, ‘of course’, ‘naturally’” bothered Kahn. He was also not used to hearing psychiatrists who were shying away from explanations in terms of etiology and psychopathology, which was and has remained the hallmark of psychiatry as a medical speciality.

Kahn preferred the language of science to Boss’s more “poetic” and sometimes light-hearted prose. What he did not see is that psychiatry might well have needed a dose of the latter in order to evoke the fullness of experience of patients. The restoration of a sense of humor to psychiatry would also turn out to be important for R.D. Laing, whose first important books were published in 1960 and 1961.⁶⁰

What is lost on Khan, I believe, is that it required the sensibility of a Boss to communicate the richness of a given human being’s often “unspeakable” existence. Daseinanalysis focuses on a given human being’s complexity, allowing it to slowly come up in all of its detail and nuance in the sense of what one sees as a negative is being developed. This is in stark contrast to the tendency of the diagnostic approach the goal of which is to simplify and present the simplest outline of existence. Perhaps what Kahn reacts to most strongly, then, is this very impulse to make matters more complicated than they might have appeared to be at the outset. But that is what makes daseinanalysis different from other therapeutic approaches, which look for answers based on causal explanations rather than a richer understanding of the other by waiting for more and better questions *from the other*, by allowing what is *there* to show itself as it is. This is its phenomenological well-spring. Although the word ‘phenomenological’ appears in his text, Kahn does not have an understanding of its meaning. This was unfortunate for the readers of the debut of daseinanalysis in American psychiatry, but that was its fate.

⁶⁰ Laing’s debt to Heidegger is acknowledged in these texts: *The Divided Self. An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness*. London: Tavistock, 1960, 94, and *The Self and Others. Further Studies in Sanity and Madness*, New York: Pantheon [1961], 2nd “extensively revised” edition, *Self and Others*, 1969, 110.

A bit more needs to be said about the difference between *daseinanalysis* and psychiatry in our own time. Some reflection the origins of the latter is perhaps the best place to begin. Now working in close association with neurology, psychiatry originally developed theoretically as an approach to the treatment of the psyche. All the same, it was the province of medicine and the earliest treatments involved controlling and subjecting the body of the patient to what are now understood as barbaric interventions. Psychiatry became a legitimate medical specialty only fairly recently. Most historians date its origins to the French physician Philippe Pinel (1745-1926), who segregated a subpopulation of prisoners in asylums for the insane. By the middle of the 19th century psychiatrists were also known as alienists, given that the insane were by the early 19th century to be *aliens*, that is, strangers or “others” among the general population. Until the middle of the 20th century medicine as a whole was still based on a very limited understanding of the functioning of human body. Somatopsychic conditions were reported that further defied the physician’s already limited understanding. The model for such conditions was syphilis, which was understood to be exemplary of the effects on the mind (behavior and reported experience) of a demonstrable disease. Medicine’s modern era as a natural science can be said to have begun with Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902), who made it clear that to qualify as a disease some observable transformation of the body’s tissues had to be demonstrated. This advanced to an understanding of disease based on structural and functional change at the cellular level. But, as Thomas Szasz and others have pointed out, in its origins psychiatry never really belonged among the areas of medical understanding defined by Virchow. The liaison between medicine and psychiatry was therefore suspect from the start.

We must recall again that only since René Descartes (1596-1650) were the physical and psychical accorded distinctive ontological status, respectively, in an attempt to understand consciousness. Once isolated from each other, the problem became one of determining how they could be (once again) joined. The problem of somatopsychic and psychosomatic phenomena arose only at that point. As it has turned out, American psychiatry dispensed with the very concepts. In 1917, liaison-consultative psychiatry was instituted and worries about actions of the mind on the body and effects of bodily processes on the mind disappeared. The problem of Cartesian dualism was, in effect, returned to philosophy. This was presaged in the States at the beginning of the 20th century, when the difficulty was in effect dissolved by discounting the meaningfulness of talk about the psyche at all in the context of human experience, this due in great part to the work of the American psychologist John Broadus Watson (1878-1958), whose work was based on the hypothesis of a cerebral reflex by teachers of the Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936). Watson’s solution was, then, in some ways similar to that of phenomenology, with the difference that beginning with Edmund Husserl a phenomenology of consciousness began with a fresh look at the meaning of consciousness. For

Watson, there was simply no need to hypothesize consciousness since all motivated behavior (thoughts, feelings, attitudes) was said to be reducible to small, often indiscernible muscular movements. For both classical conditioning and a phenomenology of consciousness, however, the dualism remains. At this point, Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology of *Dasein* for the first time attempted to explore what a view of the human being would be that did not begin with the assumption of any such dualism.

The current era of neuroscience, which formulates human experience as a phenomenon of the functioning of the brain and the nervous system, retains the dualistic assumption, as does Freud's psychoanalysis. Indeed, current trends in psychoanalysis aspire to a *rapprochement* between neurophysiology and psychodynamics.⁶¹ The innovation of neuroscience has been to propose that the brain is the psyche, albeit a sort holographic epiphenomenon of the organ. The term that means psychiatrist ("physician of the psyche") nevertheless remains, even though such doctors attempt to understand the human being entirely in terms of brain functioning. Electrochemical connections between neurons along passageways in the tissues of the brain have replaced Watson's tiny muscle movements. For both behaviorism and neuroscience, all that matters is what can be measured and that means quantified. The question raised by Heidegger and daseinanalysis is whether the human understood as *Dasein* is measurable. The answer is that nothing of *Dasein* can be quantified. These imperceptible muscular movements are in some way linked to activity in the vast complex of the brain's neural glia. All of this remains odd, however, since only a very small part of the practice of psychiatry is devoted to diseases of the brain such as epilepsy, Alzheimer's dementia, or the sequelae of damage to the brain by infection, or the presence of toxins. Meanwhile actual injuries to the brain are the province of neurology and internal medicine. For the rest, psychiatry is interested only in behavior

Neuroscience now dominates academic psychology as well as psychiatry. Even though its findings are far from having been well established and the promise of "mapping" the brain and localizing psychological functions is still only a promise, understanding the connections between behavior and neurological events is assumed to be the only recourse remaining open to the study of human existing. Psychiatric studies now primarily have to do with studying images of brain physiology (fMRI and PET scans) and introducing certain chemical agents into the blood stream in

⁶¹ Curiously enough, this would amount to a return to Freud's starting point in 1895 with his "Project for a Scientific Psychology." See Mark Solms and Oliver Turnbull, *The Brain and the Inner World. An Introduction to the Neuroscience of Subjective Experience*, New York: Other Press, 2002, and Mark Solms, *The Hidden Spring. A Journey to the Source of Consciousness*, 202

order to observe what is assumed to be a cause and effect relation between their presence in the blood stream and brain tissue and fluids and changes in those images. Attempts are made to link the monitored neurochemical events with reports of experience and observed behavior. The agents introduced into the bloodstream are said to affect the quantity and distribution of neurotransmitters in the brain and elsewhere in the body. Such agents are known as psychotropic drugs and are said to modify behavior and experience in ways that are unlike other substances ingested by people, whether for purposes of nutrition or for generating feelings of pleasure and calm, euphoria, or greater energy.

The use of these psychotropic agents by psychiatrists is now the most powerful form of intervening in the existing of the other available to psychiatry, having replaced physical restraints. Apart from the whole world of emotions, psychotropic agents are also said to affect attitudes and motivation, memory and perception, and thinking (cognition). Indeed, all of the so-called psychological functions are thought to be amenable to modification by the effects of such agents. In the tradition of natural science, it is said that this is possible because, like the quantities of these substances, the classic mental functions are also *measurable*, for example, by psychometric tests.

Retaining the notion of human *life* as the *de facto* object of psychiatric interventions has been possible only by conflating the functioning of a living organism with *Dasein*. Such an identification of a biological entity with an existential phenomenon has never been demonstrated, but by a rhetorical sleight of hand and category errors, psychiatry did create and foster an illusion that has captured the imagination of the public as other, seemingly more sinister and crude explanations of behavior and their application in the prediction and control of individual and group behavior—above all the operant conditioning of Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-1990)—lost favor. (Its influence remains alive and well in advertising and manipulation of the media.) The most important alternate explanations, of course, had been provided by religion, which postulates the incursion of spiritual entities or otherworldly beings into the everyday life of the human organism. As these explanations lost favor, demons were replaced by psychological forces understood as neurological activity. But there remains another possibility of understanding the human being and that is the one provided by daseinanalysis.

It should be clear that daseinanalysis is not remotely related to contemporary psychiatry, especially given the historical closeness of the latter to psychoanalysis soon after its inception, and even though psychiatrists and psychoanalysts were the central figures in the early days of daseinanalysis. This is an especially important

consideration when assessing the work of Medard Boss, who is the central figure in the development of daseinanalysis with many of its possibilities still to be realized.

It is always important to bear in mind that during Boss's lifetime psychiatry was moving from the psychoanalytic era to that of the widespread use of psychotropic drugs, yet Boss died in 1990 believing that Freud's *talking cure* was the way to go even while he took interest in psychopharmacology. Indeed, in 1951, he published a paper on the psychiatric use of a hypnotic scopolamine (Plexonol) at a time when the first of the new psychotropics were just being discovered and synthesized. He was certain, however, that chemical agents could not be psychotropic ("mind-changing") since having abandoned the notion of the psyche clearly there was nothing to change. Nor was there the possibility of a causal relation between physiological events and *Dasein*.

Psychotherapy

It should be clear from what we have just said that daseinanalysis is not a form of *psychotherapy*. As the term says loud and clear, psychotherapy is directed toward the psyche.⁶² The problem is that no such entity has ever been

⁶² It is important to keep in mind that psychotherapy as a movement is quite new. So are its connections with modern medicine. As a profession, it arose in response to broad sociocultural changes that saw populations in Europe and the North America moving from small-town, rural settings to sites where factory work was the principal source of labor. It is very much a phenomenon of suburban and (big-)city life. Psychiatry was an even later-comer as a recognized speciality. Disease was defined on the basis of natural science and illness was attributed to a mental disorder, on the one hand, or a physical ailment. As we have seen, such a division was possible only given the presupposition of cartesian dualism. Treatment of illnesses of both kinds had been in the hands of healers of all sorts prior to the medicalization of society beginning with the 20th century. These included clergymen and outright charlatans. Even at the end of the 19th century no special prerogative was given by law to doctors as providers of treatment for illnesses. Doctors who practiced hypnosis were among the best known of such proto-psychotherapists. Their field was *medical psychology*. The medical profession's systematic utilization of psychology led to psychotherapy as an independent *medical* discipline, although medical schools did not embrace psychotherapy and psychology as part of their curricula. That remains the case today, even given a period of popularization among psychiatrists of Freud's psychoanalysis. The success of psychotherapy among medical doctors was most evident

found. It is a construct that is presupposed. And yet an entire field of study—psychology—has been built around it, just as a specialty within medicine—psychiatry—assumes such an entity. It is heir to the notion of the mind.

Passages in the daseinanalytic literature abound on the problem of the psyche, but the clearest presentation perhaps is found in the *Zollikon Seminars*. “Psyche and psychology are attempts to objectify the human being” (ZS 216/271).⁶³

among men who had been traumatized by World War I experience in the final year of the Great War (1918-1918). Much as syphilis had been the model for psychosomatic medicine (the influence of somatic events on mental experience and behavior), “shell shock” (now termed posttraumatic stress disorder) illustrated the influence of mental and emotional experience on physiopathology. World War II and its prelude interrupted the development of the field. Only in 1948 was the first congress of the International Federation of (Medical) Psychotherapy held. Full realignment of the sequelae of disruptions in international relations required another decade. Of special interest to us is that the theme of the Fourth Congress (Barcelona 1958) was “Daseinsanalysis and Psychotherapy.” Medard Boss gave a paper that year which has not been published. He had hosted the previous congress in Zurich in 1954 on “Transference in Psychotherapy.” The professionalization of psychotherapy, briefly recounted here, is dealt with in an excellent monography by Gerhard Heim, published as a supplement to the journal *Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics* **79**, 2010, 1-90.

⁶³ See also Boss’s late comments on the unintelligibility of the psyche in the *Grundriß*. Quotations are from *Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology*, New York: Jason Aronson, 1979: “It is necessary to explode the traditional notions of an encapsulated psyche, with its enclosed field of consciousness, to understand human being-in-the-world, and it should be clear by now that to do so is a main goal of this existential foundation of medicine” (p. 135).

Human behavior cannot be comprehended in terms of a boxlike psyche nor as a similarly constituted ego, consciousness, subjectivity, or person. Where, in human behavior, may we find even a trace of the actual presence of such a psychic capsule? And we have yet to see a demonstration of the actual existence of intrapsychic mental representations of reality or of quantitatively measurable drives. The conception of human experience as a series of physiochemical reactions that relay impressions from the sense organs to that mysterious psychic capsule is such a misconception that, if it were so, we would be a miserable species with no inkling that there is an outside world. To know and comprehend the outside world the person who is not a passive receptacle must literally grasp it, and he can do this only by extending to that world in whose immediate vicinity he already is” (p. 225).

We have shown there is no evidence for the actual presence in people of the kind of internality represented in the container concepts of ego, consciousness, psyche, subject, or person. Instead, human beings are inherently

Whatever the psyche may be, it is an object. Its ontological status is curious in that it is the object that is the subject. It is said to be the seat of consciousness and by a reflexive turn consciousness becomes aware of itself. Here human consciousness is differentiated from the awareness that is evident in other animated creatures, most notably animals. What makes human consciousness unique is that it is conscious of its being conscious. In recent years, given developments in neuroscience, for some the mind is somehow an epiphenomenon of the brain. Needless to say, the notion has a long history extending back at least to the lectures of Aristotle Περὶ Ψυχῆς, known in Latin translation as *de anima*. This is not the place to review the complicated developments that led to distinguishing the ψυχή from the *anima* and the soul, and the spirit (*Geist*). It is enough to say that in event, in each case a being of some sort is implied, albeit since Descartes a *materia* that is distinguished from physical *materia*. For Heidegger, “from the perspective of the analytic of *Dasein*, all conventional, objectifying representations of an encapsulated-like psyche, subject [*Subjekt*], person [*Person*], ego [*Ich*], or conscious [*Bewußtsein*] [as found] in psychology and psychopathology must be abandoned in favor of an entirely different understanding” [ZS 4/3].⁶⁴

Fundamentally and throughout, daseinanalysis focuses, not on this hypothetical entity, but on *Dasein*—the *who*. The problem turns on the distinction between psyche and soma itself, which for Heidegger is unintelligible (ZS 201/250). Indeed, even Aristotle had said that much. Christian philosophy follows suit, even though it speaks of the ensouled body. Faced with the habit of making such a distinction, however, we may understand how misleading it is by considering a distinction made in German that does not carry over into English between *Körper* and *Leib*. The organism that can be measured and weighed like any inanimate body is known as the *Körper* (body). It is comprised of the tissues that together form a functional unity that can be studied by anatomy, physiology, and kinesics. It is the body perhaps best studied post-mortem. In everyday medical practice, the objectivity of the physician requires that she observe, palpate and treat the organism as if it were a living version of the corpse she dissected, only now animated and to a certain degree understandable by physiology functioning optimally (healthy) or malfunctioning to a greater or lesser extent (diseased, sometime subjectively experienced as being ill). For the physician, this body is an object that might as well be nameless. She must to the greatest extent possible treat it that way. We may speak of my *Körper* as *the body I have*.

engaged in relatedness to whatever phenomena address them from their locations in the human world and exist as these perceiving and responding relationships” (p. 271).

⁶⁴ Cf. SZ, 201/250.

By contrast, one may speak of the *Leib* of *Dasein*, that is, the *lived body*, the body that lives out my life. The closest English word to *Leib* is its etymological cognate *life*. We may then properly speak of the *Leib* of *Dasein* as its life living.

Leib and *Körper* are perhaps most clearly seen in their difference in those situations when one *has* a body and yet does not *live* it, for example, when one is a coma. We leave it open whether the body one *is* is experienced in some way while asleep. For Boss, while dreaming, the continuity of *Dasein* and thus the lived body one *is* is preserved.

Descartes' famous thought experiment in his *Meditations* had in mind his *Körper* and it was this *materia* that he attempted to imagine away, as it were, after having done so with the things surrounding him—his table and pen, his clothing and the rest. Understood phenomenologically, the *Leib* is understood in terms of situation and doing. The *lived body* *comports* itself in a situation. It does not move through space; it is of a piece, as it were, with space. It does not respond to cues provided by the environment and detected by the five senses as B.F. Skinner's theory of operant conditioning postulated. Indistinguishable from *Dasein*, it carries out acts that are motivated, not caused. When one says, for example, that he risks "life and limb" (in German, *Leib und Leben*) to carry out a certain act, we mean that he throws his existing into it wholeheartedly, with all his heart and soul. We say it "means the world" to him to do such and such. The phrase *Leiben und Leben* which means "being alive and living life" or "being who you actually are" or "being all that you can be" expresses the meaning of *Leib*, the body I *am*, where the verb *to be* is understood in a transitive sense.

To speak of *embodied existence* is misleading, since there is no occasion for living [*leiben*] apart from existing (*Dasein*). In the early days of his work, Medard Boss was occupied with so-called psychosomatic phenomenon, but by the time of the conclusion of the Zollikon seminars, it has become entirely problematic. Even so, the idea persisted

even into including it in the names of training institutes and journals.⁶⁵ The “unfortunate term” (ZS 297/368)⁶⁶ lingered despite Heidegger’s clear understanding that “the term ‘psychosomatic medicine’ endeavors to synthesize two things which simply do not exist” (ZS 198/248). In American psychiatry, the term has officially disappeared.⁶⁷

Pastoral Care

Nor, finally, is daseinanalysis pastoral care. The latter may be best appreciated by recalling the history of the relation of pastoral care to psychiatry and psychoanalysis as well as to organized religion in the States. The connection can be traced back to the American psychiatrist Smiley Jordan Blanton (1882-1966), who was in analysis with Freud irregularly over a period of nine months from 1929 to 1930. Soon after returning to the States, Blanton co-founded the American Foundation of Religion and Psychiatry with Norman Vincent Peale (1898-1993), an ordained minister in the Reformed Church in America, who beginning in 1932 was for fifty-two years pastor of the Marble Collegiate Church in New York. A clinic was established next door to the church where Peale and Blanton took a cooperative approach to working with psychologically disturbed persons. Together they published books such as *Faith Is the Answer* (1940) and *The Art of Real Happiness* (1950). Peale’s book *The Power of Positive Thinking* (1952) was a American national

⁶⁵ As recently as 1971 Gion Condrau founded the Swiss Daseinsanalytic Institute for Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics. Six years later, along with Boss and Alois Hicklin, he edited *Leiben und Leben. Beiträge zur Psychosomatik und Psychotherapie [Being Alive and Living Life. Contributions to Psychosomatics and Psychotherapy]*, Bern: Benteli, 1977. Indeed, the journal *Daseinsanalyse* was in 2017 subtitled *Yearbook for Psychotherapy, Psychosomatics, and Fundamental Research*. The most recent article on the topic was published in 1999. Boss’s early interest in psychosomatics led to . In 1985, near the end of his life, he published “Psychosomatische Medizin? Wissenschaft oder Magie? [Psychosomatic Medicine: Science or Magic?],” in *Daseinsanalyse* 2(2), 1985, 107-119.

⁶⁶ The term appeared in Boss’s open “letter to a friend [Heidegger]” published in Swiss newspaper on October 5, 1969, which is now the “Afterword” of the *Zollikon Seminars*.

⁶⁷ *Psychosomatics. The Journal of the Academy of Psychosomatic Medicine* ended its 27-year career in 1987, renamed *The Journal of Consultation-Liaison Psychiatry*. In October, 2017, the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology voted to eliminate the subspeciality psychosomatic medicine, to be replaced by consultative-liaison psychiatry, effective in 2018.

best seller and has been in print for seventy years. Resonating with Freud's early interest in hypnosis, Peale's practices have been compared to self-hypnosis.

The Foundation eventually came to be known as the Blanton-Peale Institute and Counseling Center and continues to provide outpatient psychotherapy. As a state-accredited mental health care provider, it accepts most insurance and, in 2022, charged \$90.00 out-of-pocket for an hour of counseling for individuals without insurance. By contrast, in New York, the few remaining psychiatrists who have trained as psychoanalysts may charge as much as \$350.00 for a 45-minute hour, which is usually billed to insurance. The Blanton-Peale Institute continues to offer a psychoanalytic training program, one that retains links to pastoral counseling as reflected by its inclusion in Division 17 (Counseling Psychology) of the American Psychological Association. Pastoral care is thus institutionally related to psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, and counseling—and indirectly to psychiatry.

I have reviewed this history in order to remind the reader that, like other forms of counseling and psychotherapy, pastoral care is also grounded in the medical model. Graduates of approved Institute programs are hired by churches to work with priests and pastors, and if they are not clergy they are paid by insurance providers much like any other "mental health practitioner," the generic term for those who provide a modality of therapy. Those who are clergy are not paid directly since they answer to a calling and do not belong to a profession. Catholic priests, for example, are supported in their everyday life by the Church and would have no need to demand a fee. Protestant ministers and Jewish rabbis are supported by a salary provided by their congregation. Some may work independently as pastoral counselors and charge a fee.

Providers of pastoral care and medical professionals continue to vie for the belief of individuals in their respective kinds of power, one emanating from mediated divine intervention, the other from drugs, the dispensing of which may be authorized only by a medical doctor or his proxy (for example, a physician's assistant or nurse practitioner) or a dentist. In both cases, individuals are authorized by a governing body—the Church or the State—to carry out their respective procedures. Thus only an ordained priest may exorcise demons and only a licensed psychiatrist may lawfully prescribe psychotropic drugs. Given Boss's focal interest in the spiritual life of the human being, it is important to distinguish it from the person's religious beliefs and practice. We will return to this dimension of daseinanalysis when discussing praxis.

It is notable that the daseinanalyst is similar to the pastoral caregiver in one respect. He has responded to a calling rather than to the benefits that might come of belonging to a profession, the heir to the guild. It is essential to see daseinanalysis as a calling, like the religious life and teaching.