





**Martin Heidegger**

***FOUR TEXTS***

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**FOUR TEXT**  
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## TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

From the start published translations of Heidegger have often been awkward English, but they need not be. It is possible to bring Heidegger over into English in a way that is readable and evocative. But it takes some thought.

Heidegger's writing is poetic and playful. His writing is steeped in literature, especially the authors who procreated German: Luther, Goethe—and Hölderlin. His basic book was the Grimm brothers' *Wörterbuch*, which provided an inexhaustible source of literary references, bedrock for mining the ore from which a given word continues to be refined. He is someone who finds philosophical depth in everyday *façons de parler*, colloquialisms, and idiomatic formations unique to German. For example, there is the common phrase *es gibt* [there is] . . . (as in "Es gibt keinen Ausweg [There's no way out]"). Word for word, "es gibt" translates as "it gives." And so, Heidegger asks, what is this "it" that "gives"? And what sort of giving is this? What gives?

Heidegger is especially attuned to the relations among words that have a common root but very different meanings. But only rarely does assonance alone in German words based on a common root lead to something felicitous in English.

Writing Heidegger in English I often follow leads provided by his discoveries of sense in his own language with some of my own in English. His means of unfolding sense in German can be adapted to other languages so that the other language is freed up for the playfulness and poetry of its own genius. In his letter of November 23, 1945 (following my translation of the "Letter on 'Humanism,'" below), he offers Jean Beaufret such an investigation of French in its attempt to translate the *da* in *Da-*

*sein*. He suggests *le-là* but admits it probably does not “work” in French. With some reflection, however, the play is nevertheless illuminating.

My interest in Heidegger began in 1965 when I first read the essays in *Existence and Being* (1949), which includes two of the texts presented here. More than twenty years ago I translated the following four texts which I believe contain related fundamental explorations Heidegger carried out. I posted them on my college faculty page. They have been deleted there but lurk on the www. In 2016 I extensively revised them and expanded my annotations. I hope I have learned something through the years. I also hope that the reader will find these revised translations of *Four Texts* first.

There are now many English translations of full-length books by Heidegger from the 102 announced “manuscript” (“typescript”) *Gesamtausgabe* (= GA) of his writings begun in 1976.<sup>1</sup> Only a few have been brought into English in bi-lingual editions.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A recent count (Winter 2016) showed 89 of the GA volumes published with 13 remaining. My ongoing *Bibliography of English Translations of the Writings of Martin Heidegger (1949-2016)* appears in *The Voice that Thinks* (rev. ed.) (New York: ENI Press, 2016). There I provide the details of the translation of more than 200 items (poems, letters, articles and books).

<sup>2</sup> The following significant short texts and full-length books have been published in bi-lingual editions to date (2016) since 1958: *The Question of Being* (1958) New York: Twayne [William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde]; *What Is Philosophy?* (1958) New York: Twayne, [William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde]; *The Essence of Reasons* (1969) Evanston: Northwestern University Press [Terrence Malick]; *Identity and Difference*



Like Heidegger I am convinced that all philosophy must be read in the language of its composition and every translation should be published in a bi-lingual edition. The Loeb Classical Series has done this with the Greek and Latin authors. It should be a matter of course that the work of philosophers be presented in the same way. A good example of having done that from the start is Ludwig Wittgenstein's

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(1969) New York: Harper and Row [Joan Stambaugh]; "Letter to Father William J. Richardson," published as the "Preface" to Richardson's *Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought* [Phaenomenologica 13] (1963) New York: Fordham University Press, 1993 [4<sup>th</sup> ed. 2003], pp. IX-XXIII [William J. Richardson]; "The Pathway," in *Listening* (Dubuque) 8, 1973, 32-39, reprinted in Thomas Sheehan (ed.), *Heidegger. The Man and the Thinker* (1981) Chicago: Precedent Publishing Company, 69-72 [Thomas Sheehan]; "Messkirch's Seventh Centennial," in *Listening* (Dubuque) 8, 1973, 41-57 [Thomas Sheehan]; "Thoughts," in *Philosophy Today* (Celina) 20(4), 1976, pp. 286-290 [Keith Hoeller] which is included in Jack Hirschman's *Slow Lightning. The Poems of Martin Heidegger*, San Francisco: Deliriodendron Press, 2001, along with the rest of what appeared in Flavio Cassio (ed.), *Il Pensiero Poetante. La Produzione Lirica Heideggeriana (1910-1975)*, Milan: Mimesis, 2000; "Modern Natural Science and Technology," in *Research in Phenomenology* (Pittsburgh) 7, 1977, pp. 1-2 [John Sallis]; "On a Philosophical Orientation for Academics," in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* (New York) 14-15, 1991, pp. 496-501 [John Protevi]; "Psychology of Religion and the Subconscious," in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* (New York) 14-15, 1991, pp. 503-517; and *The Concept of Time* (1992) London: Blackwell [William McNeill]. Nothing more bi-lingual in 25 years.

*Tractatus*. It would be especially important to make a start at such a series of Heidegger, beginning with *Sein und Zeit*.

In my renderings of the four texts that follow I have erred on the side of excess in giving the German word(s) translated in brackets [ ]. I have given them, suffixes and all, as found in the text. The content of certain notes has been repeated throughout the four texts on the assumption that readers may not work through the entire series.

I do not hope to have solved any of Heidegger's linguistic enigmas. I only want to transmit the revelatory ambiguities of his German and, when possible, encourage comparable explorations of what has been vouchsafed to English.

I have introduced additional words <...> when they make the English more explicit. The whole point is to make Heidegger "sound" rightly in English. My guess is that only one's mother tongue allows one full access to any language's richness and, for the rest, translating is a creative exercise. I am convinced that Heidegger wished his mother tongue had been the Greek spoken by Heraclitus and Parmenides, but alas . . . that has been an impossibility for a few millennia.

Endnotes [= EN] were prepared for the first iteration of these translations. Footnotes [= FN] are new to this edition. They are numbered consecutively through all four texts.

There may be excesses in my reflections on certain of Heidegger's words. The renderings may sometimes be a stretch, but I think that is one source of the ongoing interest in Heidegger, namely, that he strains the limits of thinking. He tests them. *L'endurance de la pensée* is, for Heidegger, something visceral, alive—and trying. Thinking and living are coterminous for him and for this reader of Heidegger.

## Heidegger's Basic Vocabulary

Next I want add a few remarks about translations I have made of some key terms. They summarize much of what is said in the notes accompanying the four translations. A look back at the earlier versions of my translations will show that in many cases I have changed my mind radically about how to bring Heidegger over into English. As with Heidegger, these translations are about the process of translation as much as about the "content" of the texts.

(1) *Das Sein* ('be[ing]') is the substantive of the infinitive of the verb *sein* [(to) be]. I intend it to be read as "be[ing]" but pronounced /bi/. The ending is bracketed for this reason. Once it is clear what Heidegger means to do with the term *Seiende* (see (2) below) and how it works for him, the question about the *Sinn* (sense) of *Sein* comes into focus. *Be[ing]* is "that" thanks to which "what is there [das Seiende]" emerges—beings [Seiende] come about. The epicenter of Heidegger's thought is the *Sein des Seiendes*: the *be* of beings. Existence [Da-sein] (see (4) below) would not sound or enunciate [lauten] and be the messenger of what is there were it not for *be[ing]* and *be[ing]* would not come to light were it not for existence. Together *be[ing]* and existence form what might be compared to an interval in music and therewith harmony. *Be[ing]* sets the key and tonal center (tonic) of the duet. Or perhaps they sing in unision. *Be[ing]* may also be construed as sounding or speaking in the grammatical middle voice (see EN 183), which is lacking in modern languages such as German and English, but not in Greek. Heidegger sometimes tries to simulate it in German. In later writings, he employs *Seyn*, the older spelling of *Sein*, to distinguish it from its usage in metaphysics. Capitalizing the translation of *Sein* [Being] does not

shed any light on Heidegger's efforts to understand the sheer possibility that the root of the infinitive expresses. The habit only adds to the tradition of believing that "Being" is another name for God.

(2) *Das Seiende* ('what is there', occasionally 'beings') is a collective noun. It is formed from the present participle (*seiend* [being]) of the verb *sein* [(to) be]. The adjective *seiend* is usually translated with 'actual'. The original spelling of the infinitive was *seien* (with the standard suffix (-en)) and that is preserved in the words *seiend* and *Seiende*. *Seiende* can also be used to refer to a single entity. As a collective noun, however, it refers not so much to a totality as to the entirety [Ganze] of all there is and exists. *Das Seiende* has the sense of effective actuality (what is there "for real" in what is going on at any given moment) in contrast to what is not to be found "out there" at all.

(3) *Das Seiendheit* ('be-ingness' or 'is-ness') means "of the character of what is there [das Seiende]."

(4) *Das Dasein* ('existence') (usually hyphenated [*Da-sein*] in the later Heidegger) is the name for the unique status of human beings or Man [Mensch]. When hyphenated, it is translated 'being-there'. The French have rendered it in a way that can be translated as "being-the-there [*être-le-là*]." *Da-sein* is perhaps best translated as William Richardson has with 'There-being', which exactly transliterates the capitalized hyphenated German word. To distinguish *Da-sein* from what is (in each instance a What) I would translate it with the (capitalized) word 'Who' (the interrogative pronoun)<sup>3</sup> to distinguish the human (being) (a Who) from every What

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<sup>3</sup> This is agreeable since it avoids gendered pronouns and suggests the questioning nature of existence [Da-sein].

(object, thing) that taken together comprise what is there. There is no need to further defer the translation of *Dasein*. This custom suggests that the concept of existence is so inscrutable as to be accessible only to German-speaking readers.

(5) *Die Existenz* ('way of life') is the name for the particular situation of any given instance of *Da-sein*. This is perhaps my most problematic translation among the "being"-related and "existential" words. In Heidegger, it refers to what a biography recounts, what is made meaningful for a given Who whose existence makes time and history and is a world. Heidegger had already abandoned talk about *Leben* (life) (as in Dilthey's *Lebensphilosophie*) when he wrote *Sein und Zeit*. By the time of the Letter<sup>4</sup> he was also concerned with distancing himself from Jaspers' *Existenzphilosophie* [philosophy of existence] and Sartre's *existentialisme* [existentialism]. A passage in the Introduction to the Lecture that contrasts humans with all the rest of what is there of every sort (all of which *are*) is crucial. To paraphrase: rocks, trees, horses, angels and God *are*, but none of them *exist* {374-375}.<sup>5</sup> Heidegger reserves the verb *existieren* (and variant forms) for discussing *Existenz*. Its Latin origins are revealing: *ex-* (out) + *sistere* (make stand, *be*), best rendered with 'eksistence' (often hyphenated as 'ek-sistence'). *Ek-sistenz* indicates the being out there in-the-world of existence [*Da-sein*].

(6) *Das Nichts* ('[the] no-thing') is the utter absence of any and all *Seiende*. See the long note (EN 94 to {105}) to the Lecture on the various nugatory terms Heidegger employs in his reflections on the no-thing.

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<sup>4</sup> Throughout I refer to the four parts listed in the Table of Contents as the Introduction, Lecture, Epilogue and Letter (all capitalized).

<sup>5</sup> Page references in braces refer to GA 9 (1976).

(7) *Die Gegenwart* ('present') is the temporal here and now of a particular instance of a Who. It is also the German word for the grammatical present tense. In an illuminating passage in the Lecture, Heidegger refers to the present of the existence of someone who is loved {110} as revealing the sense of what is there in its entirety. The present of the existence of the love one is not equivalent to his physical presence (another sense of *Gegenwart* perhaps best rendered with *Anwesenheit*).

(8) *Das Ereignis* ('eventuality') is the inevitability that what is there [das Seiende] will come to pass [sich ereignen]. For Heidegger, such an event-uality (an "in the event that . . ." that does in fact come about from time to time) originates in and rests with *be[ing]*. According to Heidegger, this has been overlooked and forgotten by philosophy (ontology). After Heidegger's turning back [Kehre] to thinking from the "perspective" of *be[ing]* (rather than from that of *Dasein*, the 'There [Da]' of *be[ing]* [Sein]) following his excursus into the *analytique* [Analytik] of existence in *Sein und Zeit*, the eventuality of *be[ing]* becomes his focus. He is no less concerned with how there can be anything at all rather than nothing whatsoever. Any such occasion is the source of that wonder with which, according to Aristotle, philosophizing begins. In the wake of Leibniz's famous question—*Pourquoi il y a plutôt quelque chose que rien?*—the eventuality and the wonder of "it at all" haunt Heidegger's reflections.

(9) The verb *wesen* ('[to] come about' or '[to] come to be') is used to express the change from no-thing whatsoever to something being there. Its use is closely related to Heidegger's use of the reflexive verb *sich ereignen* ([to] come to pass) on which the substantive *das Ereignis* (see (8) above) is based. In each instance, what is there of any stripe comes about [west] in its own way. The essence [Wesen] or

what comes about as being human [Mensch] is existence [Da-sein]. Existing is how we come about.

The translations are in two parts: (I) What Is Metaphysics? and (II) Letter on 'Humanism'. Conceived as a work-book, the printing of *Four Texts* has been provided with generous leading so that the reader can fill in all of the original German above the translation.

Next follows some information about the history of each text.

## **PART I**

### ***What Is Metaphysics?***

The three texts that comprise Part I are separated from each other by fourteen and twenty years, respectively. On July 24, 1929, Heidegger gave his inaugural lecture "Was ist Metaphysik?" (the Lecture) to the combined faculties of the University of Freiburg. He wrote a "Nachwort" (the Epilogue) to this letter to his colleagues for the fourth edition (1943) of the publication of the Lecture. For the fifth edition (1949) he added an "Einleitung" to the Lecture entitled "Der Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik [Getting to the Basis of Metaphysics]" (the Introduction) and revised the Epilogue. He then published the three parts as a single work in what would be the customary order of any such work: Introduction, Lecture, and Epilogue.<sup>6</sup> From 1967 on, however, Heidegger presented the parts chronologically in

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<sup>6</sup> I consulted the 11<sup>th</sup> *durchgesehene* edition (1975) that contains the marginalia also found in GA 9.

order of composition in his anthology *Wegmarken* [*Frontier Markers*].<sup>7</sup> The order of presentation there makes sense since as the title of Heidegger's book indicates each text in it marks a new frontier or horizon for his thinking. By contrast, his earlier anthology *Holzwege* [*Stray Ways*] (1950) contains experiments in thinking that were, as the title suggests, blind alleys (*culs-de-sac*). He borrows the usage from Luther, who sometimes referred to such enlightening misadventures as *Irrwege*.

Heidegger describes the Epilogue as “more an opening preface [anfänglicheres Vorwort]” {303} than a postscript. In that sense it should come first, followed by the Introduction and then the Lecture. In other words, the Epilogue should bring us back to the Lecture itself for a re-reading. The order of reading would then be Introduction, Lecture, Epilogue, and the Lecture once again. For Heidegger, any introduction also has pedagogical and heuristic significance. Many of his lecture courses bear the homely title “Einführung in [Introduction (in)to] . . .” which has the sense of an initiation of the listener or reader into a way of thinking [Denkweg] represented, for example, by Parmenides, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche.

I present these three frontier markers grouped as Heidegger chose to do in 1949, not in order of their composition or presentation in GA 9. The translations are based on that volume of the *Gesamtausgabe*, however, and include the marginal notes Heidegger gleaned from his copies of various printings of the Lecture. All citations {...} are to GA 9: “Einleitung zu ‘Was ist Metaphysik?’” [= EWM], pp. 365-

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<sup>7</sup> Heidegger's motto for his *Gesamtausgabe* [Collected Edition] is “Wege nicht Werke”: “Ways not Works.” This resonates with the appearance of the word *Weg* [way, journey] in the titles of both of his anthologies of essays. The resulting texts are records of the thoughtful journeys that led to them.



383; "Was ist Metaphysik?" [= WM], pp. 103-122; and "Nachwort zu 'Was ist Metaphysik?'" [= NWM], pp. 303-312.

A few further notes follow on these three texts in order of presentation.

### **Introduction**

#### **Introduction to "What Is Metaphysics?": Getting to the Basis of Metaphysics (1949)**

The Introduction was written in 1949 and published with the Lecture and revised Epilogue beginning that year with the 5<sup>th</sup> edition of the lecture, dedicated to the German novelist Hans Carossa (1878-1956). It first appeared in a translation by Walter Kaufmann the year Carossa died, in the first edition of *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* (New York: World Publishing, 1956). In the "Preface" to the first edition of his book Kaufmann wrote: "To Heidegger I am also [in addition to sitting in on some of his lectures] indebted for answering, orally and in writing, questions about his essay [the Introduction] which is here offered in English for the first time" (see rev. ed., New York: New American Library, 1975, p.10). Only in this edition of his very popular anthology was the Epilogue added, along with Heidegger's 1963 essay "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie [My Journey to Phenomenology]."

### **Lecture**

#### **What Is Metaphysics? (1929)**

The Lecture was first translated into English by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick in *Existence and Being*, a collection of Heidegger's essays edited by Werner Brock (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949, pp. 325-349). The Lecture and Epilogue (1943

version) have been reprinted since 1975 in the revised and expanded edition of Walter Kaufmann's book *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* (New York: New American Library, 1975, pp. 242-257). A second translation of the lecture, by David Krell, was published in Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings* (New York: Harper and Row [1977]; expanded edition, 1993, pp. 93-110). A version edited and revised by Krell and William McNeill appeared in *Pathmarks* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 82-96).

### **Epilogue**

#### **Epilogue to "What Is Metaphysics?" (1943; 1949)**

The Epilogue was first published with the fourth edition (1943) of the Lecture. In this version, it was included with the Hull/Crick translation of the Lecture (in *Existence and Being* (op. cit., pp. 349-361; reprinted in Kaufmann, op. cit., 1975, pp. 257-264). An edited and revised version of the Kaufmann translation by William McNeill in collaboration with Krell appeared in *Pathmarks* (op. cit., pp. 231-238). Kaufmann did not have the advantage of using the *Wegmarken* presentation of the Epilogue when he first published his anthology in 1956 or for the revised and expanded version. McNeill did, however, and includes the footnotes that indicate where changes were made by Heidegger in his revision of the Epilogue.

## PART II

### Letter on 'Humanism'

#### Letter to Jean Beaufret, November 23, 1945

This text is most closely related to the contemporaneous Introduction (1949) and revised Epilogue (1949) to the Lecture translated in Part I. Heavily annotated, I have modified my earlier translation of the Letter in tandem with fresh translations of the texts in Part I. I have retained my original endnotes but have added new footnotes that reflect a growing familiarity with what I think Heidegger is saying. In the first edition of *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den "Humanismus"* (Bern: Francke, 1947), Heidegger notes that his letter is in response Beaufret's letter dated Paris, November 10, 1946 (p. 4). In GA 9 (p. 483), however, Heidegger says that his letter was written in the fall of 1946. For discussion, see section 14 of "Naissance d'une Question. Conversations avec Jean Beaufret," in Frédéric de Towarnicki, *À la Rencontre de Heidegger. Souvenirs d'un Messager de la Forêt-Noire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993, pp. 249-252), "La Lettre sur l'Humanisme."

The letter to Beaufret first appeared in Martin Heidegger, *Lettre sur l'Humanisme* (Paris: Aubier, 1964, pp. 185). It does not appear in GA 9 with the essay.



**PART I**

**(1) INTRODUCTION TO "WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?":**

**GETTING TO THE BASIS OF METAPHYSICS (1949)**

**(2) WHAT IS METAPHYSICS? (1929)**

**(3) EPILOGUE TO "WHAT IS METAPHYSICS" (1943; 1949)**



## INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup> TO "WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?"

### GETTING TO THE BASIS OF METAPHYSICS (1949)<sup>2</sup>

{365} Descartes wrote to [Claude] Pico<sup>3</sup> who translated the *Principia Philosophiae* into French: "Ainsi toute la Philosophie est comme un arbre, dont les racines sont la Métaphysique, le tronc est la Physique, et les branches qui sortent de ce tronc toutes les autres sciences . . ."<sup>4</sup>

In keeping with this image we ask: In what soil [Boden]<sup>5</sup> do the roots of the tree of philosophy find their support? From what ground [Grund]<sup>6</sup> do the roots and the tree as a whole receive their vital nourishment and strength? What element [Element]<sup>8</sup>, utterly hidden, suffuses the supporting and nourishing roots of the tree? What lies buried and is active in the ground [Wesen]<sup>7</sup> of metaphysics? What does metaphysics look like from its basis [vom ihren Grund]? What after all is metaphysics fundamentally?

It thinks of what is there [das Seiende]<sup>8</sup> as what is there. Whenever it is asked what is there, what is there as such is in view. Metaphysical formulating [Vorstellen]<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Heidegger uses the latin word *Element* with reference to "the appropriate sphere of operation" (*OED*) of a creature's agency in which it feels "at home." In a more precise sense, it refers to that place in which one unfolds his *Existenz*. Thus, Heidegger was in his element in the seminar room just as a condor is in the air or a trout is in a stream. In the Letter, he will ask about the proper element of the human being. In one's element, one's agency is most effective and one's skills are most freely and easily deployed. In this passage the element in which metaphysics flourishes is being questioned.

owes its view to the light [Licht]\*<sup>10</sup> of *be[ing]* [Sein].<sup>11</sup> The light itself (that is, what such thinking experiences as light) no longer comes into view in this thinking, because it presents what is there always and only with respect to what is there. Clearly, in view of this metaphysical thinking asks about the actual [seienden] source and creator [Urheber] of the light. From this alone it is evident enough that every <metaphysical> perspective affords [gewährt] an examination [Durchsicht] of what is there.

However what is there may be interpreted [ausgelegt], whether as spirit [Geist] in the sense of spirituality [Spiritualismus], as becoming [Werden] and being alive [Leben], as | {366} formulation [Vorstellung], as will [Wille], as substance [Substanz], as subject [Subjekt], as *energeia* [what is at work, effectance], or as the eternal return of the equivalent [ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen]<sup>12</sup>, each time what is there appears as what is there in light [im Lichte] of *be[ing]*. Whenever metaphysics formulates what is there, it has shed light on *be[ing]*. *Be[ing]* has arrived in emergence [Unverborgenheit] ('Αλήθεια).<sup>13</sup> Whether and how *be[ing]* brings such emergence with it, whether and how it brings itself along\*<sup>14</sup> into and as metaphysics in the first place remains obscure. *Be[ing]* is not thought in its disclosing nature [entbergenden Wesen], that is, in its truth. Nevertheless, in its answer to the question about what is there as such metaphysics speaks out of an unnoticed overtness [Offenbarkeit] of *be[ing]*. We can therefore call the truth of *be[ing]* the ground [Grund] in which metaphysics as the root of the tree of philosophy is supported <and> by means of which it is nourished.

Because metaphysics questions what is there as what is there, it is left with what is there and does not turn [kehrt] to *be[ing]* as *be[ing]*. As the root of the tree, it sends nourishment and strength out into its trunk and branches. Roots branch out into the land [Grund und Bogen] and so, for the good of the tree, go out of



[hervorgehen] it and therefore can take leave of [verlassen] it. The tree of philosophy grows out of the rootbed [Wurzelboden] of metaphysics. The land in fact is the element [Element] in which the root of the tree comes about [west]<sup>15</sup>, but the growth of the tree is never able to so absorb [aufzunehmen] the rootbed that it disappears as something tree-like<sup>16</sup> into the tree. Instead, the roots lose themselves in a thickset knot of fibers in the soil [im Boden]. The ground [Grund] is ground for the root, which for the good of the tree leaves itself behind [vergißt] in it. But the roots still belong [kehrt sich] to the tree, even though in their own way they commit themselves to the element of the soil [Boden]. In this way they use up [verschwendet] their element and themselves. | {367} As roots, they do not care about the soil, at least not in such wise that it would appear to be their nature [Wesen] to grow only in that element and spread only through it. Presumably, this element would not be the element it is were it not that the roots weave their way through it.

Insofar as it always formulates what is there as what is there, metaphysics does not think about [denkt nicht an] be[ing] itself. Philosophy does not get it together [versammeln]<sup>9</sup> on its basis [auf ihren Grund].\*<sup>17</sup> In fact, as metaphysics it always abandons it. But it nonetheless never escapes it. If thinking sets out [auf den Weg begibt] to experience the basis of metaphysics, to the extent that such thinking

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<sup>9</sup> This seemingly capricious rendering of *versammeln* is meant to suggest senses of the word as “gather at a site (*locus*)” and “come together” (make sense all at once) at a certain point, in this case at its basis. An anatomical association suggests itself. Many organs are described in terms of their *fundus* (the place farthest from its opening). Heidegger’s fragment “Was heißt Lesen [What Do We Call Reading]? (1954) (GA 13, 111) is a reflection that plays with forms of the verbs *sammeln* and *versammeln*.

tries to think the truth of *be[ing]* itself instead of only formulating what is there as what is there, it has in a certain way abandoned metaphysics. From the perspective of metaphysics, such thinking goes back [geht zurück] to the basis of metaphysics. But what thus still appears to be the basis of metaphysics presumably because it is experienced from out of itself as something else [ein Anderes] and still unspoken, <this> the essence [Wesen] of metaphysics is accordingly something other than metaphysics.

Of course, thinking that thinks about the truth of *be[ing]* is not satisfied with metaphysics but neither does it think against [gegen] metaphysics. Figuratively speaking, it does not uproot [ausreißt] the roots of philosophy. It digs into its ground and ploughs its soil. Metaphysics continues to be first philosophy [das Erste der Philosophie]. First thinking [Das Erste des Denkens] <, however,> is not attained.<sup>18</sup> Metaphysics is overturned [überwunden] in thinking about the truth of *be[ing]*. The claim of metaphysics to govern the relation [Bezug] to "*be[ing]*" and to definitively determine every relationship [Verhältnis] to what is there as such becomes invalid [hinfällig]. But this "overturning [Überwindung] metaphysics" does not get rid of metaphysics. As long as man [Mensch]<sup>10</sup> is the *animal rationale* [rational animal], he is the *animal metaphysicum* [metaphysical animal].<sup>11</sup> As long as man understands

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<sup>10</sup> *Mensch* is ordinarily translated as man (male or female) in the anthropological sense and frequently capitalized. Considering the critique of metaphysics Heidegger is undertaking here, it will be appropriate to use that translation. But increasingly Heidegger comes to write in terms better suited to rendering *Mensch* with 'humans' or 'human beings'.

<sup>11</sup> The expression is from Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* [E.F.J. Payne, trans.], New York: Dover, 1966, Vol. 2, p.160.

himself as a reasonable living thing [Lebewesen], metaphysics, in | {368} Kant's words, belongs to the nature [Natur] of man.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, if it is successful in getting back to the basis of metaphysics, thinking might well also occasion a change in the essence [Wesen] of man, a change that brings along with it a transformation of metaphysics.

If, therefore, in the development of the question about the truth of *be[ing]* we speak about overturning metaphysics, this means keeping in mind [Andenken an] *be[ing]* itself. Such keeping in mind goes beyond what has heretofore been *not* thinking [das Nichtdenken] about the ground [Grund] of the roots of philosophy. The thinking attempted in *Being and Time* (1927) set out on a path [Weg] to prepare for overturning metaphysics so understood. However, what sets such thinking on its way can only be what it is to be mindful of [das zu Denkende selbst].<sup>\*20</sup> That and how *be[ing]* itself gets thinking going [angeht] is never only or at first the say [steht nie] of thinking. That and how *be[ing]* itself affects thinking brings thinking to the verge [auf den Sprung] of arising from *be[ing]* itself in order to be in accord with *be[ing]* as such.<sup>\*21</sup>

But then when is such an overturning of metaphysics necessary? Should the one discipline in philosophy that until now has been its roots merely be undermined and in this way supplanted by one that is more original? Is it a question of a change in the doctrinal system [Lehrgebäudes] of philosophy? No. Or by getting to the basis of metaphysics, will an until now overlooked precondition of philosophy be uncovered and it be established that it still does not stand on an unshakable foundation [Fundament] and therefore at this point cannot be an absolute [absolute] science? No.

The arrival [Ankunft] or nonappearance [Ausbleiben] on the scene of the truth of *be[ing]* is about something else—not the constitution of philosophy, not just

philosophy itself, but rather the nearness [Nähe] and distance [Ferne] of that from which philosophy as the | {369} propositional [vorstellende] thinking of what is there as such derives its essence and necessity. It has yet to be decided whether *be[ing]* itself in relation [Bezug] to the essence of man [Mensch] can\*<sup>22</sup> come into its own out of its own truth, or whether as in days gone by in its estrangement from its basis metaphysics denies that the relation of *be[ing]* to the essence of man comes from the essence of this relation itself that humans [Mensch] play out [zum Gehören bringt] with *be[ing]*.<sup>23</sup>

In its response to the question about what is there as such metaphysics has already formulated *be[ing]* beforehand. It necessarily speaks of *be[ing]* and continually of that. But metaphysics does not put *be[ing]* itself into words [zur Sprache bringt], since it does not consider [bedenkt] either *be[ing]* in its truth or truth as emergence [Unverborgenheit] and this in its essence [Wesen].\*<sup>24</sup> The essence of truth<sup>25</sup> appears to metaphysics only in the already derivative form [Gestalt] of the truth of knowledge and assertions about it. But emergence just might be what is more original [Anfänglicheres] than truth [Wahrheit] in the sense of *veritas* [truth].\*<sup>26</sup> Ἀλήθεια [truth]<sup>12</sup> just might be the word that gives <us> an as yet unexperienced glimpse [Wink] into the unthought [ungedacht] essence of <the> *esse* [(to) be]. If this should be so, then admittedly the propositional thinking of metaphysics could never arrive at this [dies] essence of truth no matter how keenly it might look into pre-Socratic philosophy historically, for it is not a question of some renaissance [Renaissance] of pre-Socratic philosophy (it would be vain and nonsensical to have something like that in mind) but rather <one> of paying attention to the arrival [Ankunft] of the as yet unspoken [ungesagten] essence of emergence as what

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<sup>12</sup> See EN 13 to {366}.

*be[ing]* has announced itself to be.<sup>\*27</sup> In the meantime [während], metaphysics harbors the truth of *be[ing]* throughout its history from Anaximander to Nietzsche. Why does metaphysics not think about it? Is the | {370} omitting of such thinking just part of the nature [Art] of metaphysical thinking? Or does it belong to the fate of the essence [Wesensgeschick] of metaphysics that it withdraws [sich entzieht] from its own basis because in the realization [Aufgehen] of emergence what is coming about [Wesende] in it, namely, hiddenness [Verborgenheit],<sup>\*28</sup> always fails to appear [ausbleiben] in favor it so happens of what is emerging [das Unverborgenen] just so as to be able to appear as what is there?

But metaphysics continually and in the most various ways speaks [spricht] about *be[ing]*. It alone gives and reinforces the appearance of asking and answering the question about *be[ing]*. Yet metaphysics never answers the question about the truth of *be[ing]* because it does not ask the question. It does not ask <the question> because it thinks [denkt] <of> *be[ing]* only in <terms of> [indem] formulating what is there as what is there. It means [meint] what is there in its entirety [im Ganzen] but calls [nennt] it *be[ing]*. It calls it *be[ing]* and means what is there as what is there. From beginning to end, the assertions [Aussagen] of metaphysics circulate [bewegt sich] strangely in thoroughgoing confusion [Verwechslung]<sup>\*29</sup> about what is there and *be[ing]*. Admittedly, we think of the confusion as an eventuality [Ereignis] and not as a mishap [Fehler].<sup>30</sup> In no wise can it have its basis in some mere negligence of thinking or hastiness of speaking. Accordingly, thanks to this thoroughgoing confusion, proposing attains the height of perplexity [Verwirrung] when one claims that metaphysics poses the question about *be[ing]* [Seinsfrage].<sup>31</sup>

It almost seems that in the way it thinks what is there metaphysics were without knowing it thereby shown to be the barrier [Schranke] that denies man the original

[anfänglich]\*<sup>32</sup> relation [Bezug] of *be[ing]* to the essence of man [zum Menschenwesen]. | {371}

But what if the nonappearance [Ausbleiben] of this relation [Bezug] and the oblivion [Vergessenheit] of this nonappearance were to have determined the entire modern age? What if the nonappearance of *be[ing]* leaves man ever more exclusively in the hands of what is there, so that man almost abandons [verlassen] the relation of *be[ing]* to his essence (man's essence) and this abandonment [Verlassenheit] at the same time remains hidden? What if this were the case and has been so for a long time now? What if there were now indications that henceforth this oblivion [Vergessenheit] is preparing for an even more decisive oblivion?

Would there then still be reason for someone thinking in such a way to comport himself arrogantly in the face of this venture [Geschick] of *be[ing]*? Given such abandonment of and by *be[ing]* [Seinsverlassenheit], would there still be any reason to be led to believe in something else and this entirely out of a self-induced haughty mood [Stimmung]? If that is the way it is with the oblivion of *be[ing]*, would this not be reason enough for <a> thinking that thinks about *be[ing]* to consequently become horrified at not being able to do anything but endure in dread [Angst] this venture by *be[ing]* in order to bring thinking of the oblivion of *be[ing]* to resolution for the first time? But how would thinking be able to do this as long as the dread consigned to it [zugeschickte Angst] were only a kind of depressed mood [gedrückte Stimmung]? What does the venture by *be[ing]* [Seinsgeschick] of this dread [Angst] have to do with psychology and psychoanalysis?

But to suppose that overturning metaphysics corresponded to efforts to at last pay attention to the oblivion of *be[ing]* in order to experience it and to incorporate the

experience into the relation [Bezug] of *be[ing]* to man and look after it [verwahren]<sup>13</sup> there, then in distress [Not] about the oblivion of and by *be[ing]* perhaps the question "What is metaphysics?" would continue to be what is most necessary about what is necessary for thinking.

Thus it means everything that thinking become more thoughtful in its <own> time. That comes about when instead of exerting a greater degree of effort thinking points to another origin [Herkunft]. Thinking that is situated by what is there as such and is formulated and elucidated | {372} by it then comes to be replaced by thinking that comes into its own from *be[ing]* itself and in that way is beholden to *be[ing]* [um dem Sein höriges].

All considerations [Überlegungen] are at a loss that try to see how what is and remains only metaphysical proposing is immediately to be put into action in a more effective and useful way in ordinary everyday life [Leben]. For the more thoughtful thinking becomes, the more appropriately it is fulfilled by its relation to *be[ing]*, the more purely does thinking really come to behave of its own in a way that is appropriate to it alone in thinking of what it is destined for [des ihm Zu-gedachten]\*<sup>33</sup> and therefore of what has already been thought [Gedachten].<sup>34</sup>

But who still thinks about what has been thought?<sup>35</sup> People think things up.<sup>14</sup> To get thinking on a path so that in relation to *be[ing]* it reaches [gelangt] the essence of man, to open a pathway [Pfad] for thinking to expressly consider

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<sup>13</sup> The verb *verwahren* means "to look after" or "take care of [Sorge tragen]" *someone* as an indication of "being true to" him. The relationship [Verhältnis] between humans and *be[ing]* is personal, as is "being true to" it by looking after it.

<sup>14</sup> "Man macht Erfindungen."

[bedenke] *be[ing]* in its truth<sup>36</sup> is what the thinking of *Being and Time* is "about [unterwegs]." In this way, and that means in the service of the question of the truth of *be[ing]*, meditation [Besinnung] on the essence [Wesen] of man becomes necessary, since the unspoken because still to be accomplished experience of the oblivion of *be[ing]* includes the all-important suspicion that, in consequence of the emergence of *be[ing]*, the relation of human nature [Menschenwesen] to *be[ing]* does indeed belong solely to *be[ing]*. Yet how could such surmising as is experienced here ever become an explicit question at all without <our> already having made every effort beforehand to eliminate the determination of the essence [Wesen] of man as subjectivity [Subjektivität] and also as <the> *animal rationale* [rational animal]? Also, in order to find *one* word for the relation of *be[ing]* to the essence of man and for the essential relationship [Wesensverhältnis] of man to the openness [Offenheit] ("there [Da]") of *be[ing]* as such), the term [Name] "existence [Dasein]" was chosen for the essential sphere [Wesensbereich] in which man is man. This happened even though the term is also used by metaphysics for what has come to be called *existentia* [existentiality]<sup>37</sup>, | {373} actuality [Wirklichkeit], reality [Realität] and objectivity [Objektivität], and even though the everyday way of speaking <in German> about "menschliche Dasein [human existence]" makes use of the metaphysical sense of the word [Wort]. Yet every re-consideration [Nach-denken] is obstructed, however, if one feels satisfied by establishing that in *Being and Time* the word 'existence' is used instead of 'consciousness [Bewußtsein]'. As if it were here merely a matter of the employment of a different usage [Gebrauch] of words [Wörter], as if it were not <rather> about the one and only <thing that matters>: to bring about <a> thinking <through of> the relation of *be[ing]* to the essence of man and thus to our way of thinking, above all <to bring about> with respect to our leading question what is an adequate experience of the essence [Wesenserfahrung] of man. 'Existence' neither



merely takes the place of the word [Namen] 'consciousness', nor does that "matter [Sache]" called "existence" take the place [Stelle] of what we formulate [vorstellt] with the term 'consciousness'. Moreover, what is termed [genannt] "existence" should first of all be experienced and as a result then thought of as a "place [Stelle]," namely, the habitat [Ortschaft] of the truth of *be[ing]*.

Throughout the treatise *Being and Time* what is thought in the term [Wort] 'existence' is already given in the basic principle [Leitsatz] that says: "*The 'essence [Wesen]' of existence [Dasein] is its way of life [Existenz]*" (p. 67).<sup>38</sup>

Admittedly, if one takes into consideration that in the language of metaphysics the term [Wort] 'existence [Existenz]' names [nennt] what is meant by 'existence [Dasein]', namely, <that both refer to> the actuality of anything that is actual [jedes beliebigen Wirklichen], from God to a grain of sand, then when one only casually understands the statement, the difficulty of what is to be thought [des zu Denkende] is merely displaced from the word 'Dasein' to the word 'Existenz'. In *Being and Time* the expression [Name] "way of life [Existenz]" is used expressly as the designation [Bezeichnung] for the *be[ing]* of man. Correctly thought, "way of life" may be thought of as the "essence" of existence in whose overtness *be[ing]* manifests itself and hides, grants itself and eludes <us> [sich bekündet und verbirgt, gewährt und entzieht] without the truth of *be[ing]* | {374} depleting [erschöpft] itself in existence or letting itself be one [in eins] with it after the fashion of the metaphysical principle <that> all objectivity is as such subjectivity.

What is the sense of "way of life [Existenz]" in *Being and Time*? The word [Wort] names a way of *be[ing]* [Weise des Seins], in fact the *be[ing]* of what is there that stands open [offen steht] to the openness of *be[ing]* within which it stands [steht] while it endures [aussteht] it. This enduring [Ausstehen] has come to be known as "care [Sorge]."<sup>39</sup> The ecstatic [ekstatische] essence of existence is thought of as

care, just as, conversely, care is experienced adequately only in the ecstatic essence <of existence>. Experienced in this way, enduring is here of the essence for thinking <the> ekstasis [Ekstasis].<sup>40</sup> The ecstatic essence of a way of life is still inadequately understood, however, when it signifies [vorstellt] only "being beyond [Hinausstehen]"<sup>41</sup> and one takes the "beyond [Hinaus]" to be an "away from [Weg von]" the inside [Innern] of an immanence [Immanenz] of consciousness and spirit [Geist], for in that way a way of life would still be represented [vorgestellt] as "subjectivity [Subjektivität]" and "substance [Substanz]," while the "out [Aus]" as what is outside [Auseinander] the openness of *be[ing]* itself would still have to be thought. Strange as it may sound, the stasis [Stasis]<sup>42</sup> in the ek-static [des Ekstatischen] is based on [beruht auf] being an instance [Innestehen] of the "out" <and> "there" [im "Aus" und "Da"] of emergence as which *be[ing]* itself comes about [west]. What is to be thought by the expression [Name] "way of life" can be very beautifully named [nennen] with the word [Wort] "urgency [Inständigkeit],"<sup>43</sup> if thinking uses the term as a way to think the truth of *be[ing]* and to think it through [ihr denkt aus]. But in particular we must then think the instance of the openness of *be[ing]*, the bearing [Austragen]<sup>44</sup> of such an instance (care), and enduring [Ausdauern] in extremity [im Äußersten] (*be[ing]* to the utmost<sup>45</sup> [Sein zum Tode])\*<sup>46</sup> at the same time [zumal], and <think them> as the full essence of a way of life.\*<sup>47</sup>

The being who is as a way of life is the human being [Mensch]. Only human beings exist.<sup>48</sup> A rock is, but it does not exist. A tree is, but it does not exist. A horse is, but it does not exist. An angel is, but it does not exist. God is, | {375} but he does not exist.<sup>49</sup> The statement "only human beings exist" does not at all intend to say that only humans are real [sei ein wirklich Seiendes] and everything else is unreal [unwirklich] and only an illusion [Schein] or idea [Vorstellung] for human beings. The statement "human beings exist" means [bedeutet] that human beings are beings

[Seiende] <of the sort> whose *be[ing]* is marked [ausgezeichnet] by *be[ing]* as the outstanding instance [offenstehende Innestehen] of the emergence of *be[ing]*.<sup>50</sup> The\*<sup>51</sup> existential essence [existenziale Wesen] of humans is the basis [Grund] of what humans can formulate as what is there of any sort and what they can be conscious of that is so formulated. All consciousness presupposes a way of life thought ecstatically as the *essentia* [essentiality] of humans, where *essentia* means what humans come to be insofar as they are humans.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, consciousness neither first creates the openness of what is there nor first confers on humans their being open [Offensein] to [für] what is there. Whither and whence and in what open dimension [freien Dimension], then, could all intentionality of consciousness move if humans were not in essence already <such an> urgency? What else (if anyone has seriously thought about this) could the word [Wort] '-sein [-ness]' mean in the terms 'Bewußtsein [consciousness]' and 'Selbstbewußtsein [self-consciousness]' except the existential essence of what exists, which is that in which [in dem] it exists? Of course, to be a self [Selbst] is the mark of the essence of what is there which exists [existiert], but a way of life neither consists in being-a-self [Selbstsein]<sup>52</sup> nor is it itself determined by this. Since, however, metaphysical thinking characterizes the being-a-self of humans as substance [Substanz] or what is at bottom the same [im Grunde das Selbe] as subject [Subjekt], the path [Weg] that first leads away from metaphysics to the ecstatic-existential [ekstatisch-existenzialen] essence of humans must get past [hindiurchführen] the metaphysical

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<sup>15</sup> "Das existenziale Wesen des Menschen ist der Grund dafür, daß der Mensch Seiendes als ein solches vorstellen und vom Vorgestellten ein Bewußtsein haben kann." In the Letter {329} Heidegger glosses *essentia* with *Wesenheit* [essentiality] and *existential* with 'Wirklichkeit' [actuality].

determination of the selfness [Selbstseins] of humans (*Being and Time* §§ 63 and 64).<sup>53</sup>

But now because the question about a way of life is always at the disposal [im Dienste] of the singular [einzig]<sup>16</sup> question for thinking, that is, because the question about the truth of *be[ing]* as the hidden basis of all metaphysics has yet to be unfolded, the title | {376} of the treatise that attempts to get to the basis of metaphysics is therefore not *Way of Life and Time* or *Consciousness and Time*, but *Be[ing] and Time*. Neither, however, let us think of the title as anything like the well-known <pairs> *be[ing]* and becoming [Werden], *be[ing]* and semblance [Schein],<sup>54</sup> *be[ing]* and thinking [Denken], <or> *be[ing]* and the ought [Sollen]. For in each case *be[ing]* is then narrowly designated as though "becoming," "seeming," "thinking," and "having to" did not belong to *be[ing]*, while it remains clear that they are not nothing [nicht nichts] and so belong to *be[ing]*. In *Be[ing] and Time*, *be[ing]* is none other than [nicht etwas anderes als] "time," as long as "time" goes by its "first name" [Vorname],<sup>55</sup> the truth of *be[ing]*, and is thus *be[ing]* itself. But why then "time" and "*be[ing]*"?<sup>17</sup>

Recollecting [Andenken an] the beginning of the history of *be[ing]* that is unveiled [sich enthüllt] in the thinking of the Greeks will show that early on the Greeks experienced the *be[ing]* of what is there as the presence of what is

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<sup>16</sup> This is the "only" question in the sense of being the that alone matters, the unique question, that demands our attention.

<sup>17</sup> This is the title of the projected third division of Part One of *Sein und Zeit*, "Zeit und Sein [Time and *Be[ing]*" (GA 2, p. 53). Based on a lecture given January 31, 1962, at the University of Freiburg, "Zeit und Sein" was first published in 1968 (GA 14, pp. 3-30).

presenting itself [die Anwesenheit des Anwesenden]. If we translate <the verb> εἶναι<sup>18</sup> with 'sein', the translation is linguistically correct but we merely replace one verbal expression [Wortlaut] with another. If we question ourselves, however, we see at once that we neither think εἶναι in a Greek way<sup>56</sup> nor 'sein' with <a> correspondingly [entsprechend] clear and unambiguous determination [Bestimmung]. What do we say [sagen], then, when we utter [sagen] "sein" instead of εἶναι, and εἶναι and esse instead of "sein"? We say [sagt] nothing.<sup>57</sup> The Greek, Latin and German words [Wort] are all obtuse [stumpf] in the same way. In everyday usage, we give ourselves away as being merely trendsetters [Schrittmacher] for the greatest thoughtlessness that has ever gone on in thinking and remains in power to this very hour. For εἶναι means to make present to [anwesen]<sup>58</sup>. The essence [Wesen] of this making present <to> [Anwesen] is buried deep [tief geboren] in the original name [Namen] for be[ing]. For us, however, like παρ- [present <to>] and ἀπουσία [absence <of>],<sup>59</sup> εἶναι [(to) be] and οὐσία [essence <of what is there>] already say the following: <as> unthought and hidden, the present [Gegenwart] and the lasting [Andauern] are at work [waltet] in presence [Anwesen]—time comes about [west Zeit]. Accordingly, be[ing] as such is revealed as time.<sup>60</sup> Thus time is referred back to emergence, that is, <to> the truth of be[ing]. But now the <sense of> time to be thought is not | {377} experienced as some sort of process [Ablauf] of what is there. Obviously, time is of a wholly different nature [Wesen]\*<sup>61</sup> that so far is not merely unthought <of> in the metaphysical concept of time, but will never be thought in it. Time becomes the <familiar> first name [Vorname] given to what still has to be considered [bedenkende] about the truth of be[ing] and experienced for the first time [allererst].

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<sup>18</sup> See FN 82 to the Letter {334}.

Just as the hidden essence [Wesen] of time says something about the first metaphysical expression [Namen] for *be[ing]*, <that is, εἶναι,> it also says something about the last expression [Namen] for *be[ing]*: "the eternal return of the equivalent [Gleichen]." In the era [Epoche] of metaphysics\*<sup>62</sup> the history of *be[ing]* is at work in the <as yet> unthought [ungedachten] essence of time. Here space [Raum] is neither merely co-ordinated with [nebengeordnet] nor ordered to [eingeordnet] time <so understood>.\*<sup>63</sup>

Any attempt to get from formulating [Vorstellen] what is there as such to thinking about the truth of *be[ing]* must also formulate the truth of *be[ing]* in a certain way in every <such> formulating embarked upon so that the formulating is necessarily different in kind from what is to be thought and ultimately inappropriate to it in such formulating. The in-depth relationship [Verhältnis] <of thinking> to the relation [Bezug] between the truth of *be[ing]* and human nature [Menschenwesen] deriving from metaphysics is conceived of as "understanding [Verstehen]." In that case, however, understanding is thought from out of [aus] the emergence of *be[ing]*. Inwardly begotten [im Entwerfen], it is what is given forth [Entwurf] ecstatically, that is, in the ambit [Bereich] of the open [Offenen].\*<sup>64</sup> The ambit that avails itself\*<sup>65</sup> as open [offenen] of such a schematic [im Entwerfen] by <means of> which something (in this case *be[ing]*) turns out to be [erweise] something (in this case *be[ing]* as it is in its emergence) is called sense [Sinn]\*<sup>66</sup> (cf. *Being and Time*, pp. 192-93)<sup>67</sup>. "Sense of *be[ing]*" and "truth of *be[ing]*" speak <of> the same thing [sagen das Selbe].<sup>68</sup>

Assuming that time belongs to the truth of *be[ing]* in an as yet hidden [verborgene] way, every conjectural leaving open [entwerfende Offenhalten] | {378} of the truth of *be[ing]* as <the> understanding of *be[ing]* must therefore look to time as the possible\*<sup>69</sup> horizon [möglichen Horizont] of the understanding of <and by> *be[ing]* [Seinsverständnisses] (cf. *Being and Time*, §§ 31-34 and 68).<sup>70</sup>

On the first page of *Being and Time* the preface of the treatise closes with the following sentences: "The intention [Absicht] of the following treatise is the concrete elaboration of the question about the sense [Sinn] of *be[ing]*. The interpretation [Interpretation]<sup>21</sup> of *time* as the possible horizon of an understanding of *be[ing]* as such is its provisional goal."<sup>22</sup>

Philosophy cannot easily find clearer evidence of the power of the oblivion of *be[ing]* in which all philosophy is submerged and that has also become and continues to be taken as the fateful [geschickhafte] claim of thinking in *Being and Time* than the instinctive assurance with which it [philosophy] has by-passed the only real question of *Being and Time*. This is not, however, a question of misunderstandings regarding a book but rather <one> of our abandonment by [Verlassenheit vom] *be[ing]*.<sup>19</sup>

Metaphysics speaks of what is there as what is there; it offers a λόγος (assertion [Aussage]) about ὄν [what is there]. The later term "ontology [Ontologie]" is an indication of its essence, <only> supposing, however, that we interpret the term according to its authentic content and not in a narrow textbook sense. Metaphysics moves in the realm of ὄν ἢ ὄν [what is there as what is there]. Its proposing [Vorstellen] concerns what is there as what is there. In this way, metaphysics always formulates what is there as such in its entirety as the be-ingness [Seiendheit]<sup>20</sup> of what is there (the οὐσία [essence] of ὄν [what is there]). But metaphysics formulates

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<sup>19</sup> The German *von* allows this to be read as abandonment by *be[ing]* as well as of *be[ing]*. Either case, Heidegger suggests that this is a two-way street but one where *be[ing]* is directing traffic. So, too, for the next use of the word *von* ("unsere Verlassenheit vom Sein").

<sup>20</sup> The awkward term 'is-ness' might be appropriate for this neologism.

the be-ingness of what is there in a twofold way: in the first place, as the entirety [das Ganze] of what is there as such in the sense of the most general (ὄν καθόλου, κοινόν [what is there on the whole, the everyday or common to all]); and at the same time, however, as the entirety of what is there as such in the sense of the highest and therefore the divine being [göttlichen Seiende] (ὄν καθόλου, ἀκρότατον, θεῖον [the universal, the utmost, divinity]). The emergence of what is there was developed in its twofold sense most notably in the metaphysics of Aristotle (cf. *Metaphysics* Γ, Ε, Κ). | {379}

Because it turns what is there as what is there into an idea [Vorstellung], metaphysics is in itself two-in-one [zweifaach-einig]: the truth of what is there in <the sense of> [1] what is the most general and [2] what is the highest. In essence it is ontology in the narrower <scholastic> sense and theology. The onto-theological [onto-theologische] essence of authentic [eigentlichen] philosophy (πρώτη φιλοσοφία<sup>73</sup>) must surely be accounted for by the way it brings ὄν [what is there], that is, as ὄν, out into the open [ins Offene bringt]. The theological character of ontology is due not so much to the fact that Greek metaphysics was later absorbed by Christian sacred theology and transformed by it. It is due more to the means by which what is there as what is there has disclosed itself [sich entborgen hat] from early on. That <very> emergence of what is there first made it possible for Christian theology to overpower Greek philosophy. Whether to its benefit or detriment may be decided by theologians of the Christian experience as they consider [bedenken] what is written in the apostle Paul's first letter to the Corinthians: οὐχὶ ἐμώρανεν ὁ θεὸς τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ κόσμου; (1 Cor. 1:20): "Has not God let the wisdom of this world become foolishness?"<sup>74</sup> But according to [1 Cor.] 1:22, the σοφίαν τοῦ κόσμου [wisdom of this world] is what the Ἕλληνες ζητοῦσιν [Greeks seek], <what> the Greeks are searching for [suchen]. Even Aristotle expressly calls πρώτη φιλοσοφία



[authentic philosophy] ζητούμενη [<the> sought, quested for]—what is sought [die gesuchte].<sup>21</sup> What if Christian theology were to decide just for once to take seriously the words of the Apostle and so also the foolishness [Torheit] of philosophy?

As the truth of what is there as such metaphysics takes on two forms. But the basis of its dual form and indeed its origin remain closed off to metaphysics, not accidentally, however, or as the result of an omission. Metaphysics accepts this dual form since it is what it is: the formulating of what is there as what is there. Metaphysics has no choice. It is excluded from the experience of *be[ing]* by its own nature as metaphysics since what is there (ὄν) as formulated by metaphysics always formulates nothing but what has already been indicated [gezeigt] as what is there | {380} (ἢ ὄν). Metaphysics, however, never pays attention to what has been hidden in this ὄν insofar as it has been allowed to come out of hiding [unverborgen].<sup>75</sup>

And so it was necessarily the time to ponder [nachdenken] what is actually said about ὄν [what is there] with the word 'be-ing [seiend]'. Accordingly, the question about ὄν took deeper root [wieder geholt] in thinking (cf. the preface to *Being and Time*). Such repeating [Widerholen] does not merely parrot the Platonic-Aristotelian question, however, but rather asks in turn [fragen zurück] what is in hiding in ὄν [what is there].\*<sup>76</sup>

Metaphysics continues to be gounded [gegründet] in what is in hiding [das Verborgene] in ὄν [what is there], even when its formulating is devoted to ὄν ἢ ὄν [what is there as what is there]. <Our> inquiring in <re>turn [Zurückfragen] <in>to what from the point of view of metaphysics is hidden searches about for the

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<sup>21</sup> Aristotle's phrase is "ζητούμενη ἐπιστήμη," the science men are looking for (*Metaphysics* 983a21).

foundation [Fundament] of ontology. That is why the procedure in *Being and Time* (p. 34)<sup>7</sup> is called "fundamental ontology [Fundamentalontologie]." But as with any terminology [Titel], in this case the terminology proved to be unfortunate from the start. It says something correct about metaphysics as it is understood there, yet for that very reason led to error since we were out to accomplish the transition from metaphysics to the truth of *be[ing]* in thinking. As long as such thinking about the truth of *be[ing]* is described only as fundamental ontology, however, the designation [Benennung] gets in its own way and obscures it. Of course, the term "fundamental ontology" suggests the view that thinking that attempts to think the truth of *be[ing]* and not like all ontology the truth of what is there, is even as fundamental ontology still a kind [Art] of ontology. Meanwhile, even with the first step it takes in thinking about the truth of *be[ing]* as getting to the basis for metaphysics it has already abandoned the sphere [Bereich] of all ontology. By comparison, all philosophy that turns on a straightforward or indirect formulating of "transcendence [Transzendenz]" necessarily remains ontology in an essential sense, whether it wants to effect a laying of the foundation [Grundlegung] of metaphysics or to assure us that it rejects ontology as a | {381} conceptual paralysis [begriffliche Erstarrung] of experiencing [Erleben].

Indeed, if because of a long habit of formulating [Vorstellen] what is there <in a certain way> thinking that attempts to think the truth of *be[ing]* now gets caught up in proposing [Vorstellen], then as a first meditation [Besinnung] as well as an occasion for the transition from propositional [vorstellenden] to recollective [andenkende] thinking, probably nothing is more necessary than the question, "What is metaphysics?"

For its own part, the unfolding of this question in the following lecture concludes with a question. It is called the basic question of metaphysics and goes as follows:

Why after all anything at all and not rather no-thing?<sup>78</sup> For a long time much has been said back and forth about dread [Angst] and the no-thing [Nichts] spoken about [zur Sprache kommen] in the lecture. But it has not yet occurred to people to consider [überlegen] why a lecture that attempts to think <its way> from thinking about the truth of *be[ing]* to <thinking> about the no-thing and from there to the essence of metaphysics claims that the question just asked is the basic question of metaphysics. For the attentive listener, <however,> is there not something to be thought about [ein Bedenken] that must really be weightier than all the enthusiasm about dread [Angst] and the no-thing? The latter question confronts us with the consideration [Bedenken] that any meditation [Besinnung] that attempts to think of a way beyond no-thing to *be[ing]* eventually returns once again to a question about what is there. Inasmuch as in being introduced with the causal [kausal] word 'why' this question inquires into the conventional [herkömmlichen] way [Weise] of metaphysics, thinking of *be[ing]* is completely disavowed in favor of propositional knowledge about what is there in terms of [aus] what is there. To top it all off, the latter question is obviously the question that the metaphysician Leibniz posed in his *Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce [Fondé en Raison]* [*Principles of Nature and Grace [Based on Reason]*]: "Pourquoi il y a plutôt quelque chose que rien?"<sup>79</sup>

Does the lecture thus fail to keep pace [zurück fällt] with its proper intention, which is possible after all given the difficulty of the transition from metaphysics to the other <way of> thinking? In the end, | {382} like Leibniz<sup>80</sup>, does it not <merely> ask the metaphysical question about the supreme cause [Ursache] of all actual things [seienden Sachen]? Why, then, is Leibniz's name not mentioned, which would no doubt be proper?

Or is the question asked in a wholly different sense? If it does not inquire about what is there and ascertain the first actual [seiende] supreme cause of it, then the

question must start out from what is not something that is there [was nicht das Seiende ist]. That *is* [emphasis added] what the question refers to [nennt] and <therefore> the word 'no-thing' ['Nichts'] that the lecture takes as its unique [einziges] theme is capitalized. Obviously, the requirement is to think through for once to the end of the lecture from within its own and always leading perspective. What is called the basic question of metaphysics would then be consummated in a fundamental-ontological way in a question <asked> from the very basis [aus dem Grunde] of metaphysics and as the question about this basis.

But if we grant that the lecture is on course to what concerns it at its conclusion, then how should we understand the question?

It goes like this: Why after all anything at all and not rather no-thing? Assuming that we no longer think metaphysically in the way typical of metaphysics but rather think about [denken an] the truth of *be[ing]* from out of [aus] the essence and truth of metaphysics, it may now also be asked: How does it happen that what is there always has the right of way [den Vorrang hat] and takes advantage on its own of every "is [ist]," while what is not <an instance of> what is there—namely, that very no-thing understood as *be[ing]* itself—remains forgotten? How does it happen that with <respect to> *be[ing]* <sup>\*82</sup> It [Es]<sup>\*81</sup> is really nothing [eigentlich nichts ist] and the no-thing really does not come about [eigentlich nicht west]?<sup>83</sup> Is it because of this that all metaphysics gives the shocking appearance that "*be[ing]*" goes without saying<sup>84</sup> and that as a result <the> no-thing is more easily made to seem to be something?<sup>85</sup> That is indeed the way it is with *be[ing]* and <the> no-thing. Were it otherwise, then Leibniz could not have said in the same place | {383} by way of explanation: "Car le rien est plus simple et plus facile que quelque chose."<sup>86</sup>

What is more puzzling: [1] this, that anything is there [daß Seiendes ist]; or [2] this, that *be[ing]* "is" [daß Sein "ist"]?<sup>87</sup> Or in this meditation do we not also already

approach the vicinity [Nähe] of the riddle that has come to pass [sich ereignet]<sup>\*88</sup> with [mit] the *be*[ing] of<sup>\*89</sup> what is there?

In the meantime, however, whatever the answer may be, the time should have become riper to think through [durchdenken] for once the much beleaguered lecture "What Is Metaphysics?" from its conclusion, from *its* end, not from an imagined [eingebildeten] one.

## WHAT IS METAPHYSICS? (1929)

{103} "What is metaphysics?" The question leads one to expect talk about metaphysics. We will forgo that. Instead we will elucidate a definite metaphysical question. In this way, it seems, we will be placed in the midst of metaphysics. Only thus will we make it really possible for metaphysics to explain itself.

Our task begins by presenting a metaphysical question, goes on to elaborate the question, and ends with an answer to it.

### The Presentation of a Metaphysical Question

According to Hegel [and Schelling], from the point of view of good common sense philosophy is "the world upside down [die verkehrte Welt]."<sup>90</sup> The peculiarity of our undertaking therefore requires some preparatory remarks. This results from the twofold character of metaphysical questions.

First, every metaphysical question always grasps the entire problematic of metaphysics. In every case it is the entirety itself. Furthermore, every metaphysical question can only be asked in such a way that the one doing the questioning (such as he is) is there in the question, that is, put into question. From this we take the following directive: a metaphysical question must be put in its entirety and from the essential position of questioning existence [des fragenden Daseins].<sup>91</sup> Here and now we question on our *own* behalf. Our existence in the community of scholars, teachers and students is determined by science. What is really happening to us at

the heart [im Grunde] of our existence, now that science has become our passion? |  
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The fields [Gebiete] of science are widely separated from each other. Their ways of dealing with the objects they inquiry about are fundamentally different. In our time such dissociated diversity of disciplines is held together only thanks to the technical organization of the universities and their faculties and is given meaning [Bedeutung] by establishing a common practical aim for the various departments. As a result, however, close contact among the sciences in their essential common ground [Wesensgrund] has died out.

And yet—in all the sciences, when we follow their own most proper aim we relate ourselves alone to what is there [das Seiende selbst]. Precisely from the point of view of science no field takes precedence over any other, neither nature over history nor vice versa. No one method of dealing with objects dominates the rest. Mathematical knowledge is no stricter than philological-historical knowledge. It merely has the character of "exactness [Exaktheit]," which is not the same as strictness [Strenge]. To demand exactness of the study of history goes against the specific strictness of the humanities [Geisteswissenschaften]. The relation [Bezug] to the world prevailing in all the sciences as such allows them to pursue only what is there with a view to making it an object of investigation and established determination [gegründeten Besinnung] according to its whatness [Wasgehalt] and mode of being [Seinsart]. The idea is that the sciences effect a *rapprochement* [In-die-Nähe-kommen] with what is essential [Wesentlichen] in all things [Dinge].

This distinctive [ausgezeichnete] relation of the world solely to what is there is borne out and guided by a freely adopted attitude [Haltung] of the human way of life [menschlichen Existenz]. To be sure, humans' prescientific and extra-scientific dealings are also related to what is there. But science is distinctive [hat seiner

Auszeichnung] in that it lets the matter itself [die Sache selbst] explicitly and alone have the last word in its own way. With such objectivity [Sachlichkeit] of questioning, defining and substantiating, a certain limited submission to what is there is effected, so that it is able in that way to manifest itself. The submissive position taken by research and teaching comes to be the basis of the | {105} possibility of having a unique, though limited kind of guiding influence on the entirety of the human way life [Existenz]. Of course, the particular relation of science to the world and the guiding attitude of humans within it can be fully conceptualized only when we see and grasp what happens in a relation to the world attained in this way. Humans—what is there of one sort [ein Seiendes] among others—"pursue [treibt] the sciences." In this "pursuit" nothing less happens than the incursion [Einbruch] by what is there of one sort known as humans into the entirety of what is there, so that in and through this incursion what is there thereby emerges [aufbricht] as what and how it is. In its own way, this eruptive incursion [aufbrechende Einbruch] helps [verhilft] first come into its own what is there.

In its radical unity, this trinity—relation to the world [Weltbezug], attitude, incursion—brings an enlivening simplicity and keenness to *being*-there [Da-sein] in the way of life of science [wissenschaftliche Existenz]. If we expressly take over for ourselves such an enlightened scientific existence [Da-sein] then we must say:

That to which the relation to the world refers is only what is there—and nothing else [und sonst nichts].<sup>92, \*93</sup>

That from which any attitude takes its direction is only what is there—and nothing more than this [und weiter nichts].



That with which scholarly confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] with its incursion <into what is there> takes place [geschieht] is only what is there—and above and beyond that, nothing [und darüber hinaus nichts].

But it is remarkable that just when scientific man [der wissenschaftliche Mensch] makes sure of what is most his own he speaks of something else. Only what is there is supposed to be studied, and other than that—nothing [nichts]; only what is there, and more than that—nothing; solely what is there, and beyond that—nothing.

How do things stand with this no-thing [Nichts]?<sup>94</sup> Is it an accident that we speak quite automatically in this way? Is it then only a manner of speaking—and nothing besides [und sonst nichts]? | {106}

So why do we trouble ourselves about this no-thing? In fact, the no-thing is indeed turned away by science and given up on as the null and void [das Nichtige]. Yet if we give up on the no-thing in such a way, do we not in fact accept it? But can we talk about an acceptance <of something> if we accept nothing [nichts]? Yet maybe all this back and forth has already turned into empty verbal wrangling [Wortgezänk]. Science would then have to renew its seriousness and assert its soberness in opposition to this so that it would have to do only with what is there [um das Seiende geht]. The no-thing—what can it be for science except a horror [Greuel] and phantasm [Phantasterei]? If science is right, then one thing is for certain: science wants to know nothing of the no-thing [vom Nichts nichts wissen]. In the end, this is the scientifically strict comprehension of the no-thing. We know <of> it in wanting to know nothing about the no-thing.<sup>95</sup>

Science wants to know nothing of the no-thing. But even so it is nonetheless certain that when it attempts to talk about its own essence [Wesen]<sup>\*96</sup> it calls on the

no-thing for help. It claims for its own what it has rejected. What sort of conflicted<sup>\*97</sup> essence unveils itself here?

Meditation on our way of life at the moment [augenblickliche] as one determined by science finds us in the midst of a controversy. In the course of the dispute a question has already presented itself. The question merely needs to be articulated. What about the no-thing?<sup>22</sup>

### **The Elaboration [Ausarbeitung] of the Question**

An elaboration of the question about the no-thing will put us in a position to be clear about whether it is possible or an impossibility to answer the question. The no-thing has been granted [ist zugegeben]. Science abandons it | {107} with haughty indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] as what "is not given."<sup>98</sup>

All the same, we will try to speak about the no-thing. What is <the> no-thing?<sup>23</sup> Our first approach to this question already shows us something unusual about it from the outset. In asking this question we posit the no-thing as something that "is" such and such, as an instance of what is there. But clearly it has in fact been distinguished precisely from that.<sup>\*99</sup> The question about the no-thing—what and how it, the no-thing, is—turns what is being questioned into its opposite. The question robs itself of its own object [Gegenstandes].

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<sup>22</sup> "Wie steht es um das Nichts?"

<sup>23</sup> "Was ist das Nichts?"

Accordingly, every answer to this question is impossible from the outset [von Hause]. For it necessarily starts out in the form: the no-thing "is" this or that. Question and answer alike are themselves just as nonsensical with respect to the no-thing.

Such a dismissal does not have to come from science, however. The commonly referred to fundamental rule of all thinking (the principle of avoiding contradiction <the law of non-contradiction:  $A \neq \neg A$ >) <of> everyday "logic" does in [niederschlagen] this question. For thinking, which is in essence always thinking about something [etwas], thinking about <the> no-thing would be working against its own nature.

Because we continue to fail to make the no-thing as such into an object [Gegenstand] we have already come to the end of our question about the no-thing—on the assumption that "logic"<sup>100</sup> is the highest authority on the question, that the intellect [Verstand] is the means and thinking is the way [Weg] to grasp the no-thing in an original [ursprünglich] way and decide about its revelation [Enthüllung].

But can the rule [Herrschaft] of "logic" be challenged? Is the intellect really not lord and master [Herr] in this question about the no-thing? After all, only with its help can we determine the no-thing at all and formulate it as a problem, even if only as one that eliminates itself.<sup>101</sup> For the no-thing is the negation [Verneinung]<sup>102</sup> of the fullness [Allheit] | {108} of what is there, what is not-there *per se* [das schlechthin Nicht-Seiende]. Yet with that we subsume the no-thing under the higher determination of the the not-like [das Nichthafte] and therewith, so it seems, the negated [das Verneint]. But under the ruling and never challenged doctrine of "logic," negation [Verneinung] is a specific intellectual act [Verstandeshandlung]. With respect to the question of the no-thing and indeed the question about its questionability, how can we then hope to bid adieu to the intellect? Are we that

certain about what we presuppose here? Do the Not [das Nicht], negativity [die Verneintheit], and hence negation not have about them a higher determination under which the no-thing falls as a particular species of the negated? Is there the no-thing only because there is the Not [das Nicht], i.e., negation? Or is it the other way around? Are there negation and the Not only because there is the no-thing?<sup>103</sup> This has not been decided; indeed not once has the question been expressly raised. We maintain that the no-thing is more original\*<sup>104</sup> than the Not and negation.

If our thesis is correct, then the possibility of negation as an intellectual act and therewith the intellect itself depends in some way upon the no-thing. What hope is there then to <be able to> decide about this? Does the seeming absurdity of the question and answer regarding the no-thing rest solely on the blind single-mindedness [Eigensinnigkeit]\*<sup>105</sup> of our far-ranging intellect [Verstandes]?

However, if we do not allow ourselves to be led astray by the formal impossibility of the question about the no-thing and still confront the question, at the very least then we must satisfy what is still the basic requirement [Grunderfordnis] of the possible development of any question. If the no-thing is to be questioned in the way questioning works, then it must itself be given in advance. We must be able to encounter [begegnen] it.

How do we pursue [suchen] the no-thing? How do we find the no-thing? In order to find something, must we not already know that | {109} it is there [daß es da ist]? Indeed! First and foremost, a person is able to look for something only if he has already anticipated the actual availability [Vorhandensein] of what is being sought [das Gesuchte].<sup>106</sup> But what is sought here is <the> no-thing. In the end, is there [gibt es] any seeking [ein Suchen] without some anticipation [Vorwegnahme], a seeking to which a proper finding [Finden] belongs?

Be that as it may, we know [kennen] the no-thing even if only as that which we casually talk about day in and day out. Without further ado, we can work out a "definition [Definition]" of this pale no-thing that in all the colorlessness of self-evidence so inconspicuously stalks [herumtreibt] our talk [Gerede]:

The no-thing is the complete negation of the fullness [Allheit] of what is there. In the end, is this characteristic of the no-thing not a pointer [Fingerzeig] in the only direction from which it can encounter us [begegnet]?

The fullness of what is there must be given beforehand in order that it can be made invalid [verfallen zu können] as such by <a> negation in which the no-thing itself must <after all> then manifest [bekunden] itself.

But even if we ignore the questionability of the relationship [Verhältnis] between negation and the no-thing, as finite essences [endliche Wesen] how should we make the entirety of what is there accessible in itself and in particular [zumal] to ourselves in its fullness?<sup>107</sup> If need be, we can think of the entirety of what is there as an "idea [Idee]" and then negate what has been thus thought up [das so Eingebildete in Gedanken] and "think" of it as negated. In this way we reach the formal concept of the "imagined [eingebildeten]" no-thing, but never the no-thing itself.<sup>108</sup> But the no-thing is nothing [nichts],<sup>109</sup> and no distinction [Unterschied] can prevail between the imagined no-thing and the "real [eigentlich]" no-thing unless the no-thing represents something other than the complete absence of <any> distinction [Unterschiedslösigkeit].<sup>110</sup> But is not the "real [eigentlich]" no-thing moreover that disguised [versteckte] but <but nonetheless> absurd concept of an actual no-thing [eines seienden Nichts]?<sup>111</sup> For one last time then the objections of our intellect would <seem to> call a halt to our search, the legitimacy of which can be demonstrated only in a fundamental experience [Gründerfahrung] of the no-thing. |

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As surely as we never get a sure grasp of the entirety [Ganze] of what is there in itself, just as surely do we nevertheless find ourselves somehow placed [gestellt] in the midst of the entirety of what is there <that is> revealed [enthüllt]. In the end, there continues to be [besteht] an essential distinction [Unterschied] between getting a grip on [Erfassen] the entirety of what is there and finding oneself [sich befinden] in the midst of what is there in its entirety [des Seienden im Ganzen].<sup>112</sup> In principle the former is impossible. <But> the latter happens all the time in our existence [Dasein]. Of course, it looks precisely as if we were holding fast to what is there of one sort or another in our everyday comings and goings, as though we were lost in this or that realm of what is there. But no matter how fragmented the daily round may seem, it always maintains what is there in the unity [Einheit] of the "entirety [Ganzes]," albeit in the shadows.<sup>113</sup> But even then and precisely just then, when we are not especially busy with things<sup>114</sup> this "in its entirety [im Ganzen]"<sup>115</sup> overcomes [überkommt] us; for example, in genuine boredom [Langeweile]. It [boredom] is a long way off when this or that book or play, job or leisure activity<sup>116</sup> is boring [langweilt]. It breaks out <,however,> when "it's boring [es einem langweilig ist]." Profound boredom, like a silent fog insinuating itself into the depths of existence, pulls things, others and oneself into it with an entirely remarkable indifference [Gleichgültigkeit]. Such boredom reveals what is there in its entirety [das Seiende im Ganzen].

Another possibility of such manifestation [Offenbarung] is vouchsafed by [birgt an] our joy in the present <sup>117</sup> of the existence—not merely the person—of someone we love.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> "Eine andere Möglichkeit solcher Offenbarung birgt die Freude an der Gegenwart des Daseins—nicht der bloßen Person—eines geliebten Menschen."

Being attuned [Bestimmtsein] in such a way that one "is [ist]" one way or another, we find ourselves [befinden] in the midst of what is there in its entirety [des Seienden im Ganzen]. Not only does the situational nature of mood [Befindlichkeit der Stimmung]<sup>118</sup> reveal in its own way what is there in its entirety, but far from being a mere incident [Vorkommnis] this revealing [Enthüllen] is at the same time the fundamental event [Grundgeschehen] of our *being*-there [Da-sein].

What we call our "feelings [Gefühle]," then, are neither the fleeting concomitant [Begleiterscheinung]<sup>119</sup> of our thinking and voluntary behavior [Verhalten], nor a mere causal impetus to such, nor even an actually present condition [vorhandener Zustand] with which we have to come to terms in some way. | {111}

Yet just when moods [Stimmungen] bring before us what is there in its entirety they hide [verbergen] from us the no-thing we are looking for. We are even less of the opinion than that the negation of what is there in its entirety revealed in a mood puts the no-thing before us [stelle uns vor].<sup>25</sup> That sort of thing could happen only in a correspondingly primordial [ursprünglich]<sup>120</sup> mood that makes manifest the no-thing as a revelation in the most proper sense <of the term>.

Does such a being attuned [Gestimmtsein] in which we are brought before the no-thing itself happen [geschieht] in human existence?

This happening [Geschehen] is possible and happens although only rarely and only for an instant in the fundamental mood [Grundstimmung] of dread [Angst]. In this sense, dread does not refer to the regularly occurring anxiety [Ängstlichkeit]

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Variant: Another possibility of such manifestation is the joy of the present of the existence—not merely the person—of a loved one.

<sup>25</sup> The reference is to scientific proposing and propositions [Vorstellungen].

which has its source in <the> fearfulness [Furchtsamkeit] that so easily appears in us. Dread is fundamentally different from fear [Furcht]. We are afraid of what is there that threatens us in one particular respect or other. In every case fear of . . . is also being afraid of something determinate [etwas Bestimmtes]. Since fear is circumscribed by an about-what [Wovor] and an of-what [Worum], one who is caught up in the frightening and frightful finds himself held captive by it. In striving to save himself from it—from this determinate <something>—one becomes unsure of himself with regard to everything else, that is, is "in a panic [kopflos]" about everything.

Dread does not give rise to such perplexity [Verwirrung]. On the contrary, an odd calm [Ruhe] pervades it. Dread is indeed always dread of . . . , but not of some determinate this or that. Dread of [vor]. . . is always dread about [um] . . . , but not about this or that. The indeterminateness [Unbestimmtheit] of and about what we are in dread is not about any lack of determinateness [Bestimmtheit] <of dread>, but rather about the essential impossibility of determinateness [Bestimmtheit] <of dread>. This becomes clear in the following familiar explanation [Auslegung].

In dread, we say, "It's scary [ist es einem unheimlich]." What do we mean by <the> "it [es]" and <the> "something [einem]"? We cannot say what <"it" is that> someone is scared about. There is something like this in <what is expressed by the phrase> "in its entirety [im Ganzen]."<sup>121</sup> All things [Dinge] and we ourselves sink into indifference.\*<sup>122</sup> Not in | {112} the sense of merely disappearing [Verschwinden], but rather in its very moving away [Wegrücken] it [what is there in its entirety] turns on [zu] us. This moving away [Wegrücken] of what is there in its entirety that closes in on [umdrängt] us in dread oppresses [bedrängt] us.<sup>123</sup> There's nothing left to hold on to.<sup>124</sup> This "nothing [kein]" is all that remains and <it> comes over us in the slipping away of what is there.



Dread makes evident the no-thing.<sup>26</sup>

We “are in limbo [schweben]” in dread.<sup>125</sup> More precisely, dread leaves us hanging because it brings on the slipping away [zum Entgleiten bringt] of what is there in its entirety. So it is that we alone—actual human beings [seienden Menschen]\*<sup>126</sup>—slip away [mitentgleiten] from ourselves in the midst of what is there. For, at bottom [im Grunde], this is not scary [unheimlich] “to you [dir]” or “to me [mir],” but rather it is like that “to someone [einem].” In the shuddering [Durchschütterung] of this limbo [Schweben] where one can hold onto nothing [an nichts halten kann] only *being*-there [das reine Da-sein] remains.\*<sup>127</sup>

Dread leaves us speechless [verschlägt uns das Wort].<sup>128</sup> Because what is there in its entirety slips away and the no-thing straightaway rushes in, every saying “is” [jedes “Ist“-Sagen] about it is silent in the face of it. That in the weirdness [Unheimlichkeit] of dread we frequently attempt to break the empty stillness with random chatter is only proof of <the> presence [Gegenwart] <of> the no-thing. That dread reveals [enthüllt] the no-thing is thus immediately confirmed when dread has eased up. While still fresh in our memory, in light of what we have seen we are forced to say that that about which and of which we were in dread was “really [eigentlich]”—nothing [nichts]. Indeed, the no-thing itself—as such—was there.\*<sup>129</sup>

In the fundamental mood [Grundstimmung] of dread we have reached the happening [Geschehen] of existence in which the no-thing is evident [offenbar ist] and from out of which [aus dem heraus] it must be questioned.<sup>130</sup>

How do things stand with the no-thing?<sup>27</sup> | {113}

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<sup>26</sup> “Der Angst offenbart das Nichts.”

## The Response to the Question

We have already given what for our purposes is at least at first the only essential [wesentlich] answer to our question, if we take care that the question about the no-thing has actually been posed. For this demands that we carry out the transformation [Verwandlung] of man\*<sup>131</sup> into his *being*-there that every instance of dread occasions in us in order to apprehend the no-thing manifest [offenkundig] in it\*<sup>132</sup> as it announces itself [sich bekunden]. At the same time ultimately the demand amounts to warding off characterizations of the no-thing that have not arisen from what is being claimed here.

The no-thing reveals itself in dread—but not as <an instance of> what is there. Just as little is it given as an object [Gegenstand]. Dread does not get a grasp of the no-thing.<sup>133</sup> Nevertheless, the no-thing is made manifest [offenbar] by it and in it, although again not as if the no-thing showed itself [zeigte sich] as separate "from [neben]" what is there in its entirety that is <there> in uncanniness [Unheimlichkeit].\*<sup>134</sup> Rather, we have said it so happens that the no-thing is at one with [in eins mit] what is there in its entirety.<sup>135</sup> What does this "at one with [in eins mit]" mean?\*<sup>136</sup>

In dread, what is there in its entirety becomes untenable [hinfällig]. In what sense does this happen? After all, what is there is not annihilated [vernichtet] so that the no-thing is left over. How could it be otherwise, since dread finds itself completely powerless in the face of what is there in its entirety. Moreover, the no-thing shows

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<sup>27</sup> "Wie steht es um das Nichts?" Variants: How is it with the no-thing? What's up with the nothing? How is the no-thing doing?

itself [bekundet sich] precisely with and in what is there as something that is slipping away in its entirety [im Ganzen].

No annihilation [Vernichtung] of all of [ganzen] that there is comes about in dread, although just as little do we carry out a negation of what is there in its entirety [im Ganzen] in order to reach the no-thing in the first place. Apart from the fact that explicitly making such a negative assertion [Aussage] is foreign to dread as such, we have always come | {114} too late with the very negation that is supposed to yield the no-thing. The no-thing has already happened.<sup>137</sup> As we have said, it happens "at one with [in eins mit]" what is there in its entirety that is slipping away.

There is found in dread a giving way in the face of . . . [Zurückweichen vor] that, admittedly, is not so much a fleeing [Fliehen] as a spellbound calm [gebannte Ruhe].<sup>138</sup> This back from . . . [Zurück vor . . .] takes its point of departure from [vom] the no-thing. It does not pull back from [zieht nicht auf] but is rather essentially dismissive [abweisend].<sup>139</sup> However, the rejection [Abweisung] as such is an expelling [Verweisen]<sup>140</sup> of what is there in its entirety that *lets* it slip out of one's grasp [entgleitenlassende]. The entire dismissive expulsion [abweisende Verweisung]\*<sup>141</sup> of what is there in its entirety that is slipping away [aufgleitende]—which is the way dread closes in on [umdrängt] existence—is the essence [Wesen] of the no-thing: nihilation [die Nichtung]. It is neither an annihilation [Vernichtung] of what is there nor does it arise out of [entspringt] some sort of negation [Verneinung]. Nor can nihilation be accounted for by annihilation or negation. The no-thing nihilates itself.\*<sup>142</sup>

Nihilating [Nichten] is not an occurrence [Vorkommnis] of some sort<sup>143</sup>, but rather as the dismissive expulsion of what is there in its entirety that is slipping away it reveals what is there in its full, previously obscured foreignness as the other-than *per se* [das schlechthin Andere] with regard to the no-thing.

In the bright night of dread's no-thing, the original openness of what is there as such surges up [ersteht] for the first time—that there is something and not no-thing [und nicht Nichts]. In adding "and not no-thing" we have not added an explanation [Erklärung], however, but rather <made possible> the predecessive potential [vorgängige Ermöglichung]\*<sup>144</sup> of the openness of what is there in general. The essence of the originally [ursprünglich] nihilating no-thing is found in this: it brings *being*-there [Da-sein] before [vor] \*<sup>145</sup> what is there in the first place.<sup>28</sup>

Only on the basis of the original overtness [Offenbarkeit] of the no-thing can the existence of human beings reach and | {115} get into what is there [auf Seiendes zugehen und eingehen]. However, if existence is in essence related to what is there—to what it is not and <to> what it itself is—existence as such comes from [kommt aus] the very no-thing that has already been made manifest.

*Being*-there [Da-sein] means\*<sup>146</sup> beholdenness [Hineingehaltenheit] to the no-thing.<sup>147</sup>

Beholden to\*<sup>148</sup> the no-thing, existence is already beyond [über . . . hinaus] what is there in its enitety. We call this being beyond [Hinaussein über] what is there transcendence [Transzendenz]. If existence were not in essence fundamentally transcending—which means, were it not already beholden to the no-thing—then it could not relate\*<sup>149</sup> itself to what is there and as a result not even to itself.

Without <the> original openness [Offenheit] of the no-thing, no being-a-self [Selbstsein] and no freedom.\*<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> In short, existence (existing) must be given priority to what is there (being) in the order of events. That is the message of Heidegger's fundamental ontology.

With that the answer to the question about the no-thing has been found. The no-thing is neither an object [Gegenstand] nor above all a be-ing [ein Seiendes]. The no-thing comes neither for itself nor along with what is there, which it depends upon all the same. The no-thing is the potentiality [Ermöglichung] for a overtness [Offenbarkeit] of what is there as something of some sort for [für]<sup>\*151</sup> human existence. The no-thing does not primarily provide the antithesis of what is there but is of the essence of an original coming about [gehört ursprünglich zum Wesen].<sup>\*152</sup> The nihilation of the no-thing happens [geschieht] in the be[ing]<sup>153</sup> of what is there.

But now, finally, we must articulate a reservation we have withheld so far. If existence relates itself to what is there only by being related in advance to the no-thing in order to be able to exist [existieren] and if the no-thing originally becomes manifest only in dread, must we not then remain permanently in limbo [schweben] in dread in order to be able to exist [existeieren] at all? <Yet> have we not already admitted that such original dread is rare? | {116} But above all all of us exist and relate ourselves to beings [Seiende] that we ourselves are not and those that we are—<and> without such dread. Is this <then> not an arbitrary finding and is the no-thing attributed to it <not> an exaggeration?

Yet what does it mean that this original dread happens only in rare instances? Nothing other than this [Nichts anderes]: the no-thing is at first and for the most part disguised [verstellt] in its originality [Ursprünglichkeit]. But how? By our getting lost [verlieren] in certain ways in what is there. The more we turn to what is there in our dealings [Umtrieben] the less we let what is there as such slip away [entgleiten] <and> the more we turn away from [kehren ab] the no-thing. Thus are we all the more certainly forced into the public superficialities [Oberfläche] of existence.

And yet within certain limits this permanent albeit ambiguous aversion [Abkehr] to the no-thing is in accord with its inherent sense [Sinn]. The no-thing in its nihilating

refers us precisely to what is there.\*<sup>154</sup> The no-thing nihilates without fail [unausgesetzt]<sup>155</sup> but without our really knowing about this event [Geschehen] in the sense of the kind of knowing that helps us get by on a day to day basis.

What gives more urgent evidence of the permanent and extensive, albeit disguised overtness of the no-thing in our existence than negation? This, however, does not at all draw the Not [das Nicht] out of itself as a medium of differentiation and opposition in order as it were to force itself into the midst of what is given [Gegebenen]. Moreover, how should negation draw the Not out of itself if it can negate only when something negatable [ein Verneinbares] is given [vorgegeben ist].<sup>156</sup> But how could something negatable and what is do the negating [das Zuverneinendes] be seen [erblickt] as something not-like [ein Nichthaftes] were it not that all thinking as such already looks ahead [vorblickt] to the Not?<sup>157</sup> But the Not can become manifest only if its origin [Ursprung] the nihilating of the no-thing in general and with it the no-thing itself is brought out of hiddenness [Verborgenheit]. The Not does not arise in negation but rather negation bases itself [gründet sich] on | {117} the Not\*<sup>158</sup> that comes of [entspringt] the nihilating of the no-thing. But negation is also only one means of nihilating, that is to say, only one form that the behavior [Verhalten] based in advance on the nihilating of the no-thing takes.

In this way the above thesis has been demonstrated in its basic features: the no-thing is the origin of negation, not the other way around. In the realm of the question of the no-thing and of *be[ing]* if the power of the intellect is thus breached [gebrochen wird], at the same time the fate of the dominance of "logic"\*<sup>159</sup> within philosophy is then decided. The idea of "logic" itself dissolves in the whirlpool [Wirbel] of a more original questioning.

But now no matter how often or in how many ways negation permeates all thinking, whether explicitly or not, by no means can it be the only fully valid means of

the overtness of the no-thing that belongs essentially to existence. For negation cannot be termed either the sole or even the leading manner [Verhalten] of nihilating in which existence is shaken up [durchschüttert] by the nihilating of the no-thing. More profound even than the mere propriety of rational negation is the harshness of disruption [Entgegenhandelns] and the shrillness of loathing [Verabscheuens]. The pain of failure [Versagens] and the mercilessness of prohibition are more responsible. The harshness of deprivation [Entbehrens] is more oppressive.

These possibilities of nihilating behavior—powers by means of which existence supports its givenness [Geworfenheit] even without mastering it<sup>160</sup>—are not means of mere negating [Verneinens]. But that does not prevent them from speaking out [auszusprechen] in the “No!” [im Nein] and in negation. Indeed, the emptiness and extent of negation betray themselves for the first time in these <possibilities>. That existence is pervaded by nihilating behavior attests to the permanent and doubtlessly obscured overtness of the no-thing that dread originally reveals [enthüllt]. But this means original dread is suppressed [niedergehalten] for the most part in existence. Dread is there. It is only napping.<sup>29</sup> Its breath permanently trembles in existence, | {118} only slightly in what makes us “jittery” [das “ängstliche”] and inaudibly in the “Uh huh!” [“Ja Ja”] and “Hüh uh!” [“Nein Nein”] of those who are busy <but> most readily in the reserved <and>, surest of all, at the heart of existence that is daring [verwagene]. But this happens only in those for whom it expends itself [sich verschwendet] in order to preserve the ultimate greatness [Größe] of existence.

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<sup>29</sup> “Die Angst ist da. Sie schläfft nur.” One thinks of the phrase “Die Zeit ist da”: “The time has come” or “Now’s the time.” Variant: Dread has come. It is merely sleeping.

For the daring [Verwegenen] dread is not the antithesis [Gegenstellung] of joy or even the comfortable pleasures of quiet busyness. It shares a secret bond with the cheerfulness and mildness of creative yearning.

Original dread can awaken [erwachen] in existence at any moment. It does not need wakening [Weckung] by an unusual event [Ereignis] for that. The depth of its sway [Waltens] corresponds to the scarcity of its possible occasioning [Veranlassung].<sup>161</sup> It is permanently on the verge [zum Spring] and yet only seldom comes into play to hold us in suspense.<sup>162</sup>

Beholdenness of existence to the no-thing on the basis of hidden dread makes man the custodian [Platzhalter] of the no-thing.<sup>30</sup> We are so finite [endlich] that we are not even able to bring ourselves face to face with the no-thing by our own will and resolve. So deep is mortality buried [abgründig gräbt] in our existence that it denies our freedom its most proper and deepest finality [Endlichkeit].

Beholdenness of existence to the no-thing on the basis of hidden dread is the surmounting [Übersteigen] of what is there in its entirety—transcendence [Transzendenz].

Our question about the no-thing should lead us to metaphysics itself. The term “metaphysics” stems from the Greek μετὰ τὰ φυσικά. This remarkable phrase was later interpreted to be the indication of a questioning that goes μετὰ--*trans*—“beyond [über]” what is there as such.

Metaphysics is an asking “beyond [über]” what is there in order to get at it as it is and in its entirety for our comprehension [Begreifen].

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<sup>30</sup> Grimm glosses *Platzhalter* with *choragus* [chorus leader] and *praesultor* [lead dancer] with their associations to Greek theatre.



Such going "beyond" what is there as what is there as in its entirety | {119} happens [geschieht] in the question about the no-thing. In this way it is shown to be a "metaphysical" question. At the outset, we gave questions of this kind a twofold character: <first, that> every metaphysical question comprehends the entirety of metaphysics all at once. <And, second, that> in every metaphysical question, questioning existence [das fragende Dasein] is therewith also taken up in the question.<sup>163</sup>

To what extent does the question about the no-thing take hold of [durchgreift] and encompass [umspannt] the entirety of metaphysics?

From of old metaphysics has spoken of itself with the admittedly ambiguous proposition *ex nihilo nihil fit* [nothing comes from nothing], no-thing is from no-thing [aus Nichts wird Nichts]. Even though the no-thing itself never becomes a problem, the proposition is nonetheless explicated on the basis of the prevailing view [Hinblick] of the no-thing. Ancient metaphysics takes the no-thing to mean what is not anything [das Nichtseienden] at a given time, that is, unformed matter [ungestalteten Stoffes] that cannot turn itself into something formed and, accordingly, the appearance [Aussehen] (εἶδος) of something being there is [den Seienden]. What is actual [seiend] is a self-forming shape [sich bildende Gebilde] that appears as <something> pictured (<a> view <of something>) [im Bilde (Anblick)]. <The> origin, law and limits of this view of be[ing] [Seinsauffassung] are as little discussed as the no-thing itself. Christian dogmatics denies the truth of the proposition *ex nihilo nihil fit* and as a result gives it another meaning [Bedeutung] in the sense [Sinn] of the complete absence [Abwesenheit] of what is there that is other than divine [außergöttlichen]: *ex nihilo fit* [from nothing comes]—*ens creatum* [<a> created thing].<sup>164</sup> Here the no-thing is the antithesis of what <there is that> is authentic [eigentlich], of the *summum ens* [the highest being], of God as *ens increatum* [<the>

uncreated being]. Here again the explanation [Auslegung] of the no-thing points to [zeigt an] a fundamental view of what is there. The metaphysical discussion of what is there remains on the same level as the question about the no-thing. Both questions—about *be[ing]* and <about> the no-thing as such—remain unasked. Thus there is thus never any concern about the difficulty that if God creates out of no-thing [aus dem Nichts schafft] he must <also> be able to relate to the no-thing. But if God is God, he is unable to not know the no-thing, assuming that at the same time "the absolute" [das "Absolute"] excludes all nullity [Nichtigkeit]. | {120}

This simple historical reminder marks [zeigt] the no-thing as the antithesis of what is there that is authentic [das eigentlich Seienden], that is, as its negation. But when the no-thing somehow becomes a problem this contrast [Gegenverhältnis] does not merely undergo some sort of more meaningful [deutlichere] determination but rather awakens for the first time an authentically metaphysical posing of the question about the *be[ing]* of what is there. The no-thing does not remain the indeterminate opposite of what is there but rather makes itself manifest as belonging to the *be[ing]* of what is there.

"Sheer *be[ing]* and sheer no-thing are [ist] the same." This proposition of Hegel's (*Science of Logic*) is correct.<sup>165</sup> Seen from the perspective of Hegel's concept of thinking, *be[ing]* and the no-thing belong together, not because both of them agree in their indeterminacy and immediacy<sup>166</sup>, however, <but> rather because *be[ing]* itself is in essence finite and is revealed only in the transcendence of existence afforded by the no-thing [in das Nichts hinausgehaltenen Daseins].

Because the question about *be[ing]* as such is also the comprehensive question of metaphysics, the question about the no-thing is shown to be one that encompasses the entirety of metaphysics. At the same time, however, the question about the no-thing takes hold of [durchgreift] the entirety of metaphysics insofar as it

forces us to face the problem of the origin of negation, that is, to face what is fundamentally a decision about the legitimate dominance of "logic"<sup>167</sup> in metaphysics.

The old proposition *ex nihilo nihil fit* [nothing comes from nothing] has another sense that happens to speak to the problem of *be[ing]* and goes like this: *ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit* [Everything there is as what is there comes from no-thing].<sup>168, 31</sup> What is there in its entirety first comes into its own [kommt erst . . . zu sich selbst] in accordance with its very own possibility, that is, only in the no-thing of existence.<sup>169</sup> If it is <a> metaphysical <question>, then to what extent has the very question about the no-thing implicated [hineingenommen] our questioning existence? We note that as currently experienced our existence is determined essentially by science. If our existence as posed in the question | {121} about the no-thing is determined in this way, then it must have become questionable in the question itself.

Scientific existence [wissenschaftliche Dasein] acquires its simplicity and aptness [Schärfe] from being related in a marvelous way to what is there itself and to it alone. Science would like to dismiss the no-thing with a wave of the hand. But it soon becomes obvious that scientific existence is possible as such only because it is beholden beforehand to the no-thing. It therefore first understands itself as what it is when it does not abandon the no-thing. The presumed seriousness and superiority of science becomes laughable [Lächerlichkeit] if it does not take the no-thing seriously. Only because the no-thing is obvious <to it> can science make what is there an object of study. Only if science grows out of [existiert aus]<sup>170</sup> metaphysics can it prevail ever afresh in its essential task, which consists not in the accumulation and

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<sup>31</sup> Variant: Everything that is happening comes from nothing.

classification of knowledge but rather in an always fresh ongoing development [Erschliessung] of the entire expanse [Raum] of the truth of nature and history.

Only because the no-thing is manifest [offenbar] at the heart of [im Grunde] existence can the full strangeness [Befremdlichkeit] of what is there come over us [bedrängt]. Only if the strangeness of what is there impresses us does it waken us and open us up to wonder [Verwunderung]. Only on the basis of wonder, that is, the openness [Offenheit] of the no-thing, does the "Why?" come up [entspringt]. Only because the "Why?" as such is possible can we ask about in a determinate way about and establish [begründen] the basics [Gründen]. Only because we can ask and given reasons for [ergründen] is the fate our life in the hands of scientists.

The question about the no-thing puts us, the questioners, into question. It is a metaphysical one.

Human existence can relate to what is there only if it is itself beholden to the no-thing. Going above and beyond what is there is of the essence of existence.<sup>171</sup> This going beyond, however, is metaphysics itself. That is how metaphysics belongs to "the nature of man" [zur "Natur des Menschen"].<sup>172</sup> It is neither a branch | {122} of academic philosophy nor a field [Feld] of scattered notions [willkürlicher Einfälle]. Metaphysics is the basic happening of existence. It is existence itself.<sup>32</sup> Because the

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<sup>32</sup> "Die Metaphysik ist das Grundgeschehen im Dasein. Sie ist das Dasein selbst." Nearing the conclusion of his address in 1929, Heidegger brings together his topic (metaphysics) and the fundamental term (Dasein). Metaphysics is the basic outcome of existing. In German, one commonly asks "Was ist geschehen?": What's [what has] happened? What's [what is] up? Awkwardly literal: What has come about? Given the auxiliary very *sein* used with the verb *geschehen*, the latter (What's

truth of metaphysics dwells [wohnt] in this unfathomable ground [abgründigen Grunde] it has about it the ever-lurking possibility of deepest error about what is in closest proximity <to it>. Hence, no strictness [Strenge] of any science attains the seriousness of metaphysics. Philosophy can never be measured by the yardstick of the idea of science.

Because the question about the no-thing that we have gone into here has at the same time asked about us we have not brought metaphysics in from the outside. Nor have we just "changed" <our> position [in die "versetzt"]. We cannot reposition [versetzen] ourselves because since we exist [existieren], we are [steht] already within [in] it. φύσει γάρ, ὧ φίλε, ἔνεστί τις φιλοσοφία τῆ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ (Plato,

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up?) is probably preferable as a translation since it focuses in the present. As a plural noun, *Geschehen* homely denotes "goings on," "occurrences," and "happenings"—not a singular event such as an epiphany or visitation. This intransitive verb *appears* to be the past participle of a verb derived from the proto-Indoeuropean \*(s)kek- or \*(s)keg- , meaning "run" or "jump", and in that sense puts the emphasis in on what has "just happened" (both in the moment and without explanation) but has consequences. To the question: "Where did this come from?" the answer is "It just happened!" inexplicable and yet somehow not unfamiliar. Unexpected yet welcome, it sprang up, much as water breaks through the earth, bubbles up, and is the wellspring of a stream (for example, near Donaueschingen, where the Ister (Danube) River has its sources). There is much ado here about because making existence equivalent to the impulse to philosophize as it inevitably wells up in human beings. The basic sense seems to be one of something happening *to* existence in an ongoing way: "in the event" (in that case), existence; otherwise, no existence.

*Phaedrus* 279a).<sup>173</sup> [Heidegger translates:] Insofar as humans exist [existiert] philosophizing happens [geschieht] in a certain way. Philosophy, as we call it, is all about getting metaphysics off the ground [das In-Gang-bringen der Metaphysik] by <means of> which it comes into its own and is up to its particular task.<sup>\*174</sup> Philosophy gets going only [kommt nur in Gang] by a unique upsurge [Einsprung] of one's own way of life in the basic possibilities of existence in its entirety [Dasein im Ganzen]. Decisive for this upsurge is, first of all, clearing space [Raumgeben] for what is there in its entirety [das Seiende im Ganzen]; next, letting oneself loose in the no-thing [das Sichloslassen in das Nichts], that is, becoming free of the idols [Götzen] that each of us has and are in the habit of losing our way among [wegzuschleichen]; <and> finally, allowing for the full range [Ausschwingenlassen] of this twisting [Schwebens] so that it constantly turns back to [zurückschwingt] the basic question of metaphysics that the no-thing itself forces on [erzwingt] us: Why after all is anything <there> at all and not rather no-thing?<sup>175</sup>

## EPILOGUE TO "WHAT IS METAPHYSICS? (1943; 1949)"<sup>176</sup>

{303} The question "*What is metaphysics?*" remains a question. The following epilogue is <, however,> much more an initial foreword [Vorwort] for those who persist with the question. The question "What is metaphysics?" inquires beyond [über hinaus] metaphysics. It arises from [entspringt] thinking that has already gone about overturning metaphysics. It is of the nature of such transitions [Übergänge] that within certain limits they must speak the language of what they are helping to overturn [überwinden]. The particular occasion of the discussion <in 1929> of the question about the nature [Wesen] of metaphysics must not mislead us to take the view that this question is raised by the sciences. Modern research is involved in other ways of formulating [Vorstellen] and with other means of establishing [Herstellen] what is there as the basic feature [Grundzug] of its truth, according to which all that is there is marked by the will to will [den Willen zum Willen] whose prototype appears as the "will to power." Understood as the fundamental feature of the beingness [Seiendheit] of what is there, "will" makes what is there the equivalent of actualization [Wirklichung] in such a way that the actuality [Wirklichkeit] of realization is authorized by the unconditional feasibility [Machbarkeit] of constant reification [Vergegenständlichung]. Modern science neither serves the purpose first given to it nor searches for some "truth in itself [Wahrheit an sich]." As a means of the calculating [rechnenden] reification of what is there, however, it is the self-positing condition of the will to will by means of which in essence it [modern science] safeguards its own sovereignty. But because all reification of what is there arises by way of the acquisition [Beschaffung] and securing [Sicherheit] | {304} of what is there and acquires the possibilities of its own progress from this, reification sticks to what is there and even takes what is there for *be[ing]*. All relating to what is there thus

attests to a knowing [Wissen] about *be[ing]*, but at the same time to the inability to stand by [stehen aus] the law [Gesetz]\*<sup>177</sup> of the truth of its thinking. Such truth is the truth about what is there. Metaphysics is the history of this truth. It speaks of [sagt] what is there while at the same time making the be-ingness of what is there into a concept [Begriff]. Metaphysics thinks *be[ing]* as the be-ingness of what is there but, given its way of thinking, without being able to think about the truth of *be[ing]*. Metaphysics always moves in the ambit [Bereich] of truth, which metaphysically speaking continues to be its unknowingly unproven basis [unbekannte unbegründete Grund]. However, given not only that what is there stems from *be[ing]* [dem Sein entstammt] but also, and more originally still, that *be[ing]* itself is buried [ruht] deep within its truth and the truth of *be[ing]* comes about [west] as the *be[ing]* of truth, then the question is necessarily <about> what the basis [in ihren Grunde] of metaphysics is. This question must be thought metaphysically and at the same time from the ground [aus dem Grund] of metaphysics, that is, no longer thought metaphysically. Such a question is in an essential sense ambiguous [wesentlichen Sinne zweideutig].

For this reason every attempt to follow the train of thought [Gedankenlag] of the lecture will come up against obstacles. That's good. In that way, questioning becomes more genuine [echt]. Every genuine question is already the bridge to its response [Antwort]. Essential [wesentliche] responses are invariably only the last step of the question. But that <step> cannot be taken without a long series of initial and subsequent steps. An essential response draws its support [Tragkraft] from the urgency [Inständigkeit] of the question. An essential response is only the beginning of a responsibility [Verantwortung]. With <such responsibility> questioning first comes to [erwacht] in a more original way.<sup>178</sup> For this reason, too, a genuine question is not done away with [aufgehoben] by finding a response <to it>.



Obstacles to following the thought [Mitdenken] of the lecture are of two kinds. One sort arises from a riddle that is | {305} concealed [verbergen] in the sphere of what is thought in it [des hier Gedachten]. The other comes of the inability and frequently also an unwillingness to think [Unwillen zum Denken]. In the sphere of thoughtful inquiry, even passing considerations [Bedenken] can help out now and again, particularly those that are very carefully considered [überlegten]. Grossly mistaken views may also bear fruit even when aimed as blind attacks. Only pondering [Nachdenken] can restore to everything the composure [Gelassenheit] of patient meditation [Besinnung].

The prevailing misgivings [Bedenken] and mistaken views about the lecture can be organized in terms of three main claims:

1. The lecture makes <the> "no-thing" the sole object [Gegenstand]<sup>33</sup> of metaphysics. But since <no-thing> is the null and void pure and simple [das Nichtige] such thinking leads to the view that everything comes to nothing [alles sei nichts]<sup>34</sup> so that it is not worthwhile either to live or to die. Such a "philosophy of <the> no-thing" is full-blown "nihilism [Nihilismus]."

2. The lecture elevates an occasional and even depressing mood to being the sole fundamental mood [Grundstimmung]. But since dread is the psychological condition of "those who are anxious" and cowards, such thinking precludes the high-spirited mien of courage [Tapferkeit]. Such a "philosophy of dread [Angst]" cripples all willingness to act [Willen zur Tat].

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<sup>33</sup> Here *Gegenstand* means both the object of metaphysics—which it is directed toward—and its subject matter or topic.

<sup>34</sup> Variant: . . . all is for naught . . .

3. The lecture speaks out against "logic." But since the intellect [Verstand] contains standards of calculating [Rechnen] and ordering [Ordnung], such thinking consigns judgements about truth to some random mood. Such a "philosophy of mere feelings [Gefühls]" endangers "exact [exakt]" thinking and confidence in action [Sicherheit des Handelns].

A proper attitude toward these claims comes of a renewed thinking through [Durchdenken] of the lecture. It must be shown whether in its essence [Wesen] the no-thing accords with [stimmt] dread, expending itself in the empty negation [Verneinung] of all that there is, or whether what never is and is in no way what is there unveils [entschleiert] itself as what distinguishes itself from everything that there is, which we call *be[ing]*. No matter where or to what extent all research scrutinizes [absuchen] what is there, nowhere does it find *be[ing]*. It always meets up with [trifft] | {306} nothing other than [nur] what is there, because for the purposes of its explanation [Erklärungen] it insists on what is there. *Be[ing]*, however, has nothing of the actual character of what is there to give to it. *Be[ing]* does not lend itself to be objectively represented [vorstellen] or established [herstellen] as does what is there. This other [Andere]\*<sup>179</sup> to all that is there *per se* is what is not-there [Nicht-Seiende]. But this no-thing [Nichts]\*<sup>180</sup> comes about [west] as *be[ing]*. We call off thinking too hastily if we give the mere null and void [Nichtige] as an easier explanation of the no-thing and equate it with the unreal [Wesenlosen]. Instead of such eagerness to give in to empty cleverness and to abandon the puzzling ambiguity of the no-thing, we must arm ourselves with single-minded readiness [Bereitschaft] for experiencing the vastness of what in the no-thing gives warrant [die Gewähr]\*<sup>181</sup> to what is there of any sort. That is *be[ing]* itself. Without *be[ing]*, whose unfathomable [abgründig] but still undisplayed [unentfaltetes] nature [Wesen] delivers over [zuschickt] the no-thing to us in essential dread, all that there is would remain <in a state of> beinglessness

[in der Seinlosigkeit]. But as the abandonment of *be[ing]* this in turn is not a void nothing [ein nichtiges Nicht] assuming that something else belongs to the truth of *be[ing]* that never [nie] †<sup>182</sup>, \*<sup>183</sup> comes about [west] as \*<sup>184</sup> *be[ing]* \*<sup>185</sup> without what is there, <i.e.,> that nowhere [niemals] †<sup>186</sup> what is there is [ein Seiendes ist] without *be[ing]*.

An experience [Erfahrung] of *be[ing]* as what is other than all that there is bestowed [geschenkt] in<sup>35</sup> dread, provided that out of “dread [Angst]” in the face of dread, that is, in mere anxiousness [Ängstlichkeit] in the face of fear [Furcht] we do not evade the silent\*<sup>187</sup> voice that attunes us to the terror of the unfathomable [Abgrund]. | {307} Admittedly, if with this hint about essential dread we wilfully abandon the train of thought of the lecture, <that is,> if we absolve dread of having any voice [Stimme] in that determinate mood [gestimmte Stimmung] related to the no-thing, <then> we are left with dread as an isolated “feeling [Gefühl],” one among others in that familiar assortment of psychologically observed mental states [Seelenzustände] that we can distinguish and analyze. Making the easy distinction [Unterschied] between “above” and “below” allows us to allocate “moods” to the class of those that are uplifting [erhebenden] or those that are debasing [niederziehenden]. The avid hunting for “types [Typen]” and “countertypes [Gegentypen]” of “feelings” <and> for the bounty of varieties and subspecies of these “types” is never over. Such anthropological probing [Beforschen] of man therefore always rules out any possibility of following the train of thought of the lecture, since from an attentiveness [Achtsamkeit] to the voice [Stimme] of *be[ing]* it goes into the attuning [Stimmen] of this voice [Stimme] that claims [in den Anspruch nimmt] man

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<sup>35</sup> Heidegger suggests that an experience of *be[ing]* “gets to” [zugeschenkt] us. It grabs us, gets under our skin, takes hold of us.

so that in his essence [in seinem Wesen] he learns to experience *be[ing]* in the no-thing.

Readiness for dread is "saying 'Yes'" to the urgency to fulfill the highest claim [Anspruch] by which man's essence [Wesen] is affected. Called by the voice of *be[ing]* in the midst of all that is only man experiences the wonder of all wonders: *that something is there [daß Seiendes ist].*<sup>188</sup> Therefore what in its essence [Wesen] is called to the truth of *be[ing]* is always determined in an essential way along with it.<sup>189</sup> Outright courage for essential dread guarantees the mysterious possibility of the experience of *be[ing]*. For close to essential dread as terror of the unfathomable [des Abgrundes] dwells [wohnt] awe [Scheu]. It sheds light on and looks after every area [Ortschaft] of man's nature in which he is at home with what is lasting.

On the other hand, "dread" about dread can be an aberration so that it misjudges the simple relations [Bezüge] that are of the essence [Wesen] of dread. What would all courage avail if it did not find its permanent bearings in the experience of essential dread? | {308} To the degree that we disparage essential dread and what in it sheds light on the relation of *be[ing]* to man, we degrade the essence of courage. But this makes it possible to endure the no-thing [das Nichts auszustehen].<sup>190</sup> In the abyss [Abgrund] of terror courage recognizes the scarcely traversed space [Raum] of *be[ing]* in the light of which [aus dessen Lichtung] what is there of any sort first returns to that in which it is [ist] and can be [zu sein mag]. The lecture neither pursues a "philosophy of dread [Angstphilosophie]" nor seeks to give the false impression of an "heroic philosophy [heroischen Philosophie]." It only thinks what from the start Western thinking has continued to work out but has nonetheless forgotten as what is to be thought [das zu Denkende]: *be[ing]*. But *be[ing]* is not a product [Erzeugnis] of thinking. To be sure, essential thinking is instead an eventuality [Ereignis] of *be[ing]*.

But of necessity the scarcely articulated question now comes up whether there is as yet any law about the truth of this thinking when it merely follows the thinking that "logic" with its forms and rules constitutes. Why is this term placed in scare quotes [Anführungsstriche] in the lecture? It is to suggest that "logic" is only *one* explanation [Auslegung] of the nature [Wesen] of thinking and in fact, as the term [Namen] suggests, one that is based on an experience [Erfahrung] of *be[ing]* already attained by Greek thought. The suspicion about "logic" that is attested to by the logical degeneracy [Ausartung] of logistics [Logistik] derives from knowledge [Wissen] about thinking that has its source not in consideration [Betrachtung] of the objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit] of what is there but in the experience of the truth of *be[ing]*. Exact [exakte] thinking is never the most rigorous [strengste] thinking if the rigor [Strenge] has its essence [Wesen] elsewhere than in the kind of effort [Anstrengung] with which knowledge actually maintains its relation [Bezug] to what is essential to what is there. Exact thinking merely commits itself to reckoning with [Rechnen mit] what is there and serves that end exclusively.

All calculating [Rechnen] sees to it that the countable [Zählbare] is worked out in what is counted [Gezählten] in order to make use of it in subsequent counting [Zählung].<sup>191</sup> Calculating does not allow anything but the countable to come up [aufkommen].<sup>36</sup> All that "counts" is what it counts [zählt].<sup>37</sup> Time and again what is

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<sup>36</sup> The verb *aufkommen* can also mean "bear the cost of." The following section refers to a kind of thinking that is related to an overriding interest in money and material exchanges.

<sup>37</sup> "Jegliches ist nur das, was es zählt." Variant: All that matters is what it measures and submits to arithmetic manipulation. Heidegger will contrast calculative thinking with meditative thinking. In the so-called experimental social sciences

counted safeguards [sichert] the progress of counting [Zählen]. This progressively uses up [verbraucht] numbers [Zahlen] and is | {309} itself a continual self-consumption [Sichverzehren]. The working out of an accounting [Rechnung] for what is there counts as [gilt als] an explanation [Erklärung] of its be[ing]. Calculating makes use in advance of all that is there as the countable and uses up what is counted in the counting [Zählung]. This consuming use [verbrauchende Gebrauch] of what is there gives away the all-consuming [verzehrende] character of the accounting [Rechnung]. Only because number [Zahl] is reproducible *ad infinitum* and indiscriminately (whether in the direction of <what is> greater or <what is> less) can it conceal the all-consuming nature [Wesen] of the accounting behind its products [Produkten] and lend the appearance of productivity [Produktivität] to calculative [rechnenden] thinking, with the effect that in an anticipatory way and not primarily with respect to its later results it gives importance to all that is there [alles Seiende] <but> only in the form of what is available [Beistellbaren] and consumable [Verzehrlichen]. In accord with its method of logical consistency calculative thinking

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(psychology especially) all that comes up for consideration is what can be measured. Measurement implies standard units of measurement to which what is being measured must submit and be fitted. Only what can be rendered in quantitative terms is deemed admissible for study. This positivistic perspective is mistakenly said to have originated with Wilhelm Wundt, who is credited with having established the first laboratory for the study of what he assured his readers were a small number of features of human psychological life. See Sigmund Koch and David E. Leary (eds.), *A Century of Psychology as Science*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985. Heidegger's *analytique* [Analytik] of existence was fundamental to a subsequent critique of this view of psychology which has persisted for the most part in forms of behaviorism.

is itself constrained [zwingt sich selbst] in bondage [Zwang] to the mastering of everything. It cannot foresee that before being worked out in various ways as sums [Summen] and products [Produkten] <sup>38</sup> everything that is computable [alles Berechenbare] in <such> accounting is already an entirety [ein Ganzes] whose unity [Einheit] indeed belongs to the noncomputable [das Unberechenbar] and its uncanniness [Unheimlichkeit] which eludes the clutches of accounting. However, what has everywhere and always already closed itself off from any suggestion [Ansinnen] of computation [Berechnung] and yet at any given moment is nonetheless always closer to humans in its puzzling indecipherability than any instance of what is there in which they and their projects are instituted from time to time can attune [stimmen] the essence [Wesen] of man to a <kind of> thinking whose truth no "logic [Logik]" is capable of apprehending [zu fassen vermag]. Thinking [Denken] whose thoughts [Gedanken] not only cannot be calculated [rechnen] but are above all determined by what is other than what is there we call essential thinking [wesentliche Denken].<sup>192</sup> Instead of calculating [rechnen] what is there with what is there, it expends itself [verschwendet es sich] in *be[ing]* [im Sein] for the sake of the truth of *be[ing]*.<sup>193</sup> Such thinking responds to the claim <on them> [Anspruch] of *be[ing]* when humans put their historical nature [Wesen] in the hands of [übereinantwortet] what is quite simply [Einfachen] the sole necessity [einzige Not], <one> that does not coerce [die nicht nötigt] as it compels but creates a need [Not] that is fulfilled in the freedom of sacrifice [Opfer].<sup>194</sup> What | {310} is needed [Die Not ist] is that the truth of *be[ing]* be respected [gewahrt wird] no matter what may happen to humans and all

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<sup>38</sup> Here Heidegger is playing on the schoolchild's learning about sums [Summen], differences [Differenzen], products [Produkten] and quotients [Quotienten].

that is there [allem Seienden]. The sacrifice is relieved of any compulsion [Zwang] since it arises from unfathomable freedom, <a sacrifice> that is an extravagance [Verschwendung] of the essence of humans [Menschenwesens] for the sake of safeguarding [Wahrung] the truth [Wahrheit] of *be[ing]* with respect to [für] what is there. In sacrifice a hidden thanks [Dank]<sup>39</sup> comes to pass [ereignet sich] that alone pays respect to the graciousness [Huld] *be[ing]* itself has conveyed [übereignet hat] to the essence of humans in thinking so that they may assume guardianship [Wächterschaft] over *be[ing]* in their relation [Bezug] to *be[ing]*. Incipient thinking†<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> The verbs *denken* ([to] think) and *danken* ([to] thank) derive from the same primordial root (*tong-* or *teng-*) which means both “to feel” as “to think.” This is a pair of words that meet in the word *thanc*, which is common to both Old English and Proto-Germanic. It is a rare place where reflection of the kind Heidegger carries out on fundamental words can be seen in English. Heidegger returns to a meditation on the word [Wort] in his final course (1951-52), published as *Was heißt Denken?* (GA 8). The sense of *Dank* is “thanks” (as in “thanks to . . .”), that is, with gratitude for but also in remembrance of, in consideration of, keeping in mind, and much more. From a genuinely psychological point of view, *Dank* confounds the distinctions among the classic functions created by modern empirical psychology (feeling, remembering, thinking). A “thank” is a favorable thought, an expression of graciousness, grace and favor. The OED gives the word ‘thought’ as the first (now obsolete) meaning of ‘thank’. In the late 17th century it was glossed by one writer, Isaac Barrow, with χάρις (thanks). Barrow refers is to Aristotle, who on “being asked . . . What doth the soonest grow old? Replied, χάρις, Thanks.”



is the echo [Widerhall] of the favor [Gunst]<sup>40</sup> of *be[ing]* in which what is unique [das Einzige] illuminates [lichtet] and lets†<sup>196</sup> come to pass [sich ereignet läßt]\*<sup>197</sup> that what is there *is* [daß Seiende ist] [emphasis added]. This echo is the human response [menschliche Antwort] to the utterance [das Wort]<sup>41</sup> of the silent voice of *be[ing]*. Thinking's response†<sup>198</sup> is the origin [Ursprung] of human utterances [menschlichen Wortes], utterances that allow language to be put into words [in die Wörter] for the first time in the vocalization [Verlautung] of <an> utterance [das Wort].

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<sup>40</sup> In the following passage Heidegger explores the image of a kindness or favor extended to human beings by *be[ing]* to which they reply with an acknowledgement, a "Thank you!", a note of "thanks." This favor [*Gunst*] comes in the form of *Huld*, a graciousness that has the sense of an excess or overflow "gifted" (afforded) man. He also characterizes thinking as the echo of such a favor, an audible giving back of the human form of *Huld*, thinking.

<sup>41</sup> Heidegger's understanding of the word *Wort* distinguishes between *Worte* (fundamental words) and *Wörter* (terms or vocabulary). In German, *Wort* also denotes the part of speech "verb." The etymology of this word (from \**wrh d-*, the root or sprout from which a plant grows to its fully developed structure) suggests the relation of all words to their roots. A root word has the significance of an utterance, an originative, procreative first speaking (originally, a disclosing) that may later congeal in the terms comprising a vocabulary that populate the dictionary entries representing a natural language. For Heidegger, all verbs are transitive, especially *sein*. This has been forgotten and is perhaps the meaning of his regular restatement that the forgotten sense of *be[ing]* is basic to his impulse to philosophize. On utterances and words, see my *Translating Heidegger*, Amherst: Humanity Books, 1997 (second edition, University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2017).

Were there not at times [zuzeiten] <such> hidden thinking [Denken]<sup>†199</sup> at the heart of the nature of historical man [im Wesensgrunde des geschichtlichen Menschen], he would never be subsequently capable of thanking [Danken]<sup>†200</sup>, assuming that in any consideration [Bedenken] and every expression of thanks [Bedanken] <sup>†201</sup> there must still be a thinking [Denken] of what<sup>42</sup> originally thinks [denkt] the truth of *be[ing]*. But how else could humanity [Menschentum] ever find its way to original thanking [Danken], were it not that by way of an outspoken harmony [offenen Bezug] with it the favor of *be[ing]* grants [gewährt] humans the nobility of <that> poverty in which the freedom of sacrifice grants the riches of its nature [Wesen]? Sacrifice is taking leave of what is there in order to be on course to safeguarding [Wahrung] the favor of *be[ing]*. Sacrifice can be prepared for and helped along by working at and accomplishing things but <is> never fulfilled by such things. Its consummation [Vollzug] originates in the urgency with which every historical | {311} human being [Mensch] in acting—and essential thinking is also action [Handeln]—is true to [bewahrt] <the> existence it has attained [erlangt] for the safeguarding [Wahrung] of the dignity [Würde] of *be[ing]*. This urgency is an equanimity [Gleichmut] that will not let anything challenge [anfechten] the concealed readiness to let go of the leave-taking [abschiedlich] essence [Wesen] of every sacrifice. Sacrifice is rooted

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<sup>42</sup> Variant: . . . in any consideration and every expression of thanks there must still be thought of *who* originally thinks the truth of *be[ing]*.

Here both the *genitivus subjectivus* and the *genitivus obiectivus* senses of the “of” are at play. Who originally thinks *of* the truth of being is none other than the human being. The referent in the sentence is to *er* (he). Thinking of the human being as a *What* has been common since the beginning of modern philosophy (Descartes), the culmination of which is the social science psychology.

[heimisch] in the nature [Wesen] of the eventuality that *be[ing]* has laid claim upon humans<sup>202</sup> to speak on behalf of the truth. Therefore sacrifice does not put up with any computation [Berechnung] in terms of which it is reckoned with [verrechnet]<sup>203</sup>, whether to a profit or loss, whether its aims are set low or high. Such a settling of accounts [Verrechnen] disfigures the essence of sacrifice.<sup>204</sup> The search [Sucht] for purposes [Zwecken] befuddles the clarity of dread-ready [angstbewreiten] reticence about <such> readiness to make sacrifices [Opfermut] that has something deathless [Unzerstörbaren] about it.

Thinking of<sup>205</sup> *be[ing]* seeks no support from what is there.<sup>206</sup> Essential thinking pays attention to the hesitant indication [langsam Zeichen] of the noncomputable [Unberechenbaren] and recognizes the arrival in it from time immemorial of the unavoidable [das Unabwendbaren]. Such thinking is attentive to the truth of *be[ing]* and in this way helps [hilft] the *be[ing]* of truth to find in its place [Stätte] in historical humanity [geschichtlichen Menschentum]. Such helping [Helfen] effects no results because it has no need of an effect [Wirkung]. Essential thinking avails [hilft] <itself> in existence as simple urgency insofar as something like it breaks out of it [entzündet sich] without its being able to dispose over [verfügen] it or even know anything about it.

Obedient to the voice of *be[ing]*, thinking looks to it for those words [das Wort] that the truth of *be[ing]* finds becoming for language [zur Sprache kommt].<sup>207</sup> Only when the language of historical humans is put into words [aus dem Wort] does it reach its own proper depth [ist sie im Lot]. But having found its depth it signals [winkt] the assurance [Gewähr] of the silent voice of a hidden source. Thinking of *be[ing]* minds [hütet]<sup>208</sup> words [das Wort] and fulfills its purpose [Bestimmung] in such cautiousness [Behutsamkeit]. It is caring about usage [Sorge für den Sprachgebrauch].<sup>209</sup> From a long held silence [Sprachlosigkeit] and careful

clarification [Klärung]<sup>210</sup> of what is shed light on in that realm comes the utterance [Sagen] of the thinker. The naming [Nennen] | {312} of the poet [Dichter] has the same genealogy [Herkunft]. But because what is equivalent [das Gleiche] is equivalent only as what has been <first> distinguished [das Verschiedene], the poet and the thinker are equals [das Gleiche], and although composing [Dichten]<sup>43</sup> and

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<sup>43</sup> Appreciating Heidegger's usage here of the noun *Dichten* (based on the verb *dichten*: to compose, and more conventionally, to write poetry) depends on keeping in mind the origin of the word 'poetry' from the Greek verb ποιέω (to make or craft, or simply to do). Although he will trace both making (which has been rendered most often in American translations with the word 'poetizing') and thinking to a common source in thinking, the rich resonances with Greek are essential considerations at this point: composing, inventing; causing to come into being; taking time; acting *simpliciter*; considering and even pretending (in middle voice locutions). Here the word 'composing' (placing together, which is related to *versammeln* [(to) gather together] in both the passive and active senses) seems best since it suggests bringing into one place what has been dispersed (words) and the process that brings about the formation of a cloud out of airy traces, both of which suggest the thickening process of a related sense of *dichten*. For example, in clouds the air supports a saturation of previously dispersed bits of moisture in various typical formations (cumulus, cirrus). Similarly, *Dichten* is a composing of something textured (textual) that takes on a form. Ultimately, the English word 'cloud' refers to earth ('clod'). The German *Wolke* (cloud) refers more to the sky as such (compare our now obsolete beautiful word 'welkin'). In another context Heidegger will speak of language as a kind of thickening of thought. Later on in this passage he will suggest that the nothing is a sort of clouding or befogging [Schleier] of be-[ing].

thinking [Denken] approximate each other [sich gleichen] in their carefulness with words [Sorgamkeit des Wortes], the two are at the same time [zugleich] in essence the most widely separated. The thinker utters [sagt] *be[ing]*.<sup>211</sup> The poet names [nennt] the holy.<sup>†212</sup> Admittedly, thought from the essence [Wesen] of *be[ing]*, the way composing and thanking and thinking refer to each other and at the same time are distinct [geschieden] must remain open. Presumably, thanking and composing arise in different ways from thinking in its inception [dem anfänglichen Denken], making use of [brauchen] it but without being able to be thinking [ein Denken sein zu können].

No doubt we know a lot about the relationship [Verhältnis] between philosophy [Philosophie] and poetry [Poesie].<sup>213</sup> But we know nothing about the dialogue [Zwiesprache] between the composer<sup>44</sup> and the thinker who "live nearby on the most isolated peaks."<sup>214</sup>

One of essential places [Wesensstätte] of silence is dread in the sense of the terror with which the unfathomable of the no-thing gives voice to [stimmt] humans. The no-thing as the other than [das Andere]<sup>215</sup> what is there is the mist around [Schleier] *be[ing]*.<sup>\*216</sup> From the outset every venture [Geschick] of what is there is already consummated [vollendet] in *be[ing]*.

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<sup>44</sup> In English, the word 'composer' nearly always refers to a musician. Two considerations to note: the first Western poetry was sung (Homer), and Heidegger's reference to the composer of words (the poet), Friedrich Hölderlin. Part of two lines from "Patmos" are quoted (with modification). Hölderlin wrote: ". . . und die Liebsten / Nah wohnen, ermattend auf / Getrenntesten Bergen" (lines 10-12) which Heidegger gives as "nahe wohnen auf getrenntesten Bergen." Heidegger omits *ermattend* (languishing).

The final poetry [Dichtung] of the last poet [Dichters] at the dawn of Hellenism [im anfänglichen Griechentum], *Oedipus at Colonus* by Sophocles, closes with words that unknowingly [unnachdenkbar] return to [zurückwendet] the hidden [verborgene] history of these people [Volk] and preserve their access to the unknown truth of *being*:

ἀλλ' ἀποπαύετε μηδ' ἐπι πλείω

θρῆνον ἐγείρετε·

πάντως γὰρ ἔχει τάδε χῦρος.

But now let it be, and henceforth nevermore

waken lament;

to wit, everywhere keep to what has come to pass [das Eriegnete]

look after [verwahrt] <what is> a ruling [Entscheid] of the  
fulfilment [Vollendung] .[217](#)

## ENDNOTES TO "INTRODUCTION" TO 'WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?':

### GETTING TO THE BASIS OF METAPHYSICS" (1949)

[1](#) In a note to the first French translation of the Introduction ("La Remonté au Fondement de la Métaphysique"), Joseph Rovin notes that the Introduction "est conçu comme une préface à une postface [was conceived as a preface to a postscript]" to the lecture. *Fontaine* (Paris) 10, #58, March 1947, p. 888. See the Epilogue {303}.

[2](#) The adjective *rückgängig* can mean "null and void." This suggests the sense of the title of the Introduction as "The No-thing at the Heart of Metaphysics" and that the ground of metaphysics, the soil in which it is rooted, is *das Nichts* [no-thing]. For this translation of *das Nichts* see the Lecture.

[3](#) Heidegger's citation is to René Descartes, *Oeuvres*, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (1971 [1897-1910]), Paris: Vrin, Volume IX, Part 2, p. 14. Descartes' letter to Abbé Picot constitutes his introduction to the *Principia* in Picot's translation. On Picot, see Descartes' *Correspondance* (1947), Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Volume V, pp. 402-404. The current standard English translation, by John Cottingham, of the "Preface" is in John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (eds.), *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* (1985), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Volume I, p. 186.

[4](#) "Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree, whose roots are metaphysics, the trunk of which is physics, and the branches which extend out from that trunk are the rest of the sciences."

[5](#) As noted in the “Translator’s Introduction” I often give Heidegger’s German between square brackets. Sometimes a phrase or even an entire sentence is provided in an endnote or a footnote. Variant renderings are also given from time to time. I offer alternative translations in succession separated by ‘/’.

[6](#) Heidegger will play on several senses of *Grund*: the soil in which flora grow, and the basis, grounds, or reasons given as evidence for coming to a decision about the meaning of something. I will translate *Grund* with the words ‘basis’, ‘ground’, and ‘grounds’. *In den Grund* is rendered with the colloquial expression “at bottom” (fundamentally). The phrase *Grund und Boden* is translated with the word ‘land’—that patch of earth one lives and builds on, grows up on, farms, or tends. *Boden* alone is translated with the word ‘soil’. The phrase also functions idiomatically to mean “utterly.” *Im Grunde* becomes “at the heart of,” “fundamentally,” “really,” or “at <the> bottom <of>.”

[7](#) *Wesen* is translated with the words ‘essence’ or ‘nature’. Heidegger explores the relation of the noun *Wesen* to the verb *wesen* (to come about). See FN 15.

[8](#) By the collective noun *das Seiende* Heidegger has in mind effective actuality, the “things” or “goings on” of every sort of at any given moment by contrast with the “nothing being there,” “the absence of anything,” or “nothing going on” of *das Nichts* [no-thing]. It refers to what is there insofar as anything is there at all. Understood as what is actually there justifies translating the adjective *seienden* with the word ‘actual’. Here the fundamental importance of the distinction between actuality and possibility—what is in fact there and what might be there—is highlighted. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger had written: “Higher than actuality is [steht] possibility.” GA 2, pp. 51-52



[9](#) An important theme of the Introduction is how in formulating questions [eine Frage zu vorstellen] metaphysics is all about designating, proposing, making suppositions and apodeictic assertions [Vorstellungen], professing, representing (presenting something a second time and therefore in a necessarily altered version), and assigning meanings—rather than letting meaning gradually (though never fully) emerge on its own. To formulate or designate is to assert or affirm something as fixed and incontrovertibly true. In professing, metaphysics promotes what it proposes and in that way seeks to establish and further a worldview. Teaching is quite different than professing, and Heidegger is above all a teacher. The phenomenological ideal he aspires to yields knowledge *without* belief, knowledge that withholds as much as it discloses. I will render *Vorstellen* and its adjectival form with the words ‘formulating’ or ‘proposing’ and ‘propositional’, respectively. The English verb ‘propose’ (from *proponere* < *pro-* [before] + *ponere* [(to) put]) perhaps best captures the sense of the infinitive (*vorstellen*) that is the basis for the noun *Vorstellen*: to pro-*pose* is to stand [stellen] for [vor]. The verb *vorstellen* means precisely to put [stellen] before [vor] as fixed. What is proposed is fixed in place in the proposition. Where proposing dominates, as in metaphysics, what is to be seen is necessarily distorted.

[10](#) . \*Fifth edition (1949): "Lichtung [illumination]." (EWM 365)

Notes preceded by (\*) are Heidegger's marginalia gleaned from his copies of the various editions of the texts and now included in GA 9.

The word ‘light [Licht]’ is used as in the phrase "in light of" as well as “illuminated by.”

[11](#) With this term Heidegger announces the ‘be-’ [das Sein] of what is there [das Seiende]; that is, the ‘sei-’ (the linguistic root) of *das Seiende* that is found to be the ground of what is there. I have chosen the ungainly formulation “*be[ing]*” to

highlight how problematic the whole question about the sense of *Sein* remains. My contraption is meant to give pause. I pronounce the word 'be[ing]' /bi/.

[12](#) For this translation of *die Gleiche* see my essay "Who Is Heidegger's Nietzsche?," a review article of the English translations of Heidegger's two-volume *Nietzsche* (1960), in *The Voice that Thinks* (1997; rev. and exp. ed., 2016) New York: ENI Press, pp. 39-71.

[13](#) The sense is of something stepping out of the shadows after having been in hiding or in seclusion. Emergence [Unverborgenheit] as ἀλήθεια (unconcealment) is to be understood as "having been relieved of oblivion." The word ἀλήθεια is formed by adding the privative prefix α- to the root λήθη (oblivion, forgottenness, what has been put out of mind by *be[ing]*). Perhaps the word 'emergedness' would work better. Ἀλήθεια is the ancient Greek word for "truth." The hyphenated word 'α-λήθεια also hints at the deprivation inherent in truth.

[14](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "An-bringen: Gewähren die Unverborgenheit und in dieser Unverborgenes, Anwesendes. Im Anwesen verbirgt sich: An-bringen von Unverborgenheit, die Anwesendes anwesen läßt. 'das Sein selbst' ist das Sein in seiner Wahrheit, welche Wahrheit zum Sein gehört, d.h. in welche Wahrheit 'Sein' entschwindet [Bringing along: affording / granting emergence, and in this emerging, apprésenting. In apprésenting is hidden the attachment to emergence that apprésenting itself lets apprésent. 'Be[ing] itself' is *be[ing]* in its truth, truth that belongs to *be[ing]*, that is, truth in which 'be[ing]' disappears / vanishes]." (EWM 366)

I have coined the word 'apprésenting' to translate *Anwesend* to denote the "making present *to*" that results in presence or presentness [Anwesenheit].

[15](#) The verb *wesen* will usually be translated with "(to) come about," occasionally with "(to) come to be." What *wesť* arrives precisely only to pass on or

move on. This is of [vom] the essence [Wesen] of truth [der Wahrheit] and of the *Ereignis* that becomes central to Heidegger's meditation on *be[ing]*. What *wesť* never *is* in the sense the verbs 'εἶναι', 'esse', and '(to) be' suggest, all of which imply fixity or stasis. See EN 7 and 58.

[16](#) . . . that is, as something philosophical in Descartes' image that opens the Introduction.

[17](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Sein und Grund: das Selbe [*Be[ing]*] and basis: the same]." (EWM 367)

The word *dasselbe* translates as "<the> same <thing>."

[18](#) First philosophy, πρώτη φιλοσοφία, or philosophy in the primary sense as metaphysics is what Heidegger wants to ground (set on a firm basis). Metaphysics is assumed to be the first beginning of philosophy. A new beginning of *thinking* is required, however, to ground metaphysics. It must be more basic than "first philosophy" (metaphysics) and would constitute a second beginning for philosophy.

[19](#) Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* [Second Edition, 1787, translated by Norman Kemp Smith in 1929] (1965), New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 56. " . . . metaphysics actually exists, if not as a science, yet still as a natural disposition [Metaphysik ist, wenn gleich nichts als Wissenschaft, doch als Naturanlage] (*metaphysica naturalis* [natural metaphysics])." *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, in *Gesammelte Schriften* (1911), Berlin: Reimer, Band III, p. 41 [B 21]. In Kant's *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Can Qualify as Science* [1783, translated by Paul Carus in 1902] (1988), New York: Open Court, metaphysics is referred to as a "natural tendency" of man (p. 135). *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band IV, p. 363.

[20](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "was *heißt* Denken [what *calls* for thinking]?" (EWM 368)

Variants: What *cries out* to be thought? What do we call (term, what goes by the name of) thinking?

This was to become a theme of Heidegger's final lecture course at the University of Freiburg (1951-52) on Nietzsche and Parmenides—for Heidegger the great bookends of the history of philosophy—and the book based on it that he once referred to somewhere as his "favorite" book. In this formulation (*das zu Denkende*) we hear echoes of the verb *zudenken* ("intend" or "think toward").

[21](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Ereignis [eventuality] (EWM 368)

Another suggestive option for *Ereignis* is 'enownment'. See EN 30.

[22](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Brauch [customary usage]." (EWM 369)

[23](#) I think of Bach's two-part inventions (*Inventionen* or *praeambula*). Man and *be[ing]* play in two-part counterpoint. Such contrapuntal interplay is explored in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* [*Contributions about Philosophy (On the Eventuality)*] (1936-38), GA 65 (1989). Resonances with imagery from music are present there in abundance. To offer two more analogies from music, *be[ing]* is the ground bass with which man harmonizes and against which he plays the melody. Or perhaps *be[ing]* and man sing in an uncanny unison.

[24](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "entbergende bergende Ge-währnis als Ereignis [revealingly harboring per-sistence as eventuality]." (EWM 369)

[25](#) The essay "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" was first published in 1930. See *Wegmarken* (GA 9, pp. 177-202), and in the translations by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick, in *Existence and Being* (1949) Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1988, pp. 292-

324, and John Sallis, in *Basic Writings* (1977) San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco (rev. ed., 1993), pp. 111-138.

[26](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Veritas bei Thomas immer in intellectu, und sei der intellectus divinus [*veritas* [truth] according to Thomas Aquinas is always *in intellectu* [in the mind] and this is the *intellectus divinus* [mind of God]." (EWM 369)

[27](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Sein, Wahrheit, Welt, ~~Sein~~, Ereignis [*be[ing]*], truth, world, ~~be[ing]~~, eventuality]." (EWM 369) The word '~~be[ing]~~' crossed out (*sous rature*) (Heidegger draws an "X" through the word) indicates that the word is inaccurate but has a place in the discussion, that is, in a sentence from the text. It is a convention Heidegger initiated early on that was central to *Zur Seinsfrage* (1955) and became a fetish among French deconstructionists, especially Jacques Derrida.

[28](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Λήθη als Verbergung [forgetting as hiding]." (EWM 370)

In GA 9 (EWM, p. 387, note a) there is a misprint of the spelling of Λήθη.

*Verbergung* has the sense of "not showing" or "not letting on" what one is experiencing (for example, fear or pain).

[29](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Verwechslung: die Gebundenheit in das Hinüber zu Sein und das Herüber zu Seiendem. Eines steht stets *im* anderen und *für* das andere, 'Auswechslung', 'Wechsel', bald so, bald so [Confusion: being caught up in the crossing over to *be[ing]* and crossing back to what is there. The one is always *in* the other and *for* the other, <an> 'exchange' / 'substitution', 'changeover' / 'alteration'], now this way, now that]." (EWM 370)

[30](#) This is a revealing use of a fundamental term in Heidegger's vocabulary. Here an *Ereignis* is contrasted with a *Fehler*. A *Fehler* is a mishap or mistake or accident that occurs unexpectedly, while an *Ereignis* is a happenstance

(contingency) that was somehow bound to happen. Recall also the association of *Ereignis* with the birth of a child, the signs of which during pregnancy point to the impending appearance of a human being. Translating *Ereignis* with the word 'event' makes sense etymologically: 'event' < *evenire* ([to] come out of). The sense of something that is bound to happen at some point is embedded in the notion of *Ereignis*. This is about something ensuing and thereby coming into its own in its suitability for a certain time and situation. Perhaps the most suggestive rendering of *Ereignis* is "inevitable eventuality." See EN 32.

[31](#) The various combinations beginning with the possessive *Seins-* will be translated with either "of *be*[ing]," "by *be*[ing]," "of and by *be*[ing]," or "about *be*[ing]." Heidegger sees the "action" of *be*[ing] in each case in counterpoint with the other element of the term; for example, in *Seinsverständnis*, *Seinsverlassenheit*, *Seinsvergessenheit*, or *Seinsgeschick be*[ing] is both the source and destination of the "understanding," "abandonment," "oblivion," or "venture" in question.

[32](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Das an-fangende, im An-fangen wesende Ereignis—brauchend—die Enteignis [the be-ginning, <the> eventuality coming about in <its> be-ginning—needing / having the use of—dispossession]." (EWM 370) Heidegger's use of the verb *anfangen* highlights the verbal sense of making a start or beginning. If *Ereignis* refers to what must come about eventually, *Enteignis* suggests what, correlatively, must come to *pass*, that is, not having come to stay but precisely in order to withdraw and "become a stranger to." Together they cooperate in cyclic fashion, becoming familiar to and alienating from. *Enteignis* also suggests being relieved or dispossessed of something, in the sense we speak ironically of what happens in a robbery. Both terms refer to "what must happen." Contingency in contrast with necessity is not at issue here, but rather a sense of the impossibility that something of great moment will not have happened but might not have. For

Heidegger, "higher than actuality is possibility," but where is impossibility in all this?  
See EN 8 and 73 to the Letter.

[33](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Zu-gesagten, Ge-währten, Ereigneten [What is to have been said, what has been afforded / brought forth, what has eventuated / been brought into its own]."

Variant: . . . what one is to have thought . . .

[34](#) In that case, what is again thought of (remembered) and what is thought about (considered) coincide. Heidegger understood the nature of memory as creative and effectively the work of imagination, not a function of reproduction or replication on the model of data storage and retrieval where items of thought or experience are warehoused like snapshots (bits of data) then recovered, re-viewed, and reused. By contrast, a computer's memory does not permit revision of the stored data—or it crashes.

[35](#) "Doch wer denkt noch an Gedachtes?" (EWM 372) The point seems to be that most people are sure everything worth thinking about has already been thought through thoroughly enough, especially matters such as what counts as worthy of thoughtful reflection.

[36](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Wahrnis als Ereignis [wareness as eventuality]."  
(EWM 372)

The word *Wahrheit* is glossed here. *Wahrnis* would appear to be something like "truth-ness" or the quality of being-true. Heidegger is pointing to the root of both truth (*Wahrheit*) and cautious attentiveness or wariness (*Wahrnis*). Our word 'awareness' and the German adjective *wahr* (true) derive from the same root. This gloss would have us compare the two. The word 'wareness' is not currently heard, although the British poet W.H. Auden used it as recently as 1930. From May 1929: "In grown man

also, may see in face / In his day-thinking and in his night-thinking / Is wareness and is fear of other, / Alone in flesh, himself no friend." In an odd way there is an evocation of Heidegger himself in these lines. From the perspective of *be[ing]* eventuality looks one way; from the perspective of the essence of man—existence—it looks (and appears to be) another way. Eventuality does not favor either, although it is initiated by *be[ing]*. Truth is found between *be[ing]* and the essence of what we are. See "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," GA 9, pp. 177-238.

[37](#) According to the entry for the word 'essence' in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (beginning with the 2nd. ed., 1989), the word *essentia* is said to be a "fictitious present participle of *esse*, to be, in imitation of Greek οὐσία [essence of what is there]."

[38](#) *Being and Time* [John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, trans.] (1962) Oxford: Basil Blackwell [= *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, p. 56].

[39](#) "Dieses Ausstehen wird unter dem Namen 'Sorge' erfahren." (EWM 374)

Variants: This enduring / perpeccion goes by the name of 'care'. An alias for this enduring is 'care'.

The word 'perpeccion'—undergoing, suffering, enduring—is another obsolete English word that may be due for revival. Conveying Heidegger's play on words based on the root verb *stehen* is only somewhat successful in English. As often as not, *stehen* simply means "is" and thus stands in for the verb *sein*.

On an argument for the translation of *Sorge* with the word 'sorrow' in its original sense (to care about), see "The Fable 'Cura' in *Being and Time*," in *The Voice that Thinks* (1987; rev. and enlarged ed., 2016) New York: ENI Press), pp. 19-42. *Sorge* in its most basic sense is "giving a damn about things," being "pained by" what is going on—something seemingly unique to us human beings. I think here of the title



of the anthology edited by René Char, *L'Endurance de la Pensée* [*The Longsuffering of Thinking*]. *Festschrift für Jean Beaufret* (1968) Paris: Plon, pp. 12-71, in which Heidegger's 1962 essay "Zeit und Sein [Time and Be[ing]]" was first published. Animals endure pain and misery with what we would call equanimity, but they are not aware of their awareness (so-called apperception) of pain and do not give it meaning. They simply move to escape from it as quickly as possible. Animals certainly care *for* and take care *of* their offspring, but the sort of care Heidegger has in mind includes a feeling or attitude based on self-awareness, something animals lack. His reflection on the perplexion of thinking and the fundamental existential attunement named by *Sorge* is especially pertinent given Heidegger's own circumstances in 1949 when the Introduction to the Lecture was written and its Epilogue was revised. The relation between enduring and thinking is also being considered here. Heidegger's discussion of the temporal nature of existence in the language of *Being and Time*—the three *Ekstases* of past, present and future—has etymological resonance with *Dasein* as existence (from the Latin *ek-sistere*: to be [stehen] out [aus] there in the world). The verb *stehen* nevertheless justifies translating it with the word 'stand' in this discussion of *Ausstehen*. The sense of enduring is preserved in one use of the English verb 'stand' (as in "I can't stand the pain"). I will translate forms of the verb *existieren* with the words 'ek-sist', 'ek-sists', and so on. The Latin verb *exsisto* does not mean to "stand out" (somehow conjuring an image of an protrusion) as many translators propose, having based their decision on a literal analysis of the parts of the word. The verb *exsisto* means "to be out there in the world" (*versus* inside a subject, self, body or brain) and follows the trail of Heidegger's discussion of the *Ausstehen* of *Ekstasis* in the next passage. The great Dutch phenomenologist and psychiatrist Jan van den Berg elucidated the sense of ex-sistence in his contribution to the fourth annual symposium of the Simon

Silverman Phenomenology Center (March 6-7, 1986, at Duquesne University) in his address "The Rise and Fall of the Medical Model in Psychiatry: A Phenomenological Analysis," published in *Psychiatry and Phenomenology*, Pittsburgh: The Center, 1987 (translated by Bep Mook), especially p. 9.

[40](#) "Das so erfahrene Ausstehen ist das Wesen der hier zu denkenden Ekstasis." (EWM 374)

[41](#) Variant: . . . standing apart from . . .

[42](#) The fundamental meaning of στάσις (status, position in a situation, standing) with which Heidegger is working in this text is the root of the word ἔκστασις. Here στάσις means "one's position on a matter," while ἔκστασις refers to one's dis-position or pre-position in the world that makes such a position possible. But see EN 39.

[43](#) Variant: '(em)ergency'.

Existence is the emergency situation within all that is there.

To be human is to be motivated (pressed or moved) to do things and not only driven "from behind" as it were by instincts. Such motivation means being drawn into things. Our word 'emotion' (e-motion) reflects its source. Our experience is drawn out of us. Heidegger is interested in the relation of this "emergency situation" (where emergence highlights to our already being "out there," exposed and therefore vulnerable) to ἀλήθεια as emergence [Unverborgenheit] where emergence means coming out of the shadow of oblivion.

[44](#) Variant: . . . giving birth to . . .

[45](#) Variant: . . . to the nth degree . . . (i.e., to the limit, "to death").

[46](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Auf sich zu-kommen lassen den Tod, sich halten in der Ankunft des Todes als des Ge-Birgs des Sein [to take death as it ap-proaches / nears, to hold out for the arrival of death as the ar-rival of be[ing]]." (EWM 374)

The hyphenated word *Ge-Birg* is heard as *Gebirg* ("the mountains," much like "the woods"). It is rich with allusions: its etymology from the verb *bergen* (to harbor or to hide), reference to "the mountains" as a place where one might find safety or build a retreat or hideaway (or hideout), mountains as elevated (lofty, sublime in the Kantian sense) or a "lighter," airier" realm *en haut* (that Nietzsche so loved) where one is spared or saved from the heaviness of everyday concerns *da unten*. The note is a reflection on the phrase from *Sein und Zeit*, "Sein zum Tode" ("being-unto-death," "being-towards-death"). While it may be possible to find sanctuary or asylum in the mountains because following one's trail there is difficult for others, at the same time in such a place one is exposed, out in the open, and subject to the forces of nature full force, at risk and vulnerable. All of this makes perfect sense to those familiar with Heidegger's fondness for his cabin (modest chalet, hunting lodge, ski hut) (*Hüte*). One cannot avoid associating such a location with his secluded hideaway in Todtnauberg—literally, Death Meadow Mountain. See Adam Sharr, *Heidegger's Hut*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006. The cabin is built into the mountain.

[47](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Wohnen, das 'bauende' [living / dwelling, the 'cultivating' / 'growing']." (EWM 374)

By way of a survey of the topic thus far: a way of life (*Existenz*) is out there in the world and is as such the essence (*Wesen*) of existence (*Dasein*). In Heidegger's formulation in *Be[ing] and Time*: "the essence of existence is [liegt in] its way of life." In the Letter this status is sharply distinguished from the valuative characterization of man in terms of *humanitas* that was the source of the existentialism of Sartre, who

claimed could he could find its “humanistic” source in Heidegger’s account of *Existenz*. Sartre, too, had conflated *Dasein* and *Existenz* (see {373}).

[48](#) “Das Seiende, das in der Weise der Existenz ist, ist der Mensch. Der Mensch allein existiert.”

Variants: Man is the being that is in the manner of a way of life. Only the human exists. What is there that is as a way of life in the human being.

Only the human being is “out there.” Indeed, he “finds himself” (in several senses: to discover oneself in a particular place and to learn who one is as a person) out there, like it or not. This “out [aus]” there is related to both senses of our word ‘utter’: the adverbial (“to the utmost point”) and the verbal (“(to) to speak, express). The animal perpetually seeks cover. The human is ineluctably out [aus] there [da] in the open, exposed, and he must answer for this. Man is not “in” the world. He is “out” there.

[49](#) “Das Seiende, das in der Weise der Existenz ist, ist der Mensch. Der Mensch allein existiert. Der Fels ist, aber er existiert nicht. Der Baum ist, aber er existiert nicht. Das Pferd ist, aber es existiert nicht. Der Engel ist, aber es existiert nicht. Gott ist, aber er existiert nicht.” (EWM 374)

The opening sentences of this paragraph have been formative in my understanding of Heidegger. As noted earlier, the verb *existieren* is reserved exclusively for humans. Forms of *sein* apply to everything else: things of the earth and what surrounds it, things fabricated by human beings, divine things. A way of life (*Existenz*) is the way of a biography, a way that has, makes, and is (a) history, not something fixed, stable and unchanging.

[50](#) Humans are notable to (“in the eyes of”) *be[ing]*. We, who exist, and can say “we” and therefore “we exist,” are all “marked” men and women, marked by the

blaze of existence. Existing, each of us makes his way, blazes a trail, marks a new, once-only course.

[51](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "ereignet-gebrauchte [eventually-accustomed]." (EWM 375)

[52](#) Variant: 'selfness'. I translate *Selbstheit* with 'selfhood'.

Some of Heidegger's neologisms ending in '-sein' seem to have been inspired by the construction of nouns such as *Bewußtsein* which literally means "knownness." Thus *Selbstsein* would translate as 'selfness'. See EN 31.

[53](#) These are the sections entitled "Die für eine Interpretation des Seinssinnes der Sorge gewonnene hermeneutische Situation und der methodische Charakter der existenzialen Analytik überhaupt [The Kind of Hermeneutic Situation Gained for an Interpretation of the Sense of *Be[ing]* and the Methodological Character of the Existential Analytique in General]" and "Sorge und Selbstheit [Care and Selfhood]." See *Being and Time*, pp. 358-370 [= *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, pp. 411-428].

[54](#) Variants: seeming / sembling.

[55](#) One's *Vorname* is the given name of the person, his first name, his "Christian name." Here, however, Heidegger uses the word to refer to the first name given to "the truth of *be[ing]*" in the history of philosophy; namely, 'time'. The relationship between *Sein* and *Zeit* is not that the word *Zeit* is the first name for *Sein* but rather the first name for the *truth* of 'Sein'. Earlier, we recall, Heidegger reviewed the series of names for *be[ing]* concluding with Nietzsche's expression "Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen."

[56](#) . . . that is, speaking Greek.

[57](#) "Wir sagen nichts." (EWM 376)

Variants: We really don't say anything at all. We don't express anything meaningful.

The verb *sagen* denotes not mere enunciating something but, rather, meaningfully expressing something (out loud or in writing). A *Sage* is a meaningful expression uttered aloud or written down in silence. A *Spruch* (as in the title of Heidegger's paper "Der Spruch Anaximanders") is a brief written text (in this case, a fragment), a saying that has aphoristic (literally, horizon-determining) value and import. The Greek ἀφορισμός derives from ἀφορίζω [delimitation] (< ἀπό [from] + ὀρίζω [separate, divide], from ὄρος [encompassing boundary] as the encircling horizon separates earth from firmament). Such sayings circumscribe a world of meditation.

Translating a German infinitive into English requires introducing it with the preposition 'to'. If we do not at least indicate the 'to'—"(to)"—we risk failing to distinguish the infinitive from its related noun as, for example, in *jump* (the noun) and *to jump* (the infinitive of a verb). It is always worth bearing in mind that Heidegger's epicentric word *Sein* is a substantive form of the infinitive of the verb *sein*. In English there are no gender-determining articles as there are in German (e.g., *das Sein*) and the Romance languages. Adding a definite or indefinite article every time a noun is mentioned simply doesn't happen in English.

[58](#) Variant: . . . make a present / gift of.

The verb *anwesen* is formed by adding the prefix *an-* [to] to the verb *wesen* [(to) come about], a verb with deeply complex significance for Heidegger. The substantive *Wesen*, of course, means "essence." Heidegger will often use the word *west*, the third person singular of *wesen*. See also EN 7 and 15. The verb *wesen* can

also have the senses “(to) come to” or “(to) end up as,” “(to) be about to” or “(to) be on the verge of.”

[59](#) The word παρουσία means ‘presence’ (having arrived); the word ἀπουσία means ‘absence’ (not yet having arrived, not yet there). In the background of this discussion is the overarching question why anything is there at all (*Seiende*) and not instead nothing at all (*Nichts*). Schlegel’s translation (1799) of the opening of Hamlet’s famous soliloquy may point to an unexplored meaning in Shakespeare’s words “To be, or not to be, that is the question”: “Sein oder Nichtsein; das ist hier die Frage [*Be[ing]* or Not-*be[ing]*], that is what our question is about.” For Schlegel, the key words are substantives, the first of which is the topic of Heidegger’s thought: *Sein*. Is Hamlet a fundamental ontologist? Does Shakespeare raise the question about the sense of *be[ing]* in this soliloquy (c. 1600)? Not all later translators take Schlegel’s approach and some use the German infinitives: “sein oder nicht sein . . . [*<to> be* or not *<to> be*]”). The latter points to Hamlet as perhaps contemplating suicide, which many critics assume Shakespeare had in mind.

[60](#) "Sein als solches ist demnach unverborgen aus Zeit." (EWM 374)

Variant: Accordingly, *be[ing]* as such comes (out) of time. Accordingly, *be[ing]* as such is born of time.

Heidegger here implies a neologism *unverbergen*. See EN 75.

[61](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Zeit ist vierdimensional: Die *erste*, alles versammelnde Dimension ist die *Nähe* [Time is four-dimensional: the *first*, all-encompassing dimension is *imminence*]." (EWM 377)

Must an implied *fifth dimension* be presupposed to provide access to the other four: (4) time, (3) volume (3-D), (2) surface (2-D), (1) length (1-D)? Or is this further (furthest?) dimension coincident with the pre-dimensional *point* (0-D)? *Nähe* means

nearness *in time*, not space; impendence with a suggestion of danger is contrasted with what is "behind us" and therefore no longer poses a threat or is so far off in the distant future that it does not pose an immediate threat. These extremes may be said to meet at a point that is the origin of thinking (perhaps symbolized  $\gg<$  or  $X$ ). On the other hand, what is far off (*die Ferne*) may have just as much influence as what is just about to happen (*die Nähe*).

The Introduction drew out of Heidegger clarifications of a kind that are rare in his writings. A certain frontier is reached here, the view from which is powerfully evocative.

[62](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Diese Epoche ist die ganze Geschichte des Seins [This era is the entire history of *being*]." (EWM 377)

[63](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Zeit-Raum [time-space]." (EWM 377) This is space not conceived of according to the schema of the three geometric co-ordinates or the famous time line:  $\infty\text{-----}>\infty$ . On space (*Raum*), see for example, Heidegger's lecture "Die Kunst und der Raum" (GA 13, pp. 203-210). This text, published in 1968, is based on a lecture first given in 1964. Its publication with the lithocollages of Eduardo Chillida marks Heidegger's only real collaboration with someone, in this case the Basque sculptor. See my essay "Geometry and Memory," in *The Voice That Thinks* (1987; rev. and exp. ed., 2016), New York: ENI Press, pp. 83-114, and "Art and Emptiness. Heidegger and Chillida on Space and Place," in *Existentialia XXVI*(3/4), 2016, 319-346. A French translation in the *Bulletin Heideggérien* (Louvain-la-Neuve) is forthcoming (2017), with a Spanish translation in *Thémata* (Sevilla) to follow.

[64](#) "Es ist der ekstatische, d.h. im Bereich des Offenen innestehende geworfene Entwurf." (EWM 377)



\*Fifth edition (1949): "Geworfenheit und Ereignis. Werfen, Zu-werfen, Schicken; Ent-Wurf: dem Wurf entsprechen [Givenness and eventuality. Issuing / producing, ex-tending, sending; pro-ject: corresponding to the issue]." (EWM 377) See EN 160. In this gloss on *Entwerfen* and *Entwurf*, *Geworfenheit* and *Ereignis* are associated because of shared resonances with (1) something coming on the scene in the sense of being born and (2) something coming up, given utterance to, put into words for the first time (and its irrevocability). The once said cannot be unsaid, but it can be addressed, answered, spoken to. The translation of *Entwerfen* with the word 'schematic' as well as with a form of the English word 'beget' and "what is conjectural" points to the richness of the verbs *werfen* and *entwerfen* in Heidegger's discussion of understanding and sense. On translating *Entwerfen* with the word 'schematic': In Greek rhetoric, a σχήμα is a figure of speech that is concerned with the syntax of the elements of an expression, not with what the individual morphemes denote. Heidegger suggests that a wide net is cast to try to capture the sense of the truth of *be[ing]*. On the maritime image, see the next two marginal notes.) As we may tentatively *gather* (retrieving what has been captured in the net) what something may mean, it is important to leave any formulation open to change to reflect expanding understanding of what has been captured by the formulation. Final formulation (the province of *Vorstellen* in metaphysics) amounts to the end of thinking. In any utterance, we are provided at most with a schematic for understanding [Verstehen], a conjecture that is delivered over to us for consideration.

[65](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "sich zu-bringt [is brought to]." (EWM 377) That is, in the way a ship is "brought to" (turned into the wind).

[66](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Sinn—Wegrichtung des Sach-Verhalts [Sense—setting the course of the fact of the matter]." (EWM 377)

Here two sense of "bringing about" work nicely in English.

[67](#) *Sein und Zeit*, p. 201. The passage is part of Section 32, "Verstehen und Auslegung [Understanding and Explanation]."

An *Auslegung* is a putting on display something of already in the open. See EN 71.

[68](#) "'Sinn von Sein' und 'Wahrheit des Seins' sagen das Selbe." (EWM 377) *Die Gleiche* is "the equivalent"; *das Selbe* is "the same (thing)." Cf. the adjective *dasselbe* (same).

Variant: 'Sense of *be[ing]*' and 'truth of *be[ing]*' meaingfully express the same thing.

[69](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "ermöglichen [possibilizing]." (EWM 378)

[70](#) These are the sections entitled "Das Da-sein als Verstehen [*be[ing]*-there / There-*be[ing]* / there-ness as Understanding]," "Verstehen und Auslegung [Understanding and Explanation]," "Die Aussage als abkünftiger Modus der Auslegung [The Assertion as the Original Mode of Explanation]," "Da-sein und Rede. Die Sprache [*Be[ing]*-there / There-*be[ing]* / there-ness and Speech. Language]," and "Die Zeitlichkeit der Erschlossenheit überhaupt. a) Die Zeitlichkeit des Verstehens. (b) Die Zeitlichkeit der Befindlichkeit. c) Die Zeitlichkeit der Verfallens. d) Die Zeitlichkeit der Rede. [The Temporality of Disclosedness in General. a) The Temporality of Understanding. b) The Temporality of Situatedness. c) The Temporality of Forfeiting / Succumbing. d) The Temporality of Speech]," *Being and Time*, pp. 182-210, 384-401 [= *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 190-221, 444-463]. Following Richardson, I translate *Da-sein* (hyphenated) with 'There-*be[ing]*'.

[71](#) Compared to *Auslegung*, which puts on display what is already there, *Interpretation* exposes what lies hidden in a matter. See EN 67.

[72](#) "Die konkrete Ausarbeitung der Frage nach dem Sinn von 'Sein' ist die Absicht der folgenden Abhandlung. Die Interpretation der *Zeit* als des möglichen Horizontes eines jeden Seinsverständnisses überhaupt ist ihr vorläufiges Ziel."

[73](#) First philosophy as metaphysics, the beginning of philosophy, or philosophy in the primary sense are all intended senses of the Greek phrase explored here. See also EN 18.

[74](#) "Hat nicht zur Torheit werden lassen der Gott die Weisheit der Welt?" (EWM 379)

[75](#) The verb *verbergen* means "(to) hide" used either intransitively (disappearing) or transitively (concealing from view). Taken intransitively, it refers to going into seclusion [*Verborgenheit*]. Coming out of seclusion or hiddenness is expressed by the neologism *unverbergen* translated here as '(to) emerge', the result of which is *Unverborgenheit* [emergence]. In this passage, a form of the verb *unverbergen* is used transitively and in the passive mood. Thus, one is brought out of seclusion. So it is in the case of all that is there [das Seiende] that is brought out of hiding, always thanks to *be[ing]*.

[76](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "der Unterschied [the distinction]." (EWM 380)

The question "What is metaphysics?" asks a seemingly naïve question that those preparing to hear Heidegger's lecture in 1929 must have thought of as trivial when it was announced. Question and answer were presumably "undergraduate material." Everybody knows what metaphysics is! Right? The lecture was probably also a disappointment to its audience inasmuch as Heidegger "answers" the question with another question {381}.

[77](#) *Sein und Zeit*, p. 18. The text of GA 9 cites p. 13.

[78](#) "Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?" (EWM 381)

Variants: Why after all any thing and not rather no thing? Why is there anything of any sort at all and not instead nothing at all?

[79](#) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Leibniz: Die philosophischen Schriften*, edited by C.I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidmann, 1875-90), Volume VI, p. 607, n.7. Heidegger omits the phrase "based on reason" in Leibniz's title. The work was written in 1714 but not published by the author.

[80](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "und Schelling [and Schelling]." (EWM 382)

[81](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "für die Metaphysik [for metaphysics]." (EWM 382)  
That is . . . what for metaphysics is no-thing (a non-issue). This 'es' is the es of *es gibt* [there is . . . or there are . . .] as in "Es gibt Vulkane auf dem Mars": "There are volcanoes on Mars."

[82](#) Fifth edition (1949): "als solchen [as such]." (EWM 382) See EN 83, next.

[83](#) "Woher kommt es, daß Es mit dem Sein eigentlich nichts ist und das Nichts eigentlich nicht west?" (EWM 382)

Variant: How does it happen that nothing comes of *be[ing]* / it is actually nothing to *be* rather than that no-thing comes about?

Heidegger's usage of *Sein* here seems to justify my translation of the word throughout as '*be[ing]*'.

[84](#) That is, the word *Sein* is unspoken in every articulation of what is there (*Seiende*) of any sort. The *be* (*be[ing]*) is "taken for granted" (perhaps better, "taken as granted") with regard to what is there. But this granting is precisely what is in question.

[85](#) "Kommt gar von hier der unerschütterte Anschein in alle Metaphysik, daß sich 'Sein' von selbst verstehe und daß sich demzufolge das Nichts leichter mache als Seiende?" (EWM 382)

[86](#) "For nothing is simpler and easier than something."

[87](#) "Was bleibt rätselhafter, dies, daß Seiendes ist, oder dies, daß Sein 'ist'?" (EWM 383)

[88](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Ereignis der Vergessenheit des Unterschieds [eventuality of the oblivion of the distinction]." (EWM 383)

[89](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "der Unterschied [the distinction]." (EWM 383)

## ENDNOTES TO “WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?” (1929)

[90](#) Hegel's words: "Die Philosophie ist ihrer Natur nach etwas esoterisches, für sich weder für den Pöbel gemacht, noch einer Zubereitung für den Pöbel fähig; sie ist nur dadurch Philosophie daß sie dem Verstande, und damit noch mehr dem gesunden Menschenverstande, worunter man die lokale und temporäre Beschränktheit eines Geschlechts der Menschen versteht, gerade entgegengesetzt ist; im Verhältniß zu diesem ist an und für sich die Welt der Philosophie *eine verkehrte* [emphasis added]." G.W.F. Hegel, "Einleitung. Über das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik überhaupt, und ihr Verhältnis zum gegenwärtigen Zustand der Philosophie insbesondere [Introduction. On the Essence of Philosophical Criticism in General, and its Relationship to the Present State of Philosophy in Particular]" (1802), in *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by Hartmut Buchner and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968) IV, p. 124-25. The text is Hegel's general introduction to the *Critical Journal of Philosophy* that he and Schelling edited. In translation, on the world of philosophy as "one that is topsy-turvy": "Philosophy is, by its very nature, something esoteric, neither made for the vulgar as it stands, nor capable of being got up to suit the vulgar taste; it is philosophy only in virtue of being directly opposed to the understanding and hence even more opposed to healthy common sense, under which label we understand the limitedness in space and time of a race of men; in its relationship to common sense the world of philosophy is in and for itself one that is inverted."

[91](#) 'Dasein' will be translated with 'existence'. 'Da-sein' (hyphenated), which first makes its appearance at {103}, will usually be translated as 'be[ing]-there'. The audience would not have heard the hyphenated word after three instances of the use

of 'Dasein' up to that point. This instance and the next occurrence of the word are exceptions, however, and for the rest of the lecture the text presents the word unhyphenated. The translation as 'be[ing]-there' gives equivalent emphasis to both elements of the word. It is rumored that Heidegger told American translators Joan Stambaugh and J. Glenn Gray that *Da-sein* should always be hyphenated in print. William J. Richardson's translation of *Dasein* (unhyphenated) as 'There-being' is therefore exact with respect to Heidegger's presumptive directive. Two decades after writing this lecture, Heidegger's understanding of the key words *Sein*, *Seiende*, *Dasein* and *Existenz* changed in certain ways, as a reading of the Introduction makes plain. For *Sein* I give 'be[ing]', which remains the same in the Introduction. For *Seiende* I give 'what is there'. *Dasein* should always be translated with 'existence' since of all that there is only humans exist. The most challenging translation is of *Existenz* with "a way of life," which always refers the life of a human being. The noun is ordinarily qualified to indicate a particular way of life, for example, as in *wissenschaftliche Existenz*, the way of life of science (as below in the Lecture). The Introduction devotes a great deal of time to an analysis of the notion of *Existenz* as it was understood in *Sein und Zeit*. There, of course, we find the famous line: "The 'essence [Wesen]' of existence [Dasein] is <in> its way of life [Existenz]." See the Letter for further clarification of this by no famous assertion.

[92](#) "Worauf der Weltbezug geht, ist das Seiende selbst—und sonst nichts."  
(WM 105)

Variant: The connection with the world extends to what is there—and nothing else besides.

The relation (*Bezug*) of be[ing] to the nature of man explored earlier in this text is taken up in the Letter (Part II, below), which is roughly contemporaneous with the Introduction. There the nature of the relation from the point of view of be[ing] is

worked through with greater nuance. The relation turns out to be more than a simple connection or linkage but points to a tension between *be[ing]* and the human being. As Heidegger's note makes explicit, the connection of humans with what is there (*das Seiende*) is another matter altogether.

[93](#) \*First edition (1929): "Man hat diesen Zusatz hinter dem Gedankenstrich als willkürlich und künstlich ausgegeben und weiß nicht, daß Taine, der als Vertreter und Zeichen eines ganzen, noch herrschenden Zeitalters genommen werden kann, wissentlich diese Formel zur Kennzeichnung seiner Grundstellung und Absicht gebraucht [The addition after the hyphen may seem arbitrary and artificial without knowing that Taine, who can be called the representative and symbol of the entirety of the still prevailing era, knowingly used this formula as the characterization of his starting point and purpose]." (WM 105)

Hippolyte-Adolphe Taine (1828-1893), philosopher and "psychologist," was one of the leading lights of positivism in France and an influence, for example, on Jean Piaget's genetic epistemology and contemporary cognitive psychology.

[94](#) I have translated *das Nichts* as no-thing (hyphenated) to highlight that no thing can be found in the absence of anything, of effective actuality (what is there) of any kind whatsoever, of "what is there" on the scene. Of course, no thing of any sort can be detected if there were not someone or something there to detect it as missing.

Here in the text begins a proliferation of terms used by Heidegger in his discussion of no-thing. Some are in common use in German, some have technical resonances in the literature of philosophy, and some are Heidegger's neologisms (marked in what follows with an \*). Occasionally, an English neologism (marked \*\*) has been required to translate a given word. The terms and their place of first



appearance in the *Wegmarken* text are as follows: the pronoun '*nichts*' [nothing, nothing (at all)] {105} and its related noun *\*das Nichts* [the no-thing] {105}; the noun *\*das Nicht* [the Not] {108}; the verb *\*nichten* [to nihilate] {114}, its related present participle and adjective *\*nichtend* [nihilating] {114}, the nouns *\*die Nichtung* [the nihilation] {114} and '*das Nichten*' [the nihilating] {115}; the noun *\*das Nichthaff* [the not-like] {108}, which is based on an implied neologism, the adjective *\*nichthaff*; the verb '*vernichten*' [(to) annihilate] {113} and the noun '*die Vernichtung*' [the annihilation] {113}; two composite nouns '*das Nicht-Seiende*' [what is not-there] {108} and '*das Nichtseiend*' [the not-there] {119}; the nouns *\*das Nichtige* [the null and void] {106} and '*die Nichtigkeit*' [the nullity] {119} (from the adjective '*nichtig*' [null, invalid, void]); the verb '*verneinen*' [to negate] {109}, its past participle '*verneint*' [negated] {109}, the related adjective '*verneinend*' [negative, negating] {113}, based on the present participle of '*verneinen*', and five related nouns: '*die Verneinung*' [the negation, in the sense of what is accomplished by placing a negative sign in front of a term in symbolic logic or mathematics] {107}, *\*das Verneint* [the negated, the negated] {108}, *\*die Verneinheit* [the negativity] {108}, *\*das Zu-verneinend* [the what that is to do the negating] {116}, and '*das Verneinen*' [the negating] {117}; the noun *\*das Verneinbar* [the *\*\*negatable*], based on a neologism, the adjective '*verneinbar*' [*\*\*negatable*] {116}; the adverb '*nein*' [no] used as an interjection [No!] {118}, and its related noun *\*das Nein* [the No] {117}; and the adverb '*kein*' [no, none, or not any] (112). *Das Nichtende* [what is nihilating or the nihilating], a noun based on *nichtend*, the present participle of *nichten* and its related adjective *nichtend*, is added in a marginal note to the 5<sup>th</sup> edition of 1949 {312}. The nuance provided gives the no-thing a strongly active sense.

[95](#) "Wir wissen es, indem wir von ihm, dem Nichts, nichts wissen wollen." (WM 106)

[96](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "die positive and ausschließliche Haltung zum Seienden [the positive and exclusive attitude toward what is there]." (WM 106)

[97](#) \*Third edition (1931): "ontologische Differenz [ontological difference]." (WM 106) The phrase is well known from *Sein und Zeit*. It is usually translated as "the ontological difference." Are they then also the same?

\*Fifth edition (1949): "Nichts als 'Sein' [the no-thing as 'be[ing]']." (WM 106)

[98](#) "Die Wissenschaft gibt es, mit einer überlegenen Gleichgültigkeit gegen es, preis als das, was 'es nicht gibt'." (WM 107)

Variant: . . . as what "there is not" / "is not there." Here Heidegger exploits the common German expression "es gibt [there is . . .]," but the reference is clearly also to "givens" in mathematics and, in general, to data (facts) in the natural sciences. In the Introduction, he pays close attention to this "It" that gives. The English expression "What gives?" catches in its net the field of the issue. Cf. the German "Was gibt's?" ("literally, "What does it give?" or "What is there?") in everyday usage it means "What's up?" or "How are things?"—or "How's everything?").

[99](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "der Unterschied, die Differenz [the distinction, the difference]." (WM 107) *Unterschied* also refers to the result of a subtraction problem (in English, the "difference"). *Differenz* may also denote a difference of opinion or a discrepancy (implying error) in the findings of one (or more) among several observers. See Heidegger's *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 35-73 [GA 11 (2006), pp. 51-79], on the principle of identity in logic and Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*.

[100](#) \*First edition (1929): "d.h. Logik im gewöhnlichen Sinne, was man so dafür nimmt [that is, logic in the usual sense that one uses the term]." (WM 107)

[101](#) "Nur mit seiner Hilfe können wir doch überhaupt das Nichts bestimmen und als ein wenn auch nur sich selbst verzehrendes Problem ansetzen." (WM 107)

[102](#) This sense of negation is exemplified by what is done by the negative sign in mathematics that appears, for example, in the formulation of the principle of non-contradiction (identity) in symbolic logic ( $A \neq -A$ ).

[103](#) "Gibt es das Nichts nur, weil es das Nicht, d.h. die Verneinung gibt? Oder liegt es umgekehrt? Gibt es die Verneinung und das Nicht nur, weil es das Nichts gibt?" (WM 108)

[104](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Ursprungsordnung [(in) order of origin / of origination]." (WM 108)

[105](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "die blinde Eigensinnigkeit: die *certitudo* des *ego cogito*, Subjektivität [blind single-mindedness: the *certitudo* [certainty] of the *ego cogito* [I think], subjectivity]." (WM 108)

[106](#) "Zunächst und zumeist vermag der Mensch nur dann zu suchen, wenn er das Vorhandensein des Gesuchten vorweggenommen hat." (WM 109)

[107](#) *Zumal* also means "at the same time."

[108](#) The "thought up" is in one sense the imaginary. The point is, we can never imagine away everything.

[109](#) "Aber das Nichts ist nichts . . ." (WM 109)

[110](#) *Unterschiedslösigkeit* also means "indifference" as the condition of having lost all capacity for making distinctions.

[111](#) Here Heidegger is pointing to the patent [seienden] latency [Nichts] of anything whatsoever.

[112](#) The fundamental sense of *das Seiende im Ganzen* seems to be “what is there at all.”

[113](#) This is the unity of what is simultaneously minimally (“at all”) and maximally (“all”) delimited.

[114](#) The sense here is of when we are whiling away the time, fooling around, tinkering about.

[115](#) This is the “at all” of “being at all.”

[116](#) Today Heidegger would likely have referred to watching television, playing video games, texting, IMing, or passing the time with other such diversions.

[117](#) The conventional translation would yield “joy in the presence of someone we love.” But *Gegenwart* denotes both “the present” (in contrast with “the past” and “the future”) and the grammatical present tense, as well as “presence.” This is a telling usage. Heidegger points to the coincidence in existence of a temporal mode and linguistic expression. This “aside” in the lecture is extremely important especially for the influence of Heidegger on psychotherapy and considering the extent to which his purported nihilism is usually said to begin with the Lecture. In genuine therapy, the goal of the therapist is to not do as much as possible by being nothing to him to permit the other to regain and resume his present. See my *After Psychotherapy* (2016) New York: ENI Press. This is one of the few places in writings published during his lifetime in which Heidegger mentions love. Except perhaps for the professors of psychology in attendance, to an audience of scholars and research scientists the mention of love, however fleeting, must have been as disarming as talk about the no-thing.

[118](#) Finding ourselves at all always means finding ourselves somewhere, in a particular place, never (a) nowhere (χώρα)—including a utopia (a literal no place, a

no-where—or is it a now-here)—or just anywhere, and in a certain “state” and mood, disposed in a certain way. Heidegger will explore the notion of place (χώρα, Ort, τόπος) in a variety of texts. See for example, *Die Kunst und der Raum* (1969 [1964]) St Gallen: Erker Verlag, which constitutes his only genuine collaboration with another thinker and artist, the Basque sculptor and Eduardo Chillida. For Heidegger, *things are places*. The notion of mood is, of course, central to the discussion of existence in *Sein und Zeit*.

[119](#) *Begleiterscheinung* may also mean a “side-effect” such as the undesired feelings consequent to a medical treatment including the administration of a medication.

[120](#) *Ursprünglich* also means ‘primordially’ or ‘originatively’, that is, in a way that occasions or originates the event in question.

[121](#) "Im Ganzen ist einem so." (WM 111)

Variant: There is also something of this about the "at all" as in "what is there at all."

Heidegger takes up two elements of the colloquial expression *ist es einem unheimlich* to probe the mystery of what is there in its entirety: the pronoun *es* and the verb *ist*. The phrase cannot be translated word for word into English, but its sense is readily captured in the equivalently idiomatic English expression I have used {112}, “It’s scary.” The contraction partially hides the verb. In the German expression, as Heidegger says, it is not possible to see what the elements are about that allows one to speak of what is “scary.” Of course, that is the beauty of idioms, which Heidegger explores again and again in his elucidations. The now obsolete English noun ‘scare’, on which the word ‘scary’ is based, is a possible translation of *Angst*, although ‘scare’ conflates fear (which has an object) with dread (which does

not) as the discussions of *Angst* here and in *Sein und Zeit* are at pains to make clear. Other options for *unheimlich* are the words 'creepy', 'odd' and 'weird', but they do not reflect Heidegger's clear reference to what is fearsome and not only unaccustomed or odd.

[122](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "das Seiende spricht nicht mehr an [what is there no longer appeals to this]."

[123](#) In the following lines, Heidegger plays with the verbs *bedrängen* ([to] pressure, in the sense of forcing someone's hand), *umdrängen* ([to] close in on, the way a storm approaches), and *andrängen* ([to] play against, the way actors "play off" one another on stage).

[124](#) "Es bleibt kein Halt." (WM 112)

Variant: There is no getting a hold on anything.

[125](#) Variant: In dread we are "at sea."

[126](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "aber nicht der Mensch als Mensch 'des' Da-sein [but not the human as the human being "of" *be[ing]-there*]." (WM 112)

Heidegger is not speaking of the "human (being)" (man or woman)—humans—understood somehow as the *result* (therefore, a "finished" being) of *be[ing]-there* [Da-sein] at all.

[127](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "das Da-sein 'im' Mensch [the *be[ing]-there* "of" humans]."

Variants: Here in the shuddering of such suspense where there is no *thing* of any kind to hold on to, nothing remains other than pure *be[ing]-there*. All that remains is pure, unalloyed *be[ing]-there*.

The "someone [einem]" is no one in particular, in effect no one.

[128](#) "Die Angst verschlägt uns das Wort." (WM 112)

Variant: Dread leaves us speechless / with nothing to say / without words to express ourselves.

[129](#) "In der Tat: das Nichts selbst—als solche—war da." (WM 112)

\*Fifth edition (1949): "heißt: enthüllte sich; Entbergung und Stimmung [that is to say, reveals itself; disclosure and mood]."

*Entbergung* alludes to opening up in the sense of confessing and giving over what one has held within (in reserve). In this paragraph, Heidegger seems to be using *Gegenwart* in the more conventional sense of "presence," yet the no-thing is after all not "just anything." He is alluding to the temporal character of the no-thing in the way he will twenty years later talk about the present of the *existence* of a loved one in the Introduction. There, we recall, he is not talking about the other as a physical entity on hand at a meeting (that is someone's presence), but rather the other's existence. Thus existence and the no-thing have something in common.

[130](#) In dread, we have in a sense "caught up" with existence and see it as it first comes about.

[131](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "als Subjekt! Da-sein aber schon denkend hier vorerfahren, nur deshalb die Frage "Was ist Metaphysik?" hier fragbar geworden [as subject! Only now, thinking of *be[ing]*-there as already having been experienced beforehand, has the question "What Is Metaphysics?" become questionable]." (WM 113)

[132](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Entbergung [disclosure]." (WM 113)

[133](#) "Die Angst ist kein Erfassen des Nichts." (WM 113)

[134](#) Fifth edition (1949): "Unheimlichkeit und Unverborgenheit [uncanniness and emergence]." (WM 113)

[135](#) " . . . das Nichts begegnet in der Angst in eins mit dem Seienden im Ganzen." (WM 113)

[136](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "der Unterschied [the distinction]."

[137](#) "Das Nichts begegnet vordem schon." (WM 114)

[138](#) "In der Angst liegt ein Zurückweichen vor . . . , das freilich kein Fliehen mehr ist, sondern eine gebannte Ruhe." (WM 114)

Variant: This retreating in the face of what we find dread is admittedly not a fleeing but rather a spellbound calm.

[139](#) Several senses of *abweisen* are at work: (1) turning away (dismissing), (2) turning away from (actively rejecting) and (3) turning down (refusing, as in choosing not to accept a job offer). The image is one of turning someone away who has sought accommodation or not admitting something.

[140](#) This may also be construed as a referring (back [zurück]) to what is there in its entirety based on the sense of *Verweisen* as referring.

[141](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "ab-weisen: das Seiende für sich; ver-weisen: in das Sein des Seienden [(to) turn away / dis-miss: what is there for itself; (to) ex-pel / send off: into the *be*[ing] of what is there]."

[142](#) "Das Nichts selbst nichtet." (WM 114)

Variants: The nothing itself is not. Only the no-thing nihilates. The no-thing nihilates itself. Only the no-thing nihilates. The no-thing only nihilates <and nothing more>.

Hull/Crick: "Nothing 'nihilates' of itself."



Richardson renders *das Nichten des Nichts* with "Non-being in its very essence" and *das Nichtende* as "negating element."

Kaufmann: "Nothing 'nihilates (*nichtet*)' of itself."

Krell: "The nothing itself nihilates."

Sheehan in his "interpretive translation": "The no-thing itself propels us into meaning" and referring to Heidegger's 5<sup>th</sup> ed. note: "that is: occurs as the action-of-the-the-no-thing; holds forth; the no-thing grants."

\*Fifth edition (1949): "als Nichten west, wahrt, gewahrt das Nichts [as <in> nihilating brings about, sustains, grants the no-thing]." (WM 114)

[143](#) Variant: Nihilating does not begin at some point. The sense seems to be of nihilating as ongoing. The no-thing has always already been underway.

[144](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "d.h. Sein [that is, *be[ing]*]." (WM 114)

*Be[ing]* is the "predecessive potential" for there being anything at all and in its entirety. The predecessor is the eventuality Heidegger calls *das Ereignis* that ushers in what is there and marks off a world for each existence. See {118}.

[145](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "eigens vor Sein des Seienden, vor den Unterschied [in particular before <the> *be[ing]* of what is there, before the distinction <has been made>]." (WM 114)

Variant: Originally nihilating no-thing brings forward *being*-there in advance of what is there of any sort.

[146](#) \*First edition (1929): "1.) u.a. nicht nur, 2.) daraus nicht folgern: also ist alles Nichts, sondern umgekehrt: ubernehmen und Vernehmung des Seienden, Sein und Endlichkeit [(1) *inter alia* not only; <and> (2) <moreover,> it does not follow that

therefore all is no-thing, but rather the other way around: taking over and taking up / consideration of what is there, *be[ing]* and finitude]." (WM 115)

[147](#) "Da-sein heißt: Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts." (WM 114)

Variant: *Be[ing]*-there means involvement in the no-thing. *Be[ing]*-there means directedness into the no-thing.

The image I have is of a propulsive launching out into into a beckoning wide-open expanse (the nothingness of air) much like a back flip. An overview of earth is provided in such transcendence of "it all" [*das Seiende*], of everything.

[148](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "wer hält ursprünglich [who originally holds]?" (WM 115) Who, indeed? There is in the word *ursprünglich* a reference to that image of a back flip [*Sprung*] mentioned in the previous endnote. What is the source of the energy that launches existence on its trajectory? At the same time, however, there is a sense of restraint. The beholdenness of existence is therefore in a state of tension, the rigidity of body in executing such a *Sprung*.

[149](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "d.h. Nichts und Sein das Selbe [that is, no-thing and *be[ing]* <are> the same]." (WM 115)

The paratactic structure is familiar from Heidegger's late translations of a fragment of Parmenides in *Was heißt Denken?*. See my *Translating Heidegger* (Amherst: Humanity Press, 1997), Part II.

[150](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Freiheit und Wahrheit im Vortrag 'Vom Wesen der Wahrheit' [Freedom and truth in the essay 'On the Essence of Truth']." (WM 115) The essay, first given in 1930, was not published until 1943, the year the Epilogue was added.

Variant: No no-thing, no selfhood and no freedom.

[151](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "nicht 'durch' [not "through" / not "by way of"]." (WM 115)

[152](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Wesen: verbal; Wesen des Seins [<the> coming about: gerundive; <the> coming about of *be[ing]*]." (WM 115)

Variant: The no-thing is the very coming about of *be[ing]*.

[153](#) This is the first appearance of the word *Sein* in the lecture.

[154](#) Fifth edition (1949): "weil *in* das Sein des Seienden [because *in* the *be[ing]* of what is there]." (WM 116)

[155](#) Using the word 'continually' here would more clearly preserve Heidegger's understanding of the temporality of the nihilating of the no-thing.

Variant: The no-thing continually nihilates but without our really knowing about this happening in the sense of the kind of knowing that helps us get by on a day to day basis.

[156](#) The imagery and language here are suggestive of mathematics: givens, the negative sign [die Verneinung], and so on. See EN 160.

[157](#) "Wie soll aber ein Verneinbares und Zu-verneinendes als ein Nichthaftes erblickt werden können, es sei denn so, daß alles Denken als solches auf das Nicht schon vorblick?" (WM 116)

[158](#) \*First edition (1929): "gleichwohl hier—wie sonst Aussage—die Verneinung zu nachträglich und äußerlich gefaßt [even here, in the usual way of expressing it <the notion of> negation is too extraneous and superficial]." (WM 117) See EN 75 to the Introduction.

[159](#) \*First edition (1929): "'Logik', d.h. die *überlieferte* Auslegung des Denkens [“logic,” that is, <as> the *traditional* explanation of thinking]." (WM 117)

[160](#) *Geworfenheit* refers to the basic condition of existence that it is given in such and such a way and not in some other, given in(to) a given situation, a situation which it must "give in to" for which there is no choice in the matter. As whom, where and when we are born are the elements of this *Geworfenheit* and fundamental to how our projects in life will be formulated and unfold; that is, as our way of life (*Existenz*) is in a basic sense circumscribed by its possibilities (even if they are not all realized). This endowment both allows and forces upon us a certain range of possibilities. Heidegger's usage implies that we are fated to the particular conditions of our existence. One sense of *werfen*, the root verb of term *Geworfenheit*, is "having a baby." Each of us has also been "had" in this sense. In English, we say a woman "has" a baby. Our parents "had" us. What we have been allotted in life sometimes seems to be a joke. There is something of this in *Geworfenheit*, too, but so also is there a sense of one's mission as a consequence of having been had (born) as a human being in a certain body and setting. We might even try two neologisms of our own for *Geworfenheit*: 'hadhood' and 'hadness'. Finally, *Geworfenheit* can refer to the status of what "has" to (must) be; for example, the givens of a problem in logic or mathematics. The grammatical imperative mood is suggested.

[161](#) "Der Tiefe ihres Waltens entspricht das Geringfügige ihrer möglichen Veranlassung." (WM 118)

Variant: Just because its possible occasions are rare, the sway of dread is great when it does occur.

[162](#) In this sentence, Heidegger is playing on the meaning of *umreißen*. The sense is that one is immobilized, hemmed in, stunned, frozen by dread.

[163](#) Variant: Existence—i.e., the human being—which questions is brought up for questioning / put in question when any metaphysical question is brought up.

The scenario is suggestive of an interrogation.

[164](#) "The created thing comes from nothing."

[165](#) Heidegger's reference corresponds to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, A.V. Miller, trans. (New York: Humanities Press, 1976), Volume I, Book One, Section One, Chapter 1, p. 82. "Das reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist also dasselbe." Hamlet's query may be moot! Perhaps there is no either/or here. The singular [*is*] in Hegel's assertion makes it preferable to read the sentence: "The same—pure *be*[ing] and the pure nothing." The intransitive (or is it transitive?) verb "is" is implied.

[166](#) Variant: . . . in their uncertainty or vagueness and unmediatedness.

[167](#) \*First edition (1929): "d.h. immer der überlieferten Logik und ihr Logik als Ursprung der Kategorien [that is, always traditional logic and logic as the origin of the categories]." (WM 120)

[168](#) "Every thing as a thing comes from no-thing."

Variants of the famous expression *ex nihilo nihil fit*: No-thing comes of no-thing. No-thing comes from no-thing.

[169](#) "Im Nichts des Daseins kommt erst das Seiende im Ganzen seiner eigensten Möglichkeit nach, d.h. in endlicher Weise, zu sich selbst." (WM 120)

Variant: All that is in its entirety comes into its own in accordance with its very own possibility, that is, only in the no-thing of existence.

[170](#) See the Introduction to the Lecture in which the meaning of *existieren* is refined. Only man exists. Man is an original. The verb *existiert* is used to stress the ex-istential nature of existence that Heidegger will explore in the Letter to Jean Beaufret as being out there (*da sein*) in the world. Science is science inasmuch as it

derives from (originates in) metaphysics. Our word 'derive' means to "flow from" as water forms a stream from its source.

[171](#) "Das Hinausgehen über das Seiende geschieht im Wesen des Daseins."  
(WM 121)

Variants: Exceeding what is there is of the essence of existence. The essence of existence is being more than the rest of what is there.

[172](#) The reference is to Kant. See the Introduction to the lecture where it is repeated {368} and note 19.

[173](#) "For by nature, my friend, philosophy is in the mind of man." Hackforth's translation: "For that mind of his, Phaedrus, contains an innate tincture of philosophy." *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (1961) Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 524.

[174](#) \*In the first edition of *Wegmarken* (1967): "zweierlei gesagt: 'Wesen' der Metaphysik und ihre eigene seinsgeschickliche Geschichte; beide später genannt in der 'Verwindung' [said two ways: <the> 'essence' of metaphysics and its own befitting history; both <are> named in 'twisting free [Verwindung] of <metaphysics>']." (WM 122) Contrast this "twisting free of" metaphysics with Heidegger's later, somewhat tamer reference to upending (knocking over) or overturning [Überwindung] of metaphysics. Perhaps an allusion is not out of place to a correction of what, for Hegel, philosophy does in turning everything upside down. See EN 90 to the Lecture.

[175](#) "Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?" See EN 78. It is, to repeat, the question posed by Leibniz in 1714 in his *Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce [Fondé en Raison]*: "Pourquoi il y a plutôt quelque chose que rien?" It is a question that haunts Heidegger throughout his lifetime. As we saw, he explicitly

refers to it in the Introduction to the Lecture twenty years later. His fundamental question—about the sense of *be[ing]*—refers to the “is” in the question (“Why *is* there something rather than nothing?”). Interestingly enough, the French formulation avoids using a form of the very “(to) be” in employing “il y a [it has there] . . .”, the little word *y* (evidently a shortened form of the Old French word *iv*) corresponding to the German *da* [there] of *Dasein*.

## ENDNOTES TO "EPILOGUE TO 'WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?'"

(1943; REVISED 1949)

[176](#) The following note preceded the Epilogue in the fourth edition (1943) of the Lecture, which was the first to include the Epilogue: "No matter how abstract and near to thinking the word may be, metaphysics is a word from which everyone more or less flees as from someone afflicted with the plague." Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, *Werke* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot), Band XVII, p. 400." Notes that first appeared the original (1943) version of the Epilogue are preceded by (†).

[177](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Ge-setz; Ereignis [<the> giv-en / command]; eventuality]." (NWM 304)

Variant: . . . the inability to stand by what is given by the truth of this knowledge.

[178](#) The question "What is metaphysics?" thus "comes to life" in a fresh way or even for the first time. Metaphysics is roused from the slumber of customary treatments of it as one of the standard "areas" of philosophy along with logic, ontology, epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics. It also "comes to" in becoming reoriented as a *question* with respect to us, the questioners. Like a ship, the question changes direction ("comes to" or "comes about").

[179](#) \*Fourth Edition (1943): "Auch dies noch metaphysisch vom Seienden her gesagt [But this still speaks metaphysically about what is there]." (NWM 306)

[180](#) \*Fourth Edition (1943): "vom Seienden [of / from what is there]." (NWM 306)

[181](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "das Gewährende [the granting]." (NWM 306)



[182](#) †In the fourth edition (1943), we read 'wohl [probably, no doubt]' instead of 'nie [not]'.

[183](#) \*Fourth edition (1943): "In der Wahrheit des Seins west das Seyn qua Wesen der Differenz; dieses Seyn qua ~~Sein~~ ist vor der Differenz das Ereignis und deshalb *ohne* Seiendes [Be[yng] comes about in the truth of be[ing] as <the> essence of the difference; this be[yng] as ~~being~~ is the eventuality before the difference between be[ing] and what is there <has been made> and <is> therefore *without* being]." (NWM 306)

*Be[ing]* is without *being*. Heidegger's crossing out of the word *Sein* was first seen in the 1956 essay *Zur Seinsfrage*. See *On the Question of Being* (1958) New York: Twayne (a bilingual translation). He explains there that crossing out the word *Sein* reminds us that what the word points to is nothing that comes into contact with humans and somehow interacts with us. It is nothing that is there. It is unspeakable and yet at the same time something that language somehow points to. Not crossed out, *Sein* is understood as still considered from the perspective of metaphysics. The device also suggests a middle voice (*Aktionsart* or *genus verbi*) of the verb *sein* on which *das Sein* is based, a voice (diathesis) that does not exist in German or English but that one finds in ancient Greek. The middle voice expresses what neither does (active) or is done to (passive) but has some other relation to the subject of the sentence.

\*Fifth edition (1949): "Vordeutung aus Seyn qua Ereignis, aber dort (in der 4. Auflage) nicht verständlich [pre-understanding of be[yng] as eventuality, but not understandable there (in the 4th edition)]." (NWM 306)

Just as in German *Seyn* is an antiquated spelling of *Sein*, so in English 'beyng' is an antiquated spelling of 'being'. In pointing to the near antiquity of the spelling of

*Sein* as *Seyn* Heidegger shows how compliant language is with the need for giving verbal (spoken, written) expression to thinking. Hölderlin still spelled the word *Seyn*.

[184](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Wesen von Sein: Seyn, Unterschied; 'Wesen' von Sein mehrdeutig: 1. Ereignis, nicht durch Seiendes bewirkt, Ereignis—Gewährende; 2. Seiendheit—Washeit: während, dauernd, ὅεί [essence of *be[ing]*: *be[yng]*], distinction; <the word> 'coming about' of *be[ing]* <is> ambiguous <in the phrase>: 1. eventuality, not effected by what is there; eventuality—granting; 2. be-ingness—whatness; granting, lasting / going on, (for)ever]." (NWM 306)

*Be[ing]* makes possible what is there, that is, makes what is there come about without itself coming about or bringing itself about.

[185](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "im Sinne von Seyn [in the sense of *be[yng]*]." (NWM 306)

[186](#) †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of 'niemals [<in> no way]': "niemals aber [never, however]." (NWM 306)

[187](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "'das Sein' (Austrag) als die lautlose Stimme, die Stimme der Stille [*be[ing]*] (bearing) as the inaudible voice, the voice of silence]." (NWM 306)

The sense is of being brought to term and issuing forth—images of parturition are unmistakable here, as when we say a woman *bears* a child—but also of coming to terms with something.

[188](#) Variant: Man experiences *that* there is something and not nothing.

This becomes the basis for consciousness, which follows having come to know [*bewußt*] that there is something there.

[189](#) "Der also in seinem Wesen in die Wahrheit des Seins Gerufene ist daher stets in einer wesentlichen Weise gestimmt." (NWM 307)

Variants: What is called (for) in the truth of *be[ing]* is always in tune with it in an essential way. The truth of *be[ing]* and what is, in truth, called for are invariably in tune with each other.

[190](#) Variant: . . . to stand up to, bear, put up with the no-thing.

[191](#) Heidegger's figure refers to arithmetic computation and data management (for example, by statistics and computing). Everything that is subjected to calculative thinking must be divisible into discrete, discernible units and accountable for in that way; for example, in the operation of a computer program—and it would appear now to the operator of the computer as well. The explanations that calculative thinking produces (thinks up) must "add up" (make sense). In the natural and social sciences, which are the realm of calculative thinking, everything must be submitted to numerical analysis, "figured" out, and presumably thereby explained. The data and computational results must be measurable and measurability depends on the employment of fixed standards and units of measurement (seconds, inches, etc.) and expressible in arithmetic terms. Every problem must have a solution. As in the case of the typewriter, so for the calculator and the computer, the person and the gizmo become interchangeable. Recall though that a human operator was always named first, followed by the device. For example, the first computer was a person whose special work was to complete calculations (adding, multiplying) for a businessman. She sat at a desk doing sums, etc.

[192](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "*Rechnen*: Herrschaft—Bestellung; *Denken*: Gelassenheit in die Vereinigung des Brauchs—Ent-sagen [*calculating*: rule—order;

*thinking*: the composure of acclimation to custom—ab-negating / denying / dis-avowing].” (NWM 309)

[193](#) "Statt mit dem Seienden auf das Seiende zu rechnen, verschwendet es sich im Sein für die Wahrheit des Seins." (NWM 309)

This is a telling usage of the verb *verschwenden*, which is based on the verb *schwenden* (to disappear), in Heidegger’s characterization of the relation of a human being to *be[ing]*. Self-negation is implied.

[194](#) "Diese Denken antwortet dem Anspruch des Seins, indem der Mensch sein geschichtliches Wesen dem Einfachen der einzigen Notwendigkeit überantwortet, die nicht nötigt, indem sie zwingt, sondern die Not schafft, die sich in der Freiheit des Opfers erfüllt." (NWM 309)

Variant: . . . just as man puts his historical essence in the hands of all that is of the essence . . .

*Opfer* means “sacrifice” and the basic meaning of sacrifice is “giving something up.”

[195](#) †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of "Das anfängliche Denken [original thinking] . . .": "Das ursprüngliche Danken [original thanking] . . ." (NWM 310).

The note implies something in the ellipsis, but is it thanks *for*, thanks *to*, or thanks *of*? Another sense of *anfänglich* as “incipient” is in play here that casts a wide net. It is thinking that is about to happen, sets one on the right track (and is therefore steadying and consoling), begins ever anew (where one is always a beginner, as in the application of the phenomenological method), is innovative (starts something new), and is unusual (exceptional, maybe even “excessive,” “out there,” edgy). All of

these attributes apply, of course, to Heidegger's way of thinking and writing. "The opening thought" suggests the opening tone(s) of a piece of music.

[196](#) †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of " . . . in der sich das Einzige lichtet und sich ereignen läßt [in which the unique sheds light on itself and lets it come to pass]": " . . . in der es sich lichtet und das Einzige sich ereignen läßt [in which it lights up and lets the unique come to pass]." (NWM 310)

[197](#) \*Fifth edition (1949): "Ereignis [eventuality]." (NWM 310)

[198](#) †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of "Die Antwort des Denkens . . . [the response of thinking]": "Die sprachlose Antwort des Dankens im Opfer [the speechless response of thanks in sacrifice]. . . ." (NWM 310)

[199](#) †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of "Denken [thinking]": "Danken [thanking]." (NWM 310)

[200](#) †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of "Danken [thanking]": "Denken [thinking]." (NWM 310)

[201](#) †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of "Bedanken [thanks]": "Andenken [remembrance / commemoration]." (NWM 310)

[202](#) " . . . als welches das Sein den Menschen für die Wahrheit des Seins in den Anspruch nimmt." (NWM 311)

\*Fifth edition (1949): "er-eignet, braucht [comes to pass / e-ventuates, uses / makes use of]." (NWM 311)

Humans are engrossed in (completely preoccupied with and made greater by) speaking for (on behalf of) the truth. Here Heidegger plays on *ansprechen* ([to] speak to), the colloquial expression *in den Anspruch nehmen* ([to] claim), and *ansprechend* (mutually attracting, in this case *be[ing]* and the human being). There is

the hint that *be[ing]* appeals to humans—in the sense of (1) making a request of humans and (2) being attractive to humans—and humans respond to that. In a sense human beings are seduced by *be[ing]*.

[203](#) Variant: . . . balanced . . . This seems to refer to the double entry bookkeeping system in which when credits and debits cancel each other out the books are balanced.

[204](#) The point is that giving up something (in this case what is there) does not mean losing anything. I may have a cell phone and choose not to use it.

[205](#) Both the objective genitive and subjective genitive forms of the preposition are in play here.

[206](#) "Das Denken des Seins sucht im Seiende keinen Anhalt." (NWM 311)

Variant: Thinking of *be[ing]* hasn't a clue about what is there.

[207](#) "Das Denken, gehorsam der Stimme des Seins, sucht diesem das Wort, aus dem die Wahrheit des Seins zur Sprache kommt." (NWM 311)

These are words that "fit" or are appropriate to the truth of *be[ing]*.

[208](#) Variant: Thinking of *be[ing]* oversees or looks after words . . .

[209](#) Heidegger's use of *Sorge* here repeats what he has said (*Spruch*) about caring for the way language is used. See EN 39.

[210](#) Here at stake is clearing up of the meanings of words in light of what thinks *be[ing]*.

[211](#) "Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige." (NWM 312)

Variant: The thinker announces / heralds *be[ing]* . . .



Let no one mourn again.

These things are in the hands of God.

Sophocles, Volume 1, in *The Complete Greek Tragedies*, translated by Robert Fitzgerald, edited by David Grene and Richard Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 155. Heidegger adds a line to Sophocles' text. Were it to be added to Lattimore, it would function as a gloss on "what had to be" or "what was destined to be." To so guarantee means "to look after what is [after all] a ruling of the consummation" of the relationship between man and *be[ing]*. The erotic nature of the relationship between man and *be[ing]* is undeniable, while the looking after it is not.



**PART II**

**LETTER ON 'HUMANISM' (1947)**

**APPENDIX: Letter to Jean Beaufret (November 23, 1945)**



## LETTER ON "HUMANISM"\*1

{313} We still by no means think decisively enough about the essence of action [Handeln]. One knows action only as the bringing about of an effect, the effectiveness of which is assessed according to its usefulness. However, the essence of action is perfecting [Vollbringen] <something>. Perfecting means to unfold something in the fullness [Fülle] of its essence <and in so doing> bring it forth, *producere*. But what is alone already actually perfectible, what above all "is," is *be[ing]*. Thinking perfects the relation [Bezug] of *be[ing]* to the essence of humans [Mensch].<sup>45</sup> It does not make or effect this relation. Thinking only bears it [bringt . . . dar] as what is handed over <to it> by *be[ing]*. This bearing [Darbringen] consists in

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<sup>45</sup> Ordinarily one would translate *Mensch* with 'Man' (capitalized), which is the topic of anthropology. I have chosen 'humans' here and in Heidegger's lecture *Was ist Metaphysik?* since it is gender neutral and in the Letter the topic of Heidegger's consideration is the status of humanism as a worldview. The *Bezug* Heidegger speaks of here is really a pull [Zug] exerted on humans. Later Heidegger will develop the meaning of this "pull" that from the point of view of *be[ing]* effects a tension between *be[ing]* and humans. By contrast, he speaks of a *Verhältnis* (relationship) between humans and *be[ing]* that does not point to such a tension and is therefore unidirectional from *be[ing]* to humans. He also speaks of a certain tensional relation between the East and the West and between Hölderlin and ancient Greece (Hellenism). He usually reserves the word *Beziehung* for simple connections between ideas, concepts and the like. See also FN 50.

the fact that in thinking *be[ing]* comes into language.<sup>46</sup> Language is the home [Haus] of *be[ing]*. Humans live by its accommodation [in ihrer Behausung].<sup>47</sup> Those who are thoughtful and those who are poetic are the guardians [Wächter] of this habitation [Behausung]. For humans guarding is perfecting the overtness [Offenbarkeit] of *be[ing]* insofar as they bring this up in their pronouncements and preserve it in language. Thinking does not just turn into action in the sense that an effect issues from it or that it is applied <to something>. Thinking acts [handelt] in that it thinks [indem es denkt]. Presumably, this <sort of> action is the simplest and at the same time highest <sort> because it concerns the relation of *be[ing]* to humans. But all effecting [Wirken] rests on *be[ing]* and is intent on what is there [das Seiende]. On the other hand, thinking lets itself be absorbed by *be[ing]* in order to speak the truth of *be[ing]*. Thinking consummates this letting <happen> [Lassen]. Thinking is *l'engagement par l'Être pour l'Être* [the commitment by *be[ing]* for *be[ing]*]. I do not know if it {314} is linguistically possible to say both of these ('*par* [by]' et '*pour* [for]') at once; namely, as in *penser, c'est l'engagement de l'Être* [to think<, that> is the commitment of *be[ing]*]. Here the genitive form "*de l'* [of the]. . ." expresses both the *genitivus subjectivus* and the <*genitivus*> *objectivus*. Yet <the terms> 'subject' and 'object' are the terminology [Titel] of metaphysics that from early on co-opted the interpretation [Interpretation] of language in the form of Western logic and grammar. Today we have only just begun to discern what came over [bemächtigt hat] the

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<sup>46</sup> " . . . im Denken das Sein zur Sprache kommt." Idiomatically, *zur Sprache kommt* means "comes up." In language, *be[ing]* comes up for discussion.

<sup>47</sup> The often quoted "Language is the house of Being" is not really an appropriate translation. A house is not a home. Accommodating something is not merely providing bed and breakfast. *Be[ing]* is at home, finds a home in language.

interpretation of language in the early days. The freeing of language from grammar for a more original articulation of its essence [Wesensgefüge] remains <something> for thinking and poetry to do. Thinking is not only *l'engagement dans l'action* [<the> commitment in action] for and by what is there <in some way>, in the sense [Sinn] of what is actual [das Wirklichen] in the present situation [Situation]. Thinking is <rather> *l'engagement* [<the> commitment] by and for the truth of *be[ing]*. Its history is never past. It is always imminent [bevor]. The history of *be[ing]* bears and determines every *condition et situation humaine* [human state and situation]. In order first to learn to purely experience what is termed the essence of thinking—and that also means to carry it out—we must free ourselves from an interpretation of thinking in terms of doing and making [Tun und Machen].<sup>48</sup> Its beginnings reach back to Plato and Aristotle. There thinking itself is valued as a kind of τέχνη [means], a procedure [Verfahren] of deliberating [Überlegens] in the service of doing and making. In that case, however, thinking over [Überlegen] is already seen with a view to πράξις [doing] and ποίησις [making]. Thus when taken by itself cognition [Erkennen] is not "practical." The characterization of thinking as θεωρία [looking at] and the determination of cognition as <a form of> comportment [Verhalten] are one already in accord with the "technical" explanation [Auslegung] of thinking. It is more a reactive move to preserve a sort of independence for thinking in contrast to doing and making. Since then, "philosophy" has had to justify its way of life [Existenz] before "the sciences." It thinks this will most certainly happen by elevating itself to the level of a science. Yet these efforts amount to the relinquishment of the essence of thinking. Philosophy is pursued by the fear of losing respect and value | {315} if it is not science. This is regarded as a shortcoming that is equated with what is

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<sup>48</sup> The sense of the expression is "keeping busy," "doing for the sake of doing."

unscientific. *Be[ing]*<sup>2</sup> as the element [Element] of thinking is abandoned by the technical explanation of *be[ing]*. Beginning with the Sophists and Plato, "logic" has sanctioned this explanation [Auslegung]. One <thus> assesses thinking according to a measure inappropriate to it. This assessment resembles a procedure that <would> try to evaluate the essence [Wesen] and capabilities of a fish according to how long it is able to live on dry land. For a long time now—for far too long—thought has been on dry land. Can one now call the effort to bring thinking back into its element "irrationalism [Irrationalismus]"?

Undoubtedly, the questions in your letter would become clearer in actual conversation. In what is written, thinking loses something of its deftness [Beweglichkeit]. But above all only with difficulty can it keep to the multidimensionality peculiar to its realm [Bereich]. In its difference [Unterschied] from the sciences the strictness of thinking<sup>3</sup> is not merely in the artificial, that is to say, technical and theoretical exactitude of <its> concepts. It lies in the fact that uttering [Sagen] dwells purely in the element of *be[ing]* and lets what is simple rule in its manifold dimensions. But, on the other hand, what is written offers the beneficial constraint of a thoughtfully spoken [bedachtsamen sprachlichen] version. For now, I should like to select only one of your questions. An elucidation of it may shed some light on the others.

You ask: *Comment redonner un sens au mot 'Humanisme'?*<sup>49</sup> This question comes from your aiming to retain the word 'humanism [Humanismus]'. I wonder whether that is necessary. Or is the unwholesomeness [Unheil] caused by all terminology [Titel] of this kind still not obvious enough? Of course, we have been

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<sup>49</sup> "How <are we> to restore sense to the word '*humanisme*'?" In the text (GA 9, p. 344) Heidegger capitalizes the noun as though it were a German word.

wary of "isms [-ismen]" for a long time now. Yet the market of public opinion craves ever new ones. | {316} We are always ready to supply the demand anew. And designations [Namen] like 'logic', 'ethics', & 'physics' first turn up as soon as original [ursprünglich] thinking has come to an end. In their great age the Greeks thought without such terminology. Not once did they call thinking "philosophy [Philosophie]." This comes to an end when it moves out of its element [aus seinem Element weicht]. The element is that out of which thinking is able <to come forth> to be thinking. The element is the really empowering [Vermögende]: the <enabling> power [das Vermögen]. It looks after [nimmt . . . an] thinking and thus brings it about in its essence. Simply put, thinking is thinking of *be[ing]* [Denken des Seins]. The genitive says something twofold. Thinking is of *be[ing]* insofar as, brought about by [ereignet von] *be[ing]*,<sup>\*4</sup> thinking belongs to *be[ing]*. At the same time thinking is thinking of *be[ing]* insofar as, belonging [gehörend] to *be[ing]*, thinking listens [hört] to *be[ing]*. As regards its essential origin thinking is what it is as a listening [gehörend] belonging to [Gehörende] *be[ing]*. Thinking is—this says that *be[ing]* has looked after [angenommen] its essence in an always becoming [geschicklich] way. To look after [annehmen] a "thing" or a "person" means in essence [in ihrem Wesen] to love it [sie lieben], to take to it [sie mögen]. Thought in a more original way this taking to [Mögen] means bestowing [schenken] its essence <on something>. Such taking to is the authentic essence of enabling [Vermögen], which does not just carry out [lesiten] this or that <act> but can let something "come to be [wesen]" in its coming forth [Herkunft], that is, let it be [sein lassen]. The enabling of <such> taking to is that on the "strength" of which something is genuinely capable of being [zu sein vermag]. This enabling is what is genuinely "possible" [das eigentlich 'Mögliche'], that whose essence lies in taking to [Mögen] <something>. *Be[ing]* makes thinking possible in terms of this taking to [Mögen]. The latter <[Mögen]> makes the former <[Denken]>

possible. As the enabling taking-to [das Vermögend-Mögend], *be[ing]* is the "potential [Mög-liche]." As the element <of thinking>, *be[ing]* is the "quiet power [stille Kraft]" of enabling, that is, <of> what is possible [das Möglich]. Of course, under the influence of "logic" and "metaphysics," the words 'possible' [möglich] and 'possibility' [Möglichkeit] are only thought in distinction from "actuality [Wirklichkeit]", that is, according to a <certain> determinate (<i.e.,> the metaphysical) interpretation [Interpretation] of *be[ing]* as *actus* [performance] and *potentia* [capacity], a distinction that is identified with *existentia* [existentiality] and | {317} *essentia* [essentiality]. If I speak of the "quiet power of the possible [stillen Kraft der Möglichen]," I do not mean the *possibile* [might be] of an already presented *possibilitas* [possibility], or *potentia* [capacity] as the *essentia* [essentiality] of an *actus* [act] of *existentia* [existentiality], but rather <I mean> *be[ing]* itself taking to [mögend über] thinking and thus to the essence of humans, and that means the relation <of thinking> to *be[ing]*. Here to enable something means to preserve [wahren] it in its essence, to keep it in [einbehalten] its element.<sup>50</sup>

When as it turns away from its element thinking comes to an end it makes good the loss by acquiring value as τέχνη [means], <that is,> as an educational tool and thus as schoolwork [Schulbetrieb] and later on as part of <the process of> acculturation [Kulturbetrieb]. Gradually, philosophy turns into a technique of

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<sup>50</sup> Later, Heidegger glosses *essentia* with *Wesenheit* [essentiality] and *existentia* with *Wirklichkeit* [actuality]. Metaphysical considerations allow for understanding the possible as either the "might be" or the "capacity" for something to happen. Heidegger offers an alternative understanding of the "stillen Kraft des Möglichen [quiet power of the possible]." That a meaning of the Latin *potentia* is "power" is not lost on Heidegger.



clarification [Technik des Erklärens] based on fundamental causes. One no longer thinks; instead, one "does [beschäftigt sich mit] philosophy." Such activities then go public as "isms" that try to outdo each other <as> in a competition. The domination of such nomenclature [Titel] is not by chance. In modern times, it is found above all in the odd dictatorship of what is public [Öffentlichkeit].<sup>51</sup> But the so-called "private <way of> life [private Existenz]," that is, being human [Menschsein] is still not essential. It merely holds fast to a denial [Verneinung] of what is public. It remains the dependent offspring of <public life> and feeds on its retreat from what is public. Thus against its own will it attests to its subservience to the public. But because it stems from the domination of subjectivity, this [the public] is itself the metaphysically conditioned institution and authorization of the frank display of what is there in the unconditional reification of everything. That is why language falls into the service of providing routes along which reification [Vergegenständlichung] as the uniform accessibility of everyone to everything spreads without disregard to any limits. Thus does language come under the dictatorship of <what is> the public. This decides beforehand what is intelligible [verständlich] and what must be rejected as unintelligible [unverständlich]. What is said | {318} about "people [man]" in *Sein und Zeit* (1927), §§ 27 and 35, is by no means meant to be a casual contribution to sociology. Just as little does "people" merely mean the ethical-existential [ethisch-existential] counterpart of a person's being himself [Selbstsein der Person]. Instead, what was said <there in *Being and Time*> contains a clue [Hinweis] about the original belongingness [Zugehörigkeit] of words to [zum] *be[ing]* <that is> thought in the

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<sup>51</sup> Heidegger certainly also means the dictatorship of the public as mediated overwhelmingly in our time by the (a)social media.

question about the truth of *be[ing]*. This relationship [Verhältnis]<sup>52</sup> remains hidden by the domination of subjectivity, which appears as publicity [Öffentlichkeit]. However, when the truth of *be[ing]* has become worthy of thought [denk-würdig] for thinking [Denken], reflection [Besinnung] on the essence of language must also attain another position [Rang]. It can no longer merely be philosophy of language [Sprachphilosophie]. That is exactly why *Sein und Zeit* (§ 34) includes a clue about the essential dimension [Wesensdimension] of language and touches on the simple question of the manner of *be[ing]* [Weise des Seins] of language as language at any given time. The ubiquitous and rampantly proliferating impoverishment of language not only undermines the aesthetic and moral responsibility of all use of language. It comes of an endangering of the essence of humans. A merely sophisticated use of language still does not prove that we have as yet escaped this essential danger. Today it may indicate instead that we have not even seen the danger and cannot see it because we ourselves have never even faced up to it. The recent frequently and far too belatedly discussed decay of language is, however, not the reason for but rather a consequence of the process dominated by the modern metaphysics of subjectivity that almost ceaselessly causes language to drop out [herausfällt] of its element. Language still refuses us its essence; <namely,> that it is the home [Haus] of the truth of *be[ing]*. Language, moreover, gives itself over to our sheer wanting [Wollen] and pursuing [Betreiben] as an instrument [Instrument] of the domination of what is there <of every sort>. This [what is there] alone appears as what is actual [Wirkliche] in the web of cause and effect [Ursache und Wirkung]. Acting in a

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<sup>52</sup> Heidegger's use of *Verhältnis* has the sense of the mutuality between two people. He reserves the word *Bezug* for the relation between *be[ing]* and humans, suggesting a tension exerted by *be[ing]* on humans.

calculating way, we encounter what is there <of every sort> as what is actual [Wirklichen] but also scientifically and philosophically in explanations [Erklärungen] and proofs [Begründungen]. To this [calculating] <there> also belongs the assurance that something is inexplicable. With such assertions [Aussagen] we think we confront | {319} the mystery [Geheimnis]. <It is> as if it were taken for granted that the truth of *be[ing]* lets be established causes and reasons for explanations or what amounts to the same thing their incomprehensibility.

But if humans are once again to discover the incipience [Nähe] of *be[ing]*, they must first learn to ek-sist [existieren] in the unnamed [Namenlosen]. In like manner, they must recognize not only the seductions of the public sphere but also the powerlessness of the private [Privaten].<sup>53</sup> Before they speak, humans must first let *be[ing]* have an impact on them once again, being so taken by it [ansprechen lassen] as to be in danger of having little or scarcely anything to say. Only thus will the preciousness [Kostbarkeit] of their essence be restored to words again and a dwelling [Wohnen] for living in the truth of *be[ing]* be restored once again to humans.

But now is there not in this claim upon humans, is there not in this attempt to prepare humans for this claim upon them something of a struggle for humans?

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<sup>53</sup> Heidegger's neologism *das Privat* resonates with his earlier reference to "private life" but also with the importance of home, privacy, and solitude in his personal life. One of his favorite authors for "leisure time" reading was Hebel. In 1956 he wrote a lovely essay, "*Hebel—der Hausfreund [Hebel—Friend of the Family]*," and in 1960 was awarded the Hebel Prize on the occasion of which he delivered a brief address, translated by the author and published in *Delos* **19/20** (1997), pp. 30-34.

Where does "caring [Sorge]"<sup>54</sup> lead other than in the direction of bringing humans back again to their essence? What does this mean other than that humans [der Mensch] (*homo* [Man]) become human [menschlich] (*humanus* ["human" / humane])?<sup>55</sup> In this way humanity [Humanitas] remains the concern [Anliegen] of

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<sup>54</sup> In a note to the translation of the Introduction I discuss my choice of the word 'sorrow' as a possible translation of *Sorge*, which is ordinarily rendered as 'care' (or in this translation as 'caring'), more or less in conformity with Heidegger's discussion of the fable "Cura" in *Sein und Zeit*.

<sup>55</sup> This section plays on the theme of the Letter by considering the distinction between what is human nature and what is natural (bodily functions, anthropological features) in men and women, and how we are to understand the origin of the notion of being humane (civilized) with each other. This is at the heart of Beaufret's concerns. The Latin *humanus* means both "human" and "humane," a distinction that might be lost on speakers of the so-called "romance languages" based on Latin (French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Catalan, Romanian). The word in the title of Heidegger's epistolary essay is *Humanismus*. He titled the publication to indicate that it is a text about a word. Later the reference to that was deleted. (The word 'Humanismus' was not presented in single quotation marks.) Here it corresponds to customary contemporary usage (capitalized): "Any system of thought or ideology which places humans, or humanity as a whole, at its centre, *esp.* one which is predominantly concerned with human interests and welfare, and stresses the inherent value and potential of human life. In early use freq. with reference to humanitarian religions" (*OED*, q.v., 5a: Closely associated with such an ideology are values such as humanitarian treatment of living things and most political platforms.) The basic question seems to be whether human beings are by nature humane.

such thinking; for this is humanism [Humanismus]: musing and brooding over whether humans are human [menschlich] and not "in-human [un-menschlich]," that is deprived of their essence [Wesens]. But in what does the humanness [Menschlichkeit] of humans consist? That lies deep in [ruht in] his essence.

But whence and how is the essence of humans determined? Marx requires that the "humane human being" be identified and respected. He finds him in "society [Gesellschaft]." The "social [gesellschaftliche]" human is, for him [Marx], the "nature [natürlich]" human. In "society" human "nature [Natur]",<sup>56</sup> that is, all of a human being's "natural [natürlich] needs" (food, clothing, procreation [Fortpflanzung], economic subsistence) are equably ensured. Christians see the humanness of humans, the humanity of *homo* [the human being], in his delimitation from the deity. Christ [Der Christ] sees the humanness of humans, the humanity of *homo*, <in his> being set apart from the godhead [Deitas]. He [*homo*] is saved as "God's child" who, in Christ, | {320} hears [vernimmt] and accepts [übernimmt] the claim of the Father on him. Humans are not of this world inasmuch as "world [Welt]," thought theoretically <and> platonically, is only a passing passage [vorübergehender Durchgang] on to the beyond [Jenseits].

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Heidegger is not sure about that. More important, he wants to stress that *be[ing]* must be at the center of the world of human beings.

<sup>56</sup> The word 'nature' usually translates *Wesen*, but in his discussion of Marx and elsewhere in this text, Heidegger writes about the consequences of humans being creatures that live in the world of Nature, that is to say, what is "by nature" or "natural" to them. To refer to *Natur* I will often translate and capitalize [Mother] Nature.

So-called *humanitas* [civilized life] was for the first time reflected on and striven for in the time of the Roman Republic. *Homo humanus* [civilized man] contrasts with *homo barbarous* [uncivilized men]. Here *homo humanus* is the Roman who exalts Roman *virtus* [character] and ennobles it with the "incorporation [Einverleibung]" of παιδεία [formation] taken over from the Greeks.<sup>57</sup> The "Greeks" are the Greeks of the Hellenic world whose education [Bildung] was acquired [gelernt] in the schools of philosophy. It [*humanitas*] is concerned with *eruditio et institutio in bonas artes* [learning and instruction in the liberal arts]. Παιδεία so understood is translated by <the word> '*humanitas*'. The authentic *romanitas* [Roman-ness] of *homo romanus* [Roman Man] persists in such *humanitas*. In Rome, we come upon the first humanism [Humanismus]. There it remains in essence [im Wesen] a distinctively Roman phenomenon that comes of the encounter of the Roman world with the formation of the late Hellenic world. The so-called Italian Renaissance of the 14th and 15th centuries is a *renascienta romanitatis* [rebirth of Roman culture]. Since *romanitas* is what matters, here it is all about *humanitas* and thus about Greek παιδεία. However, the Greek world is always seen in its later form and this is seen as Roman. The *homo romanus* of the Renaissance is seen as the antithesis of the *homo barbarous* [uncivilized human]. But now the in-human [In-humane] is the presumed barbarism [Barbarei] of the Gothic scholasticism of the Middle Ages. Historically understood, then, there always belongs to humanism a *studium*

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<sup>57</sup> The account of *homo humanus* is drawn from the first volume of Werner's Jaeger's *Paideia* (1933-1947). Παιδεία refers not to schooling but to the formation of the individual as a civilized, "cultured" person, and citizen. The subtitle of Jaeger's work was *Die Formung des griechischen Menschen* [The Shaping of the Greek Human Being].

*humanitatis* [humanist school] that in a certain way reaches back into antiquity and each time thus becomes a revival of the Greek world. This appears in 18<sup>th</sup>-century [German] Humanism as represented by Winckelmann [1717-1768], Goethe [1749-1832] and Schiller [1759-1805]. Hölderlin [1770-1843], by contrast, is not a part of "Humanism," precisely because he in fact thought the fate of the essence of humans more originally than "Humanism" is able to do. |

{321} But if in general one understands by humanism the effort of humans to become free for their humanness and to find their dignity in it, then humanism is determined differently depending upon one's conceptions of "freedom" and the "nature [Natur]" of humans. So, too, do its ways of realization differ. Marx's humanism did not need to revert to antiquity, as little as does the humanism in terms of which Sartre conceptualizes his existentialism [Existenzialismus]. Christianity is also a humanism in the broad sense given the term insofar as according to its teachings everything depends upon the salvation [Seelenheil] (*salus aeterna* [eternal salvation]) of humans and the history of mankind [Menschheit] manifests itself within the scope of Christianity. However different these kinds of humanism may be in their goal and basis, in the manner and means of their actualization and in the form of their teaching they nevertheless all concur that the *humanitas* of *homo humanus* is determined from the viewpoint of an already well established explanation of Nature [Natur], history [Geschichte], the world [Welt], <and> the basis of the world [Weltgrund], that is, of what is there in its entirety [des Seienden im Ganzen].

Every humanism is either based [gründet] in metaphysics or makes itself the basis of some metaphysics. Be it intentional or unintentional, every determination of the essence of humans that already presupposes an explanation of what is there without <raising> the question of the truth of *be[ing]* is metaphysical. It thus appears (and precisely with respect to the manner in which the essence of humans is

determined) that what is peculiar to all metaphysics is that it is "humanistic." Accordingly, every humanism is metaphysical. In the case of the determination of the humanness of humans, not only does humanism not ask about the relation [Bezug] of *be[ing]*\*<sup>5</sup> to the essence of humans. Humanism even precludes this question, which by virtue of its origin in metaphysics it neither knows about nor understands.

| {322} On the contrary, the necessary and only way in terms of which the question about the truth of *be[ing]* (which is forgotten\*<sup>6</sup> in and by metaphysics) can therefore come to light in the midst of the domination of metaphysics is if the question "What is metaphysics?" is raised. Above all, every question about "*be[ing]*," even the one about the truth of *be[ing]*, must at the outset be introduced as a "metaphysical" question.

The first humanism, Roman humanism, and all the kinds of humanism that have come into fashion up to the present presuppose <that> the most general "essence" of humans is self-evident. The human being [Mensch] is considered to be the *animal rationale* [rational animal]. This designation is not just the Latin translation of the Greek <phrase> ζῷον λόγον ἔχον [the animal that has language] but a metaphysical explanation [Auslegung]. This essential determination of humans is not wrong, but it is conditioned by metaphysics. The essential provenance of metaphysics and not just its limits became questionable in *Be[ing] and Time*. The questionable [Das Frag-würdige] is first entrusted to thinking as what it is to think [als sein zu Denkendes], but by no means <as a way of> getting rid of it as though <it were> consumed <by thinking> in the empty pursuit of doubt.

Metaphysics does indeed confront what is there in its *be[ing]* and so also thinks the *be[ing]* of what is there. But it does not think *be[ing]* as such; <it> does not think the difference between the two (Cf. *Vom Wesen des Grundes* [On the Essence of Basis] [1929], p. 8; also, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* [Kant and the



*Problem of Metaphysics*] [1929], p. 225; in addition, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 230). Metaphysics does not question the truth of *be[ing]* itself. It therefore never asks in what way the essence of humans belongs to the truth of *be[ing]*. Not only has metaphysics not brought up this question thus far. This question is inaccessible to metaphysics as metaphysics. *Be[ing]* is still waiting for It itself [Es selbst] to become questionable to humans. With regard to the determination of the essence of humans, however one may determine the *ratio* [reason] of the *animal* [living thing] and the reason [Vernunft] of the living thing [Lebewesens], | {323} whether as a "<practical> capacity for principles" or as a "<practical> capacity for categories" or whatever, the essence [Wesen] of reason [Vernunft] is always and in every case so grounded [gründet] that in every apprehending of what is there in its *be[ing]*, *be[ing]* is always brought to light such that it eventuates [ereignet] in its truth. In the same way, "*animal* [living thing], ζῷον [living being], already presupposes an explanation of "life [Leben]" that necessarily rests on a certain reading what is there as ζωή [life] and φύσις [nature]<sup>58</sup> within which what is living [das Lebendige] appears. But apart from this and above all, it finally remains to ask for once whether at the outset and as decisive in advance of everything else the essence of humans lies in general in the dimension [Dimension] of animality [Animalitas]. Are we at all on the right track toward the essence of humans if and as long as we define a human being as one living thing [Lebewesen] among others in contrast to plants, animals [Tier], and God? One can proceed this way, <namely,> in such a way <that> one can situate the human being within <the realm of> what is there as one that is there like all the rest. In that way one will always be able to say something correct about humans. But one

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<sup>58</sup> The root of this pivotal word for Heidegger (φύσις, "to be by nature") is traced back to the English word 'bēon' ([to] be).

must be clear about the fact that humans are thereby decisively relegated to the realm <of what is there> characteristic of animality, and even if one does not equate a human being with an animal [Tier] but instead grants him a specific difference [Differenz]. In principle <here> one always thinks <of> *homo animalis* [man with a soul] even when *anima* [soul] is posited as *animus sive mens* [soul or mind] and later on as subject [Subjekt], person [Person], <or> spirit [Geist]. Such positing [Setzen] is the way of metaphysics. But in that way the essence of humans is hardly attended to and its provenance [Herkunft], the essential origin that is always the essential future for historical humanity [Menschentum], is not recalled [gedacht]. Metaphysics thinks humans on the basis of *animalitas* [animality] and does not think on to their *humanitas* [humanity].

Metaphysics refuses to have anything to do with the simple essential constancy <of the fact> that the human being comes about [west] in his essence only as long as he is claimed [angesprochen] by *be[ing]*. Only in terms of this claim [aus diesem Anspruch] "has [hat]" he come upon that <sphere> wherein his essence can dwell [worin sein Wesen wohnt]. Only in terms of this <kind of> dwelling [Wohnen] does he "have" "language ["hat" er "Sprache"] as the accommodation [Behausung] that preserves [wahrt] what is ekstatic [das Ekstatische] about his essence. <This> taking place [Das Stehen] in <the> lumination [Lichtung] of *be[ing]* is what I term [nenne] | {324} the ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz] of humans.<sup>59</sup> This way to be [Art zu sein] belongs

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<sup>59</sup> Just how *Existenz* (of the *Sein und Zeit* period) differs from *Ek-sistenz* in this and other later texts cannot be asked too often. What was "a way of life" in the 1920s has become the name for the distinctively human "standing out" or "taking place" or "taking a stand" in the illuminated place of where *be[ing]* enlists humans, where "taking a stand" and "existing" are the same. In the earlier text, the "ecstatic"

[eignet] only to humans. So understood, ek-sistence is not only the basis [Grund] for the possibility of reason [Vernunft], *ratio* [reckoning / reason], but ek-sistence is also that in which the essence of humans preserves [wahrt] the provenance of their determination [Bestimmung] <as ek-sistence>.

One can speak of ek-sistence only <with respect to> the essence of humans, that is, only <with respect to> the human [menschlich] way to "be" [Weise zu 'sein'], for as we have seen only humans are admitted into [eingelassen] the venture [Geschick] of ek-sistence. For that reason, then, ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz] can never be thought of as one special kind of living thing [Lebewesen] among others, assuming that it is becoming to humans [es dem Menschen geschickt ist] to think the essence

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temporality of existence [Dasein] prefigures this. This difference is, in part, a response of Heidegger's view having been mistakenly conflated with that of Jaspers' *Existenzphilosophie*, which Heidegger frequently and emphatically separates himself from. It justifies translating *Existenz* as "a way of life," as I have. This sentence also introduces the key term *Lichtung*, which presents enormous challenges for the translator. The image is unmistakably of a place in an otherwise dense, dark world of things (flora, fauna). This is the place of the *Da* of existence that makes out (discerns) *be[ing]*. The human being is this "opening" (an opportunity) to shed light on what is there, if only he "comes down to earth" (as in "gets real about" things and sets aside pretensions of science about explaining them). Soon Heidegger will use the neologism *Innesteher* to name this standing in the luminating of *be[ing]* of the *Da* humans are capable of and a position they are perhaps destined to take up. *Be[ing]* seems to be both the "opening" (opportunity) and the luminance provided by existence (*Da-sein*). Existence is not the "opening" or opportunity for an "experience" of *be[ing]* that *be[ing]* brings to light, as many have intimated.

of their *be[ing]* and not merely to give a natural history and historical account of their constitution [Beschaffenheit] and their habits [Umtrieb]. Thus even what we mean by a comparison of the *animalitas* [animality] of humans with "animals [Tier]" is based on the essence of ek-sistence. The body [Leib] of a human being [Mensch] is essentially other than <that of> an animal organism [tierischer Organismus]. The error of biologism is not overcome [überwunden] by annexing the soul [Seele] to what is bodily, the mind [Geist] to the soul, and the existential [Existentielle] to the mind in humans, and more loudly than ever preaching high regard for the mind in order to ultimately let everything revert to "going through life [das Erleben des Lebens]" with a cautionary warning that thinking disrupts the flow of life with its stuffy concepts, <i.e.,> that <the> thinking of *be[ing]* disfigures [verunstaltet] <every> way of life [Existenz]. That the physiology and physiological chemistry [biochemistry] of humans as an organism can be investigated in a natural scientific way is no proof that the essence of humans lies in "organicity [Organische]," that is, in the scientifically explained body.<sup>60</sup> This counts for as little as the view that the essence [Wesen] of Nature [Natur] is decided <once and for all> by nuclear physics [Atomenergie]. It may even be that Nature [Natur] just happens to hide [verbirgt] its essence [Wesen] in the side <of itself that> it shows <in the face of> the technical mastery <of it> by humans. Just as little as the essence [Wesen] of humans consists in being an animal organism [animalischer Organismus] can this inadequate

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<sup>60</sup> In this discussion it is important to recall that German distinguishes *Leib* (the body as experienced) from *Körper* (the body as an object that can be anatomized, diagnosed and treated medically). Heidegger's interest is in the *Leib* of humans, what we experience as we live from day to day, what I have termed "the body I am." See *After Psychotherapy* (New York: ENI Press, 2016).

determination of the essence of humans | {325} be set aside and compensated for by providing humans with an immortal soul, the capacity for reason, or personalhood [Personscharakter]. In each case, the essence <of humans> is overlooked and precisely on the basis [auf dem Grunde] of the same metaphysical scheme <of things given> [Entwurf].

What humans are or, in the traditional language of metaphysics, the "essence [Wesen]" of humans is founded on [beruht in] their ek-sistence. But ek-sistence thought in this way is not identical with the traditional concept of *existentia* [existentiality], which means actuality [Wirklichkeit] in contrast to *essentia* [essentiality] as possibility [Möglichkeit]. In *Be[ing]* and *Time* (GA 2, p. 56) (in spaced type<sup>61</sup>) is the sentence: "*The 'essence [Wesen]' of existence [Dasein] is [liegt in] its way of life [Existenz].*" However, the point here is not the antithesis between *existentia* [existentiality] and *essentia* [essentiality] since neither of these two metaphysical determinations of *be[ing]* (to say nothing of their relationship [Verhältnis] is as such in question as of yet <in that text>. The sentence contains even less a general assertion about existence [Dasein] in the sense that <the word 'Dasein'> came to have when it was introduced in the 18th century as another word for the word 'object [Gegenstand]' to express the metaphysical concept of the actuality of what is actual [Wirklichkeit des Wirklichen]. Rather, the sentence means this: A human being [Mensch] comes about [west] such that he is the "There <and Then> [Da]," that is, the lumination [Lichtung] of *be[ing]*. This "*be[ing]*" of the "There <and Then>" and only this has <about it> the fundamental tension [Grundzug] of ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz], that is, the ekstatic instance [ekstatischen Innestehen] of the truth of *be[ing]*. The ekstatic essence [Wesen] of humans is founded on [beruht in]

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<sup>61</sup> Now in italics in GA 2.

ek-sistence, which is different from metaphysically conceived [gedachten] *existentia* [existentiality]. This [existentiality] is conceptualized [begreift] by medieval philosophy as *actualitas* [actuality]. Kant formulates *existentia* as *Wirklichkeit* [actuality] in the sense of the objectivity [Objektivität] of experience [Erfahrung]. Hegel determines *existentia* as the self-knowing idea of absolute subjectivity [Subjektivität]. Nietzsche grasps *existentia* as the eternal return of the equivalent [die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichens]. It remains an open question here whether indeed even the *be[ing]* of a stone or perchance life [Leben] as the *be[ing]* of plants or animals has been thought extensively enough as *existentia* according to what seem to be different explanations [Auslegungen] of it as actuality [Wirklichkeit]. In any case, evidently, a living thing [Lebewesen] is the way it is without | {326} enduring [stehen in] its *be[ing]* as such and in the truth of *be[ing]*, safeguarding [verwahren] what is coming to pass [das Wesende] of its *be[ing]*. Presumably what is there <of the sort> <termed> a live thing [Lebe-Wesen] is the most difficult to think because, on the one hand, it is <so> closely related to us in a certain way but yet, on the other hand, are at the same time separated by an abyss from our ek-sistent essence [ek-sistenten Wesen]. By contrast, it might appear that the essence of the divine [Wesen des Göttlichen] were closer to us than what is seemingly so strange in the living thing, closer, that is, in an essential remoteness with which as what is remote our eksistent [eksistenten] essence [Wesen] is nevertheless more intimate than it is with our scarcely conceivable, inscrutable [abgründige] bodily [leiblich] kinship with the animal [Tier]. Such considerations [Überlegungen] cast a curious light [Licht] on the easy and for that reason always still premature characterization of the human being as the *animal rationale*. Because at any given moment plants and animals remain tethered to their surroundings [Umgebung] but are never liberated by the lumination of *be[ing]*—and this alone is "world [Welt]"—for this reason language does not matter to them. But

neither are they caught up in their surroundings without a world [weltlos] because language is denied them. Now condensed in this word 'surroundings' is all that is puzzling about the live thing [Lebe-Wesen]. In its essence language [Sprache] is not the utterance [Äußerung] of an organism [Organismus]; neither <is it the> the expression [Ausdruck] of a living thing [Lebewesen].<sup>62</sup> For that reason, it [language] can also never be thought in an essentially correct way <when it is> reduced to the character of symbolic expressions [Zeichencharakter] or even <to> semantics [Bedeutungscharakter]. Language is an illuminatingly obscuring [lichtend-verborgende] arrival [Ankunft] of *be[ing]* itself.

Thought in terms of the ekstatic [ekstatisch gedacht], ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz] does not coincide with *existentia* [existentiality] either in terms of <its> content or as regards <its> form. In terms of content, ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz] means taking place be-yond [Hin-aus-stehen]\*<sup>Z</sup> in the truth of *be[ing]*. By contrast, *existentia* [Existentiality] (*existence*)<sup>63</sup> means *actualitas* [actuality], actuality [Wirklichkeit] in

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<sup>62</sup> Heidegger's choice of the words *Äußerung* and *Ausdruck* in this passage highlights his critique of anthropologists and behavioral psychologists who conceptualize language as something emitted by human beings much the way signals (tweets, barks) are emitted by animals. In 1950 Heidegger uttered the often quoted proposition that "die Sprache spricht": language speaks—and that means not the speaker. Language is nothing that is drawn out of or ex-pressed (pressed out of) by the vocalizing or writing human being.

<sup>63</sup> Heidegger uses the French word here. This point to the equivalence in Heidegger's text of 'existentiality' and '*existence*' (as in Sartre's Existentialism).

contradistinction to mere possibility [Möglichkeit] as <an> idea [Idee].<sup>64</sup> Ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz] names that of which humans are the determination in the venture of the truth [im Geschick der Wahrheit].<sup>65</sup> *Existentia* [Existentiality] is thus the name [Name] for the actualization [Verwirklichung] of that which something evidently is as <based on an> idea [Idee] <of it>. The sentence "The human being [Mensch] | {327} ek-sists [ek-sistiert]" is not an answer to the question whether humans are or are not actually there, but rather answers the question about the "essence [Wesen]" of humans. We are used to asking this question just as inappropriately when we ask what [was] a human being is [sei] or when we ask who [wer] a human being [Mensch] is [sei]. For in the "Who [Wer]?" or "What [Was]?" we are already on the lookout for something person-like [Personhaft] or for an object. But the person-like no less than the object-like [Gegenständliche] overlooks and gets in the way of what is coming about [das Wesende] of ontohistorical ek-sistence [seinsgeschichtlichen Ek-sistenz]. For that reason, the word 'essence [Wesen]' was placed between scare quotes in the sentence previously quoted from *Be[ing] and Time* (GA 2, p. 56). This indicates that "essence [Wesen]" is now being determined neither by *esse essentiae* [essential being] nor by *esse existentiae* [existential being] but rather by what is ek-static [Ek-statischen] about existence [Dasein]. As what is ek-sisting [Ek-sistierende] humans endure [stehen aus] *being*-there [Da-sein] in that they take into their "care

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<sup>64</sup> Heidegger's point here has to do with 'the possible' as ontologically *höher* (superior) to 'the actual,' as he writes in *Sein und Zeit*. He wants to be clear that the possible is not to be thought of as having plans (an *Idee*) to do something "in the future."

<sup>65</sup> That is . . . should the truth come to pass if and when that should eventuate.



[Sorge]"<sup>66</sup> the There <and Then> [Da] as the lumination of *be[ing]*. Ex-sistence [Da-sein] itself, however, comes about [west] as the "eminent [geworfene]."<sup>67</sup> It comes about [west] in the utterance [Wurf] of *be[ing]* as what is given to it [schickend] as what is ventured [Geschicklichen].

It would be the greatest error, however, for one to want to account for the statement [Satz] about the eksistent [eksistente] essence [Wesen] of humans as though it were the secularized transference to humans of a thought expressed about God taken from Christian theology (*Deus est ipsum esse* [God is being itself]), for neither is ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz] the actualization of an essence [Essenz] nor does ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz] itself in any way bring about and fix what is essential [das Essentielle].<sup>68</sup> If one understands what is termed the "scheme <of things> [Entwurf]" in *Be[ing] and Time* as a kind of representational positing then one takes it as an accomplishment of subjectivity and not the only way "the understanding of *be[ing]*" can be thought within the scope of the "existential *analytique* [existentialen Analytik]" of "*be[ing]*-in-the-world," namely, as the ekstatic relation [ekstatische Bezug] \*<sup>8</sup> <of

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<sup>66</sup> Here Heidegger seems to be using *Sorge* (in scare quotes) in the conventional sense of something or someone being in one's care to look out for or look after. Hence the scare quotes.

<sup>67</sup> The sense of the word 'eminent' here is based on the literal (true-to-the-word) meaning of the Latin verb from which it is derived ("to project out into" the world).

<sup>68</sup> Here Heidegger seems to be playing on an equivalent of "the existential" as in French Existentialism; namely, "the essential" as related to essentialism in academic philosophy and the then current French philosophy of *essentialisme* contrasted with philosophical *existentialisme*.

ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz]> to the lumination of *be[ing]*.<sup>69</sup> An adequate apprehension and consummation of this other <kind of> thinking that abandons subjectivity is made more difficult, of course, because in the publication of *Be[ing] and Time* the third division of the second part, "Time and *Be[ing]*," was withheld (cf. *Be[ing] and Time* [GA 2], p. 53). | {328} Here the entire work\*<sup>9</sup> is turned around [kehrt um]. The division in question was withheld because thinking failed [versagt] to give adequate expression [Sagen]\*<sup>10</sup> to this turn <of events> [Kehre] and thanks to the language of metaphysics did not therefore come through <with what it had promised>. The lecture "On the Essence of Truth," thought through [gedacht] and presented in 1930 but only published in 1943, gives a certain [gewissen] glimpse into the thinking of the turn <of events> from "*Be[ing] and Time*" to "time and *be[ing]*." This turn <of events> does not mean a change of <the> standpoint [Standpunkt]\*<sup>11</sup> of *Be[ing] and Time*, but <means instead that> in it the thinking sought after in *Be[ing] and Time* for the first time reaches the place [Ortschaft] of that dimension [Dimension] out of which *Be[ing] and Time* is experienced, that is to say <the dimension of> the fundamental experience of the oblivion of *be[ing]* [Seinsvergessenheit]\*<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>69</sup> The *Bezug* requires two—*be[ing]* and a human—and it is always at the behest of *be[ing]*. We must conclude: no humans, no *be[ing]*. *Homo sapiens sapiens* may well be on the scene from the perspective of anthropology, but as life around an infant makes clear, the little creature is not born human. At some point it ex-sists and that is when it first human. In this text, Heidegger explores for Beaufret the conceptual connections between humans [Mensch], existence [Dasein] (or *being-there* [Da-sein]), and ek-sistence [Ex-sistenz], and the differences between his understanding of existence and *Existenzphilosophie* (Jaspers) and *Existentialisme* (Sartre), respectively.

Sartre, by contrast, articulates the fundamental tenet of existentialism [Existentialismus] in this way: existence [Existenz] precedes essence [Essenz] [die Existenz geht der Essenz voran].<sup>70</sup> In doing so, he takes <the terms> *existentia*

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<sup>70</sup> Here I briefly abandon my translation of *Existenz* with “a way of life” since the context is a critique of Sartre’s lecture “L’Existentialisme est une Humanisme [Existentialism Is a Humanism],” which is carried out in the traditional discourse of metaphysics. Sartre’s expression is *l’existence précède l’essence*. The German first translation (1947) of the essay was published as *Ist der Existentialismus ein Humanismus?* (Zürich: Europa). Here Sartre’s assertion becomes a question. In later editions of Sartre’s essay, the declarative form is restored. In the first published German translation the passage reads “die Existenz der Essenz vorausgeht [leads the way]” (p. 15). (No translator is named.) Heidegger’s translation is “die Existenz geht der Essenz voran.” The separable prefix *voran* with *gehen* makes all the difference in the world. Both *vorangehen* and *vorausgehen* indicate precedence, but Heidegger’s usage suggests temporal precedence and not a spatial ordering. The word *aus* also suggests that *Essenz* somehow derives from *Existenz*, which would seem to be the implication of Sartre’s inversion of ancient wisdom that says the *Existenz* of something can occur only as the expression of some *Essenz* (for example, a platonic form). The following sentences elucidate this and show that Heidegger was sensitive to the difference between what is [vor] *an* and what is [vor] *aus*. Following my translation of *Existenz* as “a way of life” (which applies only to humans), the statement translating Sartre would read: “The way of life of any human being precedes any essence he can be said to have.” Finally, it is important to note that Heidegger chooses to use the latinized German words corresponding to Sartre’s Roman language French.

[existentiality] and *essentia* [essentiality] in the sense they have for metaphysics, which since Plato has said that *essentia* [essentiality] precedes [geht voraus] *existential* [existentiality].<sup>71</sup> Sartre reverses this proposition. However, the inversion of a metaphysical proposition is still a metaphysical proposition. In this form, the proposition persists along with metaphysics in its oblivion [Vergessenheit] of the truth of be[ing].<sup>72</sup> For although, in accordance with the sense it had in the controversies of the Middle Ages or the sense it had for Leibniz or in some other sense, philosophy may determine the relationship [Verhältnis] between *essentia* [essentiality] and *existential* [existentiality] it still remains to ask in which venture of be[ing] [Seinsgeschick] this differentiation\*<sup>13</sup> within be[ing] comes before [gelangt vor]

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<sup>71</sup> “. . . die essentia geht der existential voraus.” See preceding footnote. The *Oxford Latin Dictionary* explains that *essentia* may be the coinage of Cicero (attributed by Seneca) or Plautus or Verginius Flavus (attributed by Quintillian) and is a translation of the Greek οὐσία [essence of what is there], defining this word formed by combining the verb *esse* and the adjectival suffix *-entus* to yield the sense of something “abounding in being.” There is no entry for *existential* in this source, but it is formed by combining the present participial form of *ex(s)isto* (to stand out into, appear, show up) and the same adjectival suffix *-entus*, yielding the sense of something “abundant in causing to appear (*sisto*) (stand) from (*ex-*) (from).” Heidegger’s discussion of *Ek-sistenz* [ek-sistence] hearkens back to the Latin, which is for him always where the Greek has gone wrong, that is, has been mistranslated. He is concerned to relate such “standing out” to the ek-static essence of Da-sein [ek-sistence].

<sup>72</sup> Here we may contrast the oblivion of (*genitivus subiectivus*) be[ing] and the forgetfulness of (*genitivus obiectivus*) the truth of be[ing].

thinking of it as *esse essentiae* [essential being] and *esse existentiae* [existential being]. It remains to consider the reason why the question about this venture of *be[ing]* was never asked and for what reasons it could never be thought. Or is this— <namely,> that this is how things stand with respect to the distinction between *essentia* [essentiality] and *existentia* [existentiality]—<is this> not a sign of the oblivion of *be[ing]*? We must suppose that this | {329} venture of *be[ing]* does not merely lie in something missing in human [menschlich] thinking, to say nothing of the more modest ability of early Western thinking. The differentiation between *essentia* (essentiality [Wesenheit]) and *existentia* (actuality [Wirklichkeit])<sup>73</sup> <that is> hidden in its essential provenance [Geschick] dominates through and through what has come down <to us> of Western history and all European history.

Sartre's main point about the priority of *existentia* [existentiality] over *essentia* [essentiality] justifies the word 'existentialism [Existentialismus]' as a suitable term [Titel] for (t)his philosophy. But the main point of "existentialism" has not the least bit in common with the sentence from *Be[ing] and Time* <cited earlier: "The 'essence [Wesen]' of existence [Dasein] is [liegt in] its way of life [Existenz]>," apart from the fact that in *Be[ing] and Time* no statement about the relationship [Verhältnis]

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<sup>73</sup> Heidegger glosses *existentia*, which we have translated with 'existentiality', with *Wirklichkeit*. Much depends on whether there is an exact linguistic equivalence between existentiality and actuality in Heidegger's response to Beaufret's question. It has become clear that the crucial contrast (as he said earlier) is between possibility [*existentia*] and actuality [*essentia*]. Without saying as much, *Möglichkeit* and *Wesenheit* are identified in that both translate *existentia* (see above). We are in the ambit of a *Leitmotiv* of Heidegger's thought from *Sein und Zeit*: "Höher als die Wirklichkeit steht die *Möglichkeit*" (GA 2, pp. 51-52).

between *essentia* [essentiality] and *existentia* [existentiality] can in any way even be expressed since there it is a question of getting ready for something that is a forerunner <of things to come> [Vor-läufiges].<sup>74</sup> As has been said, this was done rather awkwardly. Today what is still most worth saying might perhaps become an incentive to go along with the essence of humans to the point where it [thinking] pays attention to the dimension [Dimension] of the truth of *be[ing]* that prevails by way of it. But even this could happen in any given moment only with respect to *be[ing]* and with regard to *ex-sistence* [Da-sein], which humans sustain by *ek-sisting* [das der Mensch eksistierend aussteht], but not for the sake of humans, however, so <that they are able> to claim that civilization [Zivilisation] and culture [Kultur] are their creation.

However, in order that we of the present time might enter the dimension of the truth of *be[ing]* in order to be able to reflect on it we are then first of all obliged to make clear for once just how *be[ing]* has to do with humans and how they are absorbed by [in den Anspruch nimmt] *be[ing]*. Such an essential experience [Wesenserfahrung] happens to us when it dawns on us that a human being [Mensch] is [ist] only while he *eksists* [eksistiert].<sup>75</sup> Were we to start off by saying this in the language of the <metaphysical> tradition, then it would go: A human being's [Mensch] *ek-sistence* [Ek-sistenz] is [ist] his substance [Substanz]. For that reason,

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<sup>74</sup> Paraphrasing himself soon after citing *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger uses the verb 'ruht' (rests on, is founded on).

<sup>75</sup> " . . . der Mensch ist, indem er eksistiert." This is a crucial formulation that rests on the little word 'indem' (in that, while, as long as, as). The human being is (among all that is there) as / in that / as long as he *eksists*. Following Kierkegaard one might say that the human being is as (the) existing (Existierende).

the sentence "A human being's [Mensch] 'substance' is a way of life [Existenz]" is repeated from time to time in *Be[ing] and Time* (GA 2: pp. 157, 281, 416 [= BT 153, 255, 362].<sup>76</sup> However, thought in terms of the history of *be[ing]*, "substance" is by now an occult [verdeckende] translation of οὐσία [essence of what is there], a word that names the presence [Anwesenheit] of what is presenting itself [des Anwesenden] and | {330} at the same time generally means with enigmatic ambiguity what is presenting itself [das Anwesende]. Were we to think the metaphysical term [Name] 'Substanz' in this sense, one that was already in mind in *Be[ing] and Time* in consequence of the "phenomenological destructuring [Destruktion]" carried out there (cf. GA 2, pp. 33-34), then the sentence "A human being's [Mensch] 'substance' is ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz]" means nothing other than that the manner in which humans make their very own essence a present of *be[ing]* [in seinem eigenen Wesen zum Sein anwest] is as an ek-static instance [ekstatische Inneshen] <of what is there> in the midst of the truth of *be[ing]*. Through this essential determination [Wesensbestimmung] of humans, <however,> the humanistic interpretation of the human being [Mensch] as *animale rationale*, as "person," as a mental-spiritual-bodily essence [geistig-seelisch-leibliches Wesen] was seen to be incorrect but was not rejected. On the contrary, our sole consideration [Gedanke] is that the highest humanistic determinations of the essence of humans [Wesen des Menschens] have not even heard about the human being's real\*<sup>14</sup> dignity [Würde]. To that extent, the thinking in *Be[ing] and Time* opposes humanism. But this opposition does not mean such thinking took sides against what is humane [Humanen] and advocated what is inhumane [das

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<sup>76</sup> References to *Being and Time* are to the Macquarrie-Robinson translation (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

Inhumane], defended inhumanness [Unmenschlichkeit], and debased the dignity of humans. Opposition to humanism is thought because it does not locate the civilized life [Humanitas] of humans high enough. Of course, the essential nobility of humans [Wesenshoheit] does not lie in the fact that as "subject [Subjekt]" he is the substance [Substanz] of what is there in order as the ruler [Machthaber] of *be[ing]* to let what is beingness of what is there [Seiendsein des Seienden] dissolve all too loudly into <much> lauded "objectivity."<sup>77</sup>

A human being [Mensch] is rather "given over to [geworfen]" the truth of *be[ing]* by *be[ing]* itself so that ek-sisting [ek-sistierend] in this fashion he might mind [hüte]<sup>78</sup> the truth of *be[ing]* so that in the light [Licht] of the *be[ing]* he might appear as what is

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<sup>77</sup> The phrase is exceedingly difficult to translate. Both suffixes, *-heit* and *-sein*, can be rendered with '-ness'. The word 'be-ingness' (perhaps 'beinghood') is reserved for *Seiendheit* to refer to the "situation" of there being anything whatsoever there. The neologism *Seiendsein* in the formulation *Seiendsein des Seienden* refers not to that "situation" but articulates the active, participial sense of the *sein* ([to] be) of what is there [das Seiende], which makes the verb *sein* transitive. Variants: The be-ing-being of what is there / the beingness of what is there (if the word 'beinghood' is reserved for *Seiendheit*). Worth noting is the etymology of *substantia* is "to stand up to under the influence of something, to withstand or endure it." Heidegger is keenly aware of this in the context of his consideration of the endurance of thinking.

<sup>78</sup> The verb *hüten* refers to looking after or tending to something. The verb '[to] guard' is currently too strong with its allusions to the criminal justice system or the military. In English we speak of "minding the baby" and that seems to be the sense of the verb '[to] mind' here. There is also the sense being on the lookout for so as to avoid a mishap, as in "mind the step."



there of the sort of what is there that he is. Humans do not decide whether <what is there of a given sort> appears and how it <appears>, whether and how God and the gods, history and nature [Natur] enter into [hereinkommen] the lumination of *be[ing]*, present and absent [an- und abwesen] <themselves>.<sup>79</sup> The arrival [Ankunft] of what is there <of any sort> rests with | {331} the venture [Geschick]\*<sup>15</sup> of *be[ing]*. Yet the question for humans remains whether they can find what in their essence [Wesen] is in accord with what is ventured [das Schickliche] in that venture, since as what is ek-sisting [Ek-sistierende] they must tend <to> the truth of *be[ing]*. Humans tend to *be[ing]*.<sup>80</sup> That is all *Be[ing] and Time* is out to think through whenever the ekstatic

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<sup>79</sup> The verbs *abwesen* and *anwesen* correlate with *abesse* [absent, withdraw itself] and *adesse* [arrive on the scene or exhibit itself with the sense that that has already happened]. Both verbs should be considered as built on the verb *wesen* [(to) come about). The Latin *praesentare* has come to serve the purpose of expressing the activity that leads to that situation. In my translation one would pronounce the verb 'present' as one does the noun 'present' (gift): /'prez(e)nt/. Something could then be said to present (accent on the first syllable) itself (and in that way be exhibited [from the Latin *exhabere*] as compared to being inhibited or held back) and to absent (emphasis on the second syllable) itself (and in that sense inhibited [from the Latin *inhabere* as contrasted with being put "out there"]). There is two neat parallelisms: (1) between the two verbs based on *habere* [(to) hold] and (2) between *abesse* [to be away or to be distant from] and *adesse* [to have arrived and be there]. Heidegger's point is that whether such "minding" occurs is not the decision of humans.

<sup>80</sup> This memorable line reads: "Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins." Variant: The human being *minds* being [animals do not.] As for "The human being is the

way of life [ekstatische Existenz] is experienced as “caring <about> [Sorge]” (cf. § 44a, GA 2, pp. 299 ff.).<sup>81</sup>

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herdsman of *be[ing]*”—I choose to translate as I do because in the everyday world of animal husbandry, German farmers use the verb *hüten* to express tending a flock. Heidegger uses this word to describe what humans are destined to do with respect to truth. Earlier, I have rendered this verb with the word ‘mind’ to suggest that humans “mind” the truth of *be[ing]* in the sense of taking care to do something (implying a duty, even a warning) as well as doing it (as in “Do you mind picking up a container of milk for me?”). However, this sentence says something other than humans tend (to) the truth of *be[ing]*. Only a few sentences after saying that, Heidegger asserts that we tend (to) *be[ing]* as “its” shepherd or herdsman. For the anglophone, the person (*Hirt*) and what is tended to (herd) are the same. Early usages reflect this in which the line-up of animals and the human being taking care of them are referred to with the same word: herd (*OED*). Clearly, however, for Heidegger there is a distinction between the herdsman [*Hirt*] of the truth of *be[ing]* (and of *be[ing]* *per se*) and *be[ing]*. The biblical references to Jesus are unavoidable (John 10:1-21)—*pastor* (to feed and protect as a mother, with which Grimm glosses *Hirt*) and ποιμήν (which regularly referred to the fatherly Agamemnon). The choice of the word ‘tend’ suggests the tension of the relation between humans and *be[ing]* and an inclination and disposition for a journey. Again, for Heidegger, the “initiative” of the venture is always “in the hands of” or “up to” *be[ing]*.

<sup>81</sup> Grimm glosses *Sorge* with *cura*. Grimm’s *Wörterbuch* was perhaps Heidegger’s basic book (after Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and the Bible). In *Sein und Zeit*, the fable “Cura” (Hyginus) is the epicenter of his text, just as *Sorge* is perhaps the central *Leitmotiv* of the text and Heidegger’s *analytique* [Analytik] of existence

But *be[ing]*—what is *be[ing]*? It "is" <the> It itself [Es selbst].<sup>82</sup> To discover and articulate <what> this <means> is <something> for the <kind of> thinking that is to come [künftige] to learn <to do>. *Be[ing]*—this is not God and not the basis of the world [Weltgrund]. *Be[ing]* is essentially more at a remove from\*<sup>16</sup> all that is there but at the same time is closer to humans than all of what is there, whether it be a rock, an animal, a work of art, a machine, be it an angel or God. *Be[ing]* is our neighbor [das Nächste]. Yet what is imminent [die Nähe] is furthest from humans.<sup>83</sup> Initially, humans always cling only to what is there. But when thinking formulates what is there as what is there doubtless it refers [bezieht auf] to *be[ing]*. In truth, however, it regularly thinks only what is there as such, <but> precisely not [nicht] and never [nie] *be[ing]* as such. The "question about *be[ing]* [Seinsfrage]" always remains <to humans> a question about what is there. The question about *be[ing]* is still not at all what that tricky term [Titel] [*Seinsfrage*] indicates; <namely,> the question about *be[ing]*. Even when it becomes "critical," as in Descartes and Kant, philosophy always follows the trend of metaphysical conceptualizing. It thinks on <and on> from what is there of one sort or another with <only> a passing glance at *be[ing]*. Yet

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[Dasein]. The key word in Hyginus' *fabula* is *videtur*, which means "looks like." Looking (seeing) is the heart of phenomenology.

<sup>82</sup> "Es "ist" Es selbst." Variant: It "is" alone itself.

<sup>83</sup> There is an interplay here between *Nächste* [neighbor] and *Nähe* [nearness, incipience], which can also mean "neighborhood." We should add that *das Nächste* more conventionally means what is spatially the nearest or closest. In other passages in his writings, Heidegger makes it clear that nearness and distance in this context are not to be construed spatially, however, but rather existentially (and that means temporally).

every staring point from what is there and every turning back to it is after all in <the> light of *be[ing]*.

But metaphysics knows the lumination of *be[ing]* either solely with regard to what is presenting itself [Anwesenden] as the "way it looks [Aussehen]" (ἰδέα) or critically as what is sighted [das Gesichtete] from the viewpoint of categorial formulating on the part of subjectivity. This means that in and of itself the truth of *be[ing]* as lumination remains hidden from metaphysics. | {332} This hiddenness is not, however, a defect of metaphysics but instead a treasure withheld from it <and> yet held out before it, the treasure of its own richness. But lumination alone is *be[ing]*.<sup>84</sup> In the midst of what is going to come of *be[ing]* [Seinsgeschickes] <the lumination> grants metaphysics its first-ever look at [Anblick] how what is presenting [Anwesendes] itself touches upon [be-rührt] what is coming to pass [an-wesenden] for humans so that in becoming aware [Vernehmen] (voεῖν) they can themselves for the first time make contact with [rühren] *be[ing]* (θιγέιν, Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Θ 10). Sight [Anblick] first points to [ziehen auf] a point of view [Hin-sicht] as such. It yields to this [the point of view] when becoming aware has become <the> setting out <of things> in front of itself [Vor-sich-Herstellen] in the *percipio* [observing] of a *res cogitans* [thinking thing] as *subiectum* [subject] of *certitudo* [certainty].

Given that in general we can so unceremoniously ask the question at all, then how is *be[ing]* related to ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz]? *Be[ing]* is itself the relationship

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<sup>84</sup> "Die Lichtung selber aber ist das Sein."—"Lumination is but itself *be[ing]*." This gnomic formulation has been crucial to understanding Heidegger's discussion of *Sein*. Its "poetic" feel is deliberate. More than a mere equivalence is asserted between "the clearing" (as *Lichtung* is usually translated) and

[Verhältnis]\*<sup>17</sup> in that It [Es] embraces and rallies ek-sistence around and to itself in its [ek-sistence's] existential [existenzialen], that is, ekstatic [ekstatischen] essence as the place [Ortschaft] of the truth of *be[ing]* in the midst of what is there. Because ex-sisting [der Eksistierende] humans end up in this relationship [Verhältnis] as which *be[ing]* itself comes to pass [sich selbst schickt], during the time they live through it [the relation] ek-statically [ekstatisch] (that is, caring [sorgend]) they at first [zunächst] misconstrue what is imminent [das Nächste] <for them> and embrace the next but one [das Übernächste]. They even take this [what is there] to be the closest. Yet nearer [näher] than what is closest—what is there—and farther off for everyday thinking than what is most distant [Fernstes] from it is intimacy itself [die Nähe selbst]—the truth of *be[ing]*.

Forgetting the truth of *be[ing]* in deference to the onrush of what is there that is not reflected on in its essence has the sense of what in *Be[ing] and Time* was called "forfeiting [Verfallen]." This word does not mean the Fall of Man [Sündenfall des Menschen] understood in a moral philosophical and at the same time secularized way but instead names an essential relationship [Verhältnis] of humans to *be[ing]* within the relation [Bezug] of *be[ing]* to the essence of Man [Menschenwesen]. Accordingly, the terminology <of> 'authenticity'\*<sup>18</sup> and 'inauthenticity', | {333} <words> used in a provisional way <in *Be[ing] and Time*>, do not betoken a moral-existential [moralisch-eksistensiellen] or "anthropological" distinction but rather <refer to> the "ecstatic [ekstatischen]" relation [Bezug] of the essence of humans to the truth of *be[ing]*, something that is in the end above all else worth thinking at long last since <it has been> hidden from philosophy up to now. But this relation [Bezug] is not the way it is by reason of [auf Grund] <our> ek-sistence, but rather the essence of ek-sistence is living <a life> existentially -kstatically [existenzial-ekstatisch] comes

of [ist] the essence [Wesen] of the truth of *be[ing]* in a way that is becoming [geschicklich] <to it>.

The one thing it would like to achieve that thinking tries to bring out for the first time in *Be[ing] and Time* is something simple. As such, *be[ing]* remains mysterious, the simple nearness [Nähe] of what is unpretentiously at work. This nearness [Nähe]\*<sup>19</sup> comes about [west] as language [Sprache] itself. But language is not merely language insofar as we conceptualize it when the matter comes up as the unity of linguistic form (script), sound and meter and meaning [Bedeutung] (sense [Sinn]). We think of the phoneme and the grapheme as the body of the word, <of> sound and meter as the soul <of language>, and what is in accordance with the meaning <of the word> as the spirit of language. We usually think of language in terms of its correspondence to the essence [Wesen] of humans insofar as the latter are conceptualized as the *animale rationale*, that is, as the unity body-soul-spirit [Einheit des von Leib-Seele-Geist]. But just as ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz] is masked in the <concept of the> humanity [Humanitas] of the *homo animalis* [man with a soul]—and with it the relation [Bezug] of the truth of *be[ing]* to humans—so <also> does the metaphysical-organic [metaphysisch-animalische] explanation conceal the ontohistorical [seinsgeschichtlich] essence [Wesen] of language. According to this <explanation>, language is what is brought about by *be[ing]* and <is> the home of *be[ing]* provided by it [be[ing]]. This is what it means to think of the essence [Wesen] of language in terms of its correspondence to *be[ing]*, namely as a correspondence that is as it were an accommodation [Behausung] for the essence [Wesen] of humans.

But a human being [Mensch] is not just a living thing [Lebewesen] that in addition to having other abilities also possesses language. Rather, language is the

home of *be[ing]*, living within <which> humans ek-sist during the time that, <in> minding [hütend] it, they belong to the truth of *be[ing]*.

So it happens, then, that in the determination of the humanness [Menschlichkeit] of humans as ek-sistence, | {334} humans are not what is essential <to the determination>, but instead *be[ing]* <is>, as the dimension [Dimension] of what is ekstatic [Ekstatischen] about ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz]. This dimension, however, is not the well-known spatial <realm> [Räumliche]. On the contrary, everything spatial and all that is spatiotemporal [Zeit-Raum] comes about in what is dimensiona [im Dimensionalen]\*<sup>20</sup>, which is of the very character of *be[ing]* itself.

Thinking pays attention to these simple relations. It tries to find the appropriate words for them in the midst of the long since handed down language of metaphysics and its grammar. Assuming there is anything in a term [Titel], can such thinking still be designated humanism [Humanismus]? Surely not, insofar as humanism thinks metaphysically. Surely not, if it is existentialism [Existentialismus] and is represented in the way Sartre articulates it in this sentence: *précisément nous sommes sur un plan où il y a seulement des hommes (L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme, p. 36)*.<sup>85</sup> As thought in *Be[ing] and Time*, this <sentence> would read: *précisément nous sommes sur un plan où il y a principalement l'Être*. But where does *le plan* [the place] come from, and what is *le plan*? *L'Être et le plan* are the same thing [dasselbe]. In *Be[ing] and Time* (GA 2, p. 281) it is said intentionally and cautiously: *il*

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<sup>85</sup> “We are precisely in a place where there are only humans.” Heidegger’s confrontation of Sartre is summed up in his rewriting of the sentence: “We are precisely in a place where there is above all *be[ing]*.”

*y a l'Être* [there is *be[ing]*]: "there is [es gibt]" *be[ing]*.<sup>86</sup> But *il y a* inaccurately translates "*es gibt*." For the "es" which in this case "*gibt*" is *be[ing]* itself. The <word> '*gibt*', however, names the essence of *be[ing]* <as> giving, <i.e.,> granting its truth. Giving itself in <the sphere> of what is open <along> with the latter is *be[ing]* itself.<sup>87</sup>

At the same time, "it gives" is used temporarily to avoid the phrase "*be[ing]* is" since ordinarily <the word> 'is' is spoken of something that is [was ist]. We call such [sochles] what is there [das Seiende]. But *be[ing]* precisely "is" not a 'being' [ein 'Seiendes'].<sup>88</sup> If the "is" is spoken without a more approximate [näher] explanation of *be[ing]* then *be[ing]* all too easily becomes conceptualized as a "being" [ein 'Seiendes'] in the manner of something that works [wirkt] as a cause [Ursache] and is actualized [gewirkt] as an effect [Wirkung]. And yet, in the early days of thinking Parmenides said ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι [Es ist nämlich Sein]: "It is, namely, *be[ing]*."<sup>89</sup> In this

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<sup>86</sup> The German expression *es gibt* [there is . . .] in fact say "it gives." Heidegger is as concerned with this 'it', as he is with the "it" (*il*) of the French expression *il y a* ("it has there"). What is this "it"? *Be[ing]* itself.

<sup>87</sup> See EN 175 to the Lecture for the peculiarities of the French expression *il y a*, which figures in Heidegger's discussion of Leibniz's formulation of the question: Why is there, then, anything rather than nothing at all?

<sup>88</sup> Variant: But *be[ing]* is just what "is" not there. So also in the next sentence.

<sup>89</sup> Variants: It is nearly *be[ing]*. It is at the very least then *be[ing]*. This is the first part of the second clause of Parmenides Fragment VI: There is, after all, *be[ing]*. For there is *be[ing]*. For it is possible for it to be. Heidegger's translation of the Greek can be rendered in English: For being is. It is, to wit, *be[ing]*. It is, you see, *be[ing]*. It is *be[ing]*. The *Es* [it] in the phrase *es gibt* "is" *sein* (the infinitive '(to) be'), hypostatized as *Sein*. It (*sein*, εἶναι) hides in the "it" (*es*) of "it is" (ἔστι). The reification of the



utterance is hidden the inceptive [anfängliche] mystery of all thinking. Perhaps the "is" can come to be spoken in an appropriate way only of *be[ing]*, | {335} so that what is there <of any sort precisely> "is" not and never "is." But <in that case> because thinking would for the first time reach the point of speaking <of> *be[ing]* in its truth instead of explaining it in terms of what is there as <a kind of> being, it has to remain open as a concern [Sorgfalt] of thinking whether and how *be[ing]* is.

Parmenides' <utterance> ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι is still unthought even today. From this one may gauge how things go with the progress of philosophy. If it pays attention to its essence [Wesen] philosophy does not progress at all. It is at the point of always thinking the same <thing>. Taking steps forward, namely [nämlich], away from this point is <taking> a false step that follows thinking like a shadow it itself has cast. Because *be[ing]* is as yet unthought in *Be[ing] and Time* it is still said of *be[ing]*: "there is [es gibt]" <*be[ing]* and not "*be[ing]* is">. Yet one cannot just go right on and without a clue speculate about this *il y a*. This "there is" is at work as the venture [Geschick] of *be[ing]*. Its history comes up [zur Sprache kommt] in the utterances of essential thinkers. For that reason, thinking that delves into <the> truth of *be[ing]* is thinking historical. There is not some sort of "systematic" thinking and in addition, as

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infinitive (in German) has misled us. In Greek, as in most languages other than German and English, conflates in one word in the conjugation of its verbs what it takes two words to enunciate. Descartes' *cogito* (one word), for example, takes "I think" or "ich denke" (two words). So does ἔστι (one word), which requires "it is" or "es ist" (two words) in German and English. The *es* is the stand-in (pronoun) for the *sein* [(to) be] (where *the* [to] be is *Sein*). But since they (the *es* and *Sein* are one and the same) the "problem" lies in the transformation of the infinitive (*sei(e)n*) to the noun (*Sein*).

illustration, a history of earlier opinions [Meinungen]. But nor is there, as Hegel thought, merely a systematics [Systematik] whose law of thinking amounts to the law of history and can at the same time resolve this <history> into The System [System]. Thought more originally, there is [es gibt] the history of *be[ing]* to which thinking belongs as remembrance [Andenken] of this history <that is> brought about [ereignet] by it [history]. Remembrance is essentially distinct from history as a later bringing to mind [Vergegenwärtigen] of past goings on. First off, history does take place [geschieht] as what happens [Geschehen]. And it is not what is elapsing [Vergehen]. What happens comes about [west] as <it comes> out of the venture [Geschick] of the truth of *be[ing]* (cf. the lecture on Hölderlin's hymn "As though on a holiday . . ." [1939, GA 4, pp. 49-77].) *Be[ing]* belongs to the venture [Geschick] to the extent that It [Es], *be[ing]*, gives itself [gibt selbst]. However, thought of as what has come down <to us> [geschickhaft] means It [Es] gives itself and at the same time refuses <to give> [versagt] itself. Nonetheless, Hegel's determination [Bestimmung] of history as the unfolding [Entwicklung] of "spirit [Geist]" is not untrue. Neither is it in part true <and> in part false. It is | {336} as true as metaphysics, which with Hegel is for the first time articulated [zur Sprache bringt] in its essence (thought in terms of the absolute [ihr absolut gedachtes]) in the System. Absolute metaphysics with <its> inversions in Marx and Nietzsche belongs to the history of the truth of *be[ing]*. What stems from it is not affected by or possibly explained away by refutations. It can be grasped only as long as its truth is back safe in *be[ing]* itself and removed from the arena of mere human opinion. All refuting in the field of essential thinking is foolish. The quarrel among thinkers is a lovers' quarrel about what alone matters. In turn, it helps them gain the simple sense of belonging to what is the selfsame <matter> in terms of which they find what is ventured [das Schickliche] in the venture of *be[ing]*.

Assuming that in the future humans will be able to think the truth of *be[ing]* they will at the same time think in terms of ek-sistence. Ek-sisting, they take place in the venture of *be[ing]*. The ek-sistence of humans is as ek-sistence historical, but not only or primarily because so many things happen to humans and in human affairs in the course of time. Because it matters to think the ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz] of *being-there* [Da-sein] the thinking of *Be[ing]* and *Time* is essentially [wesentlich] that the historical reality [Geschichtlichkeit] of existence [Dasein] be experienced.<sup>90</sup>

But in *Be[ing]* and *Time* is it not said where the "there is [es gibt]" comes up for discussion (GA 2, p. 281), <that> "Only as long as there is existence is there *be[ing]*"?<sup>91</sup> Indeed. This means that only as long as the lumination of *be[ing]* comes to pass [sich ereignet] does *be[ing]* convey itself [übereiget sich] to humans. But that the There [Da], <that is,> lumination as the truth of *be[ing]* comes to pass is the dispensation [Schickung] of *be[ing]* itself. This is the venture of lumination. But the

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<sup>90</sup> In the end, *Ek-sistenz* and *Da-sein* are the same and both are translated with 'ek-sistence'. As noted, on occasion *Da-sein* (hyphenated) is better rendered with *be[ing]*-there when the discussion is focused on the status of the *Da* [there] of humans. The latin *Ek-sistenz* very clearly does *not* mean to "stand out" as we are commonly taught. The Latin *exsisto* mean "to be out there" (*versus* inside a subject, self, body or brain). The great Dutch phenomenologist and psychiatrist Jan van den Berg made this clear in his contribution to the 1986 [fourth annual] symposium of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center (March 6-7, 1986, at Duquesne University, in his address "The Rise and Fall of the Medical Model in Psychiatry: A Phenomenological Analysis," in *Psychiatry and Phenomenology*, Pittsburgh: The Center, 1987, p. 9 (translated by Bep Mook).

<sup>91</sup> "Nur solange Dasein ist, gibt es Sein."

sentence <just quoted> does not mean that the existence of humans in the ordinary sense of *existentia* [existentiality] and thought in the modern period as the actuality [Wirklichkeit] of the *ego cogito* [I think] is what is there of the sort by means of which *be[ing]* is produced [geschaffen] for the first time. The sentence does not say that *be[ing]* is a product [Produckt] of humans. In the introduction to *Be[ing] and Time* (GA 2, p. 51) it is put simply and clearly and even in italics: "*Be[ing]* is the *transcendens* [transcending] per se." Just as the openness [Offenheit] | {337} of spatial proximity [Nähe] surpasses every thing [Ding] near and distant, so is *be[ing]* essentially more boundless [weiter] than all <manner of> what is there because it is the lumination itself. But *be[ing]* is nevertheless thought of according to the initially unavoidable formulation of <the> still dominant metaphysics. Only in this respect does *be[ing]* come to light [zeigt sich] in a kind of surpassing and as such.

The preliminary determination <that> "*be[ing]* is the *transcendens* per se" takes into consideration in a simple statement the manner in which the essence of *be[ing]* has thus far enlightened [lichtete] humans. This retrospective determination of the essence of the *be[ing]* of what is there in terms of the lumination of what is there as such remains unavoidable for formulations by earlier thinking about the question of the truth of *be[ing]*. Thinking thus attests to its essence in a way becoming to it [sein geschickliches Wesen]. Far be it for it [thinking] to claim to start from scratch and explain away as false all philosophy that has come out of the past. If, however, the designation of *be[ing]* as the *transcendens* pure and simple already names the simple essence of the truth of *be[ing]*, that and that alone after all is surely a question for the <sort of> thinking that attempts to think the truth of *be[ing]*. That is also what is meant on p. 304 <of *Be[ing] and Time*> that only out of "sense [Sinn]," that is, out of the truth of *be[ing]* is the manner in which *be[ing]* is to be understood. *Be[ing]*

comes to light for humans in the ek-static [ekstatischen] scheme of things [Entwurf]. Yet this scheme of things does not produce *be[ing]*.

But more than that, this scheme of things is essentially one that is eminent [ein geworfener]. What is at issue [das Werfende] in envisioning [im Entwerfen] is not humans but *be[ing]* itself which befits [schickt] humans as [als] their essence in the ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz] of *being-there* [Da-sein]. This venture comes to pass as the lumination of *be[ing]*, which is the way it <*be[ing]*> is. It grants [gewährt] *be[ing]* intimacy [Nähe]. In the lumination of the "There" a human being [Mensch] lives in this intimacy as one who is ek-sisting [Ek-sistierende] without as of yet actually having the power to go further and adopt this way of living [Wohnen]. The nearness "of [des]" *be[ing]* that is the "There [Da]" of existence [Dasein] is from <the perspective of> *Be[ing] and Time* thought in the address on Hölderlin's elegy "Homecoming" (1943) <where> we hear "home [Heimat]" spoken of in the bard's poem | {338} <as coming> from an experience [aus der Erfahrung] of the oblivion of *be[ing]*. The word [Heimat] is thought here in an essential [wesentlichen] sense, not patriotically [patriotisch], not nationalistically [nationalistisch], but ontohistorically [seinsgeschichtlich]. At the same time, however, the essence [Wesen] of home is spoken of with the intention of thinking of the homelessness [Heimatslosigkeit] of modern humans in terms of the essence [Wesen] of the history of *be[ing]*. Nietzsche experienced this homelessness for the last time <in the history of *be[ing]*>. He could find no other way out of the midst of metaphysics than <in> the inversion [Umkehrung] of metaphysics. But that is hopelessness at its best [die Vollendung der Ausweglosigkeit]. On the other hand, when Hölderlin wrote "Heimkunft [Homecoming]" he was concerned that his "countrymen [Landesleute]" meet up with [finden] their essence [Wesen]. By no means did he look for this in some sort of egoism [Egoismus] of his people [Volkes]. He saw it instead in an affiliation

[Zugehörigkeit] with what has come down <to us> [Geschick] of the Western world [Abendland]. But the Western world is not thought of just regionally as the Occident [Occident] as distinguished from the Orient [Orient] nor merely as Europe [Europa], but rather world-historically in terms of its nearness [Nähe] to the source [Ursprung] <of the West>. We have scarcely yet begun to think about the mysterious relations [Bezüge] with the East that have been put into words in Hölderlin's poetry (cf. "Der Ister [The Ister]" and also "[Die Wanderung [The Journey]" (third stanza and ff.)). <In "Homecoming"> what is "German [das 'Deutsche']" is not spoken <of> to the world in order that it come to have a German essence [Wesen] but is instead spoken to the Germans so that given their fateful [geschickhalt] affiliation with the population [zu den Völkern] they become world-historical [weltgeschichtlich] with them (cf. "Hölderlin's Poem Remembrance"). For this historical dwelling [Wohnens] home [Heimat] is intimacy [Nähe] with *be[ing]*.<sup>\*21</sup>

The decision as to whether and how God and the gods refuse themselves and night prevails, whether and how night falls on what is holy, <and> whether and how an appearance of God and the gods may happen with a renewed emergence of what is sacred—<the> decision about these things> is made in this intimacy, if at all. But what is sacred, which is still the only sphere of the essence of divinity that alone grants in return the dimension of the gods and God comes | {339} to light then for the first time only if, first and with lengthy preparation, *be[ing]* itself has come to light [sich gelichtet] and been experienced in its truth. Only thus, from *be[ing]*, does the overcoming [Überwindung] of the homelessness in which not only humans but also the essence [Wesen] of the human being has lost its way begin.

Thinking of homelessness in this way comes of an abandonment by *be[ing]* [Seinsverlassenheit] of what is there. It is the sign of the oblivion of *be[ing]* [Seinsvergessenheit]. In consequence of this, the truth of *be[ing]* remains unthought.

Oblivion of *be[ing]* manifests itself indirectly in that humans always merely see and work with what is there. Because they cannot help but have a conception of *be[ing]*, *be[ing]* is then explained as merely "the most general" and therewith what is there that is most all-encompassing, or as a creation of what is there that is infinite, or as what has been made by a finite subject. At the same time, from time immemorial "*be[ing]*" has stood for "what is there" and, inversely, the latter <has stood> for the former, the two of them interchangeable as though <caught up> in a strange and even mindless confusion.

*Be[ing]* as what has come down <to us> that becomes truth remains hidden. But the fate of the world is presaged by poetry without its having as yet emerged as the history of *be[ing]*. For that reason Hölderlin's world-historical [weltgeschichtlich] thinking that comes to language in the poem "Remembering" is essentially more original and thus matters more for what is to come than <, for example,> Goethe's mere cosmopolitanism. For fundamentally the same reason, Hölderlin's relation [Bezug] to Hellenism is something essentially other than humanism. Thus when faced with death young Germans who knew of Hölderlin thought and lived something other than what was held out in public to be the German view <of death>.<sup>92</sup>

Homelessness is becoming the fate of the world. For that reason it is necessary to think about what has ontohistorically come down <to us of *be[ing]*>. The roots of what Marx had learned from Hegel to recognize in an essential and meaningful sense [bedeutenden Sinne] as the alienation of humans goes back to the

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<sup>92</sup> The reference here is no doubt to Norbert von Hellingrath (1888-1916), who planned the first complete edition of Hölderlin's work but completed only three of a projected six-volume set. He was died in the Battle of Verdun at the age of 28. Many German soldiers took copies of Hölderlin's poetry with them in their duffle bags.

homelessness of modern man [neuzeitlichen Menschen]. This <homelessness> is evoked and <evoked precisely> in fact by what has come down <to us> of *be[ing]* in the form of metaphysics through which <it is> consolidated and | {340} by which at the same time it is concealed as homelessness. Because since Marx discovers this alienation as he enters into an essential dimension of history, for that reason the Marxist view of history is superior to other <views of> history. But because neither Husserl nor Sartre (so far I have seen up to now) recognize the essentiality [Wesentlichkeit] of what is historical about *be[ing]*, for that reason neither phenomenology nor Existentialism enter into that very dimension [Dimension] within which a productive discussion with Marxism would for the first time become possible.

In addition to this it is certainly also necessary to free oneself of naive conceptions of materialism and from paltry refutations that are supposed to work against it. The essence of materialism does not consist in the assertion <that> everything is merely matter [alles sei nur Stoff] but rather in a metaphysical determination according to which all of what is there appears as material [Material] for labor [Arbeit]. The modern metaphysical essence of labor is presaged in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the self-establishing precedent for unconditional production that is a reification of what is actual experienced by humans as subjectivity. The essence of materialism remains hidden in the essence of technology [Technik], about which a great deal indeed is written but <to which> little thought is given. In its essence technology is an ontohistorical venture of the truth of *be[ing]* that lies in oblivion [Vergessenheit]. It does not go back to the τέχνη of the Greeks in name only [nur im Namen], but rather stems from τέχνη in an essentially historical way as a manner of ἀληθεύειν, that is, <as a manner> of making manifest of what is there. As a form of truth, technology is grounded in the history of metaphysics. This is itself a distinguished phase in the history of *Be[ing]* and hitherto



the only one that is in full view. One may express in different ways one's attitude toward the foundation and teachings of Communism. It is ontohistorically certain <, however,> that it articulates an elementary experience of what is world-historical. Whoever speaks of "Communism" as only a "<political> party" or as a "world-view" thinks too simply, just | {341} as those who mean by the term [Titel] "Americanism" only a life style and a decidedly contemptible one at that. The danger\*<sup>22</sup> into which Europe clearly has been drawn <at least> up to this point is presumably this, that first and foremost its [Europe's] thinking, once its greatness, has lagged behind\*<sup>23</sup> the essential course of the dawning fate of the world, which nonetheless remains determined in a European way in the fundamentals of its essential provenance. Given its essence [Wesen] and without even having considered the efforts <it has> exerted to explicate itself, no <kind of> metaphysics—be it idealistic, be it materialistic, <or> be it Christian—is itself able to bring home <to humans> the <meaning of> what has come down <to us>, which <in terms of> thinking means to attain and bring gather [versammeln] what now is [ist]\*<sup>24</sup> in a fulfilled sense of *be[ing]*.

In view of the characteristic homelessness of humans to ontohistorical thinking the coming venture of humans appears in what they find in the truth of *be[ing]* and <in their> starting out on such <a venture of> encountering <it> [Finden]. Metaphysically <speaking> every nationalism is an anthropologism and as such subjectivism. Nationalism is not overcome [überwunden] through mere internationalism, but is in that way only expanded and elevated to a formal principle. Nationalism is as little humanized or abolished by *humanitas* as individualism is <abolished> by a collectivism [Kolektivismus] with no sense of history. That [collectivism] is the subjectivity\*<sup>25</sup> of humans in <their> totality [Totalität]. It | {342}

fulfills their unconditional self-assertion [Selbstbehauptung].<sup>93</sup> This will not allow itself to be declared null and void [rückgängig]. It does not allow itself to be sufficiently enough experienced by <the kind of> thinking that has one-sidedly intervened. Expelled from the truth of *be[ing]* everything revolves around only the human being [Mensch] as the *animal rationale*.

But the essence of humans lies in the fact that the human being [Mensch] is more than merely the human being [Mensch] insofar as he is conceived of as the rational living thing. Here "more" must not be understood as <meaning something> added on, as if the traditional definition of humans were to remain his fundamental determination and then experience an augmentation merely by the addition of something existential [Existenziellen]. The "more" means more original and thereby more essential in <its> essence [im Wesen wesentlicher]. But here something mysterious appears: the human being [Mensch] *is* [emphasis added] in givenness [Geworfenheit]. That is to say, as the ek-sisting opposing <position> [Gegenwurf] of *be[ing]*\*<sup>26</sup>, the human being [Mensch] is so much more than the *animal rationale* that he is <to that exact extent> less so in relationship [Verhältnis] to humans understood in terms of subjectivity.<sup>94</sup> The human being [Mensch] is not lord [Herr] over what is

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<sup>93</sup> Heidegger's choice of word here is likely an allusion to the title of his rectorial address, *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutsche Universität* [*The Self-assertion of the German University*], given on May 27, 1933.

<sup>94</sup> The German *Gegenwurf* originally translated the Latin *obiectum* where the fundamental sense is of something being exposed to and "thrown against" in confrontation is clearly indicated. Heidegger contrasts this "objective" position of human beings with respect to *be[ing]* to the metaphysical understanding of human beings as "subjective" or in submission to *be[ing]*. *Be[ing]* confronts human beings.

there. The human being [Mensch] is the tender [Hirt] of *be[ing]*. Humans lose nothing by this "less" but rather gain <something by it> since <in this way> they get to the truth of *be[ing]*. Their gain in this is the essential neediness [Armut] of the tender whose dignity [Würde] lies in being called upon by *be[ing]* itself in the observance [Wahrnis] of its truth [Wahrheit]. This call [Ruf] comes as the utterance [Wurf] from which the givenness of humans derives. In their ontohistorical essence, humans are what is there their sort of whose *be[ing]* as ek-sistence is such that it lives in intimacy [Nähe] with *be[ing]*. The human being is the neighbor [Nachbar] of *be[ing]*.<sup>95</sup>

But as you have probably wanted to counter for quite a while now, does not such thinking think precisely about the *humanitas* [humanity] of *homo humanus* [civilized man]? Does it not decisively think the meaning [Bedeutung] of *humanitas* as no metaphysics has or ever could think it? Is it not "humanism [Humanismus]" in the most extreme sense? Certainly. It is the humanism that the humanity | {343} of humans [Menschheit des Menschcn] thinks from <their> intimacy with *be[ing]*. But at the same time it is a humanism with respect to which not humans but rather the historical essence of humans is at stake in its provenance [Herkunft] in the truth of *be[ing]*. But is the ek-sistence of humans at the same time not won or lost in this game? So it goes [So ist es].

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The inescapable givenness (*Geworfenheit*) of *Da-sein* is the ontological condition of that confrontation. We are invariably exposed to *be[ing]*, first and foremost [*zumeist und zunächst*], "no matter what (is there)."

<sup>95</sup> One might hazard that in ex-sisting the human (being) is the '-ing'—the participial action—of *be[ing]* on this earth "out there" in the world. We are the odd confluence of (who is) in-the-world and (what is) on-the-earth. Each of us *is* (transitive) into-the-world and *is* (intransitive) on-the-earth.

In *Be[ing] and Time* (GA 2, 51) it is said that all questions of philosophy "redound [zurückschlägt] to existence [Existenz]." But here existence is not the actuality of the *ego cogito* [I think]. Nor is it merely the actuality of subjects being at work with and for one another and thereby coming into their own themselves. In fundamental distinction from all *existentia* [existentiality] and "*existence*,"<sup>96</sup> "ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz]" is ek-static [ek-statische] living [Wohnen] in intimacy with *be[ing]*. It is vigilance [Wächterschaft], that is, caring about [Sorge für] *be[ing]*. Since something simple is to be thought by this <kind of> thinking, it is for that reason so difficult for the traditional conceptualizing <we know> as philosophy. What is difficult here does not, however, consist in indulging in some special sort of reverie [Tiefsinn] or forming a complicated concept, but is rather hidden in the step back [Schritt-zurück] that lets thinking enter upon discovering <a certain kind of> questioning and dropping the holding of opinions customary in philosophy.

It is everywhere thought that the attempt <made> in *Be[ing] and Time* came to a dead end. We will let the matter of opinion drop. Even today the thinking of *Be[ing] and Time* has not gotten beyond the few steps attempted in the treatise of that name. But in the meantime it has perhaps entered somewhat further into its question. However, as long as philosophy occupies itself only with continually obstructing the possibility of at last letting itself get involved with the matter of thinking, namely, the truth of *be[ing]*, it is certainly in no danger of ever being destroyed by the severity of what matters to it. <And> [s]o "philosophizing [Philosophieren]" about failure is separated by a chasm from thinking that is a failure. Were humans to succeed in this no danger would befall them. To them would <then>

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<sup>96</sup> Here Heidegger is using the French *existence*.

come the only present [Geschenk] from *be[ing]* that could be becoming to thinking [das dem Denken aus dem Sein zukommen könnte]. |

{344} But this also means <that> the matter of thinking [Sache des Denkens] is not reached in a way such that it paves the way for small talk [Gerede] about "the truth of *be[ing]*" and about "ontohistory [Seinsgeschichte]." The only thing that matters [liegt einzig daran] is that the truth of *be[ing]* come up for discussion and that thinking come up [gelange] in this way. Perhaps then language calls far less for an overhasty speaking out <on things> than for proper silence [das rechte Schweigen]. Yet who among us today might fancy himself at home on the way [auf dem Pfad] of silence in his attempt to think? Provided that it extends further, our thinking could perhaps point to the truth of *be[ing]*, that is, to it [the truth of *be[ing]*] as what is intended. With that it would be relieved of merely surmising and having opinions <much> sooner and <would be> pointed in the direction of what has already become the rare craft of writing [Hand-werk der Schrift]. Even though they are not determined for all eternity, matters that matter come only at the right time, even if <only> at the last possible moment.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> "Die Sachen, an denen etwas ist, kommen, auch wenn sie nicht für die Ewigkeit bestimmt sind, selbst in spätester Zeit noch rechtzeitig."

Variant: Matters in which "there is something to it," even if <they are> not determined for all eternity, come up <and then> only at the right time, even if <that is, only> at the last possible moment."

The English idiom "There's something to it" is a good example of an utterance that cannot be reproduced in another language. Many of Heidegger's expressions are of that kind. The challenge and adventure (and fun) of translating is, however, to try to do just that.

Whether the realm of the truth of *be[ing]* in which the freedom of its essence [Wesen] is saved is a *cul-de-sac* [Sackgasse] or <something that remains out in> the open everyone may judge <for himself> according to the way in which he himself has tried to follow the appointed path [gewiesenen Weg] or, better still, has tried to clear the way for a better way that is appropriate to the question. On the penultimate page of *Be[ing] and Time* (GA 2, p. 577) are found the following sentences: "The *dispute* [Streit] about the interpretation [Interpretation]<sup>98</sup> of *be[ing]* (that is to say, not of what is there <of whatever sort> nor of the *be[ing]* of humans [Menschen]) cannot be settled *because it has not yet been provoked* [entfacht]. And in the end it does not let itself "start a fight [vom Zaun brechen]"; rather, the provoking of the dispute no doubt requires some equipping <of oneself> [Zurüstung]. But the preceding endeavor is solely on the way to this." Even now after two decades these sentences still have value. In the days to come let us as sojourners [Wanderer] also continue approaching the incipience [Nachbarschaft] of *be[ing]*. The question you have put <to me> helps to elucidate that way [Weg].

You ask: *Comment redonner un sens au mot 'Humanisme'?*<sup>99</sup> Your question not only presumes that you want to retain the word 'humanism [Humanismus]', but | {345} also includes the admission that this word has lost its sense [Sinn].<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Compared to *Auslegung*, which explicates what is out there, *Interpretation* exposes what lies hidden in a matter so that it can be subjected to *Asulegung*.

<sup>99</sup> "How to restore sense to the word 'humanism'?" Heidegger's point is not that the word is imprecise in its current usage but rather that it no longer bears meaning. As explains in the next passage, it is no longer a meaningful appellation. It does not mean anything to those who utter it.

It has lost it [its sense] owing to the insight that the essence [Wesen] of humanism [Humanismus] is metaphysical, and this means that the question about the truth of *be[ing]* has not only not been posed but rather <is also> blocked <from being asked> inasmuch as metaphysics continues in its oblivion [Vergessenheit] of *be[ing]*. But precisely thinking that leads to insight into the questionable essence [Wesen] of humans [Menschen] has at the same time brought us to the point of thinking the essence of humans more originally. In view of this more essential *humanitas* [humanity] of *homo humanus* [civilized man] there follows the possibility of restoring an historical [geschichtlich] sense to the word 'humanism' that is older than its oldest <sense as> reckoned by history [historisch]. This restoring [Zurückgeben] is not to be understood as if the word 'humanism [Humanismus]' were without sense as such and a mere *flatus vocis* [mere sound / so much air].<sup>101</sup> The <adjective> "*humanum* [human]" in the word *humanitas* [humanity] points to the essence of humans. The "-ism [-ismus]" indicates that the essence [Wesen] of humans [Menschen] is meant to be taken essentially [wesentlich]. The German word '*Humanismus*' has this sense as a word. To restore [zurückgeben] its sense can only mean to determine the sense of the word once again. That calls for experiencing

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<sup>100</sup> That Heidegger translates *sens* with *Sinn* rather than *Bedeutung* merits a discussion of its own. Both words (*sens* and *Sinn*) can be traced back to the Proto-Germanic *sinnaz* (mind, meaning), and yet even further to the Proto-Indo-European *sent-* (to feel). In question is the "feel" of the word. He will translate Beaufret's *redonner* with *zurückgeben* ([to] give back, restore). *Sinn* comes over better as 'meaningfulness' than 'meaning.' See the Introduction {377}.

<sup>101</sup> So much "sound and fury / Signifying nothing" as Shakespeare's Macbeth says.

more originally at last the essence of humans, <and> for a second time to indicate again the extent to which this essence is becoming [geschicklich] <to it> in its own way. The essence of humans lies in [beruht in] ek-sistence. It [the essence of humans] depends essentially on this, that is to say on *be[ing]* itself insofar as in this <essential depending> *be[ing]* accommodates [sich ereignet] humans as <the> ek-sisting to <their> vigilance [Wächterschaft] over the truth of *be[ing]*. Supposing that we resolve to retain the word, "humanism" now means <that> the essence of humans is essential for the truth of *be[ing]*, and so much so then that it does not simply depend upon humans as such. We thus think of "humanism" in a curious fashion. The word [Wort] amounts to a term [Titel] that is a "*lucus a non lucendo* [a grove by not being light]."102

Should one still use <the term> 'humanism [Humanismus]' for a "humanism [Humanismus]" that speaks <out> against all previous humanism [Humanismus] | {346} but which nevertheless does not make one an advocate of the inhumane [Inhumanen]? And <do> that in sympathy with the prevailing trends of usage of the term [Titel] only in order to go along with them, <trends> that are suffocated by metaphysical subjectivism and immersed in the oblivion of *be[ing]*? Or in outspoken resistance to "humanism [Humanismus]" should thinking risk taking the initiative that could occasion its for once being taken aback [stutzig zu werden] at some point by the *humanitas* [humanity] of *homo humanus* [civilized man] and its foundation [Begründung]? If not already compelled to do so by the world-historical moment itself, it [such thinking] could at least awaken a reflection not just about humans [Menschen] but <also> about the "nature [Natur]" of humans, <and> not just about

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<sup>102</sup> The Latin idiom refers to an absurd etymology. Heidegger demotes the "word" to a mere grapheme or caption, just so many characters written down.



<that> nature [Natur] but even more originally thought about the dimension [Dimension] in which the essence [Wesen] of humans determined in this way by *be[ing]* itself is at home [heimisch]. Yet should we not instead for bear for a while with the inevitable misinterpretations [Mißdeutungen] to which the path of thinking [Weg des Denkens] has been exposed up to now in the element [Element] of *be[ing]* and time [Sein und Zeit] and let them slowly wear themselves out? These misinterpretations are the natural refutation [Rückdeutung] of what has been read or merely what was thought <to be found in what one has read, but> based on what which one had intended to find <in what he reads> before reading <it>. They all prove to have the same structure [Bau] and the same basis [Grund].

Because "humanism [Humanismus]" is spoken out against <here> one fears <there will be> a defense of the in-humane [In-humanen] and a glorification of barbaric brutality [barbarischen Brutalität]. For what is more "logical" than this, that for one who negates humanism there can remain only the approval of inhumanness [Unmenschlichkeit]?

Because "logic [Logik]" is spoken out against one believes word is out that the rigor of thinking is called off, in place of which the despotism of urges and feelings is brought to power and "irrationalism [Irrationalismus]" is thereby proclaimed to be what is true. For what is more "logical [logischer]" than this, that whoever speaks out against what is logical [das Logische] defends the alogical [das Alogische]?

Because "values [Werte]" are spoken out against, one is appalled by a philosophy that ostensibly dares to allow disrespect for mankind's [Menschheit] highest qualities. For what is | {347} more "logical" than this, that a thinking that denies all values must necessarily pass everything off as worthless [wertlos]?

Because it is said that the human being's [Mensch] *be[ing]* is "to be in the world [In-der-Welt-sein]" one takes it that human beings are demoted to <having> a essence [Wesen] "of this world" only, in consequence of which philosophy becomes lost in positivism [Positivismus]. For what is more "logical" than this, that whoever maintains the worldliness [Weltlichkeit] of what it is to be a human being [Menschsein] accepts only what is of this world [das Diesseitige], and denies the otherworldly [das Jenseitige] and rejects all "transcendence [Transzendenz]"?

Because reference is made to Nietzsche's words about "the death of God," one declares such conduct to be atheism [Atheismus]. For what is more "logical" than this, that whoever has experienced the "death of God" is one who is godless [ein Gott-loser]?

Because what humanity [Menschheit] values as lofty and sacred is always spoken out against in everything just mentioned <it is supposed that> this philosophy practices an irresponsible and destructive "nihilism [Nihilismus]." For what is more "logical" than this, that whoever in general denies what truly is there [das wahrhaft Seiende] takes a stand on the side of what is not-there [des Nicht-seiende] and because of that preaches mere no-thing [Nichts] as the sense [Sinn] of actuality [Wirklichkeit]?

What's going on here? One hears talk of "humanism," of "logic," of "values," of "world," of "God." One hears talk of some sort of opposition to these. One is acquainted with what is mentioned and takes <it> as <something> positive. But what speaks out against what is mentioned as hearsay <and> does so in a not exactly prudent way people immediately take as its denial [Verneinung] and this <in turn> as "what is negative [das Negative]" in the sense of what is destructive [Destruktiven].

Now somewhere in *Be[ing] and Time* there is explicit talk of "the phenomenological destruction [Destruktion]." With the help of logic and reason [Ratio],<sup>103</sup> which are often invoked, one thinks that what is not positive [positiv] is negative [negativ], and so encourages the rejection [Verwerfung] of reason and therefore deserves to be denounced as a kind of depravity [Verworfenheit].<sup>104</sup> One is so full of "logic" that everything that is offensive to the customary indolence of opinion is immediately rung up as its opposite. One tosses aside everything that does not keep to the well known and much beloved positive [beliebten Positiven] | {348} into the previously depicted pit of mere negation [Negation] that negates [verneint] everything <and> thereby ends up in no-thing [Nichts] and consummates nihilism. In such nihilism one lets founder everything that one has found out about with the help of logic.

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<sup>103</sup> Here atypically Heidegger uses the German word based on the Latin *ratio*. A recent coinage, *Ratio* does not appear in Grimm.

<sup>104</sup> It is inevitable that one will want to compare *Geworfenheit* (one of the existentials: givenness) and *Verworfenheit* ("fallenness from grace," as found in the texts of the German mystics whom Heidegger read with such interest). But they are not the same and the importance of Heidegger's neologism (*Geworfenheit* does not appear in Grimm) as a fundamental ontological notion becomes striking. What could be more basic than not having been born at all? The topic (antinatalism) is ancient. The tragedy of *Geworfensein* would be the inevitable starting point of having been rendered a living thing by "the heartless gods." Heidegger knew well the words of Sophocles (echoing Theognis): "μη φῦναι τὸν ἅπαντα νικᾷ λόγον [Not to be born is beyond all account best]" (*Oedipus at Colonus*, l. 1225). The line just happens to contain forms of the two Greek words Heidegger contemplated most during his lifetime. The closing lines of the play are quoted at the end of the Epilogue.

But does "what is against [das Gegen]" that thinking proposes over against what is commonly thought necessarily show up as mere negation [Negation] and as what is negative [das Negative]? That happens only if one sets up beforehand what is commonly thought of as "the positive [das Positive]" and absolute and at the same time negatively [negativ] decides about the range of possible comparisons with this <positive>, and only then of course <does so> inescapably and definitively, which is to say with no prospect of anything else freely in view. A refusal to permit reflection on the previously held "positive [Positive]" together with the positing and opposing from which it believes it has escaped lies hidden in such a way of proceeding. With constant appeal to what is logical one gives the impression of being honestly engaged in thinking, while <in fact> one has renounced [abgeschworen] thinking.

That the opposition to "humanism [Humanismus]" by no means comes out in defense of the inhumane [Inhumanen] but rather opens up other prospects should have become somewhat clearer <by now>.

"Logic" understands thinking as the proposing [Vorstellen] of what is there in its *be[ing]*, which proposing serves itself [zustellt] in the generality [im Generellen] of the concept [Begriffes]. But how do things stand with reflection [Besinnung] on *be[ing]* itself and that means with thinking that thinks the truth of *be[ing]*? Only this thinking hits upon the more original essence [Wesen] of λόγος that was submerged and lost even by the founders of "logic," Plato and Aristotle. To think in opposition to "logic" does not mean to stand up for what is illogical [das Unlogische] but rather means precisely to think about λόγος and the essence of the λόγος that appeared at the dawn of thinking, that is to say, <it means> to take pains for once in preparing for such pondering [Nachdenken]. What do all such extensive systems of logic mean to us if they themselves (and without understanding what they are doing) decline in advance the task of asking, even if just for once, about | {349} the essence of

λόγος? If one wanted to make counterobjections, which is of course fruitless, then one could with even greater justice say <that> as the refusal of *ratio* irrationalism [Irrationalismus] prevails unrecognized and uncontested in defense of "logic," which believes <that> reflection on λόγος and the grounding of the essence of *ratio* in it can be avoided.

Thinking <that is> opposed to "values" does not hold that all one explains as "values"—"culture [Kultur]," "art," "science," "the dignity of man [Menschenwürde]," "world," "God"—is worthless. On the contrary, it matters <to such thinking> to understand that by the very characterization of something as a "value" what has been judged to be such <a "value"> [das so Gewertete] has been robbed of its dignity [Würde]. That is to say, in the valuing [Schätzung] of something as a value [Wert] what has been judged to be so is merely accepted as an object for valuing by humans. But what something is in its *be[ing]* is not exhausted in its being opposite [Gegenständigkeit] <to something else>, especially not when objectivity [Gegenständigkeit]<sup>105</sup> has the character of a value [Wert]. All valuing [Werthen], even where it values positively [wo es positiv wertet], is a kind of subjectifying [Subjektivierung]. But it [valuing] does not let what is there <just> be; instead valuing [Werthen] lets what is there count [gelten] solely as the object [Objekt] of its own doing [Tuns] <as valuing>. The remarkable effort to demonstrate the objectivity [Gegenständigkeit] of values does not know what it is doing. When one finally proclaims "God" to be "the highest value [Wert]," that is indeed a degradation of God's essence [Wesen]. Here and as a rule, thinking in <terms of> values is the greatest blasphemy [Blasphemie] that can be thought of *vis-à-vis be[ing]*. Therefore

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<sup>105</sup> Here *Gegenständigkeit* also denotes "correctness," which is also a sense of truth that Heidegger rejects as a residue of Western metaphysics.

to think in opposition to [gegen] values does not mean to beat the drum for the worthlessness [Wertlosigkeit] and invalidity [Nichtigkeit] of what is there, but rather <it> means to bring the lumination [Lichtung] of the truth of *be[ing]* into the presence of thinking in contrast to the subjectifying [Subjektivierung] of what is there to <the status of> a mere object [Objekt].

The reference to <what it is> "to be in the world [In-der-Welt-sein]" as the basic feature [Grundzug] of the *humanitas* [humanity] of *homo humanus* [civilized man] does not mean to claim that a human being [Mensch] is merely a "worldly" creature ["weltlich" Wesen] understood in the Christian sense, <and> thus turned away from God and without any tie to "transcendence [Transzendenz]." What is really meant by this word ["Transzendenz"] would more clearly be termed [genannt] the transcendent [das Transcendente]. The transcendent is | {350} what is there <of> the supersensory <sort> [übersinnlich Seiende]. This is considered to be what is there of the highest sort in the sense of being the first cause [Ursache] of <the rest of> what is there. God is thought of as this first cause. In the term [Name] "to-be-in-a-world," however, "world" does not at all mean what is there of an earthly sort in contrast to what is heavenly [zum Himmlischen], nor "what is worldly [das Weltliche]" in contrast to "what is spiritual [zum Geistlichen]." So determined, "world" does not mean all that is there or some region of what is there but rather the openness [Offenheit] of *be[ing]*.<sup>106</sup> A human being is and is human insofar as he is what is ek-sisting [Ek-sistierende].<sup>107</sup> He is [steht] out in the openness of *be[ing]*, which is how *be[ing]* itself

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<sup>106</sup> *Offenheit* usually corresponds to our sense of openness as candor. The contrast for Heidegger is secrecy or hiddenness.

<sup>107</sup> "Der Mensch ist und ist Mensch, insofern er der Ek-sistierende is." Variant: The human being is and is Man insofar as he is what is as ek-sisting. Keirkegaard's

is <what it is>, which as utterance [Wurf] has itself plunged [erworfen] the essence [Wesen] of humans into "care [Sorge]." So thrown, humans are [steht] "in [in]"<sup>108</sup> the openness of *be[ing]*. "World" is the lumination of *be[ing]* in which humans stand out [aussteht] of their eminent essence [geworfenen Wesen]. The <expression> "to be in the world" speaks of the essence [Wesen] of ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz] with regard to the luminated dimension [gelichtete Dimension] out of which [aus der] the "ek- [Ek-]"<sup>109</sup> of ek-sistence comes about [west]. Thought in terms of ek-sistence "world" is in

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word (1846) was *den Existerende*, given as 'exister' in the Hongs' translation, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941, p. 468 *passim*. Better would be "the existing." Heidegger would have read the translation of Kierkegaard's text by Hermann Gottshed published in two volumes 1925 as *Abschließende unwissenschaftliche Nachschrift*. Alistair Hannay (2009) prefer "one who exists" but conflates Kierkegaard's term in this section with other formulations that he renders with the same phrase earlier on in the work.

<sup>108</sup> Scare quotes put the reader on notice that Heidegger does not intend a spatial understanding here, as in a container and its contents or a geometric expanse, or a span of time ("in ten minutes"). Instead, this "in" of "being-in-the-world" functions adverbially to indicate the way in which *be[ing]* relates to humans. See *Be[ing] and Time* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 80, where the little word is traced back to *innan* (*Wohnen*, dwelling), and *The History of the Concept of Time* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 154. Mark Wigley nicely sums up the matter in *The Architecture of Deconstruction* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995) (rev. ed.), pp. 240-241.

<sup>109</sup> Readers familiar with Peter Shaffer's play *Equus* (1973) cannot miss the uncanny resonance with Alan Strang's ejaculation "Ek!" while dreaming in the

a certain sense precisely what is otherworldly [das Jenseitige] within and for eksistence [Eksistenz].<sup>110</sup> Above all, a human being is never a human being as a "subject [Subjekt]" this side of the world, whether this [the subject] be taken as an "I [Ich]" or a "We [Wir]." Nor to be sure is he ever simply a subject that is at the same time related to objects so that his essence [Wesen] has always lain in the subject-object connection [Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung]. In his essence [Wesen] the human being [Mensch] is ek-sistent [ek-sistent] in the openness of *be[ing]*, an opening [Offene]<sup>111</sup> that luminates beforehand the "between [Zwischen]" within which a

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presence of his therapist. Peter Shaffer, *Equus* (New York: Scribner, 2005), I.viii. Certainly, this is a play about existential crisis, not psychopathology. According to the 12<sup>th</sup> century *Etymologicum Magnum* the Latin *equus* (horse) derives from *ikkos* (equivalent to the more recognizable *hippos*), which in turn refers to the wild rage of the untamed stallion.

<sup>110</sup> This is one of only three times Heidegger does not hyphenate *Ek-sistenz* in the Letter. Munier treats *Ek-sistenz* and *Eksistenz* the same way in all three passage (*l'ek-sistence*) in *Questions* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), II/IV, pp. 110-111, 121 and 124. Barring manuscript, typescript, typesetting and/or proofreading oversights, I must assume there is meaning in the non-hyphenated form. There is a stretch between "a way of life" (*Existenz*) and the characterization of existence (*Da-sein*) as "the being thrown out there into the world" (*Ek-sistenz*). See {359} and {361} below.

<sup>111</sup> Heidegger's sense seems to be "an occasion" or "a chance opportunity" when something might happen. The *Offenheit* of *be[ing]* stresses its being open to the light of day and turned toward us (overt). There is no linguistic connection, but with Heideggerian suggestiveness one could hyphenate (o-vert) and provide the visible hint of something turned toward one (from the Latin *vertere*, [to] turn).



"connection [Beziehung]" between subject and object can for the first time "be [sein]."

To say that the essence of humans is based on being-in-the world does not imply a decision about whether in a theological-metaphysical sense the human being is something whose essence is only of this world [diesseitig] or something of the world beyond [jenseitig].

With the existential [existenzial] determination of the essence of human beings nothing has as of yet thereby been decided about the "existence of God [Dasein Gottes]" or his "not-being [Nicht-sein],"<sup>112</sup> and just as little <has been decided> about the possibility or impossibility of the gods [Göttern]. For that reason it is not merely premature but indeed wrong in advance if one maintains that the explanation | {351} of the essence of humans in terms of the relation [Bezug] of this essence to the truth of *be[ing]* is atheism. And what is more, this arbitrary way of ordering things is wanting [fehlen] even with respect to the attention <given> to <what one has been> reading. People do not care that since 1929, in *On the Essence of Ground*,

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<sup>112</sup> This formulation reminds me of the opening words of Hamlet's famous monologue as translated by August von Schlegel: "Sein oder Nichtsein; das ist hier die Frage"—but without the hyphen. But *Nicht-sein* (not-being) is not the same as *Nichtssein* (being nothing) or *Nichts-sein* (being the nothing), all notions that concerned Heidegger. Here he is using *Dasein* in the conventional (metaphysical) sense of everyday German usage and philosophy. Heidegger does not capitalize *sein* [his] in referring to God when he speaks about "das 'Dasein Gottes' oder sein 'Nicht-sein'." In his use of *existenzial* Heidegger seems to be referring to the then contemporary understanding of Existentialism *à la* Sartre and others.

there is the following (W 159, n. 56): "Through the ontological interpretation [Interpretation] of existence [Dasein] as 'to be in the world' nothing is decided either positively or negatively about a possible *be[ing]* toward [zu] God. All well and good, but a *more adequate concept of existence* is gained for the first time through an elucidation [Erhellung] of <what> transcendence [Transzendenz] <is> with regard to which it can now be *asked* how things stand ontologically with <regard to> the relationship between existence and God." But if as usual one still thinks about this observation in too limited a way one will <go on to> explain that this philosophy decides neither for nor against God's existence [das Dasein Gottes]. One comes to a standstill in indifference [Indifferenz]. Thus it is indifferent to the religious question. Such indifferentism [Indifferentismus] thus falls prey to nihilism.

But does the foregoing observation espouse indifferentism? Why then are certain words and not just any of them italicized in the remark? Just to suggest that <the kind of> thinking that thinks in terms of the question about the truth of *be[ing]* asks in way <that is> more original than <the way> metaphysics can question <things>. The essence [Wesen] of the sacred [Heilige] to be thought only in terms of the truth of *be[ing]*. The essence of divinity [Gottheit] is to be thought only in terms of the essence of the sacred [Heilige]. What the word 'God' is supposed to speak of by name [nennen soll] come to be thought and spoken for the first time only in terms of the essence of divinit. Or will we not be able to really understand and hear these words for the first time unless we as humans, that is to say, as <the> eksistent essence [eksistente Wesen] are to be capable of experiencing a relation [Bezug] of God to humans? But in the ongoing history of the world how are humans even going to be able seriously and rigorously to question whether God approaches or withdraws if humans refrain from thinking themselves into [hineinzudenken] the only dimension [Dimension] in which that question can be asked? But that is the

dimension of the sacred, which remains hidden | {352} if the opening [Offene] of *be[ing]* is not luminated [gelichtet] and yet is near humans in its lumination\*<sup>27</sup>. Perhaps what stands out about this era consists in the reserve [Verschlossenheit] of the dimension of what is wholesome [des Heilen]. This is perhaps the uniquely unwholesome [das einzige Unheil].

Yet with this reference <to the dimension of what is sacred> thinking that points the way to [vorweist] the truth of *be[ing]* as what is to be thought [das zu Denkende] has in no way decided in favor of theism. It [such thinking] can be as little theistic as atheistic. This <is so>, however, not on the basis of an indifferent attitude but rather from attention <given> to the limits that have been set to thinking as thinking <that are> in fact due to what it [thinking] is given <over> to be thought [als das Zudenkende gibt] by the truth of *be[ing]*. If and when thinking is content with its task, in that moment [im Augenblick] in the actual course of events [Weltgeschick] it gives [gibt es]<sup>113</sup> humans direction [Weisung]<sup>114</sup> as to the inceptive [anfänglich] dimension of their sojourn in history [geschichtlichen Aufenthalt]. When thinking in such a way speaks [sagt] the truth about *be[ing]* it has entrusted itself to [anvertraut] what is more essential [was wesentlicher ist] than all values [Werte] and anything

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<sup>113</sup> Heidegger speaks of thinking “giving” humans direction. One can also consider this formulation as shedding light on the idiom *es gibt* (“there is” or “it is”) that occupies Heidegger’s attention elsewhere. The *es* (it) in “*es gibt*” (“it gives”) may always implicitly refer to thinking—or to *be[ing]*. Heidegger never tires of contemplating the question *Was heißt Denken?* But if “it” is thinking, what calls for [heißt] it is *be[ing]*. If one chooses to read this question as “What is called thinking?” the only answer can be, again, *be[ing]*.

<sup>114</sup> Here *Weisung* also means “instruction” or “directive.”

whatsoever that is there [jegliches Seiende]. Thinking does not overturn [überwindet] metaphysics by climbing ever higher, surmounting it and somehow doing away with [aufhebt] it, but rather by climbing back down [zurücksteigen] into the intimacy of what is approaching [Nähe des Nächsten].<sup>115</sup> Especially where humans have gone too far with subjectivity descent [Abstieg] is more difficult and more dangerous than an ascent [Aufstieg]. The descent leads to the poverty of the ek-sistence of *homo humanus* [civilized man]. In ek-sistence the sphere [Bezirk] of <the> *homo animalis* [man with a soul] is left behind. Domination by this sphere is the indirect and longstanding basis [Grund] for the bedazzlement and despotism of that which one terms [bezeichnet] biologism [Biologismus], but also of what is known by the term [Titel] pragmatism [Pragmatismus]. To think the truth of *be[ing]* also means to think the *humanitas* [humanity] of <the> *homo humanus* [civilized man]. It is necessary for humanism [Humanismus] to be at the disposal of the truth of *be[ing]*, but without humanism in the metaphysical sense.

But if it is so evident that humanism is intrinsic to the thinking of *be[ing]* must not "ontology [Ontologie]" then be supplemented by "ethics [Ethik]"? Is this not essentially just what you are getting at | {353} that you articulate in the sentence

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<sup>115</sup> This play on spatial nearness and neighborhood (Nähe) and what is in proximity and next temporally or impending (Nächsten) works better in English perhaps than in German. For Heidegger, both spatial and temporal figures are metaphoric. Various words built on the verb *steigen* (step) are explored here: *hinaufsteigen* (ascend), *übersteigen* (surmount), *zurücksteigen* (climb back down), *absteigen* (stop over), and *absteigen* (descend).

<in your letter that reads>: "Ce que je cherche à faire, depuis longtemps déjà, c'est préciser le rapport de l'ontologie avec une éthique possible"<sup>116</sup>

Soon after *Be[ing] and Time* appeared a young friend asked me: "When are you going to write an ethics?" The way in which the essence [Wesen] of humans is thought <of> so essentially, namely, solely in terms of the question about the truth of *be[ing]*—in the course of which, however, humans nevertheless have not been exalted to be at the center [Zentrum] of what is there—<this> must awaken <in humans> the longing [Verlangen] for a compelling direction and for rules, that is, <as to> how humans <who are> experienced in terms of <their> ek-sistence toward *be[ing]* [zum Sein] should live in a way <that is> becoming [geschicklich] <to them>. The wish for an ethics presses ever more ardently for fulfillment as the evident no less than the hidden perplexity of humans mounts up [steigert] to what is <finally something> immeasurable. Every care [Sorge] must be given to a commitment to ethics in a time when technological man [Mensch der Technik] served up as a creature of the masses [Massenwesen] can attain to any kind of reliable stability at all only by means of the <sort of> organization and regulation of his planning and practices that answer to technology [Technik].

Who can miss this crisis [Notlage]? Should we not protect and safeguard the existing constraints [Bindungen] even if they protect and secure the essence of Man [Menschenwesen] in only a makeshift way and merely for the time being? Indeed. But does this need ever release [entbindet] thinking from what it recalls [gedenkt] that remains for it to think about [das Zu-denkende] and <that> prior to all there is as *be[ing]* its guarantee [Gewähr] and truth [Wahrheit]. Further, can thinking from

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<sup>116</sup> "What I have been trying to do for a long time now is to clarify the relationship between ontology and a possible ethics."

here on out renounce thinking *be[ing]* [entschlagen, das Sein zu denken] even though this has remained hidden in oblivion [Vergessenheit] for such a long time, yet at the same time makes itself known at this very moment in the world by way of the disruption of all that is there [alles Seienden]?

Before we attempt to determine more exactly the connection [Beziehung] between "ontology" and "ethics," we must ask what "ontology" and "ethics" themselves are. It is necessary to consider whether what can be designated by the two terms [Titeln] is adequate or <even> close to what is asked of thinking | {354} which, as thinking, has to think the truth of *be[ing]* before all else.

Of course, should both "ontology" and "ethics" together with all thinking in terms of disciplines [Disziplinen]<sup>117</sup> become untenable and our thinking thereby become more disciplined [disciplinierter], then how do things stand with the question about the connection [Beziehung] between the two disciplines of philosophy known as "ontology" and "ethics"?

Together with "logic" and "physics [Physik]," "ethics" comes into fashion for the first time in Plato's school. These disciplines arise at a time when thinking is allowed to become "philosophy [Philosophie]," philosophy <then becoming> ἐπιστήμη (science

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<sup>117</sup> Heidegger chooses to use the latinized spelling of *Disziplin* and creates an adjective *disciplinierter* in a mood of disdain regarding the traditional disciplines or branches of philosophy (epistemology, ontology, aesthetics, metaphysics, ethics). The approaches of the branches of philosophy known as ontology and ethics impose constraints on thinking. He rejected this disciplinarian "philosophical" activity. He was fond of the image of philosophy and its "branches" Descartes drew writing to Abbé Picot. See the Introduction {365}.

[Wissenschaft]), and science itself <becoming> a subject [Sache] in school [Schule] and schoolwork [Schulbetriebes]. As science comes into being [entsteht] in the course of philosophy understood in this way thinking passes away [vergeht]. Up to that time thinkers knew nothing of "logic" or "ethics" or "physics." Nevertheless, their thinking was neither illogical [unlogisch] nor immoral [immoralisch]. But they thought φύσις with a profundity and breadth that all later "physics" has never again been able to attain. Sophocles' tragedies (if such a comparison is at all permissible) harbor [bergen] ἦθος in what they say more originally than Aristotle's lectures on "ethics." A saying of Heraclitus that consists of only three words says something so simply that from it the essence of ethos [Ethos] immediately comes to light [ans Licht kommt]. The saying [Spruch] of Heraclitus goes (Fragment 119): ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων. It is generally translated: "For man his uniqueness is his daemon."<sup>118</sup> This translation

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<sup>118</sup> Heidegger follows the Diels-Kranz numbering of the fragments. This initial "translation" is reflects what most translators suggest: "Seine Eigenart ist dem Menschen sein Dämon": "For the human being, his peculiarity or unique feature is his *daimon*." In the text that follows, Heidegger translates the fragment in a Greek way. Diels (1903) translates the fragment as follows: "Dem Menschen ist sein Sinn sein Gott": "To man his god is his sense [Sinn]" or "To man, his sense [Sinn] is his god." The most consulted English versions are G.W.T. Patrick (1889): "A man's character is his daemon"; John Burnet (1908): "Man's character is his fate"; Kathleen Freeman (1948): "Character for man is destiny"; G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven (1957): "Man's character is his daimon"; and Herman Kahn (1979): "Man's character is his divinity." William Harris (1994) proposes: "A man's character is his guardian divinity." Since we are in conversation with Beaufret, the French translation by Tannery (1887) is worth citing: "Le caractère pour l'homme est le daimone." Heidegger's choice of

thinks in an up-to-date [modern] way but not in a Greek way. <The word> ἦθος means abode [Aufenthalt],<sup>119</sup> place of dwelling [Ort des Wohnens].<sup>120</sup> The word names the sphere [Bezirk] in which man dwells [wohnt]. What is open [das Offene] about his abode lets appear what befits [zukommt] the essence of man and in so arriving lingers [sich aufhält] in intimacy [Nähe] with him. A human being's abode [Aufenthalt] takes in [enthält] and protects [bewahrt] the arrival [Ankunft] of that to which the human being in his essence belongs [gehört]. For Heraclitus, the word for this is δαίμων, god [Gott].<sup>121</sup> The saying says: humans insofar as they are humans

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*Eigenart* to translate ἦθος is not in keeping with Diels's own (*Sinn*). The ordinary idea of the fragment is that the human being's *daimon* is his peculiarity or unique feature and that this, the godlike in him that separates him from the rest of what is there is not so much his possession as what possesses him.

<sup>119</sup> Earlier Heidegger uses the word *Aufenthalt* in its sense as "journey" or "sojourn." Both senses—sojourn and abode—are perhaps captured in the English word 'stay' ("time on this earth"). Heidegger's first trip to Greece in 1962, in his mid-70s, is recounted in *Aufenthalte* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1989). See *Sojourns. The Journey to Greece* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005).

<sup>120</sup> That is, man's ἦθος refers to where he lives out his way of life (*Existenz*).

<sup>121</sup> The Greek word δαίμων derives from the Proto-Indo-European \**deh-i-* (to divide, cut). The allusion is to the division of *time* into day and night (by dawn, eventide or dusk) and the seasons (marked by certain climatic and environmental changes and changes in flora and fauna), but also what is separated by the tide (land and sea) and by the horizon (firmament and earth). The English word 'tide' captures the linguistic connection of such dividing horizons with 'time'. Among Heidegger's early (1917) publications was a short poem "Abendgang auf der



| {355} live [wohnt] in intimacy with <the> god [in der Nähe Gottes].<sup>122</sup> A story Aristotle tells (*De partibus animalium* I, 5 [645a 17ff.]) accords with this saying of Heraclitus. It goes: 'Ἡράκλειτος λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς ξένους εἰπεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους ἐνυχεῖν αὐτῷ, οἱ ἐπειδὴ προσιόντες εἶδον αὐτὸν θερόμενον πρὸς τῷ ἰπνῷ ἔστησαν, ἐκέλευε γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰσιέναι θαρροῦνας εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεοῦς . . .

"We are told about something Heraclitus said to visitors who wanted to see him. Approaching him, they saw him warming himself by an oven. They were caught unawares but mainly because he encouraged them and invited them to come in with these very words: 'You see, gods are present even here' . . ."<sup>123</sup>

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Reichenau [Eventide on Reichenau]" that prefigures the themes of his *magnum opus* ten years later. The god appears in that *Augenblick* (moment) of time dividing a summer day from its night. It gives the poet pause and silence. There is nothing evil ('demonic') about it; to the contrary, it has the sense of something protective. Segue to the story about Heraclitus recounted by Aristotle and Heidegger's seclusion in Todtnauberg during World War II.

<sup>122</sup> A more homely translation might run: "Humans, to the extent that they are human, live near the gods."

<sup>123</sup> "Von Heraklit erzählt man ein Wort, das er zu den Fremden gesagt habe, die zu ihm vorgelangen wollten. Herzukommend sahen sie ihn, wie er sich an einem Backofen wärmte. Sie blieben überrascht stehen und dies vor allem deshalb, weil er ihnen, den Zaudernden, auch noch Mut zusprach und sie hereinkommen hieß mit dem Worten: 'Auch hier nämlich wesen Götter an . . .'" The context of the story in Aristotle is worth recalling and an alternate translation is provided: "Every realm of nature is marvelous; and as *Heraclitus*, when the strangers who came to visit him found him [at home] warming himself at the oven in the kitchen and hesitated to go

To be sure, the story speaks for itself, yet a few things are to be stressed.

In their inquisitive pushiness regarding the thinker the group of foreign visitors are at first glance disappointed and at a loss about where he lives [seines Aufenthaltes]. They believe they will certainly come across the thinker in conditions that unlike humans' customary way of living everywhere bears the traits of what is exceptional and unusual and for that reason exciting [Aufregenden]. The group hopes that during their visit to the thinker's <"space"> they will find matters that will supply them at least for a certain amount of time with the wherewithal for entertaining chatter [Gerede]. The foreigners who want to visit the thinker perhaps anticipate seeing him at a moment in which he is thinking, lost in reverie [Tiefsinn]. The visitors want to "experience [erleben]" this, not perhaps to be affected by thinking but solely in order to be able to say that as a result <of their visit> they have seen and heard someone reputed to be a thinker.<sup>124</sup>

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*in, is reported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, since even in that kitchen divinities were present; so we should venture on the study of every kind of animal without distaste, for each and all will reveal to us something natural and something beautiful." On the Parts of Animals [trans., William Ogle, modified] (London: Paul Trench, 1882).*

<sup>124</sup> I am reminded of reading my first description of Heidegger in Stefan Schimanski's "Foreword" (pp. ix-x) to *Existence and Being*, edited by Werner Brock (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949). Eventually I was led to Schimanski's article "On Meeting a Philosopher," published in *Partisan Review* 15(4), 1948, pp. 506-511, from which only a few phrases were borrowed for the "Foreword." Unlike the article, the "Foreword" makes only one "political" reference: Heidegger's refusal to accept Hitler's invitation in 1935 to teach in Berli. As Brock writes in his "Acknowledgement"

Instead of this, the curious ones find Heraclitus next to an oven. That is a quite ordinary and unremarkable spot [Ort]. To be sure, bread is baked there. But

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to the book (p. 1), Schimanski, a British journalist for the *Manchester Guardian*, had been along with the Vision Press (London) and the Chicago publishing firm, the middle man between Heidegger and Brock, who was in London, and would be the editor of the first Heidegger published in book form in English. Brock had been Heidegger's assistant in Freiburg. Schimanski reports having visited Heidegger twice in Todtnauberg, in June 1946 and October 1947. On one occasion (evidently the second), Heidegger gave the reporter copies of the Lecture "Was ist Metaphysik?" (including the 1943 Epilogue), "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," "Heimkunft / An die Verwandten," and "Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung" for translation and publication. At the time, Heidegger was in desperate need of money and hoped the publication would bring him some dollars. The article in *Partisan Review* (with which Hannah Arendt was then affiliated and who is mentioned by Schimanski in his article) should be read by all Heidegger scholars. The contemporary background of the "Heidegger affair" as observed by Schimanski is made clear ("Foreword," p. x): ". . . in that small skiing hut, I spoke to the philosopher. . . . His living conditions were primitive." In October 1947, he had been there for six months, while his wife remained at their house in Freiburg. In June 1946, when Schimanski first went looking for Heidegger the door to his house in Zähringen was answered by a French soldier. Frau Heidegger was upstairs, *incommunicado*. But to the point of the recollection and a comparison with Heidegger's anecdote from Aristotle and Heraclitus: "In appearance, he has nothing of the philosopher" ("On Meeting a Philosopher," p. 506). The circumstances of the visits by "the public" were, of course, quite different for Heraclitus and Heidegger.

Heraclitus is not even busy baking in the oven. He has stopped there only to get warm. Moreover, in this ordinary | {356} place he betrays the utter meagerness [Dürftigkeit] of his life [Lebens]. The sight of a freezing thinker offers little of interest <to the visitors>. At such a disappointing sight even the curious lose their desire to move any closer. What are they to do here? The ordinary and uninspiring occurrence of someone freezing standing by an oven can be observed by anyone anytime back home. Why, then, should they seek out [aufsuchen] a thinker? The visitors are about to turn to leave. Heraclitus can see what is written all over the faces of the disappointed curiosity seekers. He knows that, for the group, the failure of an anticipated sensation [Sensation] to appear is already enough to force those who have just arrived to immediately turn around again and leave. Because of that he encourages them <to stay>. He explicitly invites them to come in with the words εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεοῦς, "Gods, you see, are present even here."<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Heidegger translates Heraclitus's words slightly differently now: "Götter wesen auch hier an." The use of the verb *wesen* (come about) with the preposition *an* (to) suggests the neologism *anwesen* (make present to) and the related adjective *anwesend* (present to), but also an image of gods coming to that place. Grimm glosses the verb *wesen* with "*existieren, da sein.*" The verbal form *wesen* is also part of the past participle of *sein*: *gewesen*. If the verb *anwesen* is used with its prefix separated from the root the passage can be rendered "arrive at" (or, as above, "come to") and as equivalent to "present (make an appearance) at." An alternate translation would yield: "Gods, you see, even come here." In Fragment 119 we find the singular 'god', with which Heidegger translates δαίμων. In Aristotle's story, we find the plural 'gods'. With the singular it is possible to think of δαίμων as the Christian (capital-G) God. In the fragment, however, we are in the presence of the

These words place [stellt] the abode [Aufenthalt] (ἦθος) of the thinker and his doings in a different light. Whether the visitors immediately understood these words (or ever understood them at all) and then saw everything in this different light the story does not say. But that these events were recounted and have come down to us today rests on the fact that what they report grows out of and characterizes the atmosphere [Atmosphäre] created by this thinker. καὶ ἐνταῦθα—"even here" in front of the oven, in this homely place where each thing and every circumstance, everything done and thought is trusted [vertraut] and familiar [geläufig], that is to say, good for the household [geheure], "even here, namely," in surroundings that are good for the household [des Geheueren], εἶναι [. . .] θεοῦς, is such <a place> "where <the> gods make <themselves> present <to> [anwesen]."

ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων, Heraclitus says himself: "The (familiar) abode for humans is an opening [Offene] for the arrival [Anwesenung] of the god (of the unfamiliar one [des Un-geheueren])."<sup>126</sup>

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Greek god(s) and not *der letzte Gott* of Christianity. The Greek δαίμων (Latin *genius*) was beyond good and evil dangerous in its power. In the fragment, man's "character" (the unity of his unique features) is referred to his δαίμων, unique to the individual (for example, Socrates and his δαίμων). By contrast, ἦθος has commonly been translated with 'character'. In the most familiar places—and the most unlikely since it is part of everyone's daily life and not set apart and sanctified like a chapel or shrine—Heraclitus is said to claim that the most unfamiliar appears. As fate (before the unconscious was invented and replaced it), the Greek god (the most other) shows up anywhere but most remarkably where everything is most familiar.

<sup>126</sup> "Der (geheure) Aufenthalt ist dem Menschen das Offene für die Anwesenung des Gottes (des Un-Geheuren)." Heidegger plays with the word *geheuer*, which can

If in conformity with the fundamental meaning [Grundbedeutung] of the word ἦθος the word [Wort] ethics [Ethik] should reflect the human being's abode, then thinking that thinks the truth of *be[ing]* as the human being's original element [Element] as something ek-sisting is already in itself an original ethics [die ursprüngliche Ethik]. But to begin with such thinking | {357} is not at all ethics because it is ontology. For ontology <is> precisely <what> always thinks <about> what is there [das Seiende] (ὄν [a being]) in its *be[ing]*. Yet as long as the truth of *be[ing]* is not thought, all ontology is without its foundation [Fundament]. For that reason, in *Be[ing] and Time* the thinking that attempts to think ahead [vorzudenken]<sup>127</sup> into [in] the truth of *be[ing]* designates itself [bezeichnete sich] fundamental ontology [Fundamentalontologie]. This <thinking> strives to get back into the essential ground [Wesensgrund]<sup>128</sup> in which thinking the truth of *be[ing]*

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mean “spooky” but also, as here, “familiar” or “homely.” The un-familiar (*Un-geheuer*) is, in German, also the tremendous and immense (*das Ungeheuer*). *Anwesen* is a neologism based on Heidegger's verb *anwesen* (make present to). In resonance with *Anwesen* as presence (*praesens*) it means “arrival at” and “coming to be at.” But like eventide or twilight it comes precisely to pass.

<sup>127</sup> It is tempting to translate this with ‘premeditate’, which would preserve Heidegger's sense of a kind of thinking that is *besinnlich* [meditative]. English knows the word ‘premeditate’ in this sense of anticipatory foresight. The Latin *meditare* (to consider) neatly derives from a Greek word denoting “to care for”: μελετάω.

<sup>128</sup> Heidegger is indicating the foundation or basis—the ground—of the essence of thinking that thinks the truth of *be[ing]*. See the Epilogue, which opens with the Descartes' image of philosophy as a tree with its roots (metaphysics) in the soil [Boden] or earth [Grund] that ultimately supports and sustains the entire structure.

originates. No doubt this approach with a different question removes such thinking from the "ontology" of metaphysics (even that of Kant). However, be it transcendental or precritical, "ontology" is subject to critique not because it thinks the *be[ing]* of what is there and thereby forces *be[ing]* <to be> a concept but rather because it does not think the truth of *be[ing]* *and* thus fails to recognize that there is a kind of thinking that is more rigorous than the conceptual [das begriffliche]. In the absence of any initial success, thinking that attempts to think ahead into the truth of *be[ing]* brings up only an insignificant part of that entirely different dimension [Dimension] <of *be[ing]*>. Yet this <language> falsifies itself, inasmuch as it does not yet manage to adhere to the essential [wesentliche] help provided by phenomenological looking [Sehen] and in so doing leave behind the inappropriate goals of "science" and "research." However, in order to make that attempt at thinking recognizable and at the same time intelligible for existing [bestehend] philosophy, it could be expressed at first only within the limits [Horizont] of what was then existing [das Bestehende] <in philosophy> and with the use of its familiar terminology [Titel].

I have since come to understand that this terminology must from the outset and inevitably lead to error. For the terminology and its related conceptual language did not come to be thought over once again [wieder-gedacht] by the reader in terms of the matter <that was> to be thought in the first place [aus der erst zudenkenden Sache], but rather this matter came to be represented in terms [Titeln] that clung to their accustomed meaning [Bedeutung]. Thinking that asks about the truth of *be[ing]* *and* on the strength of that thereby determines the essential abode [Wesensaufenthalt] of humans from and toward [her und auf] *be[ing]* is neither ethics nor ontology. Therefore the | {358} question about the connection [Beziehung] of the one to the other no longer has any grounds [Boden] in this realm [Bereich].

Nevertheless, thought more originally your question makes sense [Sinn] and has an essential importance.

For it must be asked: If in considering the truth of *be[ing]* thinking determines the essence of [humanity] as ek-sistence, in terms of its belongingness [Zugehörigkeit] to *be[ing]* is this thinking then nothing more than a theoretical conceptualizing [Vorstellen] of *be[ing]* and of humans, or with such knowledge [Erkenntnis] can we infer directives [Anweisungen] for everyday life and make them available [an die Hand geben] <to us>?

The answer is <that> this thinking is neither theoretical [theoretisch] nor practical [praktisch]. It comes to pass [ereignet sich] before this differentiation <has been made>. Insofar as it is thinking, this thinking is in remembrance [Andenken] of *be[ing]* and nothing besides [und nichts außerdem]. Belonging to *be[ing]* because <made> eminent [geworfen] by *be[ing]* in the observance [Wahrnis] of its truth and <being> absorbed by it, it thinks *be[ing]*. Such thinking has no outcome.<sup>129</sup> It has no effect [Wirkung]. It fulfills its essence in that it is.<sup>130</sup> But it is insofar as it utters [sagt] what matters to it [seine Sache].<sup>131</sup> Only one utterance [Sage] belongs to what

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<sup>129</sup> "Solches Denken hat kein Ergebnis."

Variant: "Such thinking comes to nothing."

<sup>130</sup> One cannot help thinking of the words of Angelus Silesius (1624-1677) quoted by Heidegger elsewhere: "Die Ros ist ohn warum; *sie blühet weil sie blühet*, Sie acht nicht ihrer selbst, fragt nicht, ob man sie siehet."

Variant: "It is enough that it is."

<sup>131</sup> "Aber es ist, indem es seine Sache sagt"—"But it is insofar as it gives utterance to [*be[ing]*]" (Richardson).

Variant: "But [thinking] is insofar as it says its thing."



matters for thinking [die Sache des Denkens],<sup>132</sup> <the> always historical <utterance that is> in accordance with its reality [Sachheit]. Its material relevance [sachhaltige Verbindlichkeit] is essentially greater than the validity of the sciences because it is freer. For it lets *be[ing]*—be.<sup>133</sup>

Thinking sets up housekeeping in [baut am Haus] *be[ing]* such that the articulation [Fuge] of *be[ing]* befits [verfügt] in an always fitting way [je geschickhaft]

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<sup>132</sup> In 1969, Heidegger published a small collection of essays entitled *Zur Sache des Denkens* (GA 14) from the years 1962-1964. According to Heidegger's "References" (GA 14, p. 103), the lead essay, "Zeit und Sein [On Time and Being]," was first published alone in 1968 with a French translation in a *Festschrift* for Beaufret called *L'endurance de la Pensée*, Paris: Plon. He refers to the third unpublished part of *Be[ing] and Time* (1927) that was announced at the end of the second "Introduction" to *Sein und Zeit*: "Zeit und Sein." The text of the essay was a lecture given January 31, 1962, in Freiburg. The phrase *Sache des Denkens* is a (if not *the*) *Leitmotiv* of Heidegger's thought. *Sache* means "matter," but also both "cause" and "object": the origin and impetus as well as the goal of thinking, that for the sake of which thinking takes place. Translated as "matter," the expression connotes "what matters for thinking." A similar play with the verb *heißen* allows one to translate *Was heißt Denken?* (Heidegger's acknowledged "favorite book" based on his last lecture course from 1951-52) *What Is Called Thinking?* and *What Calls for Thinking?* That would seem to be the *Sache* of thinking. Becker and Granel (1959) preferred *Qu'appelle-t-on Penser?* Also suggested are *Que Veut Dire Penser?* and *Qu'est-ce qui Nous Appelle a Penser?* According to Emmanuelle Giber, the former is said to have been the name of Heidegger's *conference*, chaired by Eugen Fink.

<sup>133</sup> "Denn sie läßt das Sein—sein."

the essence of humans for living [Wohnen] in the truth of *be[ing]*. This dwelling [Wohnen] is the essence of <what it is> "to-be-in-the-world" (cf. *Be[ing] and Time* [GA 2], p. 73). The comment there on "*be[ing]*-in [In-sein]" as "living [Wohnen]" is not just etymological fooling around. The comment in my lecture on Hölderlin's words "Voll Verdienst, doch dichterisch wohnet / der Mensch auf dieser Erde" is not the flourish of a kind of thinking that has fled from science into poetry [Poesie]. Talk about the home of *be[ing]* does not <come from> the transfer of an image of someone's "house [home]" to *be[ing]* but rather that from the essence of *be[ing]* suitably thought more than likely we will one day be able to think what <a> "home [Haus]" and "<to> live [wohnen]" mean.

| {359} All the same, thinking never creates a home [Haus] for *be[ing]*. Thinking accompanies historical eksistence [Eksistenz], that is, the *humanitas* [humanity] of *homo humanus* [civilized man] in the realm of the emergence of the wholesome [des Heilens].<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> *Heilen* is a noun formed from the verb *heilen*: "(to) heal, make whole, save." The words 'heal', 'whole', and 'holy' have a common source. Something propitious (good) is suggested but at the same time so is something overwhelming. One of the meanings of *Heil* is good. Therefore there is a sense of *das Heilen* as what is benefitting ("what is good for you"). Echoing in this discussion is what is beyond [jenseits] *Gut* and *Böse* ("what good or saving" and "what is bad or evil and harmful") in Nietzsche; namely, what these terms of valuation inherited from Christianity presume: *be[ing]*. The word *Böse* in the next sentence also suggests what is "unholy," as in "the little kid was an unholy terror." The *Böse* is disruptive; the *Heilen* unifies.

In the lumination of *be[ing]* what is base [Böse] appears precisely along with what is beneficial [Heilen]. Its essence does not consist in the mere badness [Schletigkeit] of human action, but rather in the demonic [Bösartigen] of what is forbidding [Grimmes]. Both what is salutary [das Heile] and what is sinister [das Grimmig] can, however, come about [wesen] in *be[ing]* only to the extent that *be[ing]* itself is what is in distress [das Strittige]. The provenance of the essence [Wesensherkunft] of the nihilating [Nichten] hides [verbirgt] in it [*be[ing]*]. What nihilates [nichtet] comes to light [lichtet sich] as the Not-like [das Nichthafte]. This is expressed by the "No [Nein]!". In no way does the "Not [das Nicht]" arise out of the "Saying 'No' [Nein-sagen]" of negation [Negation].<sup>135</sup> Every "No" that is not misinterpreted as a self-willed insisting on subjectivity's powers of putting <something> in <its> place [Setzungskraft] but rather remains something permissive of ek-sistence [sein-lassenden der Ek-sistenz] answers the claim [Anspruch] of the nihilating that has been brought to light. All "No [Nein]" is only the affirmation [Bejahung] of the Not [Nicht].<sup>136</sup> Every affirmation is founded on [beruht in] acknowledgement [Anerkennen]. This lets what it goes toward approach it.<sup>137</sup> People think that the nihilating is nowhere to be found in what is there. This is so as long as

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<sup>135</sup> In this passage the latinate word should be heard in terms of its basic meaning of a denial: from *negare*, to deny, to say "No!"—as in response a question such as "Did you yell at your sister?" From the root of the Latin word *aiere* (negate) we get the word 'adage' (perhaps a good translation for *Spruch*).

<sup>136</sup> "Variant: All saying "No!" Is only a saying "Yes!" [an "Aye!-ing"] to the Not ...."

<sup>137</sup> "Dieses läßt das, worauf es geht, auf sich zukommen"—"This is what makes it happen."

one looks for the nihilating in something that is there [etwas Seiendes], <that is,> as an existing condition of what is there [seiende Beschaffenheit am Seienden]. But one is not looking for the nihilating in looking in this way. For *be*[ing] is no existing condition that lets itself cling [festhalten] to what is there. *Be*[ing] is nevertheless more existent [seiender]<sup>28</sup> than what is there.<sup>138</sup> Therefore because the nihilating comes to pass [west] only in *be*[ing] we can never [nie] become aware [gewahren] of anything of what is there [etwas Seiendes] in the being [am Seienden].<sup>139</sup> In particular, the comment about this impossibility never substantiates <the claim about> the origin of the Not [Nicht] in saying "No" [Nein-Sagen]. Thus the proof only seems to support <the claim> if one formulates what is there as what is objective for subjectivity [das Objektive der Subjektivität]. One then concludes <in favor of> the alternative, <namely,> that because it never appears as something objective [etwas Objektive] every Not [Nicht] must <therefore> be the product of some act of the subject [eines Subjektaktes]. But whether saying "No" at first posits the Not as merely something thought [ein bloß Gedachtes] or whether the nihilating at first claims the "No" as what is to be <doing the> speaking [das zu Sagende] | {360} in the letting <come to> be of what is there [im Seinlassen von Seiendem], this can certainly never be decided in terms of a subjective reflection [subjektiven Reflexion] on thinking formulated as subjectivity. By no means has the dimension [Dimension] proper to the formulation of the question been arrived at as of yet in such reflection

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<sup>138</sup> "Gleichwohl ist das Sein seiender als jegliches Seiende."

<sup>139</sup> "Weil das Nichten im Sein selbst west, deshalb können wir es nie als etwas Seiendes am Seienden gewahren." The construction *am Seienden* is perhaps more closely approximated by "in the making" (emergent, incipient, promising). The point we can never observe this coming to pass since in a sense we are it.

[Reflexion]. Granted that thinking is part of ek-sistence, it still remains to ask whether all <saying> "Yes" or "No"<sup>29</sup> is not already eksistent [eksistent] in the truth of *be[ing]*. If that is how it is, then <saying> "Yes" or "No" is itself really in bondage to [hörig] to *be[ing]*. As so bound [Als Hörige] they can never first posit [setzen] that to which they themselves are hostage [gehören].<sup>140</sup>

Nihilating [Nichten] comes about [west] in *be[ing]* itself and in no sense in the existence of humans insofar as this is thought of as <the> subjectivity of the *ego cogito* [I think]. In no sense does existence nihilate [nichtet] in such a way that the human being as <a> subject carries out nihilation [Nichtung] in the sense of a refusal [Abweisung], but rather *being*-there [Da-sein] itself (as which the human being [Mensch] ek-sists [ek-sistiert] in <his> essence) belongs [gehört] to the essence of *be[ing]*. *Be[ing]* nihilates—as *be[ing]*. Therefore, in the absolute idealism of Hegel and Schelling, the Not [Nicht] appears in the essence of *be[ing]* as the negativity [Negativität] of negation [Negation]. But there it is thought <of> [gedacht] in the sense of absolute actuality [absoluten Wirklichkeit] as the unconditional will that wills itself, in fact, as the will that belongs to knowing and to love [Liebe]. *Be[ing]* as will to power still remains hidden in willing of this kind. But why the negativity [Negativität] of absolute subjectivity is "dialectical" and indeed why nihilating makes an appearance in [zum Vorschein kommt] dialectic but at the same time becomes veiled [verhüllt] in <its> essence cannot be discussed here.

The nihilating [Nichtende] in *be[ing]* is the essence [Wesen] of what I have termed the no-thing [Nichts]. For that reason, since it thinks *be[ing]* thinking thinks <the> no-thing.

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<sup>140</sup> The "bondage" and "belonging of" assertion and denial to alluded to here refer to their being possessed by or the possession of *be[ing]*.

*Be[ing]* first grants [gewährt] what is wholesome [Heilen] emergence into favor [Aufgang in Huld] and to what is sinister [Grimm] impetus [Andrang] toward the unwholesome [Unheil].

Only to the extent that ek-sisting [ek-sistierend] into the truth of *be[ing]* humans belong to this <granting of *be[ing]*> can the dispensation [Zuweisung] | {361} of those directives [Weisungen] that are bound to become law [Gesetz] and rule [Regel] for humans come from *be[ing]* itself. To dispense [zuweisen] in <classical> Greek is νέμειν. A νόμος is not merely a law [Gesetz], but <thought> in a more original way <a> dispensation [Zuweisung] secure [geborgene] in what is becoming of *be[ing]* [Schickung des Seins]. Only this makes it possible to implicate [verfügen] humans in *be[ing]*. Only such coincidence [Fügung] <in *be[ing]*> makes it possible <for them> to uphold and to obligate to <something>. Otherwise, all law is only what has been made by human reason [Vernunft]. More essential for humans than all establishing of rules [Regeln] is finding his abode [Aufenthalt] in the truth of *be[ing]*. This abode first grants an experience [Erfahrung] of what is lasting [Haltbaren]. The truth of *be[ing]* provides the support [Halt] for all <forms of> comportment [Verhalten]. In our language '*Halt* [support]' means '*Hut* [shelter]'. *Be[ing]* is the shelter that holds [behütet] humans in their ek-sistent essence [ek-sistenten Wesen] to [zu] its truth in such a way that it accommodates [behaust] ek-sistence [Ek-sistenz] in language [Sprache].<sup>141</sup> For that very reason language is both the home [Haus] of *be[ing]* and

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<sup>141</sup> The syntax is such that, in view of the preceding sentence, our being held to [behütet] something refers to the truth of *be[ing]* and not to *be[ing]* itself. In that case *be[ing]* is that "cover" or protective place that makes possible our being beholden to its truth and provides a place for the relation between *be[ing]* and humans to happen. This arrangement [Gestell] allows language to provide a habitat for ek-

the accommodation [Behausung] of the essence of humans.<sup>142</sup> <But> only because language is the accommodation of the essence of humans can historical humanity [geschichtlichen Menschentümer] and humans not be at home [zu Hause] in their language, so that it [language] becomes for them mere housing [Gehäuse].

But now how does <the> thinking of *be[ing]* stand in relation [Beziehung] to theoretical and practical <ways of> comportment [Verhalten]? It surpasses all consideration [Betrachten] because it is concerned with that in light of which any seeing [Sehen], as *theoria* [Theoria], can for the first time come and go. Thinking

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sistence. In carpentry (or cabinetmaking, joinery), a “housing” is the name for a space in one piece of wood (mortise) for another to be inserted: “tongue and groove”). In the world of machinery, however, it is a different matter as Heidegger makes clear in the very next sentence with his reference to the *Gehäuse* (the “housing” or casing that encloses an engine or other piece of machinery). In addition to the obvious reference in this passage to inns and stables, the word *Haus* is the generic term for a place to stay versus being homeless. The everyday example from woodworking is suggestive of a seamless arrangement where two elements fit together and are joined seemingly without a gap. No extraneous bond is required. They hold each other together and in place with screws or glue. In the next sentence, Heidegger repeats the often quoted {313} statement about language and *be[ing]*. The human being is a guest in *be[ing]*'s home: language.

<sup>142</sup> *Behausung* has the sense of both a habitat and an allowance. The English word ‘accommodation’ has the added advantage of alluding to a “fit” and what is “fitting” (appropriate). Various explorations of the verb *fügen* a bit earlier allude to this figure as well.

minds [achten auf] the lumination of *be[ing]* in that it puts what it says [sein Sagen]<sup>143</sup> about *be[ing]* into language as the accommodation of eksistence [Eksistenz]. Thus thinking is a kind of doing [ein Tun]. But <it is> a kind doing that outdoes [übertrifft] all *praxis* [doing] Thinking permeates action [Handlen] and production [Herstellen], not because of the greatness of what it achieveses and not because of the consequences of what it brings about, but rather because of the modest value of its inconsequential accomplishments.

For in what it says [in seinem Sagen] thinking only brings to language the unspoken [ungesprochene]<sup>144</sup> word <of> *be[ing]*.

Now the turn of phrase used here ("to bring to language [zur Sprahce bringen]") is to be taken entirely literally. *Be[ing]* approaches making itself clear to language.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> The Proto-Indo-Germanic root of the verb *sagen* which is nominalized here as *Sagen* is *\*sekw-* (<to> notice or see). Saying is more than turning thoughts into words or verbalizing. Hence the use of *achten auf* earlier in the sentence with its allusions to noticing and paying attention to (minding, as in "Mind the step!").

<sup>144</sup> The adjective *ungesprochen* (unspoken) can be nicely translated with the English word 'unsounded'. One can exploit the meaning of the verb '(to) sound' as both "to make a noise" and "to fathom" or "to plumb." We would then be talking about the unfathomed word (of) *be[ing]*.

<sup>145</sup> "Das Sein kommt, sich lichten, zur Sprache." The sentence is susceptible of a variety of translations. If one hears *kommt* and the *zu* in *zur Sprache* as parts of the verb *zukommen* (with the *zu* as a separable preposition), it reads: "*Be[ing]* . . . befits language" or "*Be[ing]* . . . becomes (makes a good appearance in) language." Perhaps even: "Becoming transparent, *be[ing]* turns into language." The critical modifying phrase *sich lichtend* is polysemic but the basic sense seems to be that



It is always on the way [unterwegs] to it [language]. For its part, this approaching [Ankommende] | {362} brings ek-sisting [ek-sistierende] thinking to language in its utterance [in seinem Sagen]. This [language in its saying] itself thus becomes uplifted [wird gehoben] in [the] lumination of *be[ing]*.<sup>146</sup> Thus, in that mysterious and yet for us authoritative manner [Weise] language for the first time *is [ist]*. To the extent that language that has been brought fully into its own essence in this way is historical, *be[ing]* is kept [verwahrt] in remembrance [Andenken]. Ek-sistence thoughtfully inhabits [bewohnt] the home [Haus] of *be[ing]*.<sup>147</sup> In all this it is as though nothing at all happens by way of thoughtful saying [denkende Sagen].

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*be[ing]* itself becomes less opaque and dense. Thus the most radical translation would be: “Becoming more transparent, *be[ing]* turns into language.” All of this is in the interest of making Heidegger’s language and, so, his thought more transparent, too. Thanks to language, the fog lifts around *be[ing]*. If one takes the verb *kommen* on its own, we have another possibility: “Becoming transparent, *be[ing]* seeks out language” or “Becoming transparent, *be[ing]* reaches (or attains to) language.” What is approaching [das Zukommende] (close) is distinguished from what is arriving [Ankommende] (already here).

<sup>146</sup> “Language itself is raised to the level of the lumination of *be[ing]*.” Heidegger is very close to pronouncing *be[ing]* and language (in its saying) as equivalent. Bearing in mind what was said earlier in the Letter that “lumination is none other than *be[ing]* itself” {332}, language now achieves the status of lumination. With this we arrive at the climax of Heidegger’s argument.

<sup>147</sup> “Die Ek-sistenz bewohnt denkend das Haus des Seins.”

Variant: “Ek-sistence is thoughtfully at home in *be[ing]*.” Most directly and perhaps best: “Thinking, ek-sistence is at home in *be[ing]*.”

However, an example of this inconspicuous activity [Tun] of thinking has just now shown itself to us. For to the extent that we expressly think the turn of phrase [Wendung] "bring to language" so becoming to language—<and> just <to> this and nothing else—as long as with a mind to saying [in der Acht des Sagens] we keep to this thought [Gedacht] as what continually is to be thought [das Zudenkendes] in the future, we have brought to language something of what is coming to pass [etwas Wesendes] of *be[ing]* itself.

What is remarkable about this thinking of *be[ing]* is what is simple [das Einfach] <in it>. <Yet> precisely this keeps us from it. For we expect thinking, which is known world-historically by the name "philosophy," to take the form of something uncommon [Ungewöhnlichen]<sup>148</sup> that is accessible only to the initiated. At the same time we conceive of thinking on the model of the scientific <way of> knowing and its research enterprises. We assess what we do [das Tun] regarding <how> impressive and successful <its> results <are in terms> of *praxis*. But the conduct [das Tun] of thinking is neither theoretical nor practical [praktisch], nor is it the coupling of the two means of comporting [Verhaltensweisen] <oneself>.

In its simple essence <the> thinking of *be[ing]* makes itself something unrecognizable to us. But if we come to be on intimate terms with what is unusual about the simple then we are stricken with another affliction. The suspicion [Verdacht] arises that this thinking succumbs [verfallen] to arbitrariness [Willkür],

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<sup>148</sup> The resonance of *wohnen* (inhabit, dwell) in this adjective alludes to earlier discussions of dwelling and the abode of *be[ing]*. There is nevertheless the sense that thinking has something of the uninhabitable or unlivable about it, which Heidegger is not denying.

since it cannot keep [halten . . . an] to what is there. From what does thinking takes its measure?<sup>149</sup> What is the law of its conduct [Tun]?

At this point the third of your questions should be attended to: *comment sauver l'élément d'aventure que comporte toute recherche sans faire de la philosophie und simple aventurière?*<sup>150</sup> Poetry [Dichtung] may be mentioned in passing at this point. It is faced with same | {363} question in the same way as thinking <is>. But Aristotle's still scarcely reflected on words in his poetics [Poetik] still hold good, that writing poetry [Dichten] is truer [wahrer] than the exploring [Erkunden] of what is there.

But thinking is not *une aventure* [aventure] of looking into and asking about what is unthought [Ungedachte]. As the thinking of *be[ing]* in its essence thinking is absorbed by this [in den Anspruch genommen]. Thinking is related to *be[ing]* as what is arriving [das Ankommende] (*l'avenant*). *Thinking*, as *thinking*, is committed [angebunden] to the arrival [Ankunft] of *be[ing]*, to *be[ing]* as what is to come [die Ankunft]. *Be[ing]* has already come down to [zugeschickt] thinking.<sup>151</sup> *Be[ing]* is as what has come down to <us of> thinking [das Geschick des Denkens]. But what has

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<sup>149</sup> "Woher nimmt das Denken sein Maß?" Variants: "What does thinking measure up to?" / "What is thinking up to?" / "Where does thinking come from?"

<sup>150</sup> "How can we save the element of risk that all research implies without turning philosophy into a mere adventure?"

<sup>151</sup> In the English idiom, *be[ing]* has already been seen to be a matter of thinking. In the next sentence, Heidegger reformulates this statement using the word *Geschick* (what has come down to us humans) with the additional sense of this as a venture of *be[ing]*, which works nicely with Beufret's term *aventure* in mind. *Be[ing]* (if it can be said to "be") "is" (as) the (ad)venture of thinking.

come down <to us> is in itself historical [geschichtlich]. Its history [Geschichte] has already come up in the utterance of the thinker [im Sagen der Denker zur Sprache gekommen].<sup>152</sup>

Remaining ever and anon to be brought up and in so abiding [Bleiben] waiting for humans, the arrival [Ankunft] of *be[ing]* is all that matters for thinking [die einzige Sache des Denkens]. That is why essential thinkers [wesentlicher Dender] always say the same thing [das Selbe]. However, that does not mean <they say what amounts to> the equivalent [das Gleiche].<sup>153</sup> Admittedly, they speak of this <same matter> only to one who ventures [einläßt] to reconsider [nachdenken] it. To the extent that thinking historically thinking pays attention to what has come down <to us> of *be[ing]*, it is already committed to what is appropriate [das Schickliche], to what is in accordance with what has come down to us [Geschick]. To take refuge in the same thing [das Gleiche] is harmless. To venture [wagen] into discord in order to be able to say the same [Selbe] is a danger [Gefahr]. Ambiguity threatens, and mere quarreling [Zwist].

Befittingness [Schicklichkeit] of what is said about *be[ing]* as what has come down <to us> of truth is the first law of thinking, not the rules of logic, which can become rules only on the basis of the law of *be[ing]*. Attending to [achten auf] what is ventured [das Schickliche] by thoughtful saying [denkenden Sagens] does not imply reflecting at every turn on *what* [was] it to be said about *be[ing]* and *how* [wie] it is to

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<sup>152</sup> Earlier on in the Letter {335}, Heidegger had written: “Its [*be[ing]*’s] history comes up [zur Sprache kommt] in the utterances of essential thinkers.”

<sup>153</sup> Here it is a matter of differentiating between tirelessly reverting to the same matter [das Selbe] and not saying what amounts to the same thing in different terms that are in some sense equivalent [das Gleiche].

be said. It is equally essential to be mindful of [bedenken] of *whether* [ob] what is to be thought [das zu Denkende] ought to be spoken, to what extent, at what moment in the history of *being*, in what sort of dialogue [Zwiesprache] with this <history>, and on the basis of what claims [Anspruch] it. That threefold [Dreifache] mentioned in an earlier letter is | {364} defined in its cohesiveness by the law of the befittingness of ontohistorical thinking: strictness of reflection [Strenge der Besinnung], careful attention to saying [Sorgfalt des Sagens], <and> economy of words [Sparsamkeit des Wortes].<sup>154</sup>

It is time to wean oneself of the habit of overestimating the value of philosophy and thereby asking too much of it. What is needed in this time of need [Weltnot] is less philosophy and more attentiveness to thinking, less literature [Literatur] and more care [Pflege] about what is written down [Buchstauben].

The thinking of the future is no longer philosophy, <but> not because it thinks more originally than metaphysics, which means the same thing <as philosophy>. <At the same time,> [h]owever, the thinking of the future can no longer, as Hegel desired, give up the name "love of wisdom [Liebe der Weisheit]" and come to be wisdom itself in the form of absolute knowledge [absolute Wissen]. To the impoverishment of its provisional essence [Wesen], thinking is in decline. Thinking gathers [sammelt] language in simple [einfach] saying.<sup>155</sup> Language is thus the

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<sup>154</sup> It is interesting to see what Heidegger preserved in this essay from his initial reply to Beaufret (given below) to which he refers here.

<sup>155</sup> The verb "(to) gather" nicely translates *sammeln* in suggesting collecting knowledge to deduce to a conclusion. It is the collecting that memory re-collects (collects again). An obsolete usage of the word 'collect' refers to the act of inferring.

language of *be[ing]* as clouds are the clouds of the sky.<sup>156</sup> In what it says thinking leaves inconspicuous traces [Furchen] in language. They are as inconspicuous as the tracks left by the farmer who walks slowly through his fields.

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Heidegger's image in the concluding sentences of the essay evokes a gathering cloud formation, perhaps a gathering storm. Language is said to take form in some such manner.

<sup>156</sup> "Die Sprache ist so die Sprache des Seins, wie die Wolken die wolken des Himmels sind." Language is "of" *be[ing]* in a subjective genitive and an objective genitive sense. It has its source *in be[ing]* and is *about be[ing]*. Perhaps both German and English are missing a preposition that would work nicely here for 'of' [der/des/der'].

**APPENDIX**

**Letter to Jean Beaufret (November 23, 1945)**

Freiburg, November 23, 1945<sup>157</sup>

Dear Mr. Beaufret,

Your friendly letter which Mr. [Jean-Michel] Palmer [sic] delivered several days ago has given me a great deal of pleasure.<sup>158</sup>

I have known your name for only a few weeks through your excellent essays on "Existentialism [Existentialismus/existentialisme]" in *Confluences*.<sup>159</sup> So far, unfortunately, I have only Nos. 2 and 5 [August 1941 and November 1941] of the journal. Even in your first essay (in No. 2), I see the elevated concept

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<sup>157</sup> Beaufret's letter was most certainly provoked by having heard Jean-Paul Sartre's lecture, "*L'existentialisme est un humanisme*," on October 29, 1943. Heidegger's "open letter" to Beaufret is then in part a response to the publication of Sartre's lecture the following year (Paris: Éditions Nagel, 1946.) This letter first appeared in *Lettre sur l'Humanisme* (Paris: Aubier, 1964), pp. 185, with a French translation. It does not appear in GA 9 with the essay. The essay itself was first published with "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit" in *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit mit einem Brief über den 'Humanismus'* (Bern: Francke, 1947).

<sup>158</sup> Jean-Michel Palmier (1944-1998). The letter was brought to Heidegger in Todnauberg by Palmier.

<sup>159</sup> On the journal *Confluences* (1941-47) in connection with this letter, see my article "The Influence of Heidegger on Sartre's Existential Psychoanalysis," in Peter Ashworth and Man Cheung Chung (eds.), *Phenomenology and Psychological Science. Historical and Philosophical Perspectives* (New York: Springer, 2006), pp. 123-145 (especially n. 18, pp., 139-140).



[Begriff/concept] of philosophy that you have. Here are hidden realms [verborgene Bereiche/domains cachés] that are going to come to light [ans Licht kommen/qui ne s'éclaireront que] only in the future. But that is going to happen only if rigor of thinking [Strenge des Denkens/rigueur de la pensée],<sup>160</sup> carefulness of saying [Sorgfalt des Sagens/l'attention vigilante du dire], and economy of words [Sparsamkeit des Wortes/l'économie des mots] take place on a greater scale than heretofore. You yourself see that an abyss yawns between Jaspers' thought and mine, to say nothing of the completely different question that animates [bewegt/anime] my thinking and that oddly enough people have not yet grasped. I treasure very highly Jaspers as a person and as a writer. His effect on college students is considerable, but the already nearly canonical grouping together of "Jaspers and Heidegger" is *the* misunderstanding *par excellence* that runs through [umläuft/circule] our philosophy. That is surpassed only by the notion that my philosophy is "nihilism [Nihilismus/nihilisme]." That is surpassed only by the notion that my philosophy is "nihilism"—my philosophy, which does not like all philosophy heretofore question only the *be*[-ing] of *be*-ing (*l'être de l'étant*) but rather the truth of *be*[-ing] (*la vérité de l'être*).

By contrast, the essence of nihilism consists in the fact that it is not able to think the *nihil* [nothing]. As far as I have been able to tell in the few weeks since I first became acquainted with it, I sense in the thinking of the younger French philosophers an extraordinary [ungeheuren/extraordinaire] *élan* that indicates [deutet/montre] a revolution is being prepared for in this domain [dass sich eine Revolution vorbereitet/qu'en ce domaine une révolution se prépare]. What you say

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<sup>160</sup> In the Letter {364}, Heidegger replaces *Denken* with *Besinnung*.

about the translation of 'Dasein [Dasein/Da-sein]<sup>161</sup> as '*réalité humaine*' is to the point. Excellent <, too, is your> remark: "*mais si l'allemand a ses ressources, le français a ses limites* [if German has its capabilities, French has its limits]"—here is hidden an essential clue [Hinweis/indication] about the possibilities of mutually learning from one other in productive thinking [produktiven Denken/pensée productive].

'Da-sein [Da-sein/Da-sein]' is a key [Schlüsselwort/clé]<sup>162</sup> to my thinking and thereby also the occasion for great misunderstanding. To me, 'Da-sein' means not so much '*me voilà*' [here I am], but rather, if I may say this in a perhaps impossible French: *être le-là* [be[ing] the-there].<sup>163</sup> And *le-là* is just [ist gleich] 'Ἀλήθεια: emergence [Unverborgenheit]—openness [Offenheit].<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> On this occasion only (according to the typescript), *Dasein* is not hyphenated.

<sup>162</sup> A *Schlüsselwort* can also mean a "code word." Munier chooses *clé* (key, also *clef*).

<sup>163</sup> The French word *là* is a prefix and a suffix and thus requires something more (usually hyphenated) with it as in the modifiers *là-bas* (over there) and *là-même* (right there) or the pronomial *celui-là* (the one over there) and nominal *le-là* (the there). The translation Heidegger suggests accounts for both *be[ing]*, which is implied, and its grammatical object, which is what he proposes. *Dasein* is usually presented in French dictionary translations (that is, literally) as *être-là* but in translations of Heidegger's texts (that is, "philosophically") as *être-le-là* or *étant-le-Là*. See Philippe Arjakovsky *et al.*, *Le Dictionnaire Martin Heidegger. Vocabulaire Polyphonique de sa Pensée* (Paris: Cerf, 2013). Without the article *das*, *Da-sein* translates as 'the there' (no hyphenation is needed as in the formation of words with

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the suffix *là*). Heidegger implies that there could be a French word *lelà* (= *Dasein*, not hyphenated). (For fun, a Google search revealed for *lelà* the Maltese word meaning the color “lilac” or “mauve.”) Heidegger’s contrast (*me voilà*) is revealing, suggesting that “here I am” is a possible way of thinking about *Dasein*: to be the indicating or pointing to someone (in this case, the referent of the bearer of the first-person, objective case pronoun). *Dasein* is not “so much [nicht so sehr/ne pas tellement]” (but somewhat) about introducing someone at somewhat of a remove as it is about being some such a someone addressed from and at a distance. The following sentence focuses on the *da* (*le-là*).

<sup>164</sup> Variant: “The ‘le-là’ is nothing other than Ἀλήθεια: emergence—openness.”

I prefer “emergence” to “unhiddenness,” which is pretentious and not English. Emergence refers to the coming to light of what was “there” but not “seen” (understood, as in “I see what you mean”). The word ‘openness’ is not a synonym for ‘emergence’ but glosses the latter, highlighting the resulting transparency. Heidegger’s German is readily but not easily translatable into English. It requires thought and immersion in the translating language. *Unverborgenheit* translates Ἀλήθεια. Words such as ‘unconcealment’ are barbaric and unnecessary since the absence of having escaped notice is of the essence in Heidegger’s discussions of the Greek word and of *der Wesen der Wahrheit* (the essence of truth). In looking at the antonym for Ἀλήθεια one may come across this fascinating comment on ψευδής: “In many Classical Greek cities, being good at lying and deception was considered a virtue and a heroic quality; in the *Odyssey* for example.”

But this is only a superficial [äusserlich] clue. Fruitful thinking has need not only of writing and reading but <also> of the συνουσία [being together/intercourse] of conversation [Gespräch] and of learning-teaching [lernend-lehrenden] work . . .

**ENDNOTES TO**  
**“WHAT IS ‘HUMANISM’?” (1947)**

[1](#) Heidegger's marginal notes in his copies of the various editions of the lecture are included in GA 9 (1976), which has been my source. They will be cited with edition number preceded by \*. Page numbers in GA 9 [= W] are given throughout in braces preceded by | .

\*First edition (1949): "What is said here was not first of all notes that were worked out at the time but belongs to the way of a path that was begun in 1936 as a 'moment' in the attempt to speak of the truth of *be[ing]* in a simple way.—The letter still speaks the language of metaphysics, and, I admit, knowingly. The other language remains in the background." (W 313, n. a)

[2](#)\*First edition (1949): "*Be[ing]* as eventuality [Ereignis]; eventuality: voice [Sage]; thinking: renouncing [Entsagen] the voice of the eventuality [Ereignisses]." (W 315, n. a)

*Sage* might as well be translated "telling," where its sense is of something revelatory, as in "a telling comment" or "a telling observation."

[3](#)\*First Edition (1949): "even here 'thinking' <is> formulated as thinking of the truth of *be[ing]*." (W 315, n. b)

Here is an example of Heidegger's practice of representing *Sein* in a way that is similar to the way I have presented it (*be[ing]*), namely, to indicate the recognizable word marker while emphasizing that its standard indication should be stricken from our experience. He began the practice in print in *Zur Seinsfrage* (1955),

translated by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde for a bilingual edition as *The Question of Being* (1958) New York: Twayne.

[4](#)\*First Edition (1949): "Only a hint of the language of metaphysics <remains>. For since 1936, 'eventuality [Ereignis]' has been the leading word of my thinking." (W 316, n. a)

The word led Heidegger along many paths of exploration. The sense of the word in general is of something "phenomenal" in the popular sense: a miraculous event that is a turning point in the life of those who experience what the event bears. There is also a sense of festivity associated with such events. An eventuality has the sense of what is fated to be, what Heidegger will later indicate in terms of *das Geschick*, i.e. what has come down [to us] as the tradition. *Geschick* also has the sense of a venture (in this case, of *be[ing]*). Yet there is also the clear sense that the event happens unpredictably. Perhaps Heidegger has in mind by *Ereignis* what is more basic than either the predictable (what science pursues) and what comes as totally surprising (the miracle). The usage is closest to the English word 'event' in the phrase "in the event that . . . ." The root of the word *Ereignis* is the reflexive verb (*sich*) *ereignen*, which means "to come to pass."

[5](#)\*First edition (1949): "Owing to their manner of speaking [Sageweise], '*be[ing]*' and '*be[ing]* itself' at once attain *the detachment of the absolute*. But as long as the eventuality [Ereignis] is held back [zurückgehalten wird], this manner of speaking is also inevitable." (W 321, n. a)

[6](#)\**Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*, First edition (1947): "But what is 'forgotten' [diese 'Vergessen'] is eventually [ereignishaft] to be thought out from 'Ἀλήθεια [truth]." (W 322, n. a)

The meaning of *Ereignis* (the eventuality of *be[ing]*) in Heidegger's thinking should be kept in mind when reading *ereignishaft*. The basic sense of the English word 'eventually' (sure to come) captures Heidegger's meaning in this note and provides a hint about the meaning of *Ereignis*; namely, that it is bound of come of its own. *Das Ereignis* is what is bound to happen, what must come to pass, what will come about or come to be. The verb *wesen* handles the sense of this "coming about" from the perspective of what comes to pass. This "it" can only refer to *das Sein*.

7 That is, ek-sistence takes place out yonder, be-yond, ahead of itself, i.e., in the future, precisely where the truth of *be[ing]* is indicated. The key element of the term *Her-aus-stehen* is the *aus*, which can also have the sense of "in terms of," as in Heidegger's reference in the following note to the letter's companion piece when it was first published suggests.

\**Plato's Teaching of the Truth*, First edition (1947): "Hinaus': hin in das Aus des Auseinander des Unterschieds (das Da), nicht 'hinaus' aus einem Innen."—"Out yonder': yonder in what is, in terms of what is outside the difference (<i.e., outside of> the <There and> Then [Da]), not <in terms of the going> forth of something that is within." (W 326, n. a)

8\*First edition (1949): "<this is> inexact, better <would be>: <an> ecstatic instance [ekstatisches Innestehen] in the lumination <of *be[ing]*>." (W 327, n. a)

9First edition (1949): "in the what [Was] and how [How] of what is worth thinking about [des Denkwürdigen] and of thinking." (W 328, n. a).

*Das Denkwürdig* is also "what is memorable or notable."

10\*First edition (1949): "letting emerge [Sichzeigenlassen]." (W 328, n. b) The verb *sagen* might also be translated with "rendering" or "giving back."

[11](#)First edition (1949): "that is, the question about *be[ing]* [der Seinsfrage]." (W 328, n. c)

Heidegger's question remains the same, although he turns (back) to time for a further working out of the question.

[12](#)First edition (1949): "oblivion [or forgottenness] [Vergessenheit]—forgetting [Λήθη]—forgetting (as hiding) [Verbergung]—revocation [Entzug]—dispossession (dépassement) [Enteignis]: eventuality [Ereignis]." (W 328, n. d)

A similar marginal note (on *Verborgenheit*) appears in the Fifth edition of Heidegger's copy of the (GA 9, 370, n. a). It is notable that *erfahren* also means "to discover," so that Heidegger is also saying something about the fundamental experience of the oblivion of *be[ing]*, namely, that it amounts to a discovery of that oblivion.

[13](#)First edition (1949): "This differentiation [Unterscheidung], however, is not identical with the ontological difference. Inherent in this [the ontological difference], every differentiation belongs on the "side [Seite]" of *be[ing]*." (W 328, n. e)

[14](#)\*First edition (1949): "Dignity that is proper [eigene] to, that is, appropriate to [zu-geeignete], appropriated by [er-eignete] them [humans]. Suitability [Eignung] and eventuality [Ereignis]" (W 330, n. a)

There is also a sense here of a dignity that has been dedicated to [zueignete] humans, that has been afforded to humans alone. The word *Ereignis* was a lifelong focus of meditation by Heidegger. Here and above, some of its senses are emerging in the text. It is a word that only gradually revealed its meaning to him. Heidegger glosses many passages in the *Randbemerkungen* of the GA with the word *Ereignis*. Otto Pöggeler suggests that the terms *Eignung* and *Ereignis* correspond to `δύναμις' and `ἐνέργεια' in Aristotle's philosophy. See "Destruction and Moment," translated by



David Magurshak, in Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (eds.), *Reading Heidegger from the Start. Essays in His Earliest Thought* (1994) Albany: SUNY Press, p. 151, and Heidegger's essay "Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις. Aristoteles *Physik* B,1," from a course given during the first trimester 1940 at the University of Freiburg, reprinted in GA 9, pp. 239-301, translated by Thomas Sheehan in *Man and World* (Dordrecht) 9, 1976, pp. 219-270.

[15](#)\*First edition (1949): "Ge-schick: Versammlung der Epochen des brauchenden Anwesenlassens." (W 331, n. a)—"Ad-vent [from *advenio*: "to come to"]: <the> convening [from *convenio*: "to come together"] of the epochs of what is needed to let <be[ing]> come to presence."

The noun *Gebrauch*, which can be construed as what has been provided to meet such a need, means linguistic "usage." Earlier in the text, Heidegger had used the word *das Geschicklich* ("what is becoming to," in the sense of what suits or fits humans). (This sense carries over into the nonphilosophical term *Schick*: *chic*, stylish.) Heidegger also has in mind the standard meaning of *Geschick* as "fate," as well as the related term *Schicksal* (destiny). Finally, the venture of *be[ing]* is always toward something (existence) and therefore in a sense always an ad-venture.

[16](#)First edition (1949): "Weite: aber nicht die des Umgreifens, sondern der ereignenden Ortschaft; als die Weite der Lichtung." (W 331, n. b)—"Expanse: not that of the encompassing [i.e., what the horizon contains], however, but the place [i.e., the temporal "point of"] of what is coming to pass, as the expanse of the lumination <of *be[ing]*>."

[17](#)\**Plato's Teaching of the Truth*, First edition (1947): "Verhältnis aus Verhaltenheit (Vor-enthalt) der Verweigerung (des Entzugs)." (W 332, n. a.)—"The

relationship in terms of <the> holding back (with-holding) of the refusal (of the withdrawal)."

This note has a great deal to offer towards grasping what Heidegger understands about silence. He attributes silence to the nature of the circumstances surrounding the relation between ek-sistence and *be[ing]*. The withdrawal of *be[ing]* accounts for humans' holding back from speaking it. The nature of these circumstances is a kind of tense relation [Bezug], with humans holding back (being reticent) in response to the pulling back of *be[ing]*. I visualize something like a dead heat tug of war. The character of any *Verhältnis* (relationship) is that it sustains a certain proportion between the two sides or parties to the relation. The courtroom suggests itself. It is as if language were on trial, with *be[ing]* as the prosecutor and the nature of humans (ek-sistence) as the defendant.

[18](#)\*First edition (1949): "aus dem Eignen des Er-eignens zu denken." (W 332, n. b)—"<Authenticity means> to think <in terms of> what is becoming <at the heart> of what is coming to pass."

The sense of "what is becoming" in this gloss is again "what fits" or "what suits," as when one says that a certain article of clothing is very "becoming" to the person wearing it. Heidegger is playing on the root *eignen* in *er-eignen* (hence the hyphenation), thereby pointing out that what is fitting or suitable (becoming) is to be found in the event coming about or coming to pass. In other words, the coming to pass as a relation includes within it something becoming. As a gloss on the term *Eigentlichkeit*, Heidegger's marginal note suggests that at the heart of what has the character of "what comes to pass" is "the 'ekstatic' relation of the nature of humans and the truth of *be[ing]*." That relation is what is befitting or fits (is becoming to) humans. In other words, at the heart of humans' authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) is the "fit" between humans and the truth of *be[ing]*.

[19](#)\*First edition (1949): "im Sinne der Nahnis: lichtend bereithalten, halten als hüten." (W 333, n. a)—"in the sense of what approximates: to keep at the ready in bringing to light, to keep, as in to keep <a secret>."

The word *das Nahnis* is a neologism, formed by adding the suffix ' *-nis*' to the verbal stem '*nah-*' of the verb *nahen* ("to approach or get close to"). It means "what gets close to something else." Heidegger is describing something that seductively intimates, gets close to, or approximates, but never quite gets to. The verb *nahen*, "to approach," has two opposite senses: "going away toward" (as in "The train is approaching the end of its line.") and "coming in this direction" (as in "The train is approaching the station."). The attraction between *be[ing]* and humans is like that between neighbors who live very close to each other and who are drawn to each other, while still wanting to keep their distance.

[20](#)\**Plato's Teaching on the Truth*, First edition (1947): "Space <is here understood> neither in addition to [*neben*] time, nor reduced [*aufgelöst*] to time, nor inferred (or deduced) [*deduziert*] from time."

Heidegger has in mind the fundamental meanings of the Latin term *deducere* (to bring down or lead away from in time) as though the "deduction" were a "come down" from the temporal to the spatial. We recall that the original meaning of a dimension in geometry is "what metes or measures out something": μέτρον. It is what guarantees an appreciation of the fact that there is a time and place for everything, which is the goal of *παιδεία*. Here Heidegger suggests that *be[ing]* has the character of the dimensional, understood in this sense of meting out *inter alia* time and geometric space.

[21](#)"Die Heimat dieses geschichtlichen Wohnens ist die Nähe zum Sein." (W 338)

Variant: The home of this historical living is <temporal> nearness to *be[ing]*.

\**Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*, First edition (1947): "Als diese Nähe verwahrt und birgt sich das Sein selbst." (W 338, n. a)—"As this intimacy *be[ing]* itself safeguards and takes refuge."

*Be[ing]* and this intimacy are one and the same. Heidegger's discussion of the "existenzial-hermeneutische 'Als' [existential-hermeneutic 'As']" in *Be[ing] and Time* is helpful here. See especially GA 2, pp. 210-211. Here Heidegger identifies *Auslegung* [explanation] and ἐμνηαία.

[22](#)\*First edition (1949): "The danger meanwhile has more clearly come to light [ans Licht gekommen]. The relapse of thinking into metaphysics takes on a new form. It is the end of philosophy in the sense of the complete disintegration [Auflösung] in the sciences, whose unity at the same time blossoms anew in cybernetics. The power of science does not let itself be trapped in an invasion and attack <that have been> somehow or another contrived, because 'science' belongs in the set-up [Ge-stell] that further displaces [verstellt] the eventuality [Ereignis]." (W 341, n. a)

The word *Rückfall* may also mean "relapse," as in the recurrence of a chronic illness or reversion, in this case a returning to metaphysical thinking. The term *Gestell* plays an important role in Heidegger's discussions of technology. The root of the word (*stellen*) means "(to) place." The hyphenation discloses the root word and indicates the *fait accompli* of what has taken place. The *Ge-stell* is fixed and limits what will fit within its scheme <of things as given> [*Entwurf*], just as arrangements that have been made for an event of some kind accommodate only certain people and things within their scope, allowing and disallowing selected elements. At work in the *Ge-stell* is a strict code of admissibility and inadmissibility of evidence, for

example, as laid down in rules of courtroom procedure in the practice of law or in experimental science. Like Aristotle, Heidegger borrows philosophical terminology from jurisprudence—but also from soccer.

[23](#)\*First edition (1949): "relapse [Rückfall] into metaphysics." (W 341, n. b)

[24](#)\**Platons Teaching of the Truth*, First edition (1947): "What is <thought> now [jetzt], now in the days of willfulness in willing [Willen zum Willens]? Now <there> is unconditional neglect [Verwahrlosung], the word thought [gedacht] strictly ontohistorically, <i.e.,> with nothing of the true about it [wahr-los]; the opposite <of which is> what is becoming [geschicklich]." (W 341, n. c)

In this sentence Heidegger is at his most elliptical in his manner of expressing himself. His text calls for generous *Interpretation*, which requires adding words when needed. *Interpretation* in translation is not taking liberties or exercising poetic license, but rather intervening in order to make explicit what was implicit or hidden. Heidegger had to do this with Parmenides' Greek and translators of Heidegger's texts must do this with his German at certain. In the note, Heidegger brings more clarity to the connection between truth and what is becoming [geschicklich] or befitting to humans. What is becoming to something what is true to its nature.

[25](#)\*First edition (1949): "Industrial society [die Industriegesellschaft] <considered> as the definitive subject, and thinking as 'politics'." (W 341, n. d)

[26](#)\*First edition (1949): "better <said>, in be[ing] qua eventuality [Ereignis]."

Now obsolete in everyday German, the word *Gegenwurf* was the translation of both *objectum* and *subiectum* (ὑποκείμενον) among the early German philosophical mystics. As Heidegger well knew (although he does not say so here), as the *Gegenwurf* of be[ing] (i.e., in counterpoise with be[ing]) the human being is neither subject nor object.

[27](#)\*First edition (1949): "Illumination as illumination of what is concealing, which is its own self-obscuring containing [sichverbergenden Bergens]." (W 352, n. a)

The concealing Heidegger has in mind prevents one from keeping *be[ing]* in mind. This is how *be[ing]* is and remains concealed. Moreover, the concealing is self-obscuring, so that one is oblivious to the concealing, that is, to the failure to keep *be[ing]* in mind. In the psychological realm (which, of course, Heidegger does not have in mind here) there is something analogous to this in repression, which is forgetting something (perhaps actively but nonetheless unconsciously pulling it out of consciousness) and then forgetting that one has forgotten anything. Repression always refers to content of one kind or another but here the *sichverbergenden Bergens* is "of" *be[ing]* itself. More important, perhaps, is the fundamental sense of *bergen* as "to harbor" ("provide shelter for"). The verb also can mean "to contain" ("keep control over" or "hold back"), "hold in reserve," "restrain."

[28](#)That is, "*be[ing]* has more of an effect than what is there of whatever sort." It is more "real" to humans than what is there of any kind. It *is* in an active sense more than what is there of any sort.

\*First edition (1949): "insofern Sein Seiendes "sein" läßt." (W 359, n. a)—  
"insofar as *be[ing]* lets 'be' what there of any sort."

[29](#)\*First edition (1949): "Bejahen und Verneinen, Anerkennen und Verwerfen schon gebraucht in das Geheiß des Ereignisses—vom Geheiß des Unterschieds gerufen in das Entsagen." (W 360, n. a)—"Aye'-ing and 'Nay'-ing, acknowledging and dismissing already used at the behest of the eventuality—at the behest of the difference summoned by the renouncing."



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